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Abstract 
 
Western use of military violence is becoming increasingly centralised, partly through the use of 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (or more commonly referred to as “drones” in the literature). Drone 
technology allows control and command of military operations to be put under one roof, and as 
military organisations traditionally have a close dependence on technological developments, 
procedures and regulations for centralised command and control have developed in close concert 
with advances in drone technology. Apart from technological innovations, there are other aspects 
that contribute to the growing centralisation of military violence. The increasing military sensitivi-
ty about public and media criticism regarding casualties and ‘collateral damage’ underlines the 
need for Western military organisations to take central control of military missions and the use of 
violence.   
 
What are the characteristics and consequences of this centralisation and how does it affect mili-
tary practitioners’ relation to violence? The literature on military violence has slowly become 
aware that something has happened in Western military organisations’ relations to the use of force 
and has made some attempts to answer these questions. The tentative (short) answer is that mili-
tary violence is becoming increasingly bureaucratised in the wake of this centralisation, and its 
human consequences are lost in bureaucratic routines and procedures. But so far the research on 
the bureaucratisation of violence has been delimited to investigations of either the theoretical 
procedures themselves (e.g. analysis of military doctrines), or field studies of drone operators or 
airmen’s work of ‘dropping bombs’. A major gap in the literature exists as the main organisation-
al function for retaining control and command over violence – the operational level and the staff 
work performed there – is largely left aside in the research. Of particular interest here is how the 
work at operational levels of military organisations contributes to a bureaucratic institutionalisa-
tion of violence.  
 
This thesis aims to fill some of this gap through ethnographic investigations of operational mili-
tary work and the training of ‘targeteers’ – staff officers working with the operational governance 
of military violence. In addition, the thesis also sets the current bureaucratisation of violence in a 
modern historical perspective, where the nation of Sweden stands as an example of how political 
incentives for military reformations form the foundation of a bureaucratisation of violence. The 
results of these investigations illustrate how bureaucratisation of violence leaves death and vio-
lence aside, and offers detailed insights into how the procedures, routines and the language of 
bureaucracy form the main points of reference for military practitioners’ view of their work. In 
addition, the analysis shows how military masculinity is reshaped from traditional warrior ideals 
to encompass norms of ‘the rational bureaucrat’. What is salient in these results is that they open 
up an otherwise closed off part of military practice and facilitates for public debates about military 
violence. Particularly regarding the central findings that some military practitioners do not regard 
violence as an outcome of their work, and that the bureaucratic operational work operates to 
reduce and even remove the (enemy) Other as a (human) point of reference in contemporary 
military work.   
  
Sammanfattning på svenska 
 
Centralisering är en genomgående trend i västvärldens organisering och användning av militärt 
våld. Delvis för att den teknologiska utvecklingen, särskilt gällande sådana insatser som sker med 
obemannade flygande farkoster, möjliggör en centraliserad styrning av våldsanvändningen. Cent-
ralisering av ledning sker alltså delvis för att militära organisationer traditionellt sett har en nära 
relation mellan teknologisk utveckling och doktrinär utveckling av ledningsmetoder. Men vid 
sidan om teknologiska drivkrafter för den ökande centraliseringen finner vi socialt relaterade 
orsaker. Särskilt den ökade känsligheten för kritik gällande förluster av militär personal och civila 
skapar ett behov för västvärldens militära organisationer att i allt högre utsträckning ta central 
kontroll över militära operationer och dess våldsanvändning. 
 
Men hur karakteriseras den här centraliseringen, vilka är dess konsekvenser och hur påverkar 
centraliseringen den militära personalens relation till våld? De här frågorna tar sig lite olika ut-
tryck i litteraturen om militärt våld, men gemensamt är att intresset för dem ökar i den akademiska 
diskursen. I dagsläget kan forskningen kring de här frågorna kort sammanfattas i att militärt våld i 
allt ökande utsträckning blir byråkratiserat som en följd av den här pågående centraliseringen, och 
de humanitära konsekvenserna av militärt våld går därmed förlorade till följd av de byråkratiska 
rutiner och processer som omgärdar dagens militära våldsanvändning. Forskningen kring byråkra-
tiseringen av våld har dock hittills begränsats till antingen studier av militära doktriner eller ut-
gjorts av fältstudier av operatörer och personal i fältlika förhållanden. Detta innebär att den cen-
trala militära organisationsformen för att skapa förutsättningar för, och utöva ledning över militär 
våldsanvändning – den operativa nivån och det stabsarbete som utförs där – inte är representerad i 
forskningen. Institutionaliseringen av byråkratiseringen av våld genom det arbete som den opera-
tiva nivån utför utgör därför ett särskilt viktigt område att belysa. 
 
Den här avhandlingen syftar till att belysa hur operativt stabsarbete samt övning av s.k. ’targete-
ers’- stabsofficerare som arbetar med planering och genomförande av operativt våldsanvändning - 
fungerar som en del av byråkratiseringen av våld. Genom etnografiska undersökningar av dessa 
praktiker, samt genom att sätta den rådande byråkratiseringen av våld i ett modernt historiskt 
perspektiv (där Sverige utgör ett exempel), bidrar den här avhandlingen till att fylla delar av den 
brist som utlämnandet av operativa praktiker utgjort i den tidigare forskningen. Resultatet av 
undersökningarna visar hur, genom vilket typ av språk/narrativ och vilka sociala relationer, byrå-
kratiseringen av våld formas och hålls på plats i den militära praktiken. Utöver detta visa även 
avhandlingens undersökningar hur militär maskulinitet omformas av byråkratiseringen av våld, 
från traditionella ’krigar-ideal’ till att istället omfatta ett normativt ramverk där den ’rationelle 
byråkraten’ utgör norm. Framträdande i avhandlingens resultat är att den operativa praktik som 
tidigare varit avskärmad från allmän insyn blir belyst och analyserad, vilket möjliggör för fortsatt 
fördjupad debatt och forskning kring konsekvenserna av byråkratiseringen av militärt våld. Sär-
skilt gällande de resultat som indikerar att militär (och civil) personal på den operativa nivån inte 
ser våld som en effekt av deras arbete, samt att resultaten visar att den Andre (fienden) förmins-
kas, och till och med utraderas som en (mänsklig) referenspunkt i det operativa arbetet.    
 Contents 
 
  
Chapter 1: Introduction ..................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Operational Military Work ..................................................................................... 4 
1.2 The Research Context of Operational Work and Bureaucratised Labour ................... 6 
1.3 Material and Disposition ........................................................................................ 8 
Chapter 2: Previous Research and Theory ........................................................ 13 
2.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 13 
2.2 Researching Military Understandings of Violence: a question of analysing gendered 
and technologised language. ............................................................................................ 17 
2.3 Researching Military Understandings of Violence: a question of studying the 
materiality of war ............................................................................................................ 19 
2.4 Researching Military Understandings of Violence: a question of reification and 
misrecognition of the enemy ............................................................................................ 22 
2.5 Researching Military Understandings of Violence: a question of analysing Military 
Masculinities ................................................................................................................... 24 
2.6 Discourse theory – analysing language and materialities ........................................ 27 
2.7 Bureaucratisation ................................................................................................. 31 
2.8 Summary of Previous Research and Theory: Supporting research questions ........... 33 
Chapter 3: Ethnographic Method ..................................................................... 37 
3.1 Ethnography ........................................................................................................ 38 
3.2 Poststructural Critique of Ethnography ................................................................. 39 
3.3 Autoethnography ................................................................................................. 42 
3.4 Autoethnography and military practice ................................................................. 45 
3.5 Summary: My use of Auto/Ethnography and discourse theory ............................... 47 
3.6 Ethics: Challenges and Practical Solutions ............................................................ 53 
Chapter 4: Historical Narratives of Bureaucratisation ....................................... 57 
4.1 Details on the method and selection of ‘data’ ........................................................ 58 
4.2 Political Reformations of the early 20th Century – How Bureaucracy is Instilled in 
the Modern Swedish Military ........................................................................................... 60 
4.3 A Narrative of Death and Violence: The Battle of Loos, September 1915............... 64 
4.4 Analysing Narratives: Swedish Military Discourse of Violence, 1914 - 1939 ......... 66 
Part 2 of Chapter 4 - Analysing Swedish Discourses of military violence, 1939 – 1964 ...... 78 
4.5 Political Reformations of the mid 20th Century – How Bureaucracy is Instilled in the 
Modern Swedish Military ................................................................................................ 78 
4.6 A Narrative of Death and Violence: The Continuation War ................................... 82 
4.7 Analysing Narratives: Swedish Military Discourse of Violence, 1939 - 1964 ......... 85 
4.8 Conclusions ......................................................................................................... 91 
Chapter 5: Operational Staff Work .................................................................. 95 
5.1 Context of the operational staff ............................................................................. 95 
5.2 The Social Rules of Consensus: Maintaining Social Bonds and Control ............... 105 
5.3 The Social rules of Order and Bureaucracy ......................................................... 116 
5.4 Masculinity and Production: Links between Production and the Construction of 
Masculinities ................................................................................................................. 126 
5.5 The Social Rules of Operational Work: A Summary ............................................ 141 
Chapter 6: the Targeteer ................................................................................ 145 
6.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 145 
6.2 The Combined Joint Staff Exercise (CJSE) – a Wider Context ............................. 148 
6.3 The Context of Targeting.................................................................................... 152 
6.4 The Social Rules and Norms of Targeting ........................................................... 168 
The Social Rules of Legitimation ................................................................................... 168 
Social Rules and Norms of the Targeting Practice: The Corporate Discourse ................... 179 
6.5 Conclusions – The Construction of a ‘Target’ (and bureaucratised violence) ........ 190 
Chapter 7: Conclusions and Contributions ..................................................... 195 
7.1 Central Conclusions from the Empirical Investigations ........................................ 196 
7.2 Ethical Implications of Bureaucratisation – Hegemony of Bureaucratised labour and 
Problems of Silence and Responsibility .......................................................................... 205 
7.3 Reflections and Suggestions for Further Research ............................................... 210 
References and documents ............................................................................ 221 
 Figures and table 
 
Appendix 1. Narratives of bureaucracy, 1900-1965, ‘Data’ ....................................... 215 
Appendix 2. Observation scheme for the auto/ethnographical investigations ............. 219 

  
Acknowledgements 
 
Military violence is a particularly unpleasant and to some extent boring topic for most 
people. And for Swedes, having not been at war for 200 years as the popular saying 
goes, talk about military matters is mostly a question of older men sharing anecdotes 
from their time as a conscript. Anecdotes that few, apart from older men, find more than 
mildly interesting (and that is a generous estimation). One must bear the unpleasantness 
of the topic in mind when reflecting on the support of others in a project that actually 
goes ‘all-in’ in the question of how the inescapable presence of death and violence are 
managed in military practice. In addition, being an ethnographer can be truly trouble-
some when it comes to social situations where friends and relatives ask the standard 
question of “how are things going with your thesis?”. I have spotted the fear of long 
tedious answers glinting in their eyes, and noticed how the social temperature in the 
room drops to low levels in horrific anticipation when the question has been articulated. 
So my solution has been to minimise their dread and offer answers based on where I am 
in the process (a functional answer, rather than a philosophical/scientific one) and to 
some extent lie and just say “the research proceeds according to plan”. Many of my 
relatives and friends reside on the outside of academic circles and prefer to talk about 
subjects which relate to kids, food and wine, sports, cars/motorcycles, events in the local 
community, films, books and music. In short, those things that matter for most people 
and are central for living a life in a community. In light of this, the support from my 
supervisors, Professor Marie Demker and Associate Professor Dan Öberg, has been of 
utmost importance and value. Marie, with her long experience in academia and ‘down to 
earth’ personality, has offered me a steady hand in guiding me through the long process 
of completing this project. Dan, with his expertise in critical military studies and initiat-
ed knowledge of war studies and gender research, has complemented the supervision of 
my project in an important way. A dynamic duo to be sure! 
 
Unfortunately for my colleagues at the University of Gothenburg and the Swedish De-
fence University in Stockholm, I have had a general intention of presenting my drafts at 
seminars as often as possible. For their generous support on such occasions I would like 
to thank (by no particular rank, but in a type of unnecessary order) Adrian Hyde-Price, 
Jan Ångström, Lisbeth Aggestam, Lisa Justesen, Fredrik Dybfest Hjortén, Robert Frisk, 
Henrik Friberg-Fernros, Jerker Widén, Ann-Marie Ekengren, Karl Sörenson, Maria 
Eriksson Baaz, and Stefan Borg. In addition, I would like to thank Håkan Edström and 
Carl Dahlström for their support as directors of studies for PHD-studies at the Swedish 
Defence University and at the University of Gothenburg respectively. The language 
section at the Swedish Defence University must be mentioned too, and in particular 
Mara Kreslina whose persistent help with my English has been of the utmost im-
portance. Furthermore, I would like to thank Ann Towns and Helena Olofsdotter 
Stensöta for their initiated reading of my (nearly) completed thesis. Ann and Helena 
provided me with that last amount of very important feedback that was much needed for 
me to be able to finalise the project.  
 
So, how is it to arrive in an unfamiliar city and be introduced to the unknown working 
culture of academia, whilst facing the fact that you somewhere along the way have left 
your position and (quite promising) twenty-year career in the military, to follow some 
undefined notion of ‘wanting to do research’? Horrifying of course. But something that 
softened the blow was, apart from a general friendliness amongst the staff at the Univer-
sity of Gothenburg, the group of PHD-candidates that I found myself belonging to. In a 
short period of time, I came to realise that Kety, Petrus, Marina and Karin were smart 
and stylish people, holding standards that I still strive to achieve. I wish all of you the 
best of luck and general sunniness in work and life! 
 
Finally, a word about the Swedish Armed Forces and my colleagues working there. It 
may be surprising for someone on the ‘outside’ of the Swedish military that an officer 
writes a critical study of military violence – perhaps there is a general idea that military 
personnel should stay in line and not voice critical opinions? Conversely, I have written 
such a study and not once during my field studies have any of my military colleagues 
voiced any critique about my choice of subject (but naturally, other types of critical 
questions have been voiced). This is important to highlight as it reflects a strength in the 
Swedish military culture. It is from my point of view a strength to allow critical voices 
to be heard, but it is also not something to take for granted. I therefore hope that the 
Swedish military continue to cultivate a military professionalism which allows research 
based critique be a natural part of what it means to be a military officer. 
 
//Visby, 2018     
 
   
 
 
 
 1 
1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Remarkably, military and civilian leaders have even been successful in convincing people that the 
military rarely engages in killing. (Lutz 2014, 187) 
 
 
This thesis’ main research subject, bureaucratised military violence, was initially 
chosen to provoke a change in my own thinking about military practice. Setting 
aside the fact that I wanted to challenge myself to engage with the question of what 
role military violence plays in military practice, the following chapter outlines the 
academic relevance of studying this topic. But before going into the details which 
set this thesis in an academic setting, I would like to share an autoethnographical 
text that I wrote during the time of my fieldwork at the Swedish Armed Forces 
Headquarters. My intention with this story is to offer some initial insight into how 
the violent aspects of the military practice tend to disappear, only to appear as dis-
ruptions to the otherwise distant ‘reality’ of war.   
 
“The Officer, the Child and the Tank” 
Eight years ago, I brought my then 3-year old daughter to the garrison where I worked. It is a unit where 
the Armed Forces educate many different types of specialists and officers within technical maintenance. 
At this point, I had been stationed there for two years, mainly as head of army officer training. For some 
reason that now escapes me, I took my daughter with me on this day in early autumn. Probably something 
with the kindergarten being closed. Anyhow, after having spent a couple of hours in my office (my white-
board was by then covered with her drawings), I decided that it was time for some air (and lunch). I took 
her by the hand and we walked off towards the mess hall. Me in my camouflage and she in her jumpsuit. I 
remember her hair feeling like silk under my fingers as I tousled it. It was quite a walk but she managed 
in good spirits. At this age, she was extraordinarily close to laughter and positive to going places. After 
having lunch (and both of us getting many encouraging comments from colleagues), I asked her if she 
wanted to see some of the things that my colleagues work with. My plan was to take her with me to the 
area where the practical education was done on tanks, armed combat vehicles and the like. Perhaps she 
wanted to climb into a tank? She had never seen any of this stuff so she nodded and started going in her 
usual good mood. 
  
After a while I lifted her up and carried her, sitting on my arm. As we approached the training area, we 
made a turn and one of the tanks came into view. It was still approximately 100 meters away, but she 
instantly started to cry. I asked her what was wrong, and I was quite baffled since she had been in such 
good spirits just a second ago. She cried and hugged me, clinging with her arms around my neck. I 
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stopped walking and tried to reason with her. It was obvious to me that she thought that the tanks looked 
scary. I asked her, very gently I might add, if she wanted to go on. But no. She pointed at the tanks and 
expressed her view: they are dangerous and we should not go anywhere near them!  
  
I found myself half-heartedly trying to convince her otherwise, but she would not budge. And I couldn’t 
blame her because she was actually right. So we headed back to my office. I remember being a bit con-
fused: I had expected her to be awed and curious about our stuff, not afraid. 
  
Later that night I told my wife what had happened. I was stunned by the fact that our daughter could see 
the potential danger of the tank, without ever having seen one before.  
 
The event stays in my mind. It is 8 years since it happened. And now it comes back to me as I one morn-
ing, on arrival to the Operational staff, see a colleague with a pram. He has his baby boy with him who 
lies in the pram as his father changes into his uniform. At first I do not take any notice about this but 
smile at the boy, trying to get his attention. But as I wander off and start to think about the position of 
parenthood, as an identity that coexists with the military Self, the memory described above comes back to 
me. I find that the physical presence of children in the daily military practice works against a silencing of 
violence. Children can enforce a reflection upon the potential violence that otherwise lies hidden in the 
practice. The tank takes different forms in our minds. So does an operational plan for an international 
mission. We create the reason for existence for these material aspects of our practice, their place in our 
work and the purpose of them while we coexist with them on a daily basis. This process of meaning-
making carves away some otherwise quite obvious traits: the tank, and the operational plan, 'solve' our 
problems by the use of violence. And this destructive force is not necessarily precise and efficient, as a 
bureaucratised understanding of violence otherwise suggests. 
  
Somehow the messiness of violence is brought up to the surface when children enter the military context. 
Child soldiers, the death of children in armed conflicts, the strong emotional attachment that most par-
ents feel towards them, all of these things create cracks in established military understanding of violence. 
At least for me being a parent myself, and thus having the privilege of combining this position of identity 
with the subjectivities of an officer.  
 
Problem and Main Focus of the Research 
There are many ways of interpreting the story about the officer, the child and the 
tank, but here it is meant to illustrate how daily military practice tends to sediment 
and naturalise certain ways of understanding military violence. The narrative points 
to how the activities and language of military practice have the power to reduce the 
impact and meaning of violence, to a mere ‘product’ that can be viewed and used 
‘rationally’. In other words, the story is not here to put emphasis on the child and her 
ability to see the tank for what it ‘is’. Instead, the narrative’s main purpose is to 
elucidate the process of ‘revelation’ and reflection that takes place in the mind of the 
officer. A process of unearthing the fact that the violence of ‘his’ practice is periph-
eral and to some extent, even has disappeared from ‘his’ understanding of the mili-
tary practice. Consequently, this thesis’ main problem, how the inescapable pres-
ence of violence and death are managed, neutralised or silenced in military prac-
  3 
tice, can be discerned in the story by how the narrative illustrates the elusiveness of 
violence in the mundane day-to-day routines of military work.  
 
Put differently, the idea driving this investigation is that military discourse has the 
power to affect our understanding of violence and makes us only comprehend cer-
tain specific parts of military use of force. Therefore, it is the linguistically and so-
cially constructed concept of violence, in this thesis regarded as a military practice 
of preparing for, and using force, which lies at the heart of the investigation. There 
are many different avenues to how violence as a social phenomenon can be ap-
proached, such as political or structural violence, but here I engage with the organ-
ised violence that the state institution (the military) facilitates through its practices.1  
 
Previous research (which I discus at length in Chapter 2) on the question of how 
military organisations relate to the fact that their practice has a potential for violence 
and destruction has in many cases been focused on aspects of close combat. In this 
research, the debate often closes in on soldiers’/officers’ justification for killing, and 
the dehumanising effects of such justifications (Bar and Ben-Ari 2005; e.g. Bourke 
1999; Kooistra and Mahoney 2016). Others have been more inclined in their re-
search to explain how violence and death in the military are managed, neutralised or 
silenced by analysing politically initiated reformations of Western military organisa-
tions. Here the reformation of Western military organisations into operators of ‘cri-
sis management’ and participants in ‘new wars’ is on the one hand debated to have 
had the effect of mitigating and reducing the use of military violence (Farrell 2005; 
Reed, Ryall, and Dannatt 2007; Thomas 2001; Vennesson et al. 2009). What this 
research implies is that Western military organisations are not as violent as they used 
to be, and that these reformations reduce the need for military personnel to relate to 
the violent aspects of their practice. On the other hand, critics of this interpretation 
of the effects of using military force as a type of ‘crisis management’ argue that 
military personnel handle their relation to death and violence through practice-
related language that sweeps away the ‘unpleasantness’ of violence, and leaves a 
discursive focus on technicalities and procedures to represent the act of using mili-
tary violence (Coker 2001; Delori 2014; Duncanson 2011; Christophe Wasinski 
2017). Of particular interest in this latter body of research is the fact that the context 
                                                             
1 Violence – there are many ways to approach the concept of violence. Common in the literature on war is a tendency to 
lean on the Clausewitzian understanding, where violence has an inherent physical meaning of forcing an opponent to 
comply with your will (Clausewitz 1991, 29–31; Jordan et al. 2016, 2–3). Violence is in this body of literature often left 
aside, or treated as a self-evident (physical) aspect of war, and the research instead focuses on the concept and ‘nature’ of 
war (Van Creveld 1991; e.g. Gat 2001; Smith 2005).  In contrast, poststructural writings on violence “[…] includes such 
phenomenologically elusive categories as psychological, symbolic, structural, epistemic, hermeneutical, and aesthetic 
violence.” (Hanssen 2000, 9). Here, discourse, and in particular the power to delimit and shape human subjectivities, 
comes to the fore in research on what violence is and how it takes different shapes in our society (e.g. Agamben 1998; 
Shapiro 2012). In this thesis I approach military violence as a concept that is discursively situated (by military dis-
course/practice) as having a physical meaning. Which means that I do not approach violence as having an essential core, 
or nature, but as constructed by language and social relations to take a shape as having a specific meaning. In other 
words, I adhere to the statement “[T]he social and cultural dimensions of violence are what gives violence its power and 
meaning.” (Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 2004, 1). I do not proclaim that there is a ‘truth’ to military understanding of 
violence. Instead I investigate what the military practice creates in terms of a homogenised understanding of violence.  
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of these investigations of technicalities and procedures do not directly engage in 
operational military work. I will throughout the thesis come back to why operational 
military work is of specific interest when adding to the already existing body of 
research that critically engage in the question of how military organisations relate to 
the potential death and violence of their practice, but as this thesis’ investigations 
rest on an ambition to fill this gap in the litterature, some short words on this over-
looked part of military practice should be presented early on.      
  
1.1  Operational Military Work 
 
The research that emphasises the importance of analysing military use of language, 
and military subjects’ relation to the materiality of their practice, has identified some 
key conclusions about how language and objects are used in the military to manage 
the violence and death of the practice.  In simple terms, these conclusions identify a 
removal or reification of the Other (the person on the receiving end of violence) 
from the practice-related language (Cohn 1987; Delori 2014; Holmqvist 2013b; e.g. 
McDonald 2013). In addition, the research identifies a tension in the military man-
agement of violence between what the military subject actively does to make vio-
lence come into existence, and what the materiality of the practice (technological 
objects (such as drones), routines, ‘kill-list’ and procedures of staff work and target-
ing-practices) makes possible ‘on its own’ (e.g. D. Gregory 2011a; Niva 2013; 
Schwarz 2016). Both of these areas of conclusions (related to language and to mate-
riality) have in recent studies been used to point at an increasing bureaucratisation 
of violence in the military practice, where violence is reshaped into what Peter Asaro 
(2013: 215) calls “bureaucratized labor” (Bonditti and Olsson 2016; see also: K. 
Grayson 2012; Kyle Grayson 2016; I. Shaw and Akhter 2014; Öberg 2016).  
 
It is important to point out that bureaucratisation of Western military organisations 
has been studied since the days of Max Weber, but then in relation to how bureau-
cracy relates to military professionalism and how military-civil relations have been 
changed through processes of bureaucratisation (Böene 1990; Janowitz 1974; Ritzer 
1975; Toronto 2017). Indeed, the military organisation has in this body of literature 
been designated as “the ideal-type rational bureaucracy” and has as such been stud-
ied from an organisational, leadership and management perspective (Gwyn 1990, 
118). But what contemporary critical IR-research is pointing at when investigating 
bureaucratisation of military use of force, is that military violence must receive the 
same attention that historically has been given to issues of military leadership, civ-
il/social control over the military and organisational aspects of bureaucratisation.         
 
However, the research that points to this increasing bureaucratisation of violence has 
not, as of yet, engaged with the language and materiality of operational military 
work on a deeper level of inquiry. IR-research has produced some excellent studies 
that comprise analyses of operational doctrine/procedures (Nordin and Öberg 2015), 
or use of weapons (drones) in control of the operational military level (Holmqvist 
2013a; Schwarz 2016), or for that matter, the use of operational ‘kill-lists’ in target-
  5 
ing practices (J. Weber 2016). But from an ‘empirical’ perspective, insight in how 
bureaucratised labour operates so as to create military understandings of violence in 
the daily and sometimes mundane workings of operational staff work is limited. 
From my point of view, this limited insight includes knowledge about which, and 
how, social rules and norms, such as certain types of masculinities, plays a part in 
creating accepted and normalised military relations to the deaths and violence made 
possible by military bureaucratised practices. This is to some extent not surprising as 
‘real’ operational work is often clouded in secrecy and is very hard for researcher to 
gain access to. But the military operational level, with its meetings, procedures and 
social relations, must be considered if we as IR-researchers are to gain further in-
sight into how bureaucratised military violence operates and takes shape as a main 
point of reference in military ways of managing death and violence. This is partly 
due to the fact that the operational practice is central for realising military missions 
and creating/organising the fundamental needs for the use of military force (Vego 
2008). In addition, the operational practice is also pivotal in the process that estab-
lishes legitimacy for using military violence on specific targets, a process which 
constructs who and what is to be deemed a ‘viable’ target (NATO 2016). But also 
because arguably, contemporary operational military work is a context where bu-
reaucracy thrives and even sets the boundaries for what the operational practice is. 
The operational military level is in other words a place made up by bureaucratised 
labour, and should as such be thoroughly investigated if we are to learn more about 
how the bureaucratisation of military violence operates.  
 
In summary, to focus on operational military work means that this thesis’ main prob-
lem, how the inescapable presence of violence and death are managed, neutralised 
or silenced in military practice, can be investigated through the following support-
ing questions: 
- what are the main subjects or points of reference in operational military 
discourse? In particular, how does military staff practice shape understand-
ing of violence and death?  
- how are military subjects’ relation to violence shaped through the trans-
formative language and materiality of NATO targeting lists and practical 
procedures? 
- how does reification and misrecognition of the Other exist and operate in 
the bureaucratised labour of operational staff practice and in the practice of 
targeting? 
- how does the bureaucratisation of violence relate to military masculinities? 
In particular, what values and norms come in forefront in the construction 
of military masculinity in the context of bureaucratised labour at an opera-
tional staff? 
These questions are more to the point motivated by my discussions of previous re-
search and discourse theory in the next chapter, and are presented here to clarify the 
‘empirical’ focus of this thesis – military staff work in support of operations and 
military work with targeting procedures. But the question still remains: whose op-
erational military work is it that I speak of? In the next section I will discuss the 
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national context of my research and what it brings to the table when investigating 
bureaucratised understandings of violence. After this discussion, the concluding 
section of this introductory chapter outlines the disposition of the thesis, including a 
discussion on the material used in my investigation.  
 
1.2  The Research Context of Operational Work and Bu-
reaucratised Labour   
 
The operational work that I aim to study in this thesis is located in Sweden and per-
formed mainly by Swedish officers and civil servants. My intent with this approach 
is that answers to the supporting questions posed above can be gained through my 
level of access to, and knowledge of, Swedish operational staff work. But also by 
studying an annual international exercise held in Sweden where officers and civil 
servant (both Swedish and belong to several other Western countries) train in in the 
procedures of NATO operational targeting. But apart for my somewhat unique posi-
tion in being able to gain access to ‘real’ operational work, and to engage in military 
training from an insider perspective, Swedish operational work also offers some key 
features which arguably positions this context of research as a ‘place’ where bureau-
cratised military violence can be closely investigated.   
 
First of all, as I point out in the next chapter, it is not Sweden in itself that forms my 
main interest in researching bureaucratised violence. But the nation’s long tradition 
of regulating and creating procedures for its governmental control over the manage-
ment of violence, particularly through the conscript system, has had the effect of 
infusing bureaucratic norms and discourse into Swedish operational military prac-
tice. Influenced by the political visions of the People’s Home (Folkhemmet), the 
Swedish conscript system reformed during the 20th century to not only be a way of 
filling the military ranks, but to educate and ‘mature’ the male part of the Swedish 
population (Agius 2006; Sundevall 2017). The political focus on creating a ‘people’s 
army’, and as such making use of the people’s collective defence force (folkets sam-
lade värnkraft), created a relatively large mass (between 600 000 – 700 000) of 
soldiers for foremost the Army to administer during the major part of the 20th centu-
ry (Agrell 2011, 45; Sturfelt 2014; see also: Åselius 2005). In short, a central out-
come of political visions/ideas for how the Swedish military was organised during 
the 20th century was that the main purpose of political policies concerning military 
reformations comprised issues of organisation, training, armament and mobilisation 
(Agrell 2011, 45). This political focus on systematising and rationalising the Swe-
dish military was not exclusive for the military organisation, as the ideas of the Peo-
ple’s Home and the construction of the Swedish Welfare State brought about a major 
expansion of the Swedish state and an increase in employment of bureaucrats of 
various types. This is an expansion and bureaucratisation that stands out as more 
voluminous and politically salient in comparison to other Western states, at least 
during the latter part of the 20th century (Premfors et al. 2009, 60–61). What this 
means is that the military in Sweden has been formed into an organisation where 
bureaucratised military practices flourish and that the construction of Swedish mili-
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tary ways of managing its violent practices has an interlinked relation to how other 
governmental institutions have historically developed during the 20th century.   
 
In a more contemporary perspective, in the last 15-20 years Sweden has striven to 
reform its Armed Forces so as to achieve a high level of interoperability with 
NATO, partly as an active member of Partnership for Peace (PfP), but also through 
technical and doctrinal adjustments, and by placing Swedish officers in NATO staffs 
on a regular basis (Agrell 2011, 118, 153; Andrén 2002, 137–39, 158–61). In con-
trast to the large volume of soldiers and the relatively ‘low-tech’ level of military 
materiel characterising the Swedish military during the better part of the 20th century 
(with exception of the Swedish Air Force, which has historically held a comparative-
ly high technological level (see: Wennerholm 2006)), these reformations have dras-
tically reduced numbers and stocks in the Swedish military. In relation to increasing 
interoperability and gaining the right level of freedom of action for engaging in 
international operations on a larger scale, the Swedish military (through political 
decisions) has put the conscript system on ice, professionalised their soldiers, re-
placed old materiel with modern systems, and reformed the officer ranks to include 
non-commissioned officers (Agrell 2011).  
 
From a practitioner’s point of view, these reformations have had the effect of creat-
ing a high level of professionalism in operational work by Swedish staff officers. 
During discussions with officers and other representatives from other countries in 
my work as Military Adviser at the Swedish Armed Forces Headquarter, I often 
encountered a general view in the international military community that Swedish 
staff officers are regarded as ‘top notch’. Such comments were often linked to the 
Swedish officers’ high level of proficiency in the English language, and their thor-
ough education and training in NATO procedures for planning and conducting mili-
tary operations. The Swedish contemporary context of bureaucratised violence is as 
such characterised by being strongly influenced by NATO discourse. In relation to 
this, it may be useful to point out that Sweden has had an ‘active’ foreign policy 
during the latter half of the 20th century (Andrén 2002, 151). Since the 1950s and up 
to the time of writing Sweden has engaged its military forces in military operations 
in places like Congo, Lebanon, Liberia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Afghani-
stan, to mention a few. Despite what may be indicated by recognising Sweden as a 
non-aligned country in peace, and neutral in times of war, the more recent of these 
operations has been conducted under NATO-leadership. This close cooperation with 
NATO is explained by a more recent reformation of Swedish foreign policy which 
identifies NATO as an important actor for creating peace and stability, and in addi-
tion, uses UN-mandates as a guarantee for NATO missions being legitimate for 
Swedish participation (Agrell 2011, 153; Bergman-Rosamond 2011, 62).      
 
On a final note, Swedish operational practice is to a large degree populated by most-
ly male officers who started their military service in a masculinised conscription 
system (a conscript system which, at the time of writing, is being reformed and part-
ly reinstated again) (Kronsell and Svedberg 2001). But it is also a context where 
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policy changes, such as gender equality in military service, must be effectuated 
(Egnell, Hojem, and Berts 2014). Sweden is known for its ‘progressive’ reformation 
work when it comes to issues of equality and gender (Borchorst and Siim 2008; 
Olah and Gahler 2014; Towns 2002; however, the nation's actual progressivism in 
these issues is a question of debate, see: Towns, Karlsson, and Eyre 2014).2 This 
means that Swedish operational work is a practice where ‘traditional’ military mas-
culine norms meet with formalised work with gender reforms that may endanger and 
set established notions of military identity in motion. From my perspective, the 
Swedish context of operational work, seen as a meeting place between traditions of 
old and modern reforms, can offer further insights into how bureaucratised violence 
relates to masculine ideals and gender reformation processes.     
 
In conclusion, the Swedish context of military operational work offers both a re-
search environment coloured by a long institutional tradition of ‘functioning’ gov-
ernmental bureaucracy, and a context influenced by a contemporary influx of NATO 
procedures and doctrines. And in addition, the Swedish context also provides a re-
search environment where far-reaching liberal societal discourses of equality and 
gender mainstreaming are in tension with masculine traditional ideals. Added to this, 
the fact that I have the opportunity to access a rarely studied practice, situated in this 
Swedish context, must be exploited as it may provide further insight into how death 
and violence is managed, neutralised or silenced in military practice.         
   
1.3  Material and Disposition 
 
In this concluding section of this introductory chapter, I discuss ‘material’ in the 
meaning of why I have chosen to focus my investigation on specific parts and as-
pects of military operational work. Thereafter I summarise the chapter by providing 
a disposition of the thesis, aiming to offer some guidance in how the main problem 
and its subsequent research questions will be unravelled and answered.  
 
Material and Time 
As described below, in the disposition of the thesis it is the ethnographical part of 
my investigation that has contemporary operational work in focus. But my investiga-
tions of bureaucratised military violence also include a historical part.  The historical 
analysis forms a backdrop to the ethnographical studies of ‘real’ operational military 
work and training in operational procedures of targeting. It is in place to illustrate 
how bureaucracy pervades the Swedish military practice during the early and mid-
part of the 20th century, and it is meant to offer insight into how the contemporary 
operational work that I investigate further on, rests on historically constructed dis-
courses of bureaucratised violence. Or expressed differently, the historical investiga-
tion aims to clarify how the research context of operational work has gradually been 
                                                             
2 Sweden’s ‘progressiveness’ in these matters is also reflected in its organisation of the military as the nation harbours 
the Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations (NCGM). This centre is located together with the Swedish Armed 
Forces International Centre (SWEDINT) and offers international courses (accredited to NATO standards) and seminars 
on issues of gender (see: SWEDINT 2016).  
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politically influenced, and militarily narrated, to include a specific type of bureau-
cratised relation to violence and death.       
 
The ‘data’ analysed in the historical investigation has been selected purposely to be 
representative for the discursive field that I want to investigate. The instructions, 
manuals and regulations that I analyse are in other words central in constructing 
narratives of military violence, as they are produced to support the training of sol-
diers and officers in order for the Army3 to excel in the use of violence. In extension, 
the ‘data’ is representative for the analysis also through the central place these doc-
uments have had in Swedish military practice. They are with very few exceptions all 
retrieved from the archives of the Army Command and they are by their construction 
as manuals and regulations crucial for any practitioner that worked with enhancing 
the ‘effective’ use of violence during the early and mid 20th century. To my 
knowledge, no other set of documents exists that can in the same focused way por-
tray how military relations to death and violence is historically constructed in the 
Swedish Army. Since the question driving the historical analysis is not if 20th centu-
ry military violence is managed through some form of bureaucratisation, but as 
stated in the chapter, how violence and death are bureaucratised, the focus is on the 
‘data’ being representative for outlining central aspects of Swedish military dis-
courses on violence.  
 
When it comes to the time frame of my study, I have delimited the historical part of 
my investigation of military bureaucratised violence as set to be constructed under 
times of industrial modernisation and in particular, as related to the major military 
events of the 20th century. Therefore, the historical analysis is delimited to early and 
mid 20th century as this period of time comprises on the one hand politically initiated 
reformations of the Swedish military which aims at creating efficient system of 
managing large numbers of conscripts and materiel. On the other hand, this time 
period also includes a modernisation of the Swedish military tactical relation to the 
use of violence, which is reflected in how the military increases its production of 
military regulations, instructions, information pamphlets and handbooks. I have thus 
identified this time period as central to how the modern Swedish military forms the 
discourses that today ‘pave the way’ for a further bureaucratisation of military man-
agement of violence and death.  
 
The ethnographical part of my investigation takes place between 2015 and 2017. 
This is a period of intensive reformation and further modernisation of the Swedish 
military. The international focus that has dominated much of the operational work of 
the Armed Forces in the beginning of the 20th century still remains, but a shift to-
wards a new type of national focus is emerging. There is a general consensus in the 
Swedish military that the organisation needs to ‘take back’ those valuable lessons of 
                                                             
3 This is another delimitation: I have had my focus on material depicting practices of the Swedish Army and as such 
removed the possibility to investigate if portrayal of navy and/or air force practices change something in the discursive 
construction of violence. I have included some material written for the strategic level, or for general use in the armed 
forces, to compensate for this weakness in the analysis.   
 
 
 10 
the 20th century’s national defence organisation to counter the turmoil that has de-
veloped in close proximity to Sweden. The situation in Crimea and Ukraine, and 
Russia’s increase in military exercises and defence expenditure are used as motives 
for this shift in focus (Försvarsmakten 2016b). This situation creates an operational 
environment in the Armed Forces Headquarters which is characterised by both sup-
port to ongoing international operations, mainly the MINUSMA4 mission in Mali, 
and efforts to ‘re-invent’ national operational planning. Operational work must in 
this context be able to manage both international (NATO) procedures and regula-
tions, but also develop to find ways of managing the use of force in ways that meet 
the national and regional requirements. In other words, this time period allows for a 
study of how bureaucratised labour moves from being framed in a context of inter-
national ‘crisis management’ operations, to also comprise more traditional national 
defence operations. This research context can be particularly fruitful for learning 
more about how bureaucratisation relates to military violence as previous research, 
which indicate an increasing bureaucratisation of Western military violence, is 
placed in a context of international ‘crisis management’, and has not, to my 
knowledge, taken in account these types of contemporary shifts to a military opera-
tional focus on national defence.  As the time frame in which my research takes 
place includes a reformation towards national defence, the research context allows 
for critical reflections on the question if bureaucratisation of violence has to do with 
‘crisis management’ or if it is situated in other military discourses. The supporting 
research questions have been designed to allow for my research to be responsive to 
the possibility for a tension between how violence is managed in different types of 
military operational contexts (international/national), as they are specifically about 
focusing on the workings of bureucratisation of violence, but still general enough to 
allow for different types of operational activities.   
 
Disposition 
The next chapter aims at placing my research problem in a context of previous re-
search on military ways of managing, neutralising and silencing death and violence 
but the chapter also offers a theoretical framework for my studies of discourses and 
bureaucratisation. When it comes to theory I have chosen to rely on poststructural 
theories of language and social practices, to facilitate analyses of how language and 
materiality are intertwined in constructing military subjects’ relations to violence. 
But in order to facilitate my research of contemporary operational work and training 
with procedures of targeting I have also added a methodological support for engag-
ing in the ethnographical study of military practice. Chapter 3 aims to achieve this 
                                                             
4  MINUSMA – The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali. A mission made 
possible by UN resolutions 2100 (2013) and 2164 (2014), where Sweden contributes with an Intelligence, Surveillance 
and Reconnaissance Task Force, Air transportation assets and a National Support Unit (logistics). In total approximately 
320 personnel (Regeringen 2017).   
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by laying bare my ethnographical and self-reflexive approach to studying military 
practices.  
 
The empirical analysis of military violence is initiated after these two chapters on 
previous research/theory/methods. In Chapter 4 I lay the foundation for studying 
contemporary operational work by conducting a modern historical discourse analysis 
of the research context. This analysis aims to clarify how the research context of 
operational work has gradually been politically influenced, and militarily narrated, 
to include a specific type of bureaucratised relation to violence and death. It is my 
intention that this chapter will provide a deeper and more comprehensive under-
standing of how military violence can be formed by political incentives and military 
narratives into a type of bureaucratised understanding of violence.  
 
Chapter 5 engages with the question of how ‘real’ military staff practice shapes 
understandings of violence and death. The chapter includes analyses of how reifica-
tion and misrecognition of the Other operate in the bureaucratised labour of opera-
tional staff practice. But it also investigates how bureaucratisation of violence relates 
to the construction of military masculinities. In short, the chapter engages in illus-
trating and analysing what values and norms come into the forefront when military 
subjects perform bureaucratised labour in an operational staff. My ambition with the 
chapter is that it should offer insight into some previously un-recognised/identified 
conditions and aspects of how military violence is managed, suppressed and neutral-
ised through operational work.  
 
To deepen our knowledge of military understandings of violence, and in particular, 
bureaucratised ways of engaging in the use of military force, the thesis then pro-
ceeds to investigate operational targeting practices. Chapter 6 comprises an ethno-
graphical study of how military subjects’ relation to violence is shaped through the 
transformative language and materiality of NATO targeting lists and practical staff 
procedures. The analysis of military violence is in this chapter meant to move from 
the focus on ‘general’ operational staff work that is the basis for Chapter 5, to the 
‘nitty-gritty’ details of how operational work with targeting is performed and how 
this work takes form as a type of bureaucratised labour of violence. In achieving 
this, the chapter traces how ‘targets’ are constructed, and offers an analysis of how 
military subjects are trained to relate to death and violence in a specific way, using 
data collected from three successive international staff exercises.   
 
In Chapter 7, the central findings from the three empirical chapters are discussed in 
relation to the supporting research questions and the overarching problem for this 
thesis. I also provide a discussion about possible ethical problems related to bureau-
cratised labour, and some suggestions for further research.   
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2 
Chapter 2: Previous Research and 
Theory  
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The literature which engages with the question of how the inescapable presence of 
violence and death are managed, neutralised or silenced in military practice can on a 
general level be divided into two major areas – the liberal ‘optimists’ and the critical 
war/military researchers (Delori 2014). As Delori (2014: 518) points out, these two 
‘camps’ of researchers agree that Western military organisations have changed how 
they conceptualise, organise and conduct warfare since the end of the Cold War, but 
they disagree on the effects of these changes (see also: Kaldor 2012, chap. 8 for a 
similar discussion).  
 
On the one hand, the liberal, optimistic argument explains the reduction or neutrali-
sation of the presence of violence in the military practice as a consequence of West-
ern, and in particular, European military organisations being reformed into organisa-
tions with ‘crisis management’ at their core (Vennesson et al. 2009). As organisa-
tions of crisis management, the Western military is narrated to control and minimise 
their use of violence. This liberal narrative is constructed using technologically 
based arguments of a precise and surgical use of weapons, and through the use of 
political policies of humanitarian aid and liberation from anti-democratic move-
ments. The liberal positive interpretation of how Western military forces manage the 
fact that they use violence rests thus on factors that indicate that Western military 
organisations are in control over, and have minimised, their use of violence (Pinker 
2011). In addition to this interpretation of the reformation of Western military organ-
isations is the idea that public aversion to casualties and the rapid media coverage of 
conflicts results in a widespread understanding of “the human consequences of con-
flict” (Tuck 2016, 439). In short, the liberal argument rests on a conviction that 
military operations are not as violent as they used to be, and that when violence is 
used it is in a controlled (both technologically and legally), efficient and ethical way 
(Farrell 2005; Reed, Ryall, and Dannatt 2007; Thomas 2001; Wheeler 2002). It 
follows then, from the liberal arguments, that military force has become more ‘hu-
manitarian’ and that agents of the military practice have these reformations as their 
  14 
main points of reference when managing the fact that their practice can inflict vio-
lence against the ‘Other’.  
 
The problem with this ‘optimistic’ position is that it does not step outside of the 
liberal frame of analysis, and as such takes for granted that changes to military doc-
trines, rules of engagement and technology are used for increasing the military ca-
pacity for ‘doing good’, in what Christopher Coker critically calls “humanitarian 
wars” (Coker 2001, 148; see also: Duncanson 2011). Those of us who write in the 
field of critical war/military studies are skeptical to this approach on several levels, 
but common to most critique of this liberal ‘framing’ is that it leaves out the fact that 
use of military force is ‘legitimised’ (made possible) by liberalism in the first place 
(Asad 2007; M. Hardt and Negri 2005; Reid 2006). I will therefore in the following 
discuss four ways of interpreting and analysing contemporary military practice that 
offers alternative (to the liberal research) explanations and understandings of how 
Western military organisations relate to their violent practice.  
 
But before going into the details of these four approaches to military use of force, I 
want to shortly discuss how the concept of militarism functions as a common ground 
for this critical research. This discussion is in place to introduce research in Critical 
Military Studies and to underline how this field of study provides the overarching 
guidelines for my investigations of military understandings of violence.    
 
Critical Military Studies and militarism                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
In its core, investigating military understandings of violence is a type of research 
that belongs to a fairly new and emerging sub-field of Political Science and Interna-
tional Relations – Critical Military Studies. This new path of research has emerged 
as a response to the lack of critical research that actually invests efforts in under-
standing the changing character of war. Or in the words of Barkawi and Brighton 
(2011): 
 
War, then, is in the situation of being both taken for granted in its meaning and radically underde-
veloped as an object of inquiry. It is only in the wake of this realization that we can see that, in 
contrast to disciplinary objects such as politics or economy, the most basic questions regarding the 
ontology and epistemology of war have hardly been asked, much less have they issued in a sub-
stantial body of theory. (Barkawi and Brighton 2011, 127) 
 
Having studied the ‘nature’ of war to some extent during my time in various military 
schools, Barkawi’s and Brighton’s claim first struck me as quite cursory. Is it not so 
that established works such as “The Art of War” (Sun and Giles 2007) and “On 
War” (Clausewitz 1991) together with all the countless attributing authors would 
stand against their claim? On the contrary, what Barkawi and Brighton are pointing 
at is the tendency to treat war as an exceptional event and to separate war (and the 
military institution) as belonging to the ‘outside’ of an ordinary peaceful society. 
This tendency in social and political research brings about a number of blind spots 
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for the impacts that understandings of war and military violence have on how socie-
ty, with its institutions and exercise of political power, are conditioned (Barkawi and 
Brighton 2011, 141–42). Central to Critical Military Studies is thus that research 
must resist seeing the military institution as self-given in society, but rather as a 
product of social and political ideas and practices (Rachel Woodward 2014, 51).  
 
Critical Military Studies is a broad field of research when it comes to empirical 
investigations and theoretical approaches, but recently the field has focused on the 
workings of militarism (Eastwood 2018; Mabee and Vucetic 2018; Stavrianakis and 
Stern 2018). This interest in militarism connects to understandings of military use of 
force through how militarism indicates that there is a societal embedded conviction 
that military violence is ‘useful’ for conflict resolution. But traditionally, militarism 
has been understood to indicate an ideology where military matters and the use of 
military force are seen as an ideal, underlining a higher status in society for those 
who work in the military institution. Some argue that this way of understanding 
militarism no longer holds theoretically, as defining militarism as an ideology indi-
cates a delimitation to investigate ideals and values, nor empirically, as such ideas 
and values are scarcely found to hold a central place in the societies of our contem-
porary world (see also Morgan 1994, 173; Stavrianakis and Selby 2013, 12). This is, 
however, a claim which, in the wake of the recent renewed interest in militarism, has 
come to be debated to some extent through the argument that militarism understood 
as an ideology provides incitements for formulating ideological critique that can 
underline an anti-militarist debate and position (e.g. Eastwood 2018).    
 
Much research in the name of Critical Military Studies (CMS) has embraced a wider 
understanding of militarism due to the limitations which ‘traditional’ understanding 
of militarism puts on the critical study of military practices (Stavrianakis and Selby 
2013). In particular research that takes into account how the preparation for, and use 
of, military force is entrenched and normalised in and by societal practices reap the 
benefits of a sociological understanding of militarism (also: Eastwood 2015, 674; 
McSorley 2014; Stavrianakis and Selby 2013, 14; Åhäll 2016). Here this sociologi-
cal understanding and approach to the phenomenon of militarism provides a wider 
array of ways of studying military influences in society. This understanding allows 
for studying the phenomenon of militarism from all of the perspectives singled out 
by the ideological, behavioural or for that matter, institutional way of understanding 
the workings of militarism (Robinson 2016, 258). An example of such sociological-
ly inspired investigations of militarism is research that analyses such diverse corpora 
of data as how certain video games or arms trade treaties comprise underlying sup-
port for the existence and value of military force (Robinson 2016; Stavrianakis 
2016).  
 
Thus, understanding militarism from a broader sociological point of view does not 
just open up otherwise unseen avenues of research, it also creates opportunities for a 
deeper analysis of how social relations are constructed to sustain a naturalisation and 
embeddedness of military practice (on the “normal” and “given” aspect of militarism 
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(US context), see Lutz 2014). What the sociological understanding of militarism 
brings to the table when it comes to investigating how the presence of violence and 
death are managed, neutralised or silenced in military practice is precisely this cri-
tique – that military practice is closely interlinked with other societal practices 
which work to ‘normalise’ military violence. My investigation of the bureaucratisa-
tion of violence in military practice draws from this development on militarism, as 
this type of research poses such questions as how (by what means) military violence 
is embedded in the daily routines of a (military) practice. From my point of view, 
this research on militarism thus holds a position as a wider ‘umbrella’ under which 
my study is situated.         
 
And on a final note, if we (in Critical Military Studies, and IR in general) are to 
approach militarism analytically with the help of sociology, it would be pertinent to 
at least inquire briefly into how the sociologist debate relates to the existence of 
militarism in society. Without going too far into detail, there are indications in this 
debate that modern sociology, inspired by Weber and Durkheim, (also) has treated 
the military as a separate entity of human society, thus leaving the sociology of war, 
in the spirit of Janowitz, to encompass the internal workings of the military institu-
tion (Burk 1993). But recently there has been a call for a more ‘holistic’ understand-
ing of the workings of militarism in the literature on the sociology of war, which 
chimes well with how the debate has developed in CMS (West and Matthewman 
2016, 489).  
 
In other words, contemporary debates in sociology and war also point to the im-
portance of allowing research that comprises everyday practices take a more central 
role in the study of the workings of militarism and military understandings of vio-
lence. But what both CMS and the sociology of war debates on militarism endanger, 
when turning the analytical focus on the embedded militarism of practices that exist 
in ‘civil’ society, is losing sight of the mundane and daily workings of military prac-
tice. What my investigation tries to achieve is to unfold the existence of a military 
lifeworld which is stipulated on a reciprocal relationship with the developments of 
‘ordinary’ society. In other words, my study adheres to the recent call to see the 
legitimation of military violence as a product of how society develops, but it does so 
without stepping outside of the military institution itself. This approach rests on a 
conviction that the modernisation and bureaucratisation of society, and thus of or-
ganised violence, actually create further possibilities of using military force. Possi-
bilities that lie in how this development of society and organised military violence 
brings with it institutional legitimacy to, and a certain ‘truth’ about, military practice 
(Malešević 2017, 24–25). 
 
With that introduction to the field of CMS, it is time to engage with the details of 
how critical research approaches the question of how the inescapable presence of 
violence and death are managed, neutralised or silenced in military practice. The 
following four sections will discuss research that is closely related to this question, 
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starting with how gendered and technological language creates a distance to the 
violent realities of military practices.  
 
2.2  Researching Military Understandings of Violence: a 
question of analysing gendered and technologised lan-
guage.   
 
Although CMS has renewed the academic debate on militarism and on how military 
use of force can be investigated, one of the main contributions on how militarism 
and gendered language are interlinked in the construction of understandings of mili-
tary violence was made during the 1980s. Carol Cohn’s (1987) reflexive ethno-
graphical study of US nuclear defence strategists and intellectuals is widely spread 
and cited among such areas of research as the ethnographic method (Gusterson 
1993), feminist studies (Brown 1992),  military masculinities (Duncanson 2013; 
Hutchings 2008) and Critical Military Studies (H. Gray 2016; Stavrianakis and Stern 
2018) to mention but a few.  
 
In Cohn’s meeting and interaction with the daily practice of nuclear defence intellec-
tuals, she is struck by the “abstraction and removal” regarding what she sees as the 
“reality” of the “professional discourse” (Cohn 1987, 688). In other words, that the 
language of these analysts and strategists managed to legitimise US nuclear strategy 
without relating to the human consequences of using weapons of mass destruction. 
Cohn (1987: 690) calls this language “technostrategic” as it uses technological and 
nuclear strategic terms to form a “clean” nuclear weapons discourse. This discourse 
is “clean” in the perspective that it removes the deadly aspect of nuclear war from 
the practitioners’ relation to the military violence they help to construct and make 
possible. Cohn finds that the language employing sexual imagery used by defence 
intellectuals and their physical desire to touch the weapons themselves are central 
aspects of this removal of death from their practice (Cohn 1987, 695–96). In addi-
tion to this observation of the centrality of gendered language, Cohn also found that 
to be able to interact with her interlocutors, she needed to learn their language and 
talk to them using the technostrategic concepts of the nuclear discourse (Cohn 1987, 
708). In this process of learning, Cohn discovers that she starts losing her grip on in 
which ‘reality’ she lives in: that of the critical scholar or that of the defence intellec-
tual, where in the latter nuclear weapons naturally are ‘rational’ objects for provid-
ing stable international relations. This is an experience where she finds that she 
starts to believe in (or rather take for granted) impossible things, such as the possi-
bility to engage in a “surgically clean counterforce strike” with nuclear weapons 
(Cohn 1987, 713). In short, Cohn discovers that the language of nuclear defence 
intellectuals can militarise her own mind as the “racy, sexy, snappy” concepts used 
to rationalise and legitimise weapons of mass destruction have a seductive and trans-
formative power (Cohn 1987, 704, 716).  
 
My interest in military operational work comprises several similarities to Cohn’s 
study. First of all, she illustrates the importance of establishing an ‘insider’ position 
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when studying military understandings of violence, as such access offers detailed 
knowledge of which subjectivities and acts of identification are central to shaping 
understandings of violence. Secondly, Cohn’s testimony of the transformative power 
of military language opens up for further research on how different versions of such 
language operate to normalise and silence the deadly aspect of military violence. In 
the context of US nuclear strategic defence discourse we learn from Cohn that tech-
nological terms and a dimension of sexual discourse of the practice are central to 
this process of normalisation and silencing. But what happens when formalised 
bureaucratic language and the restricted areas of operational planning are investigat-
ed in a context of a small state’s use of ‘conventional’ (as opposed to nuclear wea-
ponry) military violence? Are technological terms and sexual discourse still the main 
ways of distancing the military subject from the violent and human consequences of 
using military force? These questions underline that my investigation intends to add 
something to what Cohn has taught us regarding how military violence is understood 
in military practices, by adding a different context (of practice-related language and 
military violence) to the previous research presented in this chapter. Although I 
adhere to Cohn’s analysis, it is still the case that her context has an ‘estranged’ rela-
tion to violence, in that nuclear weapons have a strategic status as objects of deter-
rence, and the use of them is confined to a few (horrifying) moments in history.    
 
In addition to adding a context where violence is actively used and managed in the 
name of ‘crisis management’ (and preparations for national defence), I also provide 
a different position as ‘insider’ in comparison to Cohn: I come from an opposite 
situation of having to learn the language of critical scholars in order to elucidate how 
contemporary operational military language has a transformative and seductive 
power, similar or different to that which Cohn illustrates in the US context. In addi-
tion, my background as a military officer with 20 years of using military ‘transform-
ative’ language, and having worked in close proximity to different versions of mili-
tary masculinities during these years, may provide further insight into how language 
and gender construct military understandings of violence. In simple terms, Cohn was 
rewarded with analytical insights through her struggle to learn the nuclear language, 
but what I offer is a context of research where the researcher (me) struggles for the 
opposite: to un-learn the military operational language in order to find out how death 
and violence are suppressed in my context of research. Here my ‘unique’ position as 
a male military officer can provide access to both physical and conceptual ‘loca-
tions’ in which the impact of military language and gendered social relations are 
open for further study (I expand on this further below when I discuss research of 
military masculinities). I will return to my position as ‘insider’ in Chapter 3 where I 
discuss reflexive ethnography and autoethnography, and in particular, what these 
methods of research offer in terms of using the researcher’s experiences of interact-
ing with the context of research as a source of ‘data’. 
 
The third and final similarity with Cohn’s study that I want to stress relates to her 
conclusion that the nuclear weapons themselves (and not humans) are the ones that 
posit the answer to the analytical question of “who (or what) is the subject here?” 
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(Cohn 1987, 711). In other words, I want to examine what the main subject or points 
of reference are in operational military discourse. Naturally, the aim is to walk in the 
footsteps of Cohn to try and single out how “abstraction and removal” of human and 
deadly consequences of military violence exist and operate in ‘my’ research envi-
ronment.    
 
This final point of ‘who’ or ‘what’ is the main subject of military discourse brings 
me to the second area of research that I want to discuss, and that is the debate on the 
materiality of war. This is a debate that revolves around the question of how materi-
ality operates as a point of reference for subjects that work with, or are otherwise 
affected by, military violence in various ways, and it has brought about several in-
sights that relate to my study.  
 
2.3  Researching Military Understandings of Violence: a 
question of studying the materiality of war 
 
The focus on gendered and technologised language described above has a closely 
related approach to investigating how violence is ‘rationalised’ through the material-
ity of war, where justification of military violence is “studied from the embodied 
experience of those who are in it, including soldiers in the field” (Christophe 
Wasinski 2017, 2). In research on the materiality of war technical capabilities and 
jargon are, as in Cohn’s research, central to how violence and death are managed by 
military organisations and their practitioners. But this research has moved beyond 
analysing discourse as language and is engaged with “ […] mundane physical idi-
oms, intercorporeal interactions, structures of feeling and sensory practices that 
occur across and between various constituencies, both civilian and military.” 
(McSorley 2014, 105–6). Here the experience of war and military related activities 
are investigated in order to shed light on how military violence ‘lives’ in the bodies 
and practices of those exposed (including military personnel, ‘adversaries’ and vic-
tims) to such experiences (Parashar 2013; Sylvester 2013). In this body of research, 
military practices are also investigated from the perspective of how mundane and 
seemingly ‘harmless’ activities, such as taking part in a military fitness movement, 
connect such feelings as pleasure and camaraderie to understandings of what mili-
tary practice is all about (McSorley 2016).  
 
On a general level, research on the experiences of war and violent practices illus-
trates how military violence is managed, gendered, reshaped or justified though a 
broad empirical context, from the dehumanising abuse of dead bodies in war (T. 
Gregory 2016), via the military control over the dead soldier’s body (Christophe 
Wasinski 2008) and its ‘ownership’ of veterans’ damaged bodies (MacLeish 2015), 
to the practices of militant women (Parashar 2011). In this strand of literature, the 
materiality of war is connected to the use (and abuse) of the human body and how 
this creates subjectivities that help ‘rationalise’ and ‘normalise’ military violence 
(see also: Baaz and Stern 2009; Zehfuss 2009). Common in this research is that, in 
line with Cohn’s observation, it critically finds military discourse (and much of IR-
  20 
research on war (Parashar 2013)) as ‘empty’ of a relation to dead and injured hu-
mans. To counter this lack of relation to dead and injured humans, several studies 
follow in the footsteps of Elaine Scarry’s (1985) research where injuring bodies is 
set as central to the ‘function’ of war (T. Gregory 2016; Lutz 2014; McSorley 2014; 
Sylvester 2012; Wilcox 2014). This approach is not exclusively used in research that 
approaches military violence from the material perspective, and I will therefore, 
further below, reconnect to how the human body is represented in military discourse 
and critical research, and how this relates to my study.       
 
But the research on the materiality of war also focuses more specifically on technol-
ogy and the objects of warfare. Inspired by Bruno Latour’s (among others) take on 
how “material ‘things’ are active in the production, stabilisation and reproduction of 
social order” this is an internal (to the critical security/military study paradigm) 
critique of how constructivists and poststructuralists have “[…] seen technology and 
material things as exogenous and apolitical” (Bourne 2012, 155). This trope of mate-
riality of war-research studies human experiences of being ‘caught up’ in the materi-
al production of war and military violence, as an addition to the bodily focus dis-
cussed above. Examples of such studies are Caroline Holmqvist’s research on 
drones, where she illustrates how the material (the drone) and the human (its opera-
tor) are intertwined in a reciprocal social relation (Holmqvist 2013a). Additionally, 
in a study of how British military personnel working with air support “make sense of 
their actions”, Christophe Wasinski find that military means condition how these 
practitioners relate to violence (Christophe Wasinski 2017, 1, 14). In other words, 
that war is experienced “through the lens of technical tools” and that the materiality 
of military practices plays an active role in creating that which counts as the ‘reality’ 
of war (Christophe Wasinski 2017, 14). In short, research that is concerned with the 
materiality of war adds at least two aspects of physical dimension to the transforma-
tive effects of language that Cohn speaks of: Firstly, the physical act of training, 
preparing and engaging in different types of military practices are in this body of 
research found to shape the subject’s and society’s understanding of military death 
and violence (Higate 2012; McSorley 2016). Secondly, technology and material 
objects are central to how military subjects rationalise and legitimise their own (vio-
lent) practices, and military technology and material has as such a discursive mean-
ing that goes beyond its technological use (Der Derian 2009). In other words, re-
search on the materiality of war illustrates how technology and its interconnected 
relationship with bureaucracy creates ‘systems and processes’ through which mili-
tary violence is not just made possible – it is reshaped into what can be called “bu-
reaucratized labor” (Asaro 2013, 215).  
 
In contrast to Cohn’s focus on language in a technological environment of ‘mutually 
assured destruction’ through the use of nuclear weapons, this more recent body of 
literature has its empirical focus on drones and the processes of killing ‘made possi-
ble’ by these weapon systems (D. Gregory 2011b, 2011a; Holmqvist 2013a; Niva 
2013; Schwarz 2016). In particular, targeted killings have been found to operate in 
ways that strongly resemble corporate or non-military institutional management, in 
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turn leading to a bureaucratisation of killing (Bonditti and Olsson 2016; see also: K. 
Grayson 2012; Kyle Grayson 2016, 101–3; I. Shaw and Akhter 2014, 214; Öberg 
2016, 1139). In short, this research unmasks a practice of military violence as sus-
tained by subjects that do not deal with violence and death at all, but with routines 
and regulatory practices of ‘targeting’ (Nordin and Öberg 2015).  
 
One example of materiality in this bureaucratised context of killing is the ‘kill-lists’ 
produced by vast and complex databases. Jutta Weber investigates how “the ‘dispo-
sition matrix’ – a kill/capture list and database is a key device in the US govern-
ment’s global ‘war on terror’” by analysing how the materiality of databases is con-
structed to continuously produce new targets (J. Weber 2016, 107). Weber finds that 
the database/kill-list intertwines human and non-human decisions on who or what 
are designated as ‘targets’:      
 
A core part of the construction of the ‘disposition matrix’ consists of extremely vague categorisa-
tions of what counts as terrorism and what is a ‘central’ node in a ‘terrorist network’. The ‘disposi-
tion matrix’ depends on maintaining secrecy about what makes somebody ‘eligible’ to be included 
in it or to become the target of a drone strike or a raid. It relies on metadata and on data mining 
tools such as SNA (which is opaque even to the analysts themselves), often follows a purely quan-
titative logic and/or ignores the social, political and cultural context, in which the data are gath-
ered. (J. Weber 2016, 120)  
 
As pointed out by Weber, of the few studies that exist so far on the details of ‘target-
ing processes’ (e.g. McNeal 2014), none has engaged critically with what the inter-
twined relationship between human and non-human decisions entails and how the 
reliance on databases and lists might project a ‘rationality’ to military violence. My 
study continues Weber’s work by engaging in ethnographical investigations of how 
military subjects are shaped by the subjectivities of targeting lists and procedures. 
By studying NATO targeting practice through the critical lenses of discourse, mate-
riality and (discussed below) the misrecognition and reification of the ‘enemy’, I 
strive to illuminate how the ‘opaqueness’ of this practice plays a role in shaping 
military subjects’ understanding of violence.         
 
In sum, the literature on how the materiality of war reshapes military (and political) 
understandings of violence points to a social context of military use of force that has 
moved from the ‘battlefield’ to the daily life of governmental institutions – it is in 
other words in the routines and management of military staffs that the technological 
and the social meet. It is in this meeting, that my study of operational staff practices 
connects to the research on materiality and war as I intend to offer further insight 
into how a military staff practice shapes violence and death through bureaucratic 
routines and the workings of daily social relations. My study (of a military staff and 
of targeting) has the ambition to provide further insight into how this closed off 
context (for civilian researchers) operates to sustain and make possible a ‘rationali-
sation’ of military use of force. This is arguably a much-needed contribution as the 
previous research discussed here has not, as of yet, engaged in ethnographical stud-
ies of how the processes and routines of operational staffs work to manage, neutral-
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ise or silence the presence of violence and death in military practice. Although oth-
ers have shown that the growing bureaucratisation of killing is reshaping how vio-
lence is understood through readings of doctrines and policy documents (Nordin and 
Öberg 2015), medical reports of drone operators and media sources (Asaro 2013) 
and analyses of US presidential directives and drone technology (I. Shaw and Akhter 
2014), there is as of yet no study that actually engages in how this bureaucratisation 
operates in military staffs. Naturally, this is not the case because military staffs have 
no relevance in this matter, but due to the restricted access and high level of secrecy 
that surrounds such military practices (e.g. Rachel. Woodward and Duncanson 2017, 
84, 212).  
 
And on a final note, the research on the materiality of war engages with the embod-
ied experiences of those that are in the midst of making military violence possible 
(among others), but one category of personnel that has not yet gained any closer 
attention is the people who by military standards “connect [the] tactical battles with 
[the] strategic goals” (Angstrom and Widen 2015, 73). What operational staff work 
does (in more plain terms) is thus to concretise and make military missions possible 
to conduct, which makes this practice a central part of the Western way of warfare 
(Vego 2008). The lack of attention to the operational practices of contemporary 
military organisations underlines the need for asking the question of how operational 
staff work includes “bureaucratized labor” (Asaro 2013) and how such labour enacts 
a military management of the fact that death and violence are a part of the military 
practice?       
               
As of yet, the relational aspect of violence (that it inflicts death and injury to another 
human) has not explicitly been addressed in this review on previous research. The 
next section will engage in this aspect of violence and illustrate what research on 
military violence has to say about how the ‘enemy’ is constructed in Western mili-
tary discourse.   
 
2.4  Researching Military Understandings of Violence: a 
question of reification and misrecognition of the enemy 
 
As pointed out by Kevin McDonald (2013), classical descriptions of what military 
violence is (such as a strategic instrumental way of damaging an opponent) miss out 
on two dimensions: firstly that violence establishes a relationship with the victim, 
and secondly, that violence is something that is experienced and embodied by those 
involved in its making and its ‘effects’ (McDonald 2013, 139; see also: M. Shaw 
2003). Research on this latter aspect of military violence has been discussed above 
and in this section I will engage with studies that connect how violence and death 
are managed, neutralised or silenced in military practice with processes of distancing 
the military ‘Self’ from violence, and dehumanising ‘the enemy’. Importantly, I am 
not engaging in the debate that concerns ‘face-to-face’ killing, as my interest, as 
with most of the research that I present in this chapter, concerns the daily ‘produc-
tion’ of violence. In other words, I focus on analysing how military violence is made 
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possible and rationalised by routines, procedures and the social relations governing 
such military practices. I mention this because there are debates about military un-
derstandings of violence based on how dehumanisation/humanisation operates in 
soldiers’ justification of killing in close combat (Baggaley and Shon 2018; Bar and 
Ben-Ari 2005; e.g. Bourke 1999, 2006; Jones 2006; Kooistra and Mahoney 2016).  
Arguably, the bureaucratisation of violence comprises a different empirical context 
of dehumanisation, compared to that of close combat.   
 
Reification and misrecognition (sometimes ‘non-recognition’ (Holmqvist 2013b))  
are two concepts that are commonly used in research that has interest in the discur-
sive and material aspects of ‘rationalising’ violence. As, for instance, in Mathias 
Delori’s study of how French fighter aircraft pilots and high ranking officers “make 
sense of the act of killing” in the 2011 Libya War (Delori 2014, 516). Following the 
works of Judith Butler and Axel Honneth, Delori approach misrecognition as on the 
one hand pointing at those social processes which contribute to the ‘Other’ in war 
not being represented and recognised in military practice. But misrecognition also 
indicates a discursive and material shaping of military subjects to not acknowledge 
that the ‘Other’ exists, or counts, as a human (see also: Butler 2010, 14–17; Honneth 
et al. 2008, 18). In short, what Delori (2014: 517) discovers in his sociological study 
is “[…] that the victims of violence by a Western state are not framed as an object of 
hatred, or of ritual sacrifice, or of military strategy, or as anything else.”. The dis-
covery that the existence of the Other is left out of the discursive and material (here: 
procedures and routinised practices) regime of French airmen’s relation to death and 
violence resonates well with Cohn’s observations discussed earlier. But Delori ex-
tends Cohn’s analysis to the context of contemporary liberal warfare where the inter-
locutors in the study legitimise their work by making use of humanitarian discourse, 
and to a case where violence has been in actual use. In addition, Delori notes that 
misrecognition is connected to a process of reifying through the bureaucratisation 
and addition of new technologies in military organisations. But as pointed out by 
Delori, his results cannot be applied to the whole range of transformed practices 
through which Western military organisations wage war, as he reflects that “[…] 
‘targeted’ and ‘deliberate’ killings are based on a different logic or set of principles” 
compared to that of his context of study (Delori 2014, 527). Nevertheless, his study 
exemplifies how the contemporary research on military understandings of violence 
analytically moves between the discursive effects of language, via the materiality of 
war, to the disappearance of the Other from military discourses on violence (see 
also: Holmqvist 2013b; Nordin and Öberg 2015).  
 
Importantly, reification is in this body of research used to point out how dehumani-
sation and distancing processes operate to ‘objectify’ in military discourse. To men-
tion a few examples, soldiers are portrayed as fixed entities and are conceptualised 
as cogs in a military machine of killing (C. Wasinski 2011), or the ‘Other’ is repre-
sented through coordinates and as ‘targets’ (also, on reification through gender, see: 
Marhia 2013; Christophe Wasinski 2017). The concept of reification can thus both 
point to an internal (to the military institution) representation of ‘Self’ or identity, 
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but also elucidate a process of objectifying or minimising the representation of the 
enemy ‘Other’. As in the words of Thomas Lindemann:  
 
[…] minimisation of the Other’s agency can be presented as an ‘objectification’ of the Other (in 
the sense of not recognising the Other as a being with needs and capabilities for reaction). This lat-
ter form of minimisation is also referred to as ‘reification’, which is the act of considering the Oth-
er as a mere object or an inanimate thing, and this is the most obvious manifestation of instrumen-
tal nonrecognition. Reification can occur following a market-based logic. This purely instrumental 
disposition toward the Other is conditioned by a vision of the world that involves a reification of 
the Self and of the Other as well as a trivialisation of violence in the name of any law of necessity, 
market, national security, or the future of nations. (Lindemann 2014, 490) 
 
Lindemann argues here that reification of the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’ is connected to a 
trivialisation of violence and this is where my study interconnect to the research on 
how death and violence ‘make sense’ to military practitioners. In addition to my 
interests stated above, an additional purpose of investigating how social relations 
and processes of identification operate in a Swedish military staff and a context of 
‘targeting’ is to provide further insight into how the bureaucratisation of violence 
operates so as to comprise a reification of the Other. In other words, operational staff 
work and targeting practices should be analysed in line with this current focus in 
contemporary research on how discourse and materiality convene to reify both the 
military subject, but also the representation of the ‘Other’.  
 
As of yet, I have not engaged in detail with how the gendered aspects of discourse 
and materiality relate to how death and violence are managed, suppressed or si-
lenced in military practice. The research discussed above has strong connections to 
studies of military masculinities, including gendered language and practices within 
military organisations, and I will therefore discuss such research in the next and final 
section of this review of previous research.       
 
2.5 Researching Military Understandings of Violence: a 
question of analysing Military Masculinities 
 
Even though the research on how death and violence are represented in military 
discourse/practice might seem ‘fractured’ between the analysis of transformative 
language, materiality and the reification of ‘Self’ and ‘Other, it is not. Not only do 
these different perspectives in Critical Military Studies (and research on IR and 
militarism) often engage in several of these approaches of analysing military vio-
lence in one and the same study, they are also often joined by a focus on investigat-
ing gendered aspects of transformative language, materiality and representations of 
the military ‘Self’ and the ‘enemy Other’. As my own study follows in the footsteps 
of such research, I will here provide a review of studies that explicitly engage in 
military masculinities and their relation to how violence ‘makes sense’ for military 
subjects. 
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Feminist research on military masculinities and violence has been in the forefront 
when it comes to the materiality of war, both in the aspect of embodied experiences 
of war, and in the perspective of human interaction with technology and processes of 
bureaucracy (Dyvik 2016; Eichler 2011; Enloe 2015; Higate 2007; Wilcox 2014). 
An important focus for this research has been to investigate how masculinities are 
militarised in different types of contexts and social constructs, and not to assume a 
specific content or core to military masculinity (Eichler 2014, 82; Hutchings 2008, 
401; Swain 2016; see also: R. Woodward and Neil Jenkings 2011). As Maya Eichler 
puts it:     
 
Militarised masculinities take many forms and are constituted at multiple sites. They need to be 
understood as diverse and changing rather than as monolithic and static— and as context-specific 
rather than universally the same. (Eichler 2014, 90) 
 
Put simply, as long as the military institution continues to change, so will military 
masculinities, which indicates that analysing the ongoing bureaucratisation of mili-
tary violence is deeply connected to analysing military masculinities (Wilcox 2014). 
The links between masculinities and violence are of interest when analysing military 
use of force as most military organisations (still) consist of a majority of men, and 
the military represents a ‘legitimate’ wielder of state violence. Furthermore, it lies in 
the interest of the state that the military comprises types of masculinities that attract 
continuous recruitment and sustainment of the military institution (Higate and 
Hopton 2004, 435). Research on masculinity also suggest that versions of masculini-
ty connect to the use of force in how they underline what is considered ‘lawful’ and 
‘legitimate’ use of organised violence, and what is considered “deviant, transgres-
sive, disruptive, or illegitimate violence” (Stachowitsch 2015, 381). Masculinity is 
thus on the one hand identified as part of the narratives that tell the tale of what 
military service comprises and how organised violence holds a position as legitimate 
on a state macro-level.  
 
But masculinities are also, as indicated further above and more in line with this 
thesis’ interest, intertwined in the construction of military understandings of vio-
lence in specific contexts of discourses and materialities. One example of such re-
search where a specific context of violence is investigated from the perspective of 
embodied materiality and masculinities, is Synne Dyvik reading of Norwegian sol-
diers’ memoirs from the war in Afghanistan. Dyvik finds that these soldiers’ “ […] 
combat experiences should be understood as productive gendered performances of a 
particular kind of militarised masculinity, symbolically associated with Vikings and 
warriors.”(Dyvik 2016, 134). What we learn here is that these militarised masculini-
ties are, from the embodied experiences of soldiers in combat, closely connected to 
the “sensory experience of sex” and Dyvik offers insights into how violence and 
death in military practice is gendered through links between different bodily activi-
ties (Dyvik 2016, 143).  Through this analysis, Dyvik manages to disrupt the “offi-
cial narratives of peacebuilding, development and reconstruction” legitimising Nor-
way’s engagement in the war as the bodily experiences described in these memoirs 
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reveal another ‘truth’ about war – “one where the horror, joy, thrill, desire and ex-
citement of war […] are placed front, right and centre” (Dyvik 2016, 134, 143).  
 
In close concert to this embodied aspect of masculinity and violence we find re-
search that engages with the question of how the materiality of war ‘produces’ mili-
tary violence (in the ‘Lautorian’ sense discussed earlier on). Here militarised mascu-
linities are studied in relation to how technology reshapes gendered relationships 
between material and humans, as well as between war and violence. The previously 
mentioned focus on drones and airstrikes is extended to this research, for example in 
Lorrain Bayard de Volo’s analysis of how the ‘safe’ environment of the drone pilot 
challenges established connections between ‘warrior masculinity’ and the use of 
violence (Bayard De Volo 2016). Bayard de Volo exemplifies how new technology 
and its implication for how military violence is used work to surpass “[…] the tradi-
tionally valorised masculine attributes associated with heroism”, and instead deep-
ens the notion of protection in the construct of military masculinities due to the dis-
courses that legitimise use of drone strikes in the name of protection (Bayard De 
Volo 2016, 72–73). Simultaneously, as a result of the protected status of the drone 
pilot him/herself, this socio-technological relationship between human and machine 
is also feminised, in that the drone pilot does not ‘risk’ anything (other than her/his 
mental health) (see also: Daggett 2015, 367). This exemplifies the complex work-
ings of gender in how military practices develop through use of new technology. But 
what I want to stress here is, as Cristina Masters points out, that “[T]he inscription 
of technology with masculinity fundamentally constitutes technology as rational, 
objective and the source of moral knowledge claims.” (Masters 2005, 122). In other 
words, technology holds a central position in not ‘just’ how military violence is 
approached by military subjects, materiality also helps to reconstruct military mas-
culinities so as to strengthen the practitioner’s sense of ‘Self’ as part of a ‘rational’ 
practice.  
 
But when it comes to research that engages in the materiality of war and gender, 
technology seems to equate materiality, which is understandable due to the attention 
drone strikes have received in this field of research. But as pointed out in the sec-
tions above, drone strikes do not exist in a ‘vacuum’, and the use of ‘precision’ tech-
nology has created a bureaucratisation of military practices especially in operational 
staffs where work is done to plan, prepare and execute targeted missions. And alt-
hough much has been written on military masculinities and their relation to violence, 
the bureaucratisation of violence has received little attention. Put simply, the materi-
ality of processes, routines and ‘kill-lists’ is missing from the literature on military 
masculinities and their gendered relation to how military organisations manage, 
suppress or hide the use of force.   
 
By linking masculinities to the sustainment and construction of routinised and daily 
military practice I can leave technology, or the experiences of actual war fighting 
aside, and instead focus on how masculinities are interlinked with a bureaucratised 
management of violence. Consequently, my study of operational staff practice un-
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derlines previous conducted research which elucidates that masculinity is something 
that is learned through particular language and social relations (e.g. Baaz and Stern 
2009). And it adds an arguably important but under-studied context of military prac-
tice to this body of research. This approach thus fills some of the gap left by previ-
ous studies of military masculinity which often have relied on data collected from 
soldiers, lower ranks of officers’ corps, recruits, veterans or military personnel that 
do not ‘fit’ in hegemonic versions of military masculinity   (Duncanson 2009; Enloe 
2015; Higate 2007; J. Hockey in Jamieson 2014; e.g. Johnson 2010; Myrttinen, 
Khattab, and Naujoks 2017).  
 
On that note, I will in the next two sections proceed with a discussion on theory. The 
main point with the following sections is to identify how research on military under-
standings of violence can find support in theories on discourse and bureaucratisa-
tion. The chapter is then summarised in section 2.8, where I outline the supporting 
research questions generated by the research discussed here and the theoretical 
‘take-aways’ from my discussions on theory. The supporting research questions are 
as such aimed at filling some of the ‘gaps’ that currently exist in critical research on 
military understandings of violence, but also to sustain my investigations with theo-
retical support.   
 
2.6  Discourse theory – analysing language and materialities  
 
Discourse theory can arguably be philosophically challenging, even mystifying (as 
testified by some of my students and colleagues), and to be fair, sometimes more 
complex than it needs to be. In contrast, to avoid “lapsing into a self-indulgent theo-
reticism” (Torfing 2005, 25), my intention here is to keep my discussion on theory 
on discourse and its relation to materiality short, easy to follow and in close relation 
to the study of military violence.  
 
To start with, the concept of discourse is widely used in the research discussed 
above, many times without a particular definition connected to its use and it some-
times indicates a certain language used in a practice (Daggett 2015) or (public) de-
bate (I. G. R. Shaw and Akhter 2012). But in the poststructuralist tradition, discourse 
indicate more than ‘just’ use of a particular type of practice- or debate-related lan-
guage. Discourse is a concept that indicates an analysis of how language and prac-
tice include certain sets of human subjectivities and ways of identification, and ex-
clude others (D. R. Howarth 2013, 4; Torfing 2005, 8–9). Put simply, this means 
that in contrast to describing a particular use of language, a poststructural analysis of 
discourse searches for how both language and materiality create ideas about what is 
true and real about a particular (political or) social practice (see also: Laclau and 
Mouffe 1985, 93–95). This can be exemplified by Cohn’s investigation, where ana-
lysing a particular discourse (of US strategic use of nuclear weapons) aims at eluci-
dating the transformative power of language, through which a nuclear strike can be 
understood as ‘surgical’ and ‘clean’.  
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In concrete terms, analysing discourse in relation to investigating how violence and 
death are managed, suppressed or silenced in military practice, means, one the one 
hand, that the researcher must listen to the language of military practitioners and 
read the documents that they treat as central to their practice. In doing so, the re-
searcher can, as in the case of Carol Cohn’s study, identify how this language is 
constructed (pinpointing what terms, concepts, images and assumptions about the 
world it comprises) and analyse how this construction creates a specific meaning to 
what military violence is and what violence does. The analytical part is an interpre-
tive move that is based on the researcher’s own subjectivities and relations to the 
context of research, and to offer the reader insights and illustrations (quotations, 
pictures etc.) of the analysed language/images is therefore of central importance 
(Glynos and Howarth 2007, 184–86). Naturally so that the reader can, in turn, criti-
cally review the researcher’s interpretation and analysis.    
 
On the other hand, the researcher ‘must’ also engage in what the discourse compris-
es in terms of activities – what the subjects’ do and what material/objects they inter-
act with (Glynos and Howarth 2007, 104–5, 109). I put ‘must’ in quotation marks 
here because it is not always the case that researchers have the possibility to analyse 
the discourse at hand in this way. It can be impossible for several reasons, such as 
lack of funds for fieldwork or denied access. But as illustrated by the research dis-
cussed above, to engage with how technology, processes, routines, bodily activities 
and/or objects provide meaning to subjects and the social practices they engage in, is 
central for understanding how the material aspect of discourse operates. Arguably, to 
leave out the materiality of a practice when analysing it from a discursive perspec-
tive, is to delimit the span of analysis and risk losing key insights into how the prac-
tice and its subjects are socially intertwined (McSorley 2014).   
 
Both of these research activities are closely connected to the broader analytical ques-
tion, previously exemplified by Cohn (1987), of what, or who, is the main point of 
reference for the subjects in the research context. The terms used in poststructural 
discourse theory regarding this question are the concepts of subjectivities and identi-
fication, and they divide the analysis of ‘point of references’ into two areas: that of 
subjectivities, meaning that the researcher engages with how the subject (a practi-
tioner, agent of an practice or the researcher her/himself) performs as an active so-
cial agent (or in Howarth’s words “a radical subject”), deliberately reforming points 
of reference by identifying “with new objects and ideologies” (D. R. Howarth 2013, 
247). In other words, what Cohn (1987) did when she decided to learn the tech-
nostrategic language of the defence intellectuals. In my investigation the concept of 
subjectivity will be used when I analyse my ethnographical observations, in order to 
be able to capture how subjects in the military operational practice are forced to 
realign and reconstruct their points of reference. In other words, the concept of sub-
jectivity and the theories behind it give clues to analysing how a military subject 
aligns him/herself with a ‘new’ subject position which, in relation to my research 
context, embodies a specific (learned) understanding of what military violence is 
and how it is used.  
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The second concept providing support when analysing the question of ‘points of 
reference’ is that of identification. The concept is in discourse theory used to point at 
meaning-making (social) relations that link agents, objects and groups together and 
also separate them from others. These relations can, in turn, be divided into two 
types of processes: A process of linking concepts, objects and social practices into a 
homogenous narrative that has the function of creating a natural belonging and ‘to-
getherness’ for subjects and groups. And, in addition, it is a process of separating 
other concepts, objects and practices from this narrative in order to provide subjects 
and groups with the distinct notion of what they are not (providing an aspect of 
difference) (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 113–15). Allow me to return to Mathias De-
lori’s (2014) study of how French fighter aircraft pilots and high ranking officers 
“make sense of the act of killing”, as it offers a good example of how these process-
es can be analysed. Delori finds that the main points of reference for these military 
practitioners are the material parts of their practice, and that in their discourse “the 
bomb” is used to create a narrative which, paradoxically, leaves out the ‘enemy 
Other’ from their conceptualisation of their practice. Put in simple terms, this means 
that these pilots identify with “the bomb”, and that this object provides a ‘social 
glue’ that shapes how they make sense of their practice: “the bomb” is to be deliv-
ered at a specific geographical coordinate, and that is what the job is all about 
(Delori 2014, 526; see also: Christophe Wasinski 2017, 7). The misrecognition of 
the ‘enemy Other’ that Delori discovers in his ‘data’ is thus made possible through a 
process of identification with a material object, as this process leaves out the narra-
tion of an ‘Other’ in the discourse – as Delori puts it “enemies are the blanks in the 
contemporary discourse” (Delori 2014, 525). I will use the theoretical idea of identi-
fication in the analyses of operational staff work and targeting that follows in Chap-
ters 5 and 6, so as to pinpoint how subjects make use of social relations to form a 
notion of what the practice is about. But also, interlinked with this, what materiality 
it is in the work they do that matters for how the daily military practice is maintained 
and follows certain routines.      
 
Furthermore, by studying how Delori analyses the discourse of French fighter air-
craft pilots, we can see that poststructural discourse analysis where the material 
aspect of a practice is taken into account, operates through analytical lenses that 
search for what it is in the discourse that enables a certain ‘truth’ about violence to 
emerge. This brings me to a final point that I need to discuss before leaving the 
theories of discourse, and that is the use of history when analysing discourses.  
 
Historical analysis of the emergence of bureaucratised labour 
Poststructuralist ways of analysing discourse are indebted to Foucault for the in-
sights his research has brought to how discourses form notions of what is ‘true’ or 
‘natural’ in different societal practices (Torfing 2005, 7–9). For Foucault, analysis of 
how such notions had come into existence was closely connected to historical read-
ings and investigations of how societal practice had been shaped by what he called 
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‘events’. That is, ‘events’ are in Foucault’s terminology “the emergence and trans-
formation of practices” such as “the birth of the prison, the birth of the clinic, the 
birth of the welfare state “ (Walters 2012, 18). This is important to stress as the in-
vestigation at hand aims to investigate how violence and death are managed, neutral-
ised or suppressed in military practice due to how violence has transformed into 
‘bureaucratised labour’. Since bureaucratisation does not just suddenly come into 
existence, the question arises how the bureaucratisation of violence has come into 
existence in the first place? Or expressed differently: Through what reformations, 
political ideas and societal changes and experiences has bureaucratisation pervaded 
the military discourse/practice?  
 
Relatedly, Inspired by Laclau and Mouffe, Torfing formulates an historically in-
clined purpose of discourse analysis (in addition to elucidat the power of transforma-
tive language), which is “[…] to describe, understand and explain how and why 
particular discursive formations were constructed, stabilised and 
transformed.”(Torfing 2005, 19). What this means is that in order to understand how 
bureaucratisation has pervaded the (Swedish) military institution, I must engage with 
“[…] the contingent political processes leading to the formation of particular struc-
tures and institutions and particular accounts of the preferences and interests of the 
social actors […]” (Torfing 2005, 22). In concrete terms, I approach this task in two 
ways, as Torfing indicates that the analysis should comprise both political processes 
and the interests of social actors. Firstly I must engage with the historical question in 
relation to those political processes that have reformed the Swedish military, in order 
to gain insight into how (through what political means) bureaucratised military dis-
course and practice have come into being. Secondly, I need to engage in what way 
the social actors, the military practitioners in other words, are a part of this transfor-
mation. My interpretation of these two parts of the historical analysis is that in em-
pirical terms, I will on the one hand review and describe what others have to say 
about political processes that reformed the Swedish military during the early and 
middle part of the 20th century. Then I will proceed to analyse how the military 
discourse of the practitioners took form during this time period. This latter part will 
be guided towards analysis of military instructions, pamphlets and books that have 
been central for the practitioners’ conceptualisation of what military violence is. I 
discuss both the material and the timeframe in more detail in Chapter 4, where this 
historical analysis takes place.              
 
Summary 
The main ‘take-aways’ from poststructural discourse theory can be summarised as 
follows: 
 
I approach the concept of discourse to include language, practice and material as-
pects of practices. By observing and analysing the meaning-making (transformative) 
power of language, moments of identifications and the subjectivities found in the 
operational staff work and in the targeting-practice, my focus is on how military 
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subjects and practices form specific understandings of violence. I use these latter 
concepts to support my ethnographical investigations to guide my observations to-
wards the social relations between practitioners, but also between actors-objects (I 
will discuss my specific method for ethnography in the next chapter). My analysis of 
contemporary practices is preceded by a historical analysis of Swedish narratives on 
the use of military force, which serves to clarify how the bureaucratised discourse of 
military violence has come to exist. The historical part of the investigation is divided 
into two areas: that of political processes and reforms which have made bureaucrati-
sation a part of military discourse/practice, and that of military narratives which help 
form a specific meaning of what violence is.     
 
This brings me to my final task in this chapter, and that is to, in more precise terms, 
clarify what the concept of bureaucratisation comprises in this thesis.  
 
2.7  Bureaucratisation 
  
The study of bureaucracy is as old as the modern state and much has been written 
about what bureaucracies are and how they should function (e.g. Albrow 1970). 
Importantly, my task in this thesis is not to contribute specifically to the study of 
bureaucracy as it is military understandings of violence that stand in focus here. But 
as my study of violence relies upon the ‘fact’ that previous research has identified 
bureaucratisation as a central aspect of how Western military institutions have trans-
formed their relation to violence, it is pertinent to inquire if and how theories of 
bureaucratisation can offer some support in my task. I will therefore provide a brief 
overview of how the concept of bureaucratisation has developed, and what it entails. 
Naturally, I do not claim to create a ‘generalisable definition’ of bureaucratisation, 
but I will highlight a development of the concept to pinpoint some central aspects of 
this phenomenon, which will help me in my analyses of military violence.      
 
A suitable start must be by taking support from Max Weber. As a widely recognised 
sociologist who studied how the modern state came into being and its developments, 
Weber’s approach to bureaucratisation has influenced much of the early writings on 
bureaucracy. Weber has a ‘rational’ approach to bureaucratisation, as illustrated by 
this quote:   
 
Bureaucratisation offers above all the optimum possibility for carrying through the principle of 
specialising administrative functions according to purely objective considerations. Individual per-
formances are allocated to functionaries who have specialised training and who by constant prac-
tice learn more and more. The 'objective' discharge of business primarily means a discharge of 
business according to calculable rules and 'without regard for persons.' (M. Weber 2009, 215 
[1922]) 
 
Bureaucratisation is here connected to an ideal of ‘objective considerations’ and a 
process of learning to apply rules and to disregard specific human factors. This ap-
proach has long been the dominant view of how bureaucratisation is identified: as a 
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‘rational’ and hierarchical imposed control over administrative functions (Barker 
1993, 410).  The removal of the ‘person’ is specifically of note here, as it aligns with 
how the critical research discussed earlier on has identified a process of reification in 
contemporary Western warfare which has moved from the classical ‘demonising’ of 
the enemy, to a complete disregard of the enemy’s existence as a human. Neverthe-
less, as pointed out by Hill (2005), the ‘rational’ and hierarchical approach to bu-
reaucratisation has in later developments been subject to critique in the bureaucracy 
literature, as it hampers the administrative subject’s ‘space’ for making own judg-
ments. In other words, that in this Weberian ideal, bureaucratisation as a process of 
‘learning to abide to the rules’ becomes too rigid, and mitigates the administrative 
agent’s own initiative to enhance the effectiveness of the practice (Hill 2005, 202–
12). Indeed, Weber identified this problem himself and coined the term “iron cage” 
which describes, in short, how an increasing ‘rationalisation’ of bureaucracy will 
eventually impose such a high level of hierarchical control to an organisation that its 
effectiveness will falter. Here the agent who is in the mist of this type of bureaucrat-
isation “cannot squirm out of the apparatus into which he has been harnessed” 
(Barker 1993).   
 
James Barker (1993) provides an overview of how this problem of hierarchical con-
trol and faltering effectiveness has been identified in the research on bureaucracy 
and organisations, and he conducts an ethnography of an organisation that shifts into 
self-managing teams (from hierarchical control). He finds that researcher and practi-
tioners alike have presented a solution to the problem of the ‘iron cage’ and the 
implications of hierarchical control, through a type of bureaucratic organisation that 
relies on concertive control:  
 
Workers achieve concertive control by reaching a negotiated consensus on how to shape their be-
havior according to a set of core values, such as the values found in a corporate vision statement. 
[…] This negotiated consensus creates and recreates a value-based discourse that workers use to 
infer "proper" behavioral premises: ideas, norms, or rules that enable them to act in ways function-
al for the organisation. (Barker 1993, 411–12)  
 
Here bureaucratisation becomes closely connected to the creation of a “value-based 
discourse” in which the subject is socialised into a specific behaviorally pattern. It is 
a type of bureaucratisation process which is dependent on consensus and acceptance 
of certain norms and rules, and, in addition, ideally a ‘flat’ organisation. Paradoxi-
cally, Barker finds that this type of bureaucratisation of an organisation creates an 
even stronger ‘iron cage’, since the consensus-based norms and values turn into 
rules to obey, and the teams in his investigation eventually started to impose more 
administrative guidelines on themselves (Barker 1993). In addition, this type of 
bureaucratisation is harder for the agents to identify because “[I]n a concertive sys-
tem […] the workers create a value-based system of control and then invest them-
selves in it through their strong identification with the system [note to Barker and 
Cheney, 1994]” (Barker 1993, 434). What this means is that the agent of the practice 
is, as Barker (1993: 434) points out, “socially constructed by the system they have 
created.”, but not completely aware of how this construction operates. 
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For this thesis, these aspects of bureaucratisation suggest that the bureaucratisation 
of violence should be investigated in terms of how the military practice is dependent 
on social rules and norms to function, in particular how hierarchal control relates to 
consensus-based discourse in the bureaucratised practice. In other words, to investi-
gate if there is a consensus-based value discourse in the operational practice, and if 
so, how it relates to the social relations of the practice. Such an inquiry might identi-
fy how the actors of the practice embody bureaucratised violence, and also help to 
identify with what means bureaucratised violence is constructed. Arguably, bureau-
cratisation is a term that emphasises a study of how agents of a practice interact in 
relation to each other, through the use of references to, and abiding by, formal and 
informal rules. Rules that they have created themselves in consensus, in order to 
stabilise and make the work more efficient, and rules that are imposed into the prac-
tice by formalised procedures and routines. As a reminder from previous discus-
sions, the discourse theoretical ‘framework’ for this thesis suggests that this materi-
ality (the procedures, routines, databases and lists of the practice) have a construc-
tive role to play in the practice – the material and the agents are intertwined in a 
social relation. This chimes well with the observations made by Barker, and his 
argument that bureaucratisation can take the form of a value-based discourse, made 
up of social rules and norms.   
 
In conclusion, having discussed previous research on how military practitioners 
relate to the violent aspects of their work, and how discourse theory offers some key 
insights into how such relations can be studied, this brief meeting with theories on 
bureaucratisation offers further support to the emphasis previous research and dis-
course theory put on investigating social interactions with the materialities of a prac-
tice. I will now summarise and outline how the discussions in this chapter point to 
certain supportive research questions.          
 
2.8  Summary of Previous Research and Theory: Supporting 
research questions  
 
My initiating discussion on the renewed interest in militarism, and specifically, the 
sociological approach to investigating mundane and daily activities with connections 
to the use of military force, has several attachments to research that engages in mili-
tary violence. Specifically, the research discussed in the first part of the chapter sets 
the spotlight on the importance of investigating those underlying conditions that 
create a ‘common sense’ to an understanding where military violence is seen as 
‘productive’ and ‘efficient’ (see also: Foucault 2003, 45–46; Shapiro 2012, 64). But 
what is of specific interest here is how previous research on how military organisa-
tions manage the inescapable presence of death and violence in their practice has 
not, as of yet, engaged in those daily routines and practices which have been labeled 
‘bureaucratised labour’ (with some few exceptions, discussed above).  
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As I have tried to illustrate in my review of previous research, approaches where 
language, materiality, conceptualisations of the military ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’, as 
well as investigations in military masculinities, have rewarded us with much 
knowledge about how military subjects relate to violence. But as the military prac-
tice develops, so does this relation to violence. And since much of the research on 
the materiality of war indicates that Western military use of force is moving towards 
a further bureaucratisation, through the military dependency of ‘kill-lists’, databases, 
routines and formalised procedures, further investigations are called for. My 
‘unique’ position of being able to gain access to two military practices (operational 
staff work and the training of ‘targeteers’), where such materialities are central in the 
preparation, conduct and evaluation of military missions, offers opportunities to fill 
some of this gap. This means that the context of Sweden, as a Western state that 
actively uses its military force in international missions is less important compared 
to the type of military practice this context facilitates for me as a researcher to inves-
tigate. In other words, although my investigation of military operational practices is 
located in Sweden, the main contribution to previous research is not Sweden per se, 
but the possible insights in bureaucratised labour of violence this context offers.  
 
Furthermore, when engaging in the study of daily military work, previous research 
on military masculinities accentuates the importance for the analysis to take into 
account how military subjects make use of masculine ‘norms’ in ways which sustain 
the naturalisation of use of military violence. In other words, research on materiality 
and military masculinities (not to indicate that these are necessarily separate fields of 
study) emphasises the study of practice-related social relations and use of language. 
These are relations and discourse that help maintain a homogenised and de-
politicised understanding of military violence.  
 
In sum, what the previously conducted research indicates in terms of questions tenta-
tively still left unanswered, in relation to the overarching question of how the ines-
capable presence of violence and death are managed, neutralised or silenced in mili-
tary practice, is the following: 
- what are the main subjects or points of reference in operational military 
discourse? In particular, how does military staff practice shape understand-
ings of violence and death?  
- how is military subjects’ relation to violence shaped through the transform-
ative language and materiality of NATO targeting lists and practical proce-
dures? 
- how does reification and misrecognition of the Other exist and operate in 
the bureaucratised labour of operational staff practice and in the practice of 
targeting? 
- how does the bureaucratisation of violence relate to military masculinities? 
In particular, what values and norms come in forefront in the construction 
of military masculinity in the context of bureaucratised labour at an opera-
tional staff? 
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The historical background to how bureaucratisation has come into being in my con-
text of research is in addition to the questions above a necessary first step in the 
analysis. A description and analysis of how bureaucratisation ‘takes hold’ of the 
Swedish military when it is reformed into its modern form can bring further depth to 
the otherwise contemporary focused analysis of military understandings of violence. 
It is, in other words, the theoretically established importance of creating a historical-
ly grounded understanding of how discourses emerge, which motivates the analysis 
of historical narratives in the thesis. This first step in the analysis is thus meant to 
complement my main contemporary analyses of operational staff work and of 
NATO targeting processes, so as to offer deeper insight into how using military 
violence has come to comprise aspects of bureaucratic labour.  
 
When it comes to theoretical ‘tools’, previous research and theories on discourse and 
bureaucratisation suggest that analysis of military language and practice should be, 
on the one hand, directed towards how identification is constructed. In particular, 
this analysis is made possible by searching for how military language contains 
points of reference where relations to death and violence are made up through pro-
cesses of bureaucratisation (e.g. rationalisation/ordering/structuring the military 
practice), relations to materiality (e.g. technology, lists, databases, routines and use 
of the body), and processes of reification. On the other hand, the analysis can be 
supported by a complementary focus on how subjectivity ‘plays out’ in military 
operational practice. In other words, observing and analysing how subjects’ interact 
and share particular points of reference in the language and materiality of operation-
al practice. In both these theoretical avenues, the analysis should conclude how 
identification and subjectivity create certain norms and social rules for how death 
and violence are managed, neutralised or silenced in military practice. This focus on 
norms/social rules rests upon how theories of bureaucratisation and of analysing 
language/materiality suggest that practitioners’ own understanding of their practice 
is anchored in consensus-related agreements on what is a ‘natural’ and ‘correct’ way 
of interpreting and conducting their practice. Analysing social rules and norms thus 
comprises a focus on human relations as they offer ways of identification and sub-
jectivities for the agents of a practice. But the analysis should also include how iden-
tification and subjectivities are made possible by the meaning-making power of 
discourse. And in addition how the language and materiality of the practice sedi-
ments, or stabilises, the social rules and norms that make the practice function in a 
particular way.      
 
On that note, I move on to engage with ethnography and reflexive methods of re-
searching military practice. 
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3 
Chapter 3: Ethnographic Method 
 
In this chapter I motivate and outline my way of utilising ethnographic methods and 
in particular, discuss why and how autoethnography is used in my search for the 
social relations, rules and norms that are central to how violence and death are man-
aged, neutralised or silenced in operational work. This chapter thus expands upon 
how methods of ethnography can be used to capture the constantly ongoing repro-
duction and sedimentation of social relations and norms/rules that are a part of how 
operational work is formed. It is in other words the value-based discourse, previous-
ly discussed as a part of how bureaucratisation takes shape, that is to be ‘captured’ 
by my ethnographical approach.  
 
The research problem points to investigations of the way in which the military itself 
contributes to a bureaucratisation of violence by how the institution conceptualises, 
articulates and understands violence. Therefore I need to investigate how operational 
work ‘functions’ in ways that create and sustain a self-imposed (bureaucratised) way 
of working (planning, sustaining and executing the use of force). Hence the decision 
to engage in studies of operational practice that, on the one hand, sustains and plans 
for the use of force through its daily work (Chapter 5) and, on the other hand, gov-
erns the direct use of operational violence (Chapter 6). As indicated by Glynos and 
Howarth, ethnographical work is preferred when a researcher engages in finding the 
social relations, rules and norms of a particular practice (Glynos and Howarth 2007, 
176). In addition, materiality and language have, by my review of previous research, 
been pinpointed as important aspects of investigating military violence. This under-
lines the need for a discussion on how these aspects of the research environment are 
managed by my ethnographical approach. 
 
Consequently, this chapter starts with providing a brief overview of ethnography and 
proceeds thereafter to a discussion of post-structural critique of ethnographic re-
search methods. As this critique is partly based on the possibilities of further use of 
reflexivity in ethnographical work, the chapter elaborates on what an auto-
ethnographical research method comprises. The chapter then moves on to provide 
more details on how auto-ethnography has been used when investigating military 
practice. This includes a methods summary where I outline my specific use of eth-
nography and auto-ethnography, and how these research methods are supported by 
post-structural theory. The chapter is concluded with a discussion on research ethics.             
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3.1 Ethnography  
 
This section will provide a brief discussion on what ethnography comprise in con-
temporary research and how this style of research (ethnography is not a single meth-
od) is relevant for my study. It will not engage in a historical walkthrough of how 
ethnography has spread from anthropology to sociology and political science, as 
there are several other works that already provide excellent descriptions of this de-
velopment (see: Atkinson and Coffey 2001; Brewer 2000; introduction in: Neyland 
2008). Nevertheless, the term ‘ethnography’ is notoriously hard to define, but it can 
be said to point to a type of research that engages in different types of social and 
cultural environments (such as indigenous, urban or work-related domains) and does 
so with ambitions to create accounts for (own, others or group) experiences (e.g. 
Atkinson and Coffey 2001, 4–5; Atkinson and Hammersley 2007, 1–2). As ethnog-
raphy can mean many different things depending on the trope of research, ‘defini-
tions’ of ethnography tend to lean on practical aspects of ethnographical investiga-
tions, as discernable in Willis’s and Trondman’s (2000) classical launching article 
for the journal “Ethnography”:  
 
What is ethnography for us? Most important, it is a family of methods involving direct and 
sustained social contact with agents and of richly writing up the encounter, respecting, recording, 
representing at least partly in its own terms the irreducibility of human experience. (Willis and 
Trondman 2002, 394) 
 
From my point of view, what Willis and Trondman (2000) suggest is that ethnogra-
phy comprises a collection of methods which are joined together in the researcher’s 
effort to shed some light on the complexities intrinsic to the social context of the 
research at hand. ‘Experiences’ is a key word here, as it is the ethnographer’s in-
volvement in a social context of research that separates this type of research from 
other methodologies (O’Reilly 2005, 2–3). In other words, to achieve some level of 
involvement, ethnography points in the direction of a method of participant observa-
tion. Or as Atkinson and Coffey (2001) puts it: “Observation and participation (ac-
cording to circumstance and the analytical purpose at hand) remain the characteristic 
features of the ethnographic approach” (Atkinson and Coffey 2001, 4–5). But the 
focus on involvement in the social context of research means that ‘ethnography’ is 
not simply another word for ‘participant observation’. To achieve some level of 
involvement, the researcher needs to engage in conversations with the subjects of the 
social context (Atkinson and Coffey 2001, 5; O’Reilly 2005, 3). But also, in some 
cases, the researcher needs to subject him/herself to the social rules and norms that 
‘govern’ the social context in order to experience ‘at first hand’ how this context 
comprises certain subjectivities (Adams, Jones, and Ellis 2015, 50). In short, to carry 
out ethnographic work is to observe, participate, talk, feel and reflect. And, as point-
ed out by Willis and Trondman in the quote above, to “richly” write down the ‘out-
comes’ of these activities.  
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Furthermore, what is indicated by the term ethnography is that the research strives to 
unfold the complexities, social identities and interactions of the context of research 
(Bloome et al. 2005, xvi). To engage in ethnographic research is thus to explore a 
specific context and its relation to the theoretical questions that fuel the research. 
Which means that the research often starts with a broadly defined interest (for in-
stance in particular actors, a context or a set of practices) and through a longer peri-
od of interaction with the research context then narrows down to more closely de-
fined areas of interests (Atkinson and Hammersley 2007, 3–4). Nevertheless, the 
detailed and exploratory character of ethnography studies can be sustained, or guid-
ed, by theories that offer analytical insight into how, as in my case, a practice is 
made to function on a day-to-day basis (Willis and Trondman 2002, 396). And every 
researcher’s ethnographical approach should include a description of how the re-
searcher relates (and in some cases makes use) of how “[…] reflexivity, one’s own 
role in the construction of social life […]” plays a part in the field work and analysis 
(O’Reilly 2005, 3).   
 
The following sections aim to provide both such a description of how reflexivity is a 
‘factor’ in my ethnographical approach, and a discussion on how post-structural 
theory has informed my ethnographical research.       
 
3.2  Poststructural Critique of Ethnography 
 
This section comprises a discussion of how reflexivity has been debated in terms of 
how the researcher’s own thoughts, feelings and status as participant should, or 
should not, be included in the ethnographical approach to, and analysis of, the field-
work. This is important to discuss, as my ethnographic work is conducted in a re-
search context which has shaped my own identity through my years of military ser-
vice as an officer. I will discuss my own situation as partly military officer, partly 
researcher, in the concluding part of this chapter, and will here, to facilitate that 
discussion, offer some of the main points of the debate regarding reflexivity. But 
this short section also offers some insight into the debate that relates reflexivity to 
discussions on how language and materiality should be approached in ethnograph-
ical work.  
 
In “Writing Culture” Clifford & Marcus display some cross-references to the very 
same academics (among others: Lyotard, Foucault and Derrida) that have inspired 
the expansion of discourse theory. Stimulated by insights from the emerging post-
structuralism, the reflexive turn provoked radical changes in ethnographic work. 
Foremost, the insight that history has a contingency to it, that there are no certain 
sets of ‘facts’ or ‘truths’ in the social world, and that claims made by researchers are 
made from a position of power, underline this connection to post-structuralism in 
“Writing Culture” (Clifford and Marcus 1986, 6, 7, 10–11). The authors suggest that 
the ethnographic writer should turn to him/herself in order to produce ethnographic 
texts that incorporate these insights (Ibid, p. 22-23). “Writing Culture” is, in retro 
perspective, indeed a text that stands for the ‘reflexive turn’ that encompassed the 
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debates of ethnographical research during the 1980s. Many years after its publishing, 
Davies, the author of “Reflexive Ethnography” (1999) strives to counter what she 
calls the “destructive force” in social research, which is a force that has taken self-
reflexive insights and drawn them to the extreme (Davies 1999, 5). By this she 
means that the constant pressure on researchers to self-reflect and to critically inves-
tigate their inner motives and preconceptions creates an inward spiral that prevents 
any possibility to find something more than just the researcher’s inner life in their 
work (Ibid, p. 7). In order to counter this tendency (which she relates to the post-
structuralist movement in science), Davies asks: 
 
Thus the question arises as to whether this inward spiral can be broken without losing the insights 
into the reflexive nature of knowledge. Is knowledge of anything other than knowledge of reflexiv-
ity possible? And if so, how is it achieved? The answer may lie in consideration of the dual nature 
of social research: that it depends both on some connection with that being researched and on 
some degree of separation from it. (Davies 1999, 10) 
 
Posing this question in relation to critique against the relativism that is (at least in 
the writer’s eyes) imbued with post-structuralism, some other ontological starting 
point must be identified for ethnographic work. Davies wants to hold on to some 
“very valuable insights” that are inherent in post-structuralism (the identification of 
power-relations and the multitude of meaning in language), and at the same time 
reject the anti-essential logic of this train of thought (Davies 1999, 17). Hence the 
turn towards critical realism which ‘allows’ a separation between the ‘real’ and our 
ideas about reality. This ontological shift can also be seen in Lilie Chouliaraki’s and 
Norman Fairclough’s work where they develop the ontological foundation of Criti-
cal Discourse Analysis (CDA). This latter theoretical/methodological approach also 
takes issue with the ‘relativism’ of post-structuralism and seeks to find something 
outside of the meaning-making effects of language and signs (they take issue with 
Derrida’s infamous claim that “there is nothing outside the text”) (e.g. Chouliaraki 
and Fairclough 1999, 8, and Chapter 6; Dilley 1999, 23–24).  
 
In both of these cases, I see traces of Roy Bhaskar’s central (to critical realism) 
argument that the subject of human science includes both social objects and beliefs 
about social objects (Bhaskar 2011, 101). However, these similarities seem to me to 
be imbued with the same difficulty: where and how does the researcher’s reflexivity 
stop, and the causality of the objects that are under investigation start?  Or expressed 
differently: where and how do the researcher’s language, signs and practice not 
matter to the transformation of the researcher’s experiences (observations, conversa-
tions) into a written ethnography (or, for that matter, discourse analysis)? From a 
poststructural position, this question is as central as it is to those who work with 
critical realism as their ontology of choice. But instead of getting stuck with a divi-
sion between the subjectivity of language, and the objectivity of objects (an apparent 
risk for a critical realist), I focus upon the context bound relationship between dis-
course and materiality, which I discuss in section 2.3 (the materiality of war) of the 
previous chapter. What this means is that my ethnography must take into account the 
‘fact’ that the materiality of my research context (its procedures, lists, objects etc.) 
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may influence and ‘produce’ a specific social order for operational work to function 
in the way it does.  
 
Furthermore, the “everyday or unmarked” is central when the ethnographer aims to 
capture discourses in the field as “… they contain information about language ideol-
ogy, socialisation, and ways in which gender, age, ethnic identity, and power rela-
tionships are linguistically constructed and conceived” (Farnell and Graham 1998, 
422). This underlines that capturing the language and materiality of violence is not 
just about noting the specific language used by the practitioners in the field. From 
my point of view, a poststructural ethnography also includes observations of what 
objects, places, bodily expressions and relations are connected to the use of lan-
guage. In other words, the investigation of operational military work must include 
observations of practitioners, including my own, central ‘objects’ of identification 
and avenues of subjectivity, when interacting with the daily work at an operational 
staff.  
 
The above discussed connections between the materiality of social order and the 
striving to take into account the researcher’s reflexivity into ethnographical work, 
chimes with more recent discussions on autoethnography and subjectivism (the latter 
not entirely interchangeable with poststructuralist interpretations of the concept of 
subjectivity, but indeed similar): 
 
In this context, subjectivism is welcomed and seen as a resource (McLeod, 2011), as the body is 
assumed to be a central site for socio-political meaning-making (Spry, 2011). However, as Sparkes 
(2003) robustly argues, subjectivism should not be confused with solipsism or self-indulgence. 
The subjectivist stance in autoethnography is predicated on quite the opposite: that culture flows 
through self and vice versa (Ellis & Bochner, 1996), and that people are inscribed within dialogic, 
socially shared, linguistic and representational practices (Bakhtin, 1984; Frank, 2005) through 
their daily occupations. The self is therefore understood as a social and relational rather than an au-
tonomous phenomenon (Church, 1995). (see: Short, Turner, and Grant 2013, 4–5,my italics). 
 
The process of inscription mentioned here is in my view a way of pointing to the 
process of subjectivity where the subject dislocates itself from one subject position 
and forms into another. In this sense, the above quote from “Contemporary British 
Autoethnography” (2013) captures the essence of my theoretical and methodical 
approach to my fieldwork. Here, the ‘field’ is not just the physical location of the 
practice of interest, nor just the people performing these practices, it expands to my 
analysis of my own field notes. Blurring the concept of ‘the field’ is thus another 
consequence of the reflexive turn (see also: A.C.G.M. Robben and Sluka 2012, 27–
29).  
 
Having discussed reflexive ethnographical research and its connections to materiali-
ty and social order, and having ended up with the term ‘autoethnography’, the next 
section will offer some insight into what this term entails.  
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3.3  Autoethnography 
 
If ethnography is about describing and analysing ‘culture’ and social experiences of 
‘others’, and reflexivity is about taking into account the researcher’s own experienc-
es of interacting with (e.g. recording, writing, participating) agents and cultural 
environments into the analysis, what is autoethnography? This section tries to an-
swer this question through a short discussion about how cultural embeddedness and 
the researcher’s own knowledge and experiences of the research context have found 
a methodological ‘place’ in the concept of autoethnography. But it also engages in a 
discussion on how the long tradition in ethnographic work of utilising narratives 
(such as anthropologists use of “life histories”) has come, through the ‘reflexive 
turn’ to include the stories told by the researchers themselves (Chang 2008, 44–45). 
These two areas of discussion (cultural embeddedness and the use of personal narra-
tives) are arguably central to creating an understanding of autoethnography. Particu-
larly as productive scholars in this type of writing outline autoethnography as: 
 
[Autoethnography is] an approach to research and writing that seeks to describe and systematically 
analyse (graphy) personal experience (auto) in order to understand cultural experience (ethno) 
[note to]: (ELLIS, 2004; HOLMAN JONES, 2005). […] A researcher uses tenets of autobiog-
raphy and ethnography to do and write autoethnography. Thus, as a method, autoethnography is 
both process and product. (Ellis, Adams, and Bochner 2011, 345 (italics in original))  
 
What this quote clarifies is that autoethnography points to research methods that 
allow for the researcher to use his/her own experiences to better understand and 
analyse the workings of the particular culture or social phenomenon of interest. The 
following two parts of the section comprise discussions that aim to clarify how au-
toethnography as a method is understood to contribute to my fieldwork.   
 
Dissolving the boundaries between Self/Others and outsider/insider 
Every fieldwork has its specific challenges. The reciprocal relationship between 
fieldworker and the people/practices of study is always bound by context and 
formed by personalities (see Angrosino and Rosenberg 2011, 468 f. for a discussion 
on this). In traditional fieldwork, challenges were often connected to language use 
and forms of ‘blending in’, while post-modern fieldwork comprises challenges that 
are connected to letting suppressed voices be heard without making a colonial 
(Western) imprint on the field environment (Davies 1999, 15). Most common 
among professional fieldworkers (and the ‘inventors’ of fieldwork) - the anthropolo-
gists - is that challenges spring from a situation where the researchers have very 
little practical experience of the culture they are to observe (see: Barley 1983 for a 
rather amusing account of this). In addition, ethnographic researchers often have 
‘outsider’ imprinted on their persons (comprised of different gender/skin col-
our/language/customs/cloths/ethical standpoints etc. than the people they aim to 
study) which thus forms a base for their specific challenges when entering ‘the field’ 
(DeWalt and DeWalt 2011, 30, 35–37).   
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My challenges have sprung from quite the opposite relation to my ‘field’. They are 
connected to my split roles as military officer and researcher as well as to my deep 
knowledge of the practices that are to be studied. As an officer with my rank and 
educational background I can blend in all too well. Not just my interlocutors but also 
I myself may forget that I am in place to do research, and not to, for instance, en-
hance the operational planning process that I aim to study. For instance, the articula-
tions that are connected to the military practices are so natural to me that they may 
pass unnoticed. The risk is obviously that I ‘miss out’ on central aspects of language 
and practice that provide deeper knowledge of military understandings of violence. 
Writings of autoethnographical methods accentuate the ‘fact’ that these reflections 
are quite commonly the main criticism of research conducted by people in my posi-
tion (see Chang 2008, 45 for a discussion on this). Such critique is often met by the 
argument that ‘insiders’ can shed light on aspects of the context at hand with a high-
er grade of representation and legitimacy than an ‘outsider’ can, bringing fourth 
details that outsiders tend to miss out on (MacIsaac, Irwin, and Mather 2009, 10–
11). In addition, Glynos and Howarth point to the importance of acquiring a measure 
of expertise in the practice that is to be studied, in order to sort out which social 
relations and rules/norms drive the practice (Glynos and Howarth 2007, 184–85).  
 
Insomuch, a ‘halfie’ ethnographer, in contrast to the ‘outsider’ is one who stands 
between differently defined subject-positions where one of these positions is in use 
by the researcher’s subjects of interest. Or in simpler terms: ‘Halfies’ do fieldwork 
in social contexts that are ‘their own’. Lila Abu-Lughod defines this term as 
“…people whose national or cultural identity is mixed by virtue of migration, over-
seas education, or parentage.” (Fox and King 1991, 466). But more recent use blurs 
the distinction between the narrow definition given by Abu-Lughod and the meaning 
of expressions like the ‘native’ ethnographer, or the ‘insider’ (e.g. Dauth 2009; 
A.C.G.M. Robben and Sluka 2012, 20). This diffusion of the term supports suggest-
ing that the term ‘halfie’ points to more than a mixed national or cultural identity, or 
at least an expansion on what cultural identity means.  
 
In my case, my background as a military officer provides me with an embedded 
knowledge of operational military ‘culture’ which, in the light of the development of 
the term ‘halfie’, makes me (tentatively) label myself a ‘halfie’ ethnographer. In 
other words, autoethnography can be understood as a label for a research method 
where researchers have been in a position where they investigate an institution or 
social context that they themselves have had a ‘non-research’ role in (Chang 2008, 
44). Just to mention a few different contexts: Former patients doing research on 
health care (Ellingson 1998); inhabitants of segregated urban suburbs participating 
in police work conducted in these areas (Fassin 2013); and medical personnel work-
ing as nurses for ethnographic purposes (Savage 2000). In short, autoethnography is 
being used when the ethnographical research is conducted by an ‘insider’ or a ‘na-
tive’ ethnographer, and the researcher’s own experience of the culture is used as 
‘data’ in the analysis of the field work. I will, further below, discuss this in more 
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detail in relation to how I have constructed my auto/ethnographical research ap-
proach with support of concepts from poststructural discourse theory.  
 
As indicated by the initiating part of this section on autoethnography, cultural em-
beddedness cannot provide a complete description of what autoethnography is, as 
this term (much like ethnography) has several applications and meanings depending 
on the researcher and the research environment (for a long list of labels that can be 
connected to the term autoethnography, see: Chang 2008, 47–48). But in common 
with the main part of these different uses of autoethnography, in addition to the 
cultural embeddedness that I point to above, is the use of different types of narra-
tives in the ethnographical research. The next part of this section on autoethnography 
aims to shed some light on the use of narratives in autoethnographical work.  
 
Narratives and the use of story-telling  
Autoethnographers construction of ‘data’, derived from one’s own experiences of 
fieldwork or one’s own encounters with the social world, often takes the form of 
personal stories (Ellis 2001; e.g. Holt 2003; Humphreys 2005; Savage 2000). Such 
use of narratives has developed during the last decade of IR-writing, either in the 
form of autobiographical, autoethnographical or other approaches that include use of 
narratives, to hold a position as a “[…] legitimate field of scholarly inquiry.” 
(Ravecca and Dauphinee 2018, 1). Insomuch, to position the use of narratives in IR-
research as ‘legitimate’ facilitates discussions on the use of personal stories as ‘da-
ta’, from a question of ‘if it’s really research’, to more constructive topics. One cen-
tral such topic is how self-narratives can be of use in creating a deeper understand-
ing of the human complexities that the researcher aims at exploring (e.g. Brigg and 
Bleiker 2010; Short, Turner, and Grant 2013).  
 
But there has been a tendency in autoethnographical research to try to ‘fit in’ with 
the rules and norms of ‘conventional’ research, impossibly trying to adhere to ideals 
such as the researcher analysing his/her data from an ‘objective’ position (L. 
Anderson 2006; e.g. Bochner and Ellis 2006). Or as aptly put by Ellis et al.:   
    
When researchers do autoethnography, they retrospectively and selectively write about epiphanies 
that stem from, or are made possible by, being part of a culture and/or by possessing a particular 
cultural identity. However, in addition to telling about experiences, autoethnographers often are 
required by social science publishing conventions to analyse these experiences. (Ellis, Adams, and 
Bochner 2011, 348)  
 
Fortunately, the debate has moved on from how autoethnography can be fitted into 
(positivist) research ideals, and now comprise questions of how the use of narratives 
can provide disruptions to established notions of how the central elements of a re-
search context function (Edkins 2013; Naumes 2015). In other words, the ‘gains’ 
offered by the use of self-reflexive stories in political science can be located in how 
such stories chime (well/poorly) with theoretical notions that explain and provide 
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understanding of that which is being investigated. Ravecca and Dauphinee (2018), in 
a recent article on the use of narratives in IR-research, conclude that personal, self-
reflexive stories have a central place in the research, when the narratives ‘engage’ 
with theoretical understanding of a particular research problem:   
 
What is important for us here is to examine how the reader might see theory working through nar-
ratives, as well as to recognise what a text offers (or does not offer): Does it solidify a position? 
How does it deal with other accounts of the world? How does the narrative then enable different 
possibilities around translation between the text, the reader, and the author? (Ravecca and 
Dauphinee 2018, 11)  
  
From my position as a ‘halfie’ researcher, this use of personal stories is productive 
for my analysis of military understandings of violence as this offers a way for me to 
elucidate how discourses and materiality belonging to bureaucratised relations to 
military violence is a part of my own subjectivity and ways of identification. Fur-
thermore, by including personal notes and reflections in my investigations of opera-
tional work, I can shed some light on how mundane and daily work with military 
matters comprise moments of identification with bureaucratised military discourse.  
I will come back to this in section 3.5 where I discuss the details of my use of eth-
nography and autoethnography.   
 
In sum, autoethnography means (at least for its use in this thesis) that I, the research-
er/officer, utilise my own experience and cultural embeddedness of the research 
context to deepen my analysis of social relations and use of language/materiality in 
the military practice. My main technique for elucidating this autoethnographical 
method is by including stories and reflections from my research endeavors, and to 
discuss these narratives from a perspective of how they offer insights into the man-
agement, suppression or silencing of death and violence. In short, personal stories 
and research notes are used to open up a space for the reader to engage in the analy-
sis of how operational military work (through its avenues of subjectivity and mo-
ments of identification) constructs understandings of violence.   
     
3.4  Autoethnography and military practice 
 
This section offers a short discussion of the problems and possibilities of using au-
toethnography in relation to researching military practice. After this section I will 
proceed to a summary of my interpretation of the autoethnographical method and 
how I use discourse theory and specifically, the concepts of subjectivity and identifi-
cation in support of my ethnographical investigations.   
 
Autoethnographical research of the military is remarkably underrepresented in polit-
ical science and IR. As MacIsaac et al. (2009) notes in one of few autoethnograph-
ical texts within the military context “Contemporary qualitative researchers will not 
likely neglect reflexivity. Yet, the concept is largely absent in studies of military 
organisations, and, in an age of post-modern academia, this is somewhat puzzling.” 
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(see also: Gait and Mao-Shai 2010, 279–80; MacIsaac, Irwin, and Mather 2009, 4). 
This may be a result of the ‘bad relation’ between anthropologists and the military, 
which stems from accusations of colonialism in the early days of the academic gen-
re, and the scandals of the 1960s US-army Project Camelot (where anthropologists 
were used as ‘intelligence gatherers’) (Fluehr-Lobban gives an extensive overview 
in: Farnell and Graham 1998, 174–78). More recent uses of anthropologists in mili-
tary contexts, the Human Terrain Teams (HTTs), have not quelled this aversion to 
anthropologists getting involved in military matters (González 2008; McFate and 
Laurence 2015, chap. 2; Antonius C G M Robben 2009). As it is, transformative 
language and objects of inscription construct military culture, which creates a fear 
among researchers of getting seduced by the strong culture in the military.  ‘Going 
native’ in a morally challenging practice like the military might cause the ethnog-
rapher to forget the ideals and ethics driving the ethnographic work.  
 
Furthermore, from the military science perspective, autoethnography might be too 
‘radical’ for the main body of researchers working with military matters, as it is a 
form of research heavily informed by poststructural theory (as previously discussed) 
(e.g. Higate and Cameron 2006, 229–30). The poststructural intake collides quite 
heavily with those that understand all things connected to the military institution in 
the ‘Huntington-tradition’, where realism is the bread and butter of the researcher’s 
theoretical/methodological approach. The (perhaps) Lutheran-inspired critique that 
autoethnography is ‘self-indulgent’ may also contribute to the absence of autoeth-
nography in ethnographical studies of the military. This latter critique is quite thor-
oughly met by researchers adopting the methodology. For example, by using argu-
ments related to how the exposure of personal feelings, discussions of ethical prob-
lems and the exposure of how meaning is imbedded in social relations creates a 
deeper understanding of the context of research (see Sparkes 2002, 210 ff.).   
 
Conversely, as indicted previously in this chapter, in many settings outside the mili-
tary several ethnographers have found that the more ‘contaminated’ they get by the 
cultures, contexts and/or subjects that they meet in the field (the more ‘biased’ they 
get in the light of traditional positivistic ideals), the more they can learn about how 
meaning is created in the field of study (Ellingson 1998, 494). Fragmentation of 
identity seems to be best captured by describing the researcher’s process of altera-
tion, often going from theoretically conversant to culturally immersed by entering 
the ‘field’ of study. Thus, by exposing the researcher’s alteration of ‘self’, by using a 
reflexive method of investigation, it is possible to learn how identity is formed in 
specific environments (e.g. Subedi 2006). Further on I will describe my attempt to 
create a bridge between these positions where immersion in culture and ethnograph-
ic work can go hand in hand in research of military practices.  
 
Autoethnography can support researchers with experience of war practices, or the 
use of force if you will, to come to terms with what ‘effects’ such experiences can 
have on their research. Or in the words of Oded Löwenheim (2010): 
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By writing this autoethnographical account, I became highly sensitive to and aware of the im-
portance of personal voice, style, and selfhood in academic texts, as well as of the personal and so-
cietal implications of suppressing these dimensions. (Löwenheim 2010, 1045)  
 
As an Israeli IR-scholar with close personal experience of war, Löwenheim discov-
ers that ‘mainstream’ IR-theory can help him detach from these experiences, but at 
the cost of academically producing something ‘real’ about war (see also Doty 2004 
for an intriguing text on identity and writing IR). But including ‘the personal voice’ 
in analysis does not come without cost. Ethical and methodological implications are 
therefore discussed at the end of this chapter and in my concluding chapter, where I 
describe how this type of reflexivity is beset with limitations of research and person-
al peril, and naturally how such perils are mitigated in my investigation. As noted by 
several in this trope of research, autoethnography functions best when the reflexivity 
added by the researcher actually provides something new or disruptive to such as-
pects of IR that otherwise are set as ‘facts’ or not seen. Indeed, much of the academ-
ic literature adhering to autoethnography or autobiography referred to above, re-
mains closely connected to using narratives of personal experiences as ‘data’ in their 
research. But consequently, this cannot be interpret as a method where ‘any’ story or 
experience of the researcher will suffice as autoethnography must be closely con-
nected to the problem and aim of the research (Brigg and Bleiker 2010; Dauphinee 
2010; Edkins 2013; for an introduction and methodlogical critique, see Naumes 
2015).  
 
Therefore, the next section will provide such connections between research problem, 
theory and method, in order to clarify how my ethnographical research has been 
conducted.  
 
3.5  Summary: My use of Auto/Ethnography and discourse 
theory 
 
My method of researching contemporary operational military work can in simple 
terms be described as participating in different central practices, observing and in-
teracting (talking) with the agents, and recording my observations and conversations 
by taking notes (and in some cases using a digital recorder). This short description 
indicates a traditional ethnographical investigation, as it points to the main features 
of what ‘defines’ ethnography (discussed early on in this chapter). But as indicated 
in my discussion on autoethnography, and the description of my research problem 
found in Chapter 1, to simply say that I conduct ethnographical research leaves too 
much of the details and focus of the research process aside.  Therefore, this section 
offers a more precise description of how (poststructural) theory, ethnography and 
autoethnography underpin my approach to investigating operational work. This 
includes a short discussion of how I use self-narratives in the ethnographical work 
and the section is concluded by a discussion of how my ‘halfie’ position is used in 
my efforts to shed light on how violence is constructed and sustained in operational 
work. 
  48 
 
Nevertheless, the focus that my supporting research questions puts on discourse, 
social relations and materiality is something that I have derived from previous re-
search, poststructural theory and theories of bureaucratisation. Insomuch, the sup-
porting research questions point the ethnographical research to take support in cen-
tral elements of poststructural theory that can offer a deeper understanding of how 
(military) subjects relate, manage and understand violence. Particularly in how the 
questions guide the ethnographical work to try to ‘capture’ ways of subjectivity and 
moments of identification, without losing sight of how the military language com-
prises meaning-making discourse.  
 
When it comes to my approach to researching operational military work, I have 
drawn much from the recent development in autoethnography in the way others have 
approached their context of research and utilised their own reflexivity in order to 
achieve the aims of their research (e.g. Bulmer and Jackson 2016; Ellingson 1998; 
Fassin 2013; Hockey 1996; Kirke 2010; McSorley 2016; Savage 2000). For in-
stance, as indicate by my previous discussions on how bureaucratisation takes shape 
(via hierarchical control and/or through concertive control), bureaucratised under-
standings of violence are arguably not likely to be ‘purely’ technocratic or ‘rational’, 
i.e. bereft of human considerations. On the contrary, research on bureaucratisation 
indicate that bureaucratised labour is formed by norms and social relations found in 
daily military practice, which makes the act of analysing military violence some-
thing personal. 
 
Consequently, taking a place in the research environment, noting behaviour, lan-
guage and bodily markers is quite a traditional approach among researchers in the 
social sciences, and even so to include the researcher’s own process of analysis. But 
to use this process and turn it inside out, letting the reflexive parts of the researcher’s 
role in the environment of study rule the outcome of research (the focus of the writ-
ten text) is not an uncontested way of writing an account of fieldwork. Some want to 
resist the reflexive turn discussed above that during the 1980s and 1990s altered 
much of the theoretical and methodological literature on ethnographic work, and as 
such still holds on to traditional norms of research. Central to their critique of reflex-
ivity is to what extent fieldwork (and accounts of fieldwork) provides “reliable data 
concerning human behaviour” and they search for “regularities in human behaviour” 
to provide means for “building generalisations” (Dewalt & Dewalt in Farnell and 
Graham 1998, 290). My role as a ‘halfie’ stands against these traditional research 
norms and so does my thesis problem. To suppress or silence the use of military 
violence is perhaps a global problem, both politically as well as militarily, but my 
intention in the thesis is to discuss the implications of how violence acquires a cer-
tain meaning in operational work. And because this is the practice where I have had 
my identity formed during years of service, it would be unsound to argue that this 
‘contamination’ of my ‘self’ does not stand in the way of taking the ‘objective’ stand 
that is promoted by the traditional values of research. Using poststructural theory for 
achieving a deeper understanding of these things is not a solution to this situation, it 
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is a way of highlighting my own process of subjectivity as researcher/officer and at 
the same time providing me with theoretical concepts for discussing the research 
questions from my ‘inside’ position.  
 
Self-narratives and personal reflections  
My use of personal storytelling is limited in my research as I wanted the context of 
the social environment to ‘speak’ as a story to the reader. Instead, I aim to utilise an 
autoethnographical technique of my own, by adding shorter reflections to the analy-
sis, rather than giving longer personal accounts. To clarify my personal struggle with 
my own understanding of military violence, I will mark these narratives with ‘LtCol 
Malm’5, as ‘his’ reflections are intended to become mirrors of what it is that holds 
bureaucratised labour in a position of hegemony. Thus, in my use of myself as an 
indicator for what it is in the practice which dispositions my mind as bureaucratic, I 
adhere to the above discussed call for integrating the ‘I’ in International Relations, if 
yet in a somewhat different way. Despite this seemingly ‘schizophrenic’ writing and 
complex approach to the research environment, it is my intention to keep the analy-
sis as clear and open to the reader as possible. Here I break with some traditions in 
poststructuralist writings where the contingent status of ontology and Self call aca-
demics to ‘destabilise’ their texts, making them hard to access.  
 
A poststructural autoethnography might embrace multidimensionality, might aim to construct texts 
that are not easily ingested, that turn around and around so that we are encouraged (or forced or 
led) to a place of thinking differently and with more complexity about the world and our places 
within it. (Gannon 2006, 488) 
 
In the ‘Derridian’ tradition, aptly summarised by Gannon (2006) in the quote above, 
it is the researcher’s task to set notions of a ‘core Self’ in motion. As much as I en-
joy reading Derrida myself, I cannot aspire to similar ambitions with my approach to 
writing poststructural autoethnography. But on the other hand, my aim with using 
versions of ‘Self’ in the analysis relies on setting established notions of what mili-
tary operational practice is, and how such practice relates to understandings of vio-
lence, in motion.       
 
Defining the ‘field’ of study and ‘making use’ of discourse theory 
Here I will describe the main strategy and methodical considerations which I have 
relied upon to meet the challenges that are related to my ‘bicultural’ or ‘halfie’ posi-
tion. The text is written in a way that elucidates the process of becoming a ‘halfie’ 
and includes some details of personal choice and relations. This is a common ap-
proach in autoethnographical work and it is meant to provide some transparency of 
                                                             
5 LtCol is an abbreviation for Lieutenant Colonel, which was my military rank at the time of my ethnographical study. In 
Western military organisations, this rank often implies a person who has extensive training as a staff officer and, at least 
in the Swedish context, indicates that the officer is proficient at working with battalion and brigade-sized units.  
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the researcher’s position from where observations are made (see Richardson (2000) 
in: Holt 2003, 23).   
 
Social relations (and use of language/objects) are that which make operational work 
function in that they regulate the practice with rules and structures of interaction, but 
they also ‘define’ the practice (Glynos and Howarth 2007, 145, 159). As previously 
mentioned, I have come to the conclusion from my review of previous research and 
theories of discourse and bureaucratisation that investigating social relations, norms 
and rules is a plausible way of finding out how military operational work operates in 
shaping military understandings of violence. A concrete output from this can be 
illustrated by my observation scheme (basically a paper with codes and concepts 
highlighting my main interests of observation, see Appendix 2) which includes not 
just terms that aim to remind me to search for how meaning-making is facilitated by 
the use of language. Since my theoretical ‘framework’ describes the formation of 
subjects’ understanding of violence as a reciprocal relationship with the practice 
itself, as discussed in Chapter 2, I have also added concepts that aim to help me 
become, or stay, aware of social relations and agents’ interaction with material ob-
jects. In addition, the observation scheme has been outlined with excerpts from post-
structural research theory/method in order to help me re-connect with my own posi-
tion as a researcher. I have added this as I in the wake of my first trials of fieldwork 
realised that I had a tendency to slip into my military ‘Self’ during observations of 
military practice. A revelation that guided me into a specific way of analysing my 
field notes (I expand on this below). In addition, the analytical work that I made 
early on in my research process, investigating political reformations and historical 
military narratives (Chapter 4), provided me with some hints of what I could expect 
in terms of what a value-based discourse on bureaucratised military labour comprise. 
The historical part of the investigation has as such not only a purpose of deepening 
our understanding of how military violence becomes bureaucratisied in Sweden 
during the 20th century, it has also helped me prepare for my ethnographical work.  
 
In the ‘tradition’ of autoethnography, I will now convey an excerpt (written as a 
research note two years after having engaged in the PhD-project) which illustrates 
how my field notes can reflect ‘movement’ between subject positions, and as such 
underline an analysis of how the practice at hand is shaping a particular understand-
ing of violence: 
 
In my first, and in the majority of the second year as a PhD-candidate I avoided contact with the Swedish 
Armed Forces as much as possible, devoting my time to academic study of research methods and theories 
of science. My studies started with a quite broad theoretical approach, supported by the premade courses 
for PhD-candidates at my university. Since I previously have had a curiosity for critical studies and 
philosophical debates regarding the role of language as a powerful creator of social reality, my studies 
soon entered the field of post-structuralism. I noticed early on that this ‘field’ of study collided in some 
severe ways with my military mind, in the way Foucault, Derrida, Lyotard, Laclau and Mouffe, among 
several others, conceptualised things like ‘truth’, ‘law’, ‘justice’, ‘science’ and ‘power’. My military way 
of thinking, utilising things (humans as well as material objects) for an effective purpose (obtaining 
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military goals) and seeing the world filled with static objects that are controlled by man, were painfully 
eroded by insights in the non-objectivity and construction of the social world. Despite this process of 
identification with alternative worldviews, my mind still lingers around how to best utilise these (to me) 
new insights to create research that can improve our way of governing organised use of force.  
 
Having during my second year enjoyed courses in ethnography and discourse theory/method I entered the 
field (started my fieldwork by participating in a large international staff exercise run by the Swedish 
Armed Forces). I was confident that my new analytical eye would capture how the practice at hand 
conforms to a certain dominant understanding of violence. When starting to read through my field notes 
(some months after this initial fieldwork) I realised that I had had certain overconfidence in my ability to 
stand firm in the critical research ontology. The field notes were a blend of military-related notes that 
comprised the quality of the staff work and possible improvements in operational thinking, as well as 
academically connected notes that outlined how the practice at hand related to how the operational work 
neutralises or silences certain aspects of death and violence.  
 
When going through the notes after the first encounter with the field, it struck me 
that these ‘lapses’ in my field notes were actually in themselves imprints of the in-
teraction between different subject positions: One the one hand, I had created a new 
discursive space where I could identify with discourse and objects in the academic 
research environment to which I now belonged. On the other hand, as soon as I 
entered the ‘field’, old ways of identifications (such as putting on my uniform and 
interacting with military colleagues) ‘pulled’ me back into my military way of think-
ing. This was a confusing experience as my task was to do research (to become ‘a 
researcher’) and not to work as a ‘staff officer’. However, after studying literature on 
reflexivity in ethnographical work, and discussing this ‘problem’ with my supervi-
sors, I realised that my own ways of subjectivity were a central part of the research. 
The recent growing interest in self-reflexive research and suggestions for methodo-
logical developments, point in a similar direction:       
 
Therefore, one question that we can pose to a narrative is: how does the author enact responsibility 
for the subjectivity she inhabits? There are various strategies through which individual narratives 
might accomplish this because there are different forms and logics within narrative structures and 
forms. (Ravecca and Dauphinee 2018, 5)  
 
What this focus on ways of subjectivity means for my research is that my way of 
‘drifting’ between different discursive fields should be elucidated by my autoethnog-
raphy narratives. But it also means that I should use my field notes, my supporting 
questions and my observation scheme to support disruptions of my own military 
mind, so as to capture how the research environment (the military staffs that I am a 
part of) reconstructs understandings of violence through the social relations and 
norms of daily and mundane, routinised work. I have therefore decided to analyse 
my field notes in search for moments where I ‘drift’ from ‘researcher’ to ‘staff of-
ficer’ and vice versa. My intention is that this will help me to further deepen the 
analysis of how the military practice comprises social rules/norms and language that 
are central to how violence and death are managed, neutralised or silenced in opera-
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tional work. In other words, my ‘drifts’ between ‘researcher’ and ‘staff officer’ out-
line discursive breaks between different ontologies that comprise different meanings 
of what military violence is. As I see it, this is thus a practical example of what 
Laclau (inspired by Žižek) points out when he discusses how a subject (me in this 
case) in a process of identification moves between different subject positions (the 
critical researcher – the producing PhD-candidate – the military officer) (see Žižek 
in Laclau, 1990, p. 250). This approach, visualising the researchers struggle in the 
analysis, chimes with other, similar developments of the theoretical and methodical 
field of autoethnography (Ellingson & Ellis in Holstein and Gubrium 2008, 448–49; 
Ravecca and Dauphinee 2018; Short, Turner, and Grant 2013, 1–2).  
 
Furthermore, my field notes reflect articulations that create and reinforce meaning in 
operational work, but it is not until these notes are analysed further that the cultural 
‘bipolarity’ discussed above can be identified. In other words, the analysis of field 
notes must be concentrated to the parts where my military thinking is disrupted by 
sudden insights given by academic discourse. But the analysis of these ‘drifts’ must 
also include a focus on what it is in the research environment that draws me into my 
military way of thinking. As such, this technique facilitates a way for me to identify 
the ‘pull’ of the military context, and specifically, what this context does to optimise 
a specific way of understanding violence. Hockey, one of few with a military service 
record who conducts critical ethnographic research on the military, has also pointed 
at this type of involvement of the researcher:   
 
Participant observation more than other methodological strategies, requires that the researcher be 
the prime and direct instrument of data collection, and this inevitably involves the immersion of 
the researcher’s self in the research process. (Hockey 1996, 13) 
 
Although this reflexive way of using my notes is one technique for the conduct of 
my analysis, I will also utilise more ‘traditional’ ways of extracting which social 
relations and materiality/language it is that govern and contextualise the practices 
that I investigate. By adhering to developments in ethnographical studies, where the 
‘mundane’ conversations with practitioners are used as ways of collecting data, 
noting daily small talk will be one way of finding the rules and norms of the practic-
es (e.g. Gudeman and Rivera 1990). Through this technique I can include my inter-
locutors in the research by asking them questions about some aspects of the practices 
that I, from a research perspective, find odd or out of place with the context of the 
practice.6 But I also intend to engage the practitioners in discussions where I bring 
up part of the ‘fabric’ of the social relations and language/materiality that I discover. 
Through these conversations I strive to gain a more complex insight into the social 
rules and norms of the practice, as some parts of these discussions may reveal emo-
tional engagement regarding some parts of the practice, more than others.  
                                                             
6 In retrospect, I have also, in those cases where these conversations have had a direct impact on my analysis, transcribed 
and sent such notes to my interlocutors for their consideration. Furthermore, I have circulated drafts of Chapter 5 to the 
personnel working at the operational staff where I conducted my fieldwork, in order to ‘include’ them in the analytical 
process. This has not been possible for Chapter 6, as the fieldwork was conducted in several different exercises in which 
the participants were, to a large extent, different each time.  
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In summary, my ethnographical and autoethnographical method is focused on social 
relations, norms and emotions in order to capture how military understandings of 
violence are constructed. In addition, previous research and theories on discourse 
and bureaucratisation facilitates a discourse analysis of my field notes by pointing 
the analysis in the direction of how social relations are made up by specific language 
and social interaction with the materiality of the practice. Importantly, un-orthodoxy 
has not been a goal in itself, but as pointed out by Robben and Sluka (2012):       
     
[…] the elements of contemporary ethnography include experimental form and method, reflexivity 
on the part of the ethnographer, collaboration and multiple authorship, and the details of fieldwork 
dialogue and experience. (A.C.G.M. Robben and Sluka 2012, 20). 
 
In other words, I break away from ‘traditional’ ways of ‘doing’ ethnography but will 
still go to great lengths to maintain a ‘systematic’ and ‘transparent’ tactic of re-
search. For instance, by using a technique of including excerpts of my field notes in 
the design of the chapters as one such way of achieving a certain degree of transpar-
ency. Nevertheless, as indicated by the discussion above, this way of conducting 
research and opening up for the use of reflexivity brings about an exposure of under-
lying currents of social relations and emotions, not only among the practitioners that 
I study, but also belonging to myself. This brings about a need to discuss the ethical 
implications of this research strategy and method, which the following concluding 
section of this chapter will outline.     
 
3.6  Ethics: Challenges and Practical Solutions   
 
In this section I will discuss those aspects of research ethics that I see as most chal-
lenging in relation to my methods and interest of study. The discussion is concen-
trated to three ‘areas’ of research that are reccurring in my investigation of contem-
porary military practices, and these are: ‘interlocutors’, which is a category compris-
ing my colleagues in the Swedish military; ‘researcher reflexivity’, which expands 
on ethical considerations that concern my own being; and finally ‘institution’, which 
represents the Swedish Armed Forces as representing an institution in Swedish soci-
ety.      
 
Possible Damage to my Interlocutors 
You have to live the experience of doing research on the other, think it through, improvise, write 
and rewrite, anticipate and feel its consequences. (Ellis 2001, 615).  
 
By noting behaviour, use of language, power relations and emotional responses in 
interaction with my colleagues in the Armed Forces, I certainly put them at risk. It is 
quite clear that sometimes the frequent exit and entering of new people in my re-
search environment creates problems both with the possibility to adhere to the prin-
ciple of informed consent and with the possibility to let interlocutors see what I have 
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noted from our interactions (Etherington 2004, 82). In addition, my appearance as an 
officer offers possibilities for a close interaction with other officers, but it also pro-
vides situations where they might tell me things that they regret, or that they do not 
see our conversations as natural parts of my data collection. Furthermore, the narra-
tives or vignettes that others provide me with while they work with violent practices 
are not mine per se, and they might comprise details that in turn can identify other 
people in unwanted ways (Chang 2008, 55; Ellis 2009, 307, 341). Finally, my possi-
bility to choose parts of their stories and leave out others (which is a natural aspect 
and a ‘must’ of the research process) puts me in a position of power where treading 
carefully will not completely balance this ‘upper hand’ (Cunliffe and Karunanayake 
2013, 365; Etherington 2004, 83 ff.). To summarise, I have the possibility to set 
them in a position where they appear to harbour a relation to violence and death that 
they do not adhere to, recognise, or are willing to share. 
 
It is thus easier said than done to incorporate and mitigate all of the ethical dilemmas 
that might occur in the process of participant observation. The quote above from 
Ellis (2001) condenses the iterative activity required in order to adhere to ‘the ethics 
of the other’ in ethnography, but such an activity cannot be outlined in detail before-
hand. I have through careful examination of experiences from other academics in 
similar situations found that ethical awareness when entering the field supports the 
possibility to anticipate and to prevent harming interlocutors (Dauphinee 2010, 808; 
Ellis 2009, 308–9). But apart from such a generic ethical identification, I have in 
order to protect my colleagues from harm created some more practical ethical 
points: as a general rule, persons are given pseudonyms even if this does not guaran-
tee complete anonymity (which is more or less impossible to guarantee in ethnogra-
phy) (Ellis 2009, 350; Berry (2005) in: Hughes, Pennington, and Makris 2012, 216–
17). Furthermore, when wearing my uniform, I will place a name-tag, in good view 
on the uniform, with the word “RESEARCHER” written on it, to indicate my status 
as an observer.7 In addition, when the situation permits, I will take the opportunity to 
remind my colleagues of my status as researcher by simply saying that “I would like 
to quote you on that” or something similar that may elucidate the reason for my 
presence. This will always be applied when conversing ‘one-to-one’, where I deem 
it easier to slip such comments into the conversation, compared to participating in 
group discussions. In addition, I will make sure to send my written text (draft of 
Chapter 5) to my main point of contact (or Officer of Primary Responsibility, OPR) 
for my investigation of the operational staff work, and also to those I have interacted 
with on a daily basis (a weaker variant of ‘member checking’) (Pennington (2007) 
in: Hughes, Pennington, and Makris 2012).  
 
                                                             
7 In retrospect - As the Swedish military has a culture where name-tags are central objects for identifying the ’status’ of 
colleagues, I quickly found out that my ‘researcher-tag’ actually provided openings for practitioners to talk to me about 
my research. It came to function, in many ways, as an ‘ice-breaker’ (way of providing social openings in conversations) 
when I met practitioners that I had not had interacted with before. It was an unintended but welcome effect of taking 
measures that would remind my interlocutors of my status as researcher.  
  55 
On a final note, at the beginning of each exercise that I will participate in (for the 
construction of Chapter 6) I will present myself to those working at the part of the 
staff that I intend to observe, and describe my research. I will also clarify that I rec-
ord meetings and other interaction between the participants in the exercise. Further-
more, I aim to clarify that their names will not be used in my research, but that I 
cannot guarantee their anonymity. This is due to the fact that every participant is 
registered with name, nation and position for each exercise by the organisers, and it 
is as such possible for someone with access to that data to cross-reference my ‘data’ 
and find out exactly who had which position during my fieldwork. In both the case 
of Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, my interest in language, social relations and in ways of 
working should be stated in order to make it clear for the interlocutors that I am not 
to engage in describing their ‘personal traits’, which may reduce possible concerns 
of being ‘exposed’ in the research. Which brings me to the next part of this discus-
sion on research ethical deliberations connected to my research: the ‘exposure’ of 
myself.                   
 
Problems of exposing the researcher’s reflexivity  
My autoethnographical approach brings with it benefits of accessibility (personal 
‘data’ can always be retrieved) and, as mentioned above, a possibility to interpret the 
research context from an ‘inside’ position. But this does not come without a cost. 
Autoethnographical narratives often include feelings, thoughts and experiences, 
some of which can be very personal (e.g. Wall 2008, 44). It is clear that the autoeth-
nographer through this practice puts him/herself in a position of vulnerability. I have 
an approach where my reflexivity is read in the light of theoretical concepts and 
philosophical thoughts found in poststructural theory, but this does not ‘conceal’ 
details of my persona. By letting my drafts be read in smaller forums and taking 
advice from research colleagues, I strive to be able to balance the includ-
ing/excluding of personal detail. Nevertheless, it is of more importance to deliberate 
and take into account possible ethical problems (and practical solutions) regarding 
damage to ‘others’ (as above), and, as in the following passage, what my research 
might endanger when it comes to the Swedish Armed Forces as a representative 
institute for Swedish society.  
 
Possible damage to the Swedish Armed Forces  
As citizens who study their own countries’ security systems, local researchers cannot ignore their 
position with regard to national security issues and how it affects both their research and social 
surroundings. (Gazit and Maoz-Shai 2010, 279). 
 
It is not likely that my research will place the military institution in a position where 
it may have its practices questioned by the public or by the press. Swedish public 
debates rarely touch upon military matters and one critically written thesis among 
many others will not change that. No, my ethical concerns related to the Swedish 
Armed Forces as an institution in society instead focus on questions of national 
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security. Gazit & Maoz-Shai (2010) discuss the methodological challenges they 
meet when doing autoethnographical research in the Israeli army, and as expressed 
by the quote above they too identify research ethics to comprise questions of nation-
al security. For them, this could be situations where criticising violations of human 
rights stood against possible gains for Israeli citizens’ safety. For me, the challenge 
of not conflicting with interests of national security takes a more practical form: it is 
a question of collecting and accounting for data without revealing that which could 
be harmful to Sweden in case of deteriorating international security. I will not record 
any sessions when I observe ‘real’ practices of operational planning and instead use 
handwritten notes. As in all my notes I use pseudonyms and fictional names of geo-
graphical places if I need to take them in at all.  
 
My interest is, as often pointed out, in the language used while preparing for the use 
of force, and how the behaviour of practitioners provide indications of social rules 
and relations central to the practice, and as such not the specifics of the operational 
work. In other words, no aspect of classified information is to be used in my thesis. I 
may sometimes recount what meetings I participate in have comprised, but I will do 
so in general terms such as ‘economics’ or ‘issues of logistical concern’, which, for 
those with military experience, is not hard to guess that meetings regarding opera-
tional matters sometimes comprise. Nevertheless, one type of risk that I will expose 
the Armed Forces to is that a potential aggressor might see ‘weaknesses’ in how 
Swedish operational practice is performed and how operational violence is under-
stood. The only respond I have to this problem is that much of the way operational 
practices are performed in Sweden, mirrors operational work taking place in many 
other countries of the Western world (the practice of ‘targeting’ is typically one such 
part of the operational work, see Chapter 6 for more on this). In other words, unin-
tentionally revealed ‘weaknesses’ are most likely already known to those that are 
interested in Western operational practice.   
 
With that discussion on research ethics my examination of the ‘what and how’ of my 
research has come to an interim end, and the next three chapters will move on to the 
actual analysis of how military violence and death are managed, neutralised or si-
lenced in operational work.  
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4 
Chapter 4: Historical Narratives of 
Bureaucratisation 
 
Words, ideas, images constitute the discursive support for military conflict; they should be under-
stood not as though they are mere froth without consequences, but as crucial aspects of the de-
structive reality of violent conflict itself. (Pick 1996, 14) 
 
The “reality of violent conflict” that Pick points at in this quote is constructed dis-
cursively both by the military practice itself, but also by the way violent conflict is 
narrated. In the following chapter, historical accounts of military practice will help 
us understand how language and images depict a ‘reality’ where military violence 
and death are neutralised and silenced. In addition, as previous research indicates 
that violence and death are neutralised and/or silenced partly by the removal of the 
dead body from military discourse, the analysis will engage with how such removal 
operates in military discourse. It is, as such, the “discursive support” for the con-
struction of military understandings of violence that is examined in the chapter, 
through a close reading of military instructions, pamphlets and other historical doc-
uments that depict modern historical Swedish ‘war-practices’.      
 
This historical investigation aims, in other words, to clarify how the research context 
of operational work has gradually been politically influenced, and militarily narrat-
ed, to include a specific type of bureaucratised relation to violence and death. The 
investigation is divided into two areas in order to achieve this: that of political pro-
cesses and reforms which has made bureaucratisation a part of military dis-
course/practice, and that of military narratives which help to form a specific mean-
ing for what violence is. To illustrate this I have outlined two supporting questions 
for this chapter:     
 
1. How (by what rationalities/reforms) was the Swedish military bureaucra-
tised and modernised during the early and mid 20th century?  
 
This question is in the following answered by discussing previous research on Swe-
dish political reforms of the military, and offers insight into how military discourse 
is politically reshaped during the early and mid 20th century. The second question is: 
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2. How (by what themes of military narratives) are violence and death pre-
sented, naturalised and/or silenced in the portrayal of Swedish military 
practice?        
 
And this question is meant to offer insight into how the discursive process of mean-
ing-making, initiated by political reforms, is stabilised and naturalised by the use of 
narratives.   
 
Initially, the next section will briefly connect some points made in the previous 
chapters to the analysis done here, in order to highlight the impact the thesis’ epis-
temological setting has on the conduct of analysis (this includes a discussion on how 
the selection of ‘data’ has taken place). Thereafter the chapter proceeds to discuss 
how political reformations bureaucratised and modernised the Swedish military in 
the early part of the 20th century. This section is then followed by a ‘disruptive’ story 
(section 4.3) about death and violence which is meant to contrast the subsequent 
analysis (which thus takes place in section 4.4) of how military narratives of the 
early 20th century portray death and violence. The chapter then repeats this order – 
section 4.6 discusses political reforms belonging to the mid 20th century, and is fol-
lowed by another disruptive story about military death and violence, in turn followed 
by an analysis of military narratives created during this time-period. The chapter is 
then concluded with a discussion on how the analysis offers insights into the sup-
porting questions posed above.  
 
4.1  Details on the method and selection of ‘data’ 
 
In this chapter, themes are used to group and sort articulations that are in frequent 
use for depicting military practice. The themes has grown out of an process of read-
ing the material several times and in this process, I have noted how military practic-
es of violence and death are illustrated through the use of common societal discours-
es. But the themes has also been crystalized through my analysis of the political 
changes and reforms that helped shape the modern Swedish military. As such, these 
themes are to concretise what points of reference historical military narratives com-
prise for creating a ‘natural’ and ‘rationalised’ military relation to death and vio-
lence. To illustrate such points of reference as themes in the analysis is an approach 
based on the thought of interdiscursivity, that is that a discourse on a topic (e.g. 
military violence) relates and makes use of other discourses in order to create mean-
ing for this topic (Wodak 2009, 40). A discourse of “education” can, for instance, 
help portray a certain ‘truth’ of military violence, as we shall see in the forthcoming 
pages. What these themes do is to form narratives that comprise a discourse which 
neutralises and/or silences certain aspects of death and violence, in a time-period 
where stories of actual use of military violence contest such silencing through horri-
fying accounts of the ‘reality’ of conflict (as two world wars are fought during this 
time-period). The chapter thus elucidates how military narratives claiming to tell the 
‘truth’ regarding military violence are constructed and used in military discourses. In 
other words, the chapter outlines how the military manage to conceal the impossibil-
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ity of bureaucratised understandings of violence, i.e. the destructive and arbitrary 
aspects of violence, through the narrative themes of production and education, order 
and bureaucracy, technology and masculinity (analysed below).  
 
Furthermore, the addition of military narratives analysed has been limited by how 
the data ‘thickens’, that is, when I could not find narratives that brought more to the 
essential theme than the previously analysed archive material provided (thus ho-
mogenising the discourse), I stopped adding material to the analysis (Milliken 1999, 
234). The large body of data analysed in the chapter has been retrieved by extensive 
searches in Swedish archives containing military regulations, instructions, infor-
mation pamphlets and handbooks. In these searches, the idea of intertextuality, 
meaning that no text stands alone as it always is in a relational position when it con-
veys meaning, has played an important role when making choices of delimitation to 
the span of data (Pouliot 2010, 72; Wodak 2009, 39). In concrete terms, Intertextual-
ity has meant that I, as an example, noticed early on in my searches that the term 
‘machine gun’ was in frequent use in the material. This meant that I intensified and 
extended my search and guided the process of selecting data, consequently including 
handbooks, regulations and instructions that touch upon the existence of the ‘ma-
chine gun’ in military practice (e.g. “Machine gunner – Instruction”, 1923, Stock-
holm). All literature analysed has been noted and can be found in Appendix 1 for 
further consideration. Intertextuality has as such been used as a first step for narrow-
ing down the span of archive material considered for analysis, but I have also con-
centrated archive material into two time periods: 1914-1939 for WWI; 1939-1964 
for WWII in order to simplify the structure of the analysis.  
 
In the following, each section containing analysis of discourses of violence will be 
initiated by a review of the major political changes that affected the reformation of 
the Swedish military in the respective time-periods. Such reviews are from a dis-
course analysis perspective particularly useful as critical explanations of how certain 
language and materiality of a practice are made possible in the first place (Glynos 
and Howarth 2007, 141). They also entail the possibilities for reformation of prac-
tices and the infusion of new signifiers for military narratives to build upon. There-
fore, the analysis below is directed at such political reformations that are central to 
how the military practice is depicted and shaped, such as the implementation and 
development of ‘armed’ neutrality and its rationalisation of the production of con-
scripts. As this chapter has the construction of military narratives as its prioritised 
target of analysis, I have delimited the span and analytical depth of my discussion to 
include political reformations that strongly affected the ‘who’ and ‘what’ of the 
military in the early and middle 20th century. Fortunately, there already exists re-
search on how the Swedish military was conceptualised and reformed during this 
time period which to some extent mitigates the ‘weakness’ of my choice to concen-
trate analytically on military narratives in this chapter (e.g. Dahlström, Söderberg, 
and Olofsson 2002; Sturfelt 2008; Zetterberg 1988). This research has also helped 
me identify the most central political reformations in the span of 1900-1965.  
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Furthermore, the discourse analysis outlined below also includes illustra-
tions/narratives of what ‘types’ or aspects of military violence are excluded in the 
way official military discourses on violence are formed during the early and mid 20th 
century. This is a methodological way of strengthening the contingent position of 
the analysis and underlines the fact that there is no ‘natural’ way that our under-
standing of military violence must have been developed into its current status 
(Glynos and Howarth 2007, 155). The illustrations/narratives of death and violence 
are also in place to counter the ‘seductive’ force that lies in the meaning-making 
produced by official military instructions and regulations. At least to me, having 
been formed by military discourse during 20 years of service, disruptive depictions 
of military violence help to analytically see the impossibilities of military bureaucra-
tised violence. Section 4.3 offers the first of these illustrations/narratives of death 
and violence and it is put in the forefront in the chapter’s analysis of military narra-
tives as it is meant to comprise a critical backdrop to the subsequent analysis of 
bureaucratisation of military violence.  
 
On that note, I move on and engage in discussing the political reforms that shape the 
modern Swedish military. 
 
4.2  Political Reformations of the early 20th Century – How 
Bureaucracy is Instilled in the Modern Swedish Military 
 
In this section I discuss some impacts of the political policy of neutrality on the 
reformation of the Swedish military, and I also note how the aspiring bureaucratisa-
tion and professionalisation of the military during this time create certain themes in 
how military violence is narrated. As touched upon elsewhere, this discussion is 
needed in order to offer a background to how military discourse relates to political 
reformations of the (military) practice.  
 
Neutrality as political pragmatism  
One central political reform during the early 20th century was initiated when Sweden 
declared itself a neutral nation on August 3, 1914 (on neutrality as a Swedish 
political myth, see: Agius 2006, Chap.4). But as Lina Sturfelt (2008) shows in her 
investigation of Swedish belief systems during WWI, a strong antagonistic relation 
followed the declaration. She elucidates that neutrality was at the time a concept 
heavily loaded with negativity; feelings and abilities like shame, greed, cowardli-
ness, decadence and unmanliness were infused into the concept of neutrality by its 
anti-pacifistic opponents (Sturfelt 2008, 187–91).  In addition to this, Zetterberg 
(1988) clarifies that the strong pacifistic and anti-militant societal forces that en-
dorsed neutrality were to a large degree separated from the parliament and the ruling 
government in the early 20th century. The ruling liberals/social democrats were 
mostly in agreement with the right wing regarding the modernisation and develop-
ment of the Swedish Armed forces (Zetterberg 1988, 25). From 1901 to 1909 the 
right wing government increased Swedish defence spending’s from 40 percent to 
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comprise approximately half of the total state budget. But in the 1911 elections 
when the more anti-militaristic political left (liberals and social democrats) were in 
majority, the initial ambition to reduce defence spending’s was lost in the wake of 
the following defence commissions (Zetterberg 1988, 9–11). Instead, the dissolution 
of the pact with Norway (1905) and the neutrality declaration created a need to build 
a strong military that could help Sweden cope with the defence burden alone. Neu-
trality has in a sense (quite ironically) worked as a fuel for militarising the Swedish 
society in the way it has been used to motivated defence reforms (e.g. Holmén 1985, 
43 f.). The antagonism following the Swedish proclamation of neutrality, the strong 
societal anti-militaristic movement and the political unity regarding the reformation 
of the military all stand against each other in this political context, as they suggest 
different types of politics. Neutrality gives something to all of these positions: neu-
trality gives the pro-militaristic forces an argument to strengthen the Armed Forces 
and it gives the anti-militaristic movement satisfaction as it promotes an important 
anti-war position. Thus, this policy was used politically in the reformation of the 
Armed Forces, but it did not pervade the Swedish Armed Forces practices with anti-
violent articulations (e.g. Zetterberg 1988, 23). The military (and other societal insti-
tutions like the press) made use of this political reform to motivate violent practices: 
the story about the lone defender, standing on higher moral ground, protecting the 
Swedish nation and the King from the ‘underdeveloped masses’ of Europe, was born 
to motivate a military knowledge in the use of violence (see Sturfelt 2008, 195–215 
for a details on this narrative; see: Zetterberg 1988, 85 on the important position of 
“the King”). In conclusion, neutrality was during its early years as a political strate-
gy a pragmatic policy, more than a normative political stand against the use of force. 
 
In other words, neutrality had to be combined with narratives of military practice 
that could merge the diverging positions of anti-militarism and militarism. And it 
was in the societal use and efficient production of conscripts, discussed more to the 
point below, that the political policy of neutrality could find incitements to create a 
narrative that could mitigate the problem of diverging norms and the antagonism 
inherent in these two positions. Much more could be said about neutrality, but for 
practical reasons I now move on to other major changes affecting the military. 
 
Democratisation – societal reform with effects on the military  
In Swedish society during this time, as a reflection from other western societies, 
bureaucracy was reformed to not just include the traditional managements of logisti-
cal account of goods and economics. This change is connected to the political idea 
that positions in societal institutes were to be separated from the persons holding 
them (see Weber (1987) in: Rolf 1998, 217–18). As such, the political reformation 
of bureaucracy in society underpins the creation of a signifying system of social 
relations (rules/norms) that provide the necessary functions for the military to adhere 
to this change. Examples of this are the regulation of positions (i.e. a career system) 
and the increasing creation of books and instructions that provide the terms for how 
the military should be managed. Bureaucracy can be seen as the primer for creating 
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the massive amount of ‘non-practices’ that the modern military eventually has come 
to comprise. That is, when analysed, military practice is shown to withhold many 
activities omitting violence, as the amount of time a soldier or officer is exposed to 
violent practices during their time of service is exceptionally small (see for example 
M.D. Feld in van Gils (ed.) 1971, p.271 f.). This makes the military ‘unique’ in 
comparison to other state institutions and has historically led researchers to con-
clude, for instance, that military weakness for bureaucracy is in general explained 
through this phenomenon of “non-practice” (e.g. Van Doorn 1968). As visualised 
below by the analysis of the archived material, this reformation, or societal devel-
opment, made it possible to narrate about military practice in ways that made it 
harmonise more with other societal practices, such as education.  
 
Closely related to bureaucratisation, the political will to create a more modern, pro-
fessional military provided the Swedish military with a plethora of new settings for 
how military discourse could to develop. To be able to implement the reformation of 
the Armed Forces (initiated by the 1901 Parliament defence policy) and as such 
create the necessary facilities and organisations for recruitment and training of con-
scripts, the military institution needed to develop a modern professionalism 
(Zetterberg 1988, 89–92). The massive funding of the Armed Forces was not only 
used for technical improvements, it was also used to build barracks and garrisons 
where new recruits could be accommodated and trained. In addition, the physical 
changes also provided the military with new settings from which professionalism 
was to develop, with its possibility to increase control of the soldier’s body and its 
provision of need to develop regulations for life in the garrisons. Here the infusion 
of professionalism was underpinned by the political will to create a military where 
‘the people’ had a dominant role. Besides the need for securing a steady influx of 
new recruits, the creation of the conscript system ensured a development of societal 
values in the military and provides a counterweight to the strong (traditionally and 
previously legislated grounded) military relation to Swedish royalty. Provided with 
large masses of ‘common folk’, the military would have to move towards a profes-
sionalisation, and democratisation was to follow in its wake (Zetterberg 1988, 88–
89). In addition, the Swedish officers’ training underwent small transformative 
changes that reflected some of the major developments in Swedish society, particu-
larly by incorporating the societal effort to reduce the social division of classes into 
the preconditions for acceptance to the programme (Norberg 1992, 264–70). Gov-
ernment bills in 1914 and 1920 aimed to prevent the officer corps from being dis-
connected from the norm-development of the rest of society, by making sure that 
cadets needed to undergo pre-course training together with non-commissioned offic-
ers. It was also stressed that ‘anyone’ (minus all women and those men deemed unfit 
for service) should have the possibility of becoming an officer (traditionally an oc-
cupation for sons of the nobility) (Åselius 2005, 37). But this possibility was in 
practice diminished by the academic requirements for admission to the course (a 
degree from high school/upper secondary school (Upplysningar rörande utbildning 
till officer på aktiv stat och i reserven vid armén. 1939, 5)) as such a level of educa-
tion was out of reach for many of working class background.  
  63 
 
In accordance to the governmental aim of securing societal values amongst the of-
ficer corps, candidates had to undergo the same basic training as any other soldier 
and also serve as a non-commissioned officer before being eligible for acceptance to 
the officer course. As such, the establishment of education and production (of con-
scripts) as major components in the construction of officers’ understanding of mili-
tary practice can be traced back to this ‘democratisation’ of the military institution. 
This ‘first impression’ of the military profession has certainly been influential in 
several aspects regarding the construction of Swedish military identity (e.g. how 
production/education is influential in creating non-practices in the military). Howev-
er, my interest in this chapter is not focused on the ‘non-practices’ (practices discon-
nected from the use of violence) of the military. The point here is to clarify that this 
establishment of common education in the Swedish system for becoming a soldier, 
or officer, has infused the military practice with discourses describing how violence 
is to be trained while educating conscripts.  
 
In sum, the early 20th century brought with it political reforms that promoted the 
infusion of modernisation, bureaucracy, professionalisation and education as dis-
courses into the military. The military with its intimate connection to Royalty and 
suspicion against the political left resisted the anti-militaristic movement in society 
by focusing on the ‘positive’ parts of neutrality: the creation of a military strong 
enough to resist attacks from an even stronger foe (see also: Agius 2006, 73). Here 
the need to create an efficient and productive flow of conscripts, with its intercon-
nected micro practices of developing training, logistics, garrisons and new technolo-
gy became, as seen below, a central driver for which articulations, signifiers and 
meaning-making processes became accessible for the narration of military violence. 
As such, there is little that indicates that political policies at the beginning of the 20th 
century had infused the Swedish military identity formation with some form of anti-
violent positions. Instead, the reformations of the Swedish military practice used 
‘non-military’ discourses to articulate the ‘new’ identity of the military. However, it 
is important to note that this modernisation was something that created space for and 
underlined ideas of educating the ‘masses’ in ‘non-military’ issues with the purpose 
of creating ‘good citizens’. Thus, it is here that the Swedish military starts to be 
considered a place for something more than ‘just’ the defence of the nation. Or in 
the words of  Sundevall (2017):  
 
While the parliamentary majority was reluctant to deduct time from the military curriculum or in-
vest considerable finances on non-military instruction, policymakers and social commentators on 
education shared, and frequently repeated, their understanding of a desire for military service to 
turn young men into both citizens and soldiers. This highlights the militarised and deeply mascu-
linised understanding of citizenship in Sweden during the first few decades of the twentieth centu-
ry. (Sundevall 2017, 66)  	
 
In the analysis of political reformations with relation to the next time-period 
(WWII), this ‘non-military’ rationalisation of maintaining a strong military and 
keeping up the production of conscripts, indicated by Sundevall’s quote, reappears. 
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In other words, I aim to illustrate further on in the chapter how the military as a 
place where ‘boys turn into men’ is something that develops during the early and 
middle of the 20th century. Nevertheless, I will in the subsequent section (4.4) turn to 
military narratives that are created in the wake of the political reformations dis-
cussed above, and as such analyse how these narratives help institute a military 
practice where production, education and bureaucracy are central elements in the 
construction of how the military manage, neutralise and/or silence death and vio-
lence.  
 
But before going into the discursive space of bureaucratisation, I outline a critical 
backdrop to what military death and violence can mean, in order to facilitate a criti-
cal discussion of how military practice is narrated during this era.   
 
4.3  A Narrative of Death and Violence: The Battle of Loos, 
September 1915 
 
Many men fell in the 500 yards of No Man's Land. But they were not missed then by those who 
went on in waves — rather, like molecules, separating, collecting, splitting up into smaller groups, 
bundling together again, on the way to the first line of German trenches. A glint of bayonets made 
a quickset hedge along the line of churned-up earth which had been the Germans' front-line trench. 
Our guns had cut the wire or torn gaps into it. Through the broken strands went the Londoners on 
the right, the Scots on the left, shouting hoarsely now. They saw red. They were hunters of human 
flesh. They swarmed down into the first long ditch, trampling over dead bodies, falling over them, 
clawing the earth, and scrambling up the parados, all broken and crumbled, then on again to anoth-
er ditch. Boys dropped with bullets in their brains, throats, and bodies. German machine-guns were 
at work, at close range. "Give 'em hell!" said an officer of the Londons — a boy of nineteen. There 
were a lot of living Germans, in the second ditch, and in holes about. Some of them stood still, as 
though turned to clay, until they fell, with half the length of a bayonet through their stomachs. 
Others shrieked and ran a little way before they died. Others sat behind hillocks of earth, spraying 
our men with machine-gun bullets until bombs were hurled on them and they were scattered into 
lumps of flesh. (Gibbs 1920, 140). 
 
This account of violence comes from Philip Gibbs, a war correspondent with several 
years of service on the WWI western front. It is not a story told for the daily press 
though, as it comes from the book “Realities of War” (1920) that Gibbs wrote to 
“[…] get deeper to the truth of this war and of all war, not by a more detailed narra-
tive of events, but rather as the truth was revealed to the minds of men, in many 
aspects, out of their experience; and by a plain statement of realities, however pain-
ful, to add something to the world's knowledge […]” (Gibbs 1920, v). Gibbs’s story 
of military violence is joined together with official military narratives (analysed 
further below) by their similar aims (they make claims of truth regarding the nature 
of war and battle). Besides this similarity, much else differs. The official military 
discourses of violence are genuinely instrumental. That is, the discourses that depict 
military practice as heavily anchored in the use of violence as a military tool. Gibbs, 
on the other hand, depicts military violence as sometimes pointless, emotional, mys-
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tifying and uncontrollable (e.g. Gibbs 1920, 35, 75, 111, 116, 117, 138, 139, 203, 
298).  
 
In Gibbs account of military practice, it is more uncertain how military violence 
should be characterised. Uncertainty is in itself something that adheres to this con-
text of military practice. Violence can even be seen (ironically) as fun.    
 
In digging new trenches and new dug-outs, bodies and bits of bodies were unearthed, and put into 
sandbags with the soil that was sent back down a line of men concealing their work from German 
eyes waiting for any new activity in our ditches. "Bit of Bill," said the leading man, putting in a 
leg. "Another bit of Bill," he said, unearthing a hand. "Bill's ugly mug," he said at a later stage in 
the operations, when a head was found. As told afterwards, that little episode in the trenches 
seemed immensely comic. Generals chuckled over it. Chaplains treasured it. (Gibbs 1920, 109). 
 
Ironically, bodily, humorously, emotionally, even cynically, Gibbs proceeds with his 
tale of military practice on the western front. Horror is imbued in his narration of 
violence; it lies underneath every account of military micro practices, covered only 
so much in the way in which daily life in the trenches is portrayed.  
 
Gibbs’s narrative is strengthened by 
stories from the soldiers and officers 
taking an active part in these events. 
The “Agony Column” is one of many 
examples, displayed here (pict. 1) as 
found in a reproduction of “The Wipers 
Times” March 5th, 1917. This ‘newspa-
per’ was created by a British unit first 
stationed in Ypres (hence the name 
“Wipers”, as Ypres was by jargon called 
so by British soldiers) and it was in 
production on and off during 1916-1918 
(it changed its name depending on 
where the editor’s Division was sta-
tioned/fighting)  (Beaver 1973, xv, 182). 
“Minnie” is slang for a German trench 
mortar (Minenwerfer) and “Flying Pig” 
is a nickname for German trench mortar 
bombs (approx. 25 cm in diameter) 
(Beaver 1973, 360, 363). “M.O” is an 
abbreviation for Medical Officer (Ibid). 
 
This text is typical for “The Wipers Times” in the way in which it is saturated with 
irony. In fact, an overwhelming part of all of the preserved issues of the newspaper 
provides an ironical, humoristic understanding of military violence. Since those who 
contributed texts were officers and soldiers taking active part in the fighting, the 
‘nature’ of military violence as instrumental, or machine-like, is in question. One 
Pict. 1. Facsimile from newspaper produced on 
the western front (Beaver 1973, 182). 
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might disregard such an argument by stating that the texts of “The Wipers Times” 
are expressions of humans trying to cope with an unbearable situation, i.e. expres-
sions of psychology, not violence. That might be the case, but the reason behind why 
these soldiers and officers took the chance of writing about life in the trenches is not 
of interest here. It is, as with most discourse analysis, what these texts themselves do 
to disrupt military violence as ‘naturally’ managed through bureaucratisation of the 
military practice that is of interest for the current chapter. And in that latter aspect, 
“The Wiper Times” adds more to Gibbs’s disruptive narrative on military violence 
through its ironic, humorous, and utterly emotional descriptions of death and vio-
lence. 
 
With this story on the ‘realities’ of war and military violence, I now move on to the 
analysis of military narratives which operate to illustrate a different type of military 
reality.      
 
4.4  Analysing Narratives: Swedish Military Discourse of Vio-
lence, 1914 - 1939  
 
The following section comprises the results from analysing books, manuals and 
pamphlets used by the Swedish Armed Forces at the time of WWI, up till the begin-
ning of WWII. It is divided into three parts where the meaning-making ‘process’ of 
the different analysed narratives is discussed. These parts are divided into the themes 
of production and education; order and bureaucracy; technology and science. The 
‘naming’ of these themes has, as previously mentioned, been influenced by the polit-
ical reformations discussed above but also emerged in my process of analysing the 
material. After these themes have been analysed and discussed, language found in 
the material that depicts military violence as something else (than what these themes 
suggest) is considered in an attempt to resist the risk of my analysis depicting the 
military practice as ‘closed’ by these themes. In sum, section 4.4 offers the first step 
in answering the question of how (by what themes of military narratives) are vio-
lence and death presented, naturalised and/or silenced in the portrayal of Swedish 
military practice?        
 
Analysis of articulations of Production and Education 
Initially this segment of the analysis comprises articulations and meaning-making 
processes of education and production found in narratives that on a general level 
portray military violent practice. The analysis then proceeds to include specific nar-
ratives of close combat.      
 
Language of production can be identified in the 1914 instruction for assault on forti-
fied positions, as it states that “Undertaking large-scale enterprises requires that all 
infantry is taken into use” (Utkast till instruktion för anfall mot befästningar 1914, 
15 (my translation)). By ‘borrowing’ the term ‘enterprise’ from corporate discourse, 
the narrative informs military understandings of violence so as to comprise elements 
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of ‘producing war’. Enemy attacks are also depicted as “enterprises” that are “hos-
tile”, which certainly from a contemporary perspective may seem unproblematic 
(Instruktion för ställföreträdande arméfördelningschef 1917, 38). But the fact that 
the Swedish military in 1914 (and onwards) used “enterprise” to describe a large-
scale military violent practice indicates that the modern military identity is narrated 
with the help of notions of production. At the present time, the term is used consist-
ently when the military describes activities conducted by the Air Force and in some 
cases, operations within the Navy (e.g. Wennerholm 2006).  
 
The military practice understood as producing fire (power) is thoroughly established 
in the way which the Swedish Army Command depicts attacks on fortified positions. 
The goal of such attacks is fulfilled as the military units “work their way towards the 
position of the enemy” and thus gain terrain “to establish a superior mass of fire 
over the opponent so that the opponent cannot actively oppose the fulfilment of the 
attack” (Utkast till instruktion för anfall mot befästningar 1914, 18–19 (my 
translation and italics)). Here, the military practice is set in the context of modern 
production: The “working troops” (1914:25) must fulfil their (productive) goal by 
establishing (creating/assembling) a functional platform from which a mass of metal 
objects (fire) can be directed towards one central pre-identified place. This is a type 
of job that in this period is often connected to the digging of trenches, but assaults 
can also be described as something that keep the troops “occupied” during long 
periods of boredom or idleness (Holmgren 1918, 6). To be occupied is to be in some 
sort of productive state, and in this case the killing of the Other or loss of one’s own 
life, which is an intrinsic part of an assault, is naturalised by a discourse of produc-
tion. The enemy is to be “occupied” as promoted in descriptive accounts of the pur-
pose of battle: “The intention of combat is either to achieve a decisive outcome, or 
to merely delay the enemy in order to gain time, occupy, hold or deceive him” 
(Fälttjänstreglemente: (F.R.). 1917, 124 (my translation); also in: Tingsten 1921, 
98).  
 
This type of military language imposes productiveness in the construction of mili-
tary discourse, but it also promotes usefulness and control as central parts of military 
violence. Bearing in mind Gibbs’s narrative of a British attack against heavily de-
fended German fortifications, there could be serious doubts regarding the plausibil-
ity of usefulness and control in such situations. But regardless of actual plausibility 
(which is not an issue here) the myths of usefulness and control weave images of 
violent activities, images that can construct understanding of military practice as a 
practice of production.    
 
Whereas the machine gun’s rate of fire as well as accuracy is considerably great, this weapon pos-
sesses, intrinsic to its appearance in combat, the fundamental quality of being able to develop con-
siderable fire power from a limited front space. Only through an appropriate service in addition to 
energetic and dedicated guidance can this valuable ability come to its right (Utkast till 
skjutinstruktion för kulspruteförband 1914, 1 also on p. 1 in part 2. (my translation)).   
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The quote above from “Draft Firing Instruction for Machine Gun Units” (1914) 
furthers the understanding of violent military practices as practices of production. 
The text breathes prospects of a relationship between the military and machines - the 
ingenuity of the machine, its “valuable ability”, and its ability to activate human 
qualities assembles the machine to an icon representing all the collected benefits of 
productiveness. Furthermore, it is clarified that with the right training, this man-
made ingenuity can come to its full utilisation. But the perfect use and innovation of 
the machine, and its need to be maintained and operated, overshadows its deadly and 
destructive purpose. Discourses of production and education are to such an extent 
fused together in the narratives that describe this object that the machine gun be-
comes an instrument of modernity, not death (see also Pick 1996).         
    
Violence is furthermore portrayed as productive in itself. Using violence to provoke 
the enemy into revealing his position, as suggested in “Draft Instruction for Attack 
against Fortified Positions” (1914) engraves understandings of military violence 
with productivity, as violence is depicted to be used for achieving a preconditioned 
outcome. In other words, it is in this narrative useful to use violence to this end 
(finding the enemy) and it is clear that there is no doubt regarding the possibility of 
applying violence in any given situation. Military violence is thus shown to be used 
for a productive purpose (it is a product taken from the shelf and put in use when 
needed) which is a strikingly common way of depicting military violent practices of 
this time period (Utkast till instruktion för anfall mot befästningar 1914, 11). Fur-
thermore, training to enhance this productive use of violence is also informed by the 
political reformations, discussed above, which connects violent practices with no-
tions of education of ‘the people’ (young men). 
 
The purpose of military training is to strengthen the spirit and the body of the individual, as they 
at the same time are brought to attention to the required military proficiency. […] The military 
training is also intended to promote the fostering of good members of society, and in addition to 
creating prerequisites for good health and stamina during the coming work in the name of peace. 
(Soldatinstruktion. Allmän del: Vårt Fädernesland och Dess Försvar 1930, 11 (italics in original, 
my translation)). 
 
This quote manifests a representative condensation of how narratives of military 
violent practices utilise production and education in the endeavour to promote a 
‘non-violent’ use of the military institution. Arguably, the violence that is inherent in 
gathering humans in masses and arming them with weapons is nowhere to be seen in 
this overarching purpose of military training. Instead, the military is used as a foster-
ing institution to secure the inflow of “good” citizens into society (see also: 
Sundevall 2017). This is to be done by engaging the military in an educational pro-
cess built upon the virtues of physical training. Below follow some reflections of 
‘data’ found depicting this process.  
 
Gibbs’s narrative above helps us understand that combat with bayonets is one for the 
time period central violent practice of the military (as he refers to how German sol-
diers get gutted by such weapons). Surely one such physically close (to the Other) 
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activity must be narrated with some discursive elements that fracture the discursive 
field that creates and sediments bureaucratised understandings of violence? And yes, 
some indications that this practice actually is meant to kill or hurt another human 
can be found in the way in which “Regulations for Training Bayonet Combat” 
(1921) outlines this practice.  
 
Picture (pict. 2) offers some insight 
into how such indicators of vio-
lence are manifest in the material. 
The picture depicts a straw man 
which is recommended to be used 
when training with bayonets. The 
rings on the sack are instructed to 
be “target dots” for the head, the 
location of the heart and the groins 
(Föreskrifter för utbildning i 
bajonettstrid 1921, 12). One might 
think that engaging in this activity 
must then be disruptive to the oth-
erwise bureaucratic articulations 
and practices provided by the dis-
courses of production and educa-
tion. But this is not quite the case 
from two perspectives: Firstly, the 
military use discourses where edu-
cational articulations is central 
when narrating about the use of 
bayonets, which imbeds this activi-
ty into a context of gymnastics. The handbook of 1921 recommends that the training 
is best conducted as a part of physical training. Something that still lives on as I 
myself met with this way of encapsulating use of force when I did my own basic 
training in close combat (in 1993).  
 
Nevertheless, this articulatory practice relocates the bodily, deadly, aspect of bayo-
net combat into the shadows as the activity is performed in a context much like the 
mechanical drill that is the foundation of learning any type of sport. Here, the taxon-
omy of sport replaces violence towards another human as an intrinsic part of com-
bat. This move towards the competition as a meaning-making practice of military 
violent activities can also be found in the instructions for use of hand grenades (see: 
Skjutinstruktion för trupper beväpnade med eldhandvapen och kulspruta. D. 5, 
Utbildning med Hand- och Gevärsgranater 1929, 10, 17), and is also perceivable in 
the development of the system for shooting contests (money and medal reward) that 
invade the narratives of military violent practices during this time. The latter re-
ceives more and more attention in the Swedish Armed Forces’ instructions for using 
firearms and machine guns and in the late 1920s and early 1930s is established as a 
Pict. 2. Scan from Regulations for Training Bayonet 
Combat, 1921 (Föreskrifter för utbildning i bajonettstrid 
1921, 11). 
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widespread narrative depicting military violent practice (in comparison, the 1914 
version of instruction for machine guns does not comprise any activity that resem-
bles the one which is described by these later narratives). The shooting contest nar-
rative is constructed through the use of paragraphs, tables, indexes, and the like, thus 
fortifying links between military education and another discursive theme: order and 
bureaucracy (analysed below) (e.g. appendix to: Skjutinstruktion för trupper 
beväpnade med eldhandvapen och kulspruta : (SIe och ksp). D. 3 1932, 24-25,36-40; 
also appendix to: Skjutinstruktion för trupper beväpnade med eldhandvapen och 
kulspruta. D. 2, Skjututbildning med gevär, karbin och kulsprutegevär 1932, 86–92, 
106, 128).  
 
The second reason why close combat training, like bayonet training, does not disrupt 
this process of neutralising and silencing death and violence emanates from the 
regulation of the activity itself. The instructions for training with bayonets (and hand 
grenades for that matter) rigorously cut the practice into small parts of mechanical 
movements which pervade the entire activity with notions of production 
(Föreskrifter för utbildning i bajonettstrid 1921, 3–9 and the entire Appendix 1. 
Skjutinstruktion för trupper beväpnade med eldhandvapen och kulspruta. D. 5, 
Utbildning med Hand- och Gevärsgranater 1929, 13–18). That is, the violent prac-
tice of close combat is understood to be one which can be deconstructed, in the 
sense that it can be taken apart into entities that together form a functional practice, 
much like the dismantling of a machine. These single parts are thus bodily move-
ments that can be manufactured through drill, and the automated learning of each 
movement is in combination imagined to function as ‘combat’. Thereby, close com-
bat as a violent practice is removed of any traces of emotional, corporeal, bodily 
aspects that were exemplified by, and discernible in, Gibbs’s narrative. At least until 
its practitioners really meet the Other (i.e. the enemy).   
 
Analysis of articulations of Order and Bureaucracy (part 1) 
The importance of order and its interconnections with bureaucracy can be visualised 
by a simple exercise in counting the pages that, for instance, the Field Regulations 
(1917) devote to describing other (peripheral to combat) military activities. The 
‘nature’ of combat is restricted to 10 pages (of a total of 262 pages) whereas “Ser-
vice messages” is allocated 26 pages, “Requisitions” 8 pages, “Accommodations” 
14 pages.8 Each of these latter chapters contain paragraphs that regulate, create and 
motivate a plethora of military activities that are not directly aimed at the use of 
force. These tales of how military practice functions in the close context of war 
postulate order to that very context. Order is assembled from those needs that are 
identified by the narrators surrounding the military use of force, as it seems logical 
                                                             
8 In the Draft Field Regulations of 1928 the complete second part (135 pages) is devoted to combat. So clearly there has 
been a development of how the Swedish Armed Forces put emphasis on the matter of combat. However, the context of 
these 135 pages does not create a discursive resistance towards a meaning-making process which works to neutralise 
violence and death in military practice. On the contrary, these pages are filled with aspects of battle which are portrayed 
as a controllable, orderly and purposeful activity, with very few exceptions.     
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to fulfil these needs. If there is no regulation of these needs, there will be no order in 
the army, and chaos and utter defeat will surely be at its doorstep. The possibility of 
engaging in detailed descriptions of more or less necessary practices has an alluring 
effect on the ‘rational’ mind. That which is countable, or is possible to control, will 
be measured and regulated to such an extent that what was meant to be the very core 
of the original practice is lost. Such excesses in order and control fill military minds 
with usable narratives that can legitimise the bureaucratisation of military practice.  
 
What I want to elucidate here is that the construction of meaning of military vio-
lence is made possible with the use of regulations. Such narratives create stories 
about militarily violent activities in which regulation is an expression of the hierar-
chically imposed order, or ‘rational’ bureaucracy, that I discuss in Chapter 2. For 
example, in “Service Instructions for the Army” (1931) everything from the conduct 
of greeting, clothing, inspections, transportation and quartering to ranks, assigned 
positions, guard duty and veterinarian services are regulated in detail 
(Tjänstgöringsreglemente för armén (TjR.) 1931). Analysis of literature, which, in 
contrast to the Service Instructions, has battle as a context, reveals strong similarities 
to the Service Instructions, by the tone of the texts and the construction of how the 
texts tell stories of the practices at hand. This comes as no surprise as regulation, or 
bureaucracy if you will, works as a discourse of its own, and thereby influences the 
language of the entire military institute. The will to categorise, sort, and regulate is 
part of every story of military practice that I have come across in the archives, and 
this furthers a bureaucratisation of these practices. Or in the words of Antoine 
Bousquet; 
 
[…] the worldviews articulated under the scientific way of warfare is a distinct approach to control 
and to the problem of order and chaos. The exercise of armed force and its instrumentalisation by 
political entities such as the state require the establishment of an intellectual and organisational 
framework which provides a degree of predictability and control over its outcome [note to Black in 
Stroud: Sutton, 2000]. In this sense warfare can be seen as part of a quest for order, the search for 
regularity and reliability of behaviour, common to most if not all forms of social activity. 
(Bousquet 2009, 239–40) 
 
Points of reference regarding what military work comprise are created by the way in 
which military practices are rationalised through the process of regulation, as violent 
practices are given a meaning based on ‘means to an end’. And it is an ‘end’ where 
something productive will occur, as discussed above. It becomes, for instance, natu-
ral to inform about the officers’ training or service as a conscript without ever men-
tioning anything about war or battle-practices (Drake 1932; Upplysningar rörande 
utbildning till officer på aktiv stat och i reserven vid armén. 1939). The creation of a 
narrative where military practice is perceived as symbiotic with regulation, thus 
starts with the soldiers’ or cadets’ initial meeting with military texts, and proceeds 
during the training (compare with the element of production and education where 
even the most violence imbued activities (i.e. bayonet combat) are regulated). Dis-
courses of order and bureaucracy thus provide a large number of regulations, and 
these work to conceptualise the military violent practice to comprise a sequenced, 
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orderly and ‘rational’ activity. This regulatory discursive practice calls for a more 
detailed investigation of how order and bureaucracy utilise categorisation as an 
articulatory praxis for sustaining the myth of the productive and orderly use of mili-
tary force.       
 
Part 2 of the theme of order and bureaucracy:  Analysis of articulations of 
Categorisation. 
Common to the instructions and regulations during the 1910s is that they introduce 
combat by categorising and delimiting different types of military activity. The field 
is an important concept for understanding violent military practice as it is used to 
define in what kinds of situations violence is used. In “Draft Instruction for Attack 
against Fortifications” (1914) the concept of the “field” enables a categorisation of 
different types of military operations: the field war (battles without strong fortifica-
tions), the positional war (battles with fortifications constructed in the field) and 
finally the fortress or fortification war (battles concerning temporary or permanent 
strong fortifications) (Utkast till instruktion för anfall mot befästningar 1914, 5). In 
“Field Regulations” (1917) and “Instruction for Deputy Commander Army Divi-
sion” (1917) the importance of establishing a “scene of war” occupies the entire 
introduction to the regulations/instructions through the categorisation and dissection 
of to whom is war an issue and at what place war may be staged 
(Fälttjänstreglemente: (F.R.). 1917, XII; Instruktion för ställföreträdande 
arméfördelningschef 1917, 7–19).  
 
While analysing the ‘empirical’ corpus of this time period, it stands clear that mili-
tary narratives are constructed through the use of articulations and signifiers which 
aim at categorising the military practice. This brings forth an order to the military 
violent practices where war is separated from society (by categorising war and its 
practices as naturally handled by the military in pre-identified “scenes”), but fore-
most it creates possibilities to narrate about war and violence as separate entities of 
military practice (they belong to the “field” or the “scene”) and as entities that are 
under (military) control. The dislocation of war from other parts of society described 
above might be viewed as a product of its time, since the Swedish Armed Forces 
later describe war as “total” (Soldatinstruktion för armén, Allmän del 1953, 13). 
Despite this more modern narration where war is depicted as influencing all of so-
ciety, and the “de-categorisation” it ought to promote, the wide use of the concept 
“scene of war” still lingers on in contemporary narratives of military practices (e.g. 
Tuck 2014, 80). As such, the articulatory praxis of using elements of categorisation 
persists in the construction of narratives of military violent practices during the 
modern and post-modern era.   
 
Categorisation as a language technique for constructing narratives of bureaucratised 
violence is perhaps best visualised, more to the point, with the help of narratives of 
military violent practices that are infused with aspects of production (as discussed 
above). Production as an element of storytelling should offer some ‘products’ that 
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need to be categorised. And one of the physical ‘products’ of military violence is a 
dead human. Oddly enough this fact does not take much space in the texts analysed 
here, despite the fact that they are all more or less aimed at violent practices. Perhaps 
this is because it is self-evidently clear that this is the case with the practice at hand 
and thereby there is no need to address the matter at any length (see: Scarry 1985 for 
a critique on how the dead are used in military discourse).  
 
Regardless of reasons for this absence of the dead, this lack of visualising the dead 
in these narratives of military practice has consequences for how military practice is 
understood. The bits of bodies that are mixed with dirt and shovelled into bags or 
into walls of fortifications (as illustrated by Gibbs’s narrative) are not perceptible to 
those fresh minds that come to engage in military practice. In other words, the pro-
spect of becoming a part of your comrades’ shelter is not a viable one, for those who 
are subjected military narratives of violence. Especially in early writings dead bod-
ies are conceptualised as “the fallen”, which is a somewhat poetic way of describing 
killed humans. “The fallen” connotes not agonising pain and punctured flesh, but 
more of an exit from the actual combat. They are not in play anymore. Nevertheless, 
when, which is seldom, the dead appear as “the dead” in the texts, they are visual-
ised as a logistic item that require categorisation. They are to be collected, counted, 
sorted, dressed, registered and numbered (Fälttjänstreglemente: (F.R.). 1917, 131–
32). The stories told about the human body as a part of military violence become 
stories that objectify the body through the element of categorisation, making it a bi-
product of the ‘war machine’ (see also: Winter 1995).  
 
The Other (the enemy) is also narrated by the 
help of articulatory elements/techniques of 
order and categorisation. How they appear, 
how they move and how they should be met 
are some examples of themes in these narra-
tions. The picture (pict. 3) injects more as-
pects of categorisation to the construction of 
military violence in the way it ‘dots out’ 
positions of enemy forces (Holmgren 1918, 
37, 45). The position of the Other resembles 
musical notes where a certain order of hitting 
keys will result in success. In similar ways as 
the body is portrayed as a product of military 
violence, the reification of the Other is here 
used to underline a context of order to the 
‘battlefield’.  
 
What else can this sketch tell us regarding the construction of narratives of military 
practice? In the context of the trench wars of WWI, the sketch provides meaning to 
expressions like: “To take a line” or “to hold a line”. The picture is thus an example 
from the archives where the depiction of military practice as ‘taking lines’ are con-
Pict. 3. Scan of an appendix outlining 
enemy positions (Holmgren 1918, 45). 
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structed through classifications of order. It could be argued that this could be a result 
of an aim to create order to a chaotic context, as Clausewitz depicts frictions as an 
intrinsic part of war. The possibility of disorder in battle is noticeable in narratives 
used for educating officers, but they are concentrated to single sentences. These few 
sentences do more to pay tribute to Clausewitz magnum opus “On War” (i.e. that the 
creator of the military narrative has read it), than they do to create disruptions to a 
narrative of order (e.g. Tingsten 1921, 51). In contrast, panic and disorder are mostly 
narrated as products of fighting at the wrong time and/or place. If the military only 
follow the regulations found in tactical instructions, the battle will proceed as 
planned (“do not attack during night, as it will leave everything to chance”: Tingsten 
1921, 57 (my translation)).  
 
As I have tried to visualise here, the articulatory technique of categorisation occurs 
frequently in the literature that narrates military practice of war. It can express itself 
as division of society, geography, type of terrain, size of war (the large and the small 
war), the reduction of the Other to dots on a sketch and so on (Tingsten, 1921, pp. 
109–135 unfolds a comprehensive view of these categorisations.). 
 
Analysis of articulations of Technology and Science 
In 1914 technology has a firm grip on how narratives of military practice are con-
structed. The following quote is typical of the discursive linkage between technolo-
gy and military violence: “The main line of attack is decided […] by the possibility 
to effectuate superior fire effect towards the points of entry, […]” (Utkast till 
instruktion för anfall mot befästningar 1914, 12–13 (my translation)). The conduct 
of battle is thus narrated as regulated by the ‘effect’ of the machines and not by 
‘irrational’ human needs. This articulates the ‘machine’ as holding a superior posi-
tion in military discourse and underlines the existence of a mythological ‘industrial’ 
character of warfare (see: Keegan 2004, 230). As such, the theme of technology and 
science effectively reduces the discursive space for narrating about military practice 
as a social, human activity (Malešević 2010, 3 f.). Furthermore, technology is used 
to establish how machines can “be of great service” in military practices (1914:11). 
In both these approaches of constructing technological myths about military vio-
lence, the ‘effects’ of weapons are used to link the ‘natural’ position of understand-
ings of violence to the supremacy of technology. This is particular clear in how 
military decisions are narrated to be guided (or even governed) by the possibilities 
provided by technology (Cohn 1987; see also: Pick 1996, 21). For instance, the 
decision where to attack is gradually reduced to a calculation of possibilities, thus 
conceptualising military violence as scientific (see Bousquet 2009 for an entire study 
on the scientific understanding of war).  
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 “Instruction for the Machine Gun-
ner” (1923) manifests some striking 
aspects of how science permeates the 
narratives of early twentieth century 
military practices. The four first pag-
es (of a total of 184) of the book 
guide the reader in the structure/order 
of the machine gun company. Then, a 
long chapter (34 pages) is devoted to 
the maintenance of horses, and this 
picture (pict. 4) can be found on page 
7. It describes the inner mechanisms 
of a horse’s hoof. This chapter is then 
followed by an extensive and in-depth 
account regarding the innermost de-
tails of the machine gun and how it is best kept in working order.  
 
The existence of cross-sections of a horse (and a machine gun, see pict. 5) concen-
trates the military practice to science in a way that removes all aspects of military 
violent practices given by Gibbs’s narrative. Or in other words, both of these long 
chapters give nothing to 
promote the deadly position 
that the object ‘machine 
gun’ can represent while it 
is in actual use. Wallowing 
in the deadliness of the 
machine gun was surely not 
the purpose of the instruc-
tions (and others similar to 
it), but yet again, the pur-
pose of the texts is not inter-
esting. Rather, of interest is 
what the reoccurring use of 
this scientific and techno-
logical ‘tone’ in these narratives of military practice does to military minds that 
during their service are constantly subjected to them.  
 
What happens here is that the death and destruction of violence are ‘naturalised’ by 
the use of science as a discursive element in the construction of narratives of mili-
tary practices. It is not just that the machine is in the centre of narrating how battle is 
conducted; it also is portrayed as an object that the soldier serves (by the focus on 
how it should be maintained).   
 
Pict. 5. Scan from Machine Gunner Instruction, 1923, outlining 
the main components of Machine Gun m/14 
(Kulsprutesoldatinstruktion 1923, 43). 
 
Pict. 4. Scan from Machine Gunner Instruction, 
1923, outlining a horse hoof 
(Kulsprutesoldatinstruktion 1923, 7) 
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If it was killing that really was 
in focus for the machine gun-
ner, had not this type of picture 
been more appropriate (pict. 
6)?9 Even if this is clearly hy-
pothetical reasoning (and still a 
scientific narrative), it is a 
useful exercise for the mind 
when reflecting on the con-
struction of military discourses 
of violence. For if killing hu-
mans is something that is a 
‘reality’ or even quite a reason-
able part of having a military 
institution in society, would not 
the gunner need to know more 
about human anatomy? This 
would surely be theoretically feasible (the scientific  knowledge did/does exist). In 
the 1925 “Fire Instruction for Troops Armed with Handguns and Machine Guns, 
Part One” there is a two-page description of what ‘effect’ a bullet has on living tar-
gets. What is essential to this description is that it is “desirable that a hit from a gun 
is instantly effectual, i.e. that the one who is hit, is immediately taken out of a com-
bat ready state” (Skjutinstruktion för trupper beväpnade med eldhandvapen och 
kulspruta (S.I.e. och k.). 1925, 37–38 (italics in original, my translation)).  
 
This description is the closest to bodily ‘effect’ of military violence that can be 
found in the literature of this era. However, the narrative of the ‘effects’ of the single 
bullet to living tissue is thickly surrounded by page up and down of the science of 
guns and their use (gunnery). This makes it almost unnoticeable for the reader who 
is engaged in the other 67 pages of formulas, graphs and ballistic theory. And the 
narrative itself is constructed with a scientific context where the bullets’ ability to 
pierce the human body is related to the bullets’ capacity to penetrate different types 
of inanimate material (e.g. wood, sand, dirt, metal). Finally, the technological narra-
tive is here constructed with effect as a central theme, visualised by how the text 
describes the desired outcome of firing the gun. Putting the Other in a state of hav-
ing no effect in combat is repeatedly used to circumscribe the killing, maiming or 
hurting of another human (Föreskrifter för utbildning i bajonettstrid 1921, 4; e.g. 
Tingsten 1921, 126).  
 
On a final note, from 1914 to 1939 the emphasis on the science of guns is articulated 
through the development and production of more complex and detailed narratives 
regarding the function of guns in military practice. After the end of WWI, the Swe-
dish Army published new editions of, and new appendices to, Fire Instructions for 
                                                             
9 Pict. 6 - Licensed under Creative Commons Zero, Public Domain Dedication via Wikimedia Commons - 
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Female_with_organs.png#mediaviewer/File:Female_with_organs.png 
Pict. 6. "Female with organs" by Mikael Häggström.  
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Machine Guns in 1920, 1923, 1925, 1927, 1929, 1932 and 1933. In 1914 the instruc-
tions were quite modest, with their total of 87 pages including appendices and tables. 
In 1932 the number of pages for the same type of content as in the 1914 version of 
instruction is at this point 274. This increase in page numbers signifies the impact 
that technology and science have on how narratives of military violent practices are 
formed during this period. Other research confirms these reflections from the ar-
chives; Daniel Pick’s walkthrough of how the concept of the machine is reinforced 
and replaces earlier notions of military violence (as competitive, subjective, or en-
joyable) during the industrialisation of the late 19th early 20th centuries, is perhaps 
the best example of such research (see Pick 1996, 70–74, 206–9).        
 
Swedish Narratives of Military Violence, 1914-1939 – Summary  
In conclusion, the themes of production and education, order and bureaucracy, and 
finally of technology and science, are in plentiful use in literature narrating military 
violent practices. As such, these themes are key ingredients in understanding how 
military work is constructed to manage, neutralise and/or silence the death and vio-
lence of military force. Particularly as the analysis of these themes unmasks how the 
removal of the dead, and the reification of the Other, is made possible by a gradually 
increasing bureaucratisation of military narratives. 
            
Counter Discursive Elements: language that indicates non-bureaucratic 
understandings of violence  
Gibbs’s narrative has helped me stay alert to language which may create non-
bureaucratic understandings of violence. I have tried to visualise my train of thought 
regarding this as the analysis proceeded above (there are some references to Gibbs’s 
narrative in the analysis above), but to clarify this I summarise below the findings 
that made me aware of whether some military language may pose a counter-
discursive force towards the buraucratisation of violence. 
 
I found that “Ruthlessness” appears in early writings (e.g. 1914:7, 8) and although 
the concept represents a human emotional state of mind (and thus should stand 
against discourses of bureaucratisation) its disruptive effect is severely hampered, as 
“ruthlessness” is clad with control. It is imbedded with language that describes it as 
a feeling that can be switched on and off depending on the need of the situation. 
Feelings are through this sort of meaning-making themselves set to be instrumental, 
i.e. to be used as a means for a goal. On the other hand, ruthlessness can be found in 
the depiction of performance of some military practices (1914:16). I will come back 
to this aspect of violence further on in this chapter. 
 
Furthermore, the concept of “Fierce fire” (e.g. 1914:10) indicates uncontrollable 
aspects of human behaviour and society (i.e. to be fierce is not to be in total control 
and/or not to be of ‘rational’ senses), but it is imbued with the same aspects of con-
trol as ruthlessness is, as the military language of the archived material dislocates the 
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uncontrollable aspects of “fierceness”. The concept is interlocked with the use of 
technology (i.e. the use of weapons that can rapidly and simultaneously discharge a 
large amount of metal objects) and the possibility of control (i.e. the discharge of 
weapons is done on command and in synchronisation).             
 
Some aspects of emotional use is also evident in Lieutenant General L.H. Tingsten’s 
“Introduction to Tactics” (8th ed. 1921), a book seen as a standard reference work 
on the nature of battle and thus widely used in officers’ education during this period 
(Norberg et. al., 1992, pp. 202–203, 257).  According to this book, a bayonet attack 
is to be conducted while forcefully shouting “Hurray” (Tingsten 1921, 69). The 
word “hurray” has a traditional use as a battle cry, but had during the 19th century 
started to get widespread use as a celebration call for royalty and for general support 
(Dalin 1830, 718). In present time, it is used exclusively as a celebration call, but 
besides the development of the application of the word, it signifies that there is a 
need for mass emotional courage and/or frightening the Other in the engagement in 
military violent practices. As such, its use in Tingsten’s narrative of military practice 
somewhat disrupts an all-emotionless bureaucratised discourse of military violence.   
 
 Part 2 of Chapter 4 - Analysing Swedish Dis-
courses of military violence, 1939 – 1964  
 
In this second part of the chapter I expand my analysis of how bureaucratised under-
standings of violence become a naturalised part of Swedish military practice, to 
comprise the time period 1939-1964, thus adding WWII and its aftermath as influen-
tial events used in the narration of military practice. This part of the chapter is initi-
ated directly below by a walkthrough of how the political reforms of the previous 
time period have developed during this era. This section is then followed by a close 
reading of a story that has helped me deepen the analysis of which points of refer-
ence are used in the management, neutralisation and/or silencing of military vio-
lence. Particularly the theme of military masculinity is added to the analysis. Before 
the actual conduct of the analysis where the use of this ‘added’ theme is scrutinised, 
I discuss how the archive material of this period relates to the previously identified 
points of reference/themes in military discourse.  
 
 
4.5  Political Reformations of the mid 20th Century – How 
Bureaucracy is Instilled in the Modern Swedish Military 
 
Neutrality 
As stated earlier, neutrality had developed into a policy of unity among the Swedish 
political parties, even though public debate was characterised by clashes between 
‘warmongers’ and ‘pacifists’ in the early 20th century. This political unity remained 
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unchanged, even though ideological shifts between left and right wing parties oc-
curred on the question of ideological legitimacy supporting the neutrality policy 
(Björklund 1992, 9 ff.). Non-alignment and neutrality successfully established them-
selves in Swedish foreign policy due to the articulations and connotations this policy 
produced, allowing for ideological opponents with different motives for neutrality to 
stand on common ground (Hugemark 1986, 32–33). This meant that the Swedish 
military practice could ‘flourish’ as the political strengthening and stabilisation of 
neutrality gave grounds for building a powerful military in order to deter aggressors 
(foremost the Soviet Union) (Aggestam and Hyde-Price 2016). Despite this, re-
search indicates that the military harboured a strong longing for alignment to the 
Western Bloc (Kronvall and Petersson 2005, 42 f.).  
 
Despite the historical fact that Sweden made some preparations for receiving mili-
tary support from the Western Bloc (e.g. Dalsjö 2014), I argue here that neutrality 
provides a discursive setting in which Swedish military practice ‘becomes’ a prac-
tice of education and training, rather than one of fighting wars. It is thus here narra-
tives of violence stabilise and help the military work to take form, constructing un-
derstandings of the military as an educator and producer of conscripts. From the 
middle of the 1960s and especially during the ‘Palme-era’ of Swedish politics, i.e. 
after the time-period analysed here, neutrality shifted from being a driver for practi-
cal solutions to international tensions and crises, to a normative framework for en-
gaging in ‘active foreign policy’ (e.g. Agrell 2000; Dalsjö 2014). This means that in 
the time after WWII, neutrality was in addition to its ‘official’ purpose of keeping 
Sweden out of a possible third world war, used in various ways to educate and ‘re-
form’ the male citizens. In other words, the ‘armed neutrality’ of Sweden made it 
possible to direct the military practice to take the education of conscripts as its main 
purpose. Here the political grand narrative of ‘the people’s collective defence force’ 
(folkets samlade värnkraft) was particularly useful to enhance and develop the polit-
ical reforms of the ‘Total Defence’ (Agrell 2011, 45, 189).      
 
‘Total Defence’ and the establishment of Swedish military practice as a 
practice of social development  
During this era, government inquiries are conducted in order to facilitate for joint 
efforts of societal defence, which initiate and establish a Swedish ‘Total Defence’ 
reform (Munck af Rosenschöld 2014, 8). In short, the concept of ‘Total Defence’ 
was used to merge and combine the defence efforts of the military, civilian, econom-
ic and psychological defence in order to create a resilient society. At the end of the 
time period of interest here, the 1963 parliamentary decision states that the main task 
for the Total Defence is to “be so prepared for war that it works as a peace-keeping 
force” and that the “different parts of the total defence cooperate and support each 
other, in order to maximise defence effectiveness” (cited in: Munck af Rosenschöld 
2014, 19 my translation).  
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As I see it, there are at least three vital political strategies that are used to support 
this defence transformation, and which make ‘Total Defence’ a vital part in under-
standing how bureaucratisation of military work has been politically fuelled. Firstly, 
‘Total Defence’ was strongly interconnected with the idea of having a conscript 
army. Military service was politically promoted as important for creating an under-
standing and acceptance for the ‘Total Defence’. In addition to the view that after 
doing their military service, citizens could work to strengthen the civilian and eco-
nomical defence in their ordinary jobs, the time of service was also portrayed as a 
time of maturity where men learned to work together towards a higher cause 
(Dahlström, Söderberg, and Olofsson 2002, 61–65, 170–72). In other words, having 
a conscript army was central to supporting the implementation and the political and 
military stability of ‘the Total Defence’ reformation. Secondly, the political focus on 
creating and maintaining a male conscript army, stimulated the use of a continuously 
diversifying narrative where certain masculine norms were implemented and sus-
tained (Kronsell and Svedberg 2001). Here the political articulations in forms of 
legislative language concerning which parts of the population were subject to service 
ensured a closure for women to affect military understandings of military practice, 
and in prolongation, of military violence. Particularly, military masculinity was 
formed with focus on norms where Swedish military violence was constructed as 
“just and virtuous” and men were to do their “duty” in relation to the benefit of the 
People (Kronsell and Svedberg 2001, 163). Insomuch, the political reform of ‘Total 
Defence’ and its focus on conscription of young males constructed a diversion in the 
Swedish society where men had the ownership of a type of ‘protective’ military 
violence (Ibid). This political reformation underlines the need to analyse how milita-
rised masculinities are discursively linked with military narratives that supported a 
construction of bureaucratised violence.  
 
The third and final phenomenon related to this political reform that I want to high-
light before entering further analysis of military narratives, is how the ‘Total De-
fence’ isolates military violence from the rest of society. It may seem counter-
intuitive to argue that a ‘Total Defence’ concept actually isolates something of the 
military practice, but there is a point to be made here. As a political strategy that 
underpins the formation of social (formal and informal) rules and behaviour as well 
as narratives that help actors and institutions create a secure identity, the ‘Total De-
fence’ concept helped sustain a consensus between (seemingly) diverging norms in 
the Swedish in society. For those who attached themselves to the grand narrative of 
Sweden as a peaceful nation, neutral in war and a breeding ground for higher mor-
al/living standards, ‘Total Defence’ provided the means to diminish understanding 
of the Swedish military as violent.10 In this narrative, the military does not need to 
be scrutinised or pondered upon, as the sole responsibility for defence is not the 
                                                             
10 For the impact of modernity and welfare on this narrative, see Alf W. Johansson, p. 202 f. On how higher moral 
standards infused this story of Sweden (and the narrative’s promotion for Swedes to turn a blind eye to violence), see 
Patrick Salmon, p. 310 f., 314. Both in Almqvist & Glans, 2001. See also Alf W. Johansson, p. 205, 211, 218 in Huldt & 
Böhme, 1995, for more on the Swedish strong (political) will to focus on modernity and peace rather than war and 
violence.  
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military’s, especially since the military’s main task is discursively framed as educat-
ing and forming young boys into men (as previously noted).  
 
The homogenised political strategy of ‘Total Defence’ affects many institutions in 
Swedish society during this period, where everything from a farmer’s tractor, na-
tional communications, industry and medical capabilities is assigned a governmen-
tally structured place in the defence of Sweden. There is thus an abundance of prac-
tices facilitated by this political reformation, and the military’s role as one cog in 
this defence machinery actually removes some light from its violent potential (e.g. 
Cronqvist 2008; Hjort 2004). Most importantly, ‘Total Defence’ brings with it a 
story of peace, not war. It enhances the military to be narrated as a ‘peace-creator’, 
which in turn reduces its possibility to be narrated as an aggressor (Agius 2006, 105 
ff.). In this way, the narratives used to promote and secure the implementation of the 
‘Total Defence’ transformation create space for the emergence of a silence regarding 
military violence (as a destructive and potentially escalating force). Instead, narra-
tives of military practice were built upon societal discourses which, as outlined be-
low, promote an understanding of military violence as ‘productive’ and ‘efficient’. 
The narration supporting the implementation of the ‘Total Defence’ also leaves the 
Swedish Armed Forces to internally develop their understandings of violence, since 
public debate and political controversy on the subject of Swedish use of force is held 
to a minimum (this lack of debate still lingers in the Swedish context, see: M. Wendt 
and Åse 2016).  
 
In sum, political reformations of the mid 20th century regarding neutrality and ‘Total 
Defence’ promote further steps in the bureaucratisation of the Swedish military. 
These political strategies open up discursive space for military work to be narrated 
in terms of ‘productivity and education’. But they also facilitate a construction of a 
type of military masculinity where conscription and its interconnected norms of duty 
and protection are instilled to millions of Swedish men (see: Kronsell and Svedberg 
2001, 158). Finally, these political reforms has also worked to reduce debate and to 
neutralise and silence the actual existence of Swedish military violence, which 
makes this context salient for investigating how bureaucratisation has taken hold of 
the military.   
 
In the next section I expand upon the alternative narrative that Gibbs and the ‘Agony 
Column’ offered above, as a critical support for the subsequent analysis of military 
narratives. But here I draw upon a narrative that represents a development of how 
violence is portrayed in the wake of WWII, but it also provides some specification 
regarding the stories that are created to support the political reformations of neutrali-
ty and ‘Total Defence’.      
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4.6  A Narrative of Death and Violence: The Continuation 
War 
 
In the book “The Unknown Soldier” (1955) Väinö Linna tells a story about the lives 
(and deaths) of Finnish soldiers and officers during the Continuation War (Finland’s 
war against the Soviet Union, 1941-1944). Linna was himself a non-commissioned 
officer during this war, which probably gives the story extra weight when it comes 
to realism and accuracy regarding details of military practice. This book is referred 
to in the introduction of Swedish Army Instruction “Command, Discipline and Mo-
rale” (1956), as the most influential fictional work of that time with respect to mili-
tary conditions in the field and in battle (despite the influx of American postwar 
accounts of WWII at that point) (Befälsföring, disciplin och förbandsanda 1956, 5). 
“The Unknown Soldier” became an instant success despite (or perhaps due to) its 
unconventional and realistic portrayal of military violence and harsh criticism of 
higher military leadership during the war. Translated into at least 14 languages, it 
has been claimed that the book represents “the peak of what world literature has to 
offer within this genre” (fictional war literature) (see preface to the English version: 
Linna 1957, XI). The book has also been made into film several times, as recently as 
2017. There is little doubt that the narrative provided by Linna had an effect on 
public opinion in Finland and to some extent also in Sweden when it comes to the 
Continuation War (a war that Finland lost). 
 
“The Unknown Soldier” is in many ways representative of a narrative that can dis-
rupt institutionalised understandings of violence, much like Gibbs’s narrative posits 
in section 4.3 of this chapter. But the book also, as manifested by the analysis below, 
enhances a bureaucratisation of violence in some ways and this dualism in the narra-
tive makes it interesting as a guide for picking up on articulations and signifiers used 
in the discursive struggle of forming a coherent discourse on what military violence 
comprises.  
 
I have analysed the Swedish translation from 1955, partly because the English ver-
sion is poorly translated (entire sections are missing in the English version), but 
mostly because this is the first version that was made available to the Swedish 
speaking audience. In general, the book forms a strong anti-militaristic and anti-
violence statement as it, in correspondence to Gibbs’ narrative, effectively portrays 
the meaninglessness and arbitrary character of violence (e.g. Linna 1955, 147, 162, 
164–65, 352, 374, 442). It also critically questions such traditional military areas as 
drill and discipline (foremost the imbalance in relations of power they create), and 
also the need for military rituals and social traditions. As such, the narrative is aimed 
at criticising the power that permeates the military practices of this time, foremost 
the power to dominate those with lower rank (often members of the working class or 
equiv.). Linna convincingly shows how the ‘best’ soldiers (i.e. those who can keep 
their cool while killing the Other and during intense fighting) resist such forms of 
domination, despite the fact that these soldiers are portrayed as ‘the salt of the earth’.   
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The ‘heroes’ of the story resist and agitate against disciplinary formalities and as-
signments that they find dislocated from the act of killing, or from acts that are di-
rected towards their own unit’s survival. And these main characters draw upon the 
self-reassurance that they get from killing and surviving in order to succeed with this 
resistance to certain formalities and assignments (Linna 1955, 245, 326). The offic-
ers that try to impose their power on these soldiers are in the end faced with the 
choice of shooting their best soldiers for insubordination, or letting go of their pow-
er. The previous choice succumbs to the latter in all cases but one, which informs 
military violent practice with the usefulness of being a good killer (you can ‘get 
away’ with obstructing military formalities if you have proven your worth as a kill-
er). And a good killer is, according to the narrative, perceived as a hard, cool-
headed, strong, bold, ruthless and rational man (Linna 1955, 158, 162–63, 265).  
 
As such, Linna’s narrative provides something more to military discourses in com-
parison to the stories of Gibbs and the ‘Agony Column’. It increases the complexity 
of military discourse in at least two ways: It informs military practice with a tradi-
tional masculine perspective (Chinkin and Kaldor 2013, 168; Pin-fat and Stern 2005, 
27,28,33), and in addition, it reveals the struggle of power that lies inherent in mili-
tary practice. Both of these aspects have not been identified in my analysis above of 
WWI-related narratives. In the WWI-section of this chapter, the military discourse 
outlines violence as a mere means to an end, thus inherently having a clinical ‘ra-
tionality’ in its formation as an object of use: “If we attack here (apply the tool vio-
lence), the operation will succeed (the goal (end) will be fulfilled)”. The masculine 
message that Linna’s narrative comprises is, however, not convincingly set apart 
from narratives that create such understandings of violence. This is partly due to the 
web of connotations that forms between masculinity and some ‘products’ of moder-
nity: the (manly) industrial worker, the (manly) rational bureaucrat and the (manly) 
elite athlete (R. W. Connell 1998, 8,11).  
 
The above could then be summarised by saying that the Swedish Army was through 
the popularity of Linna’s book provided with a non-bureaucratised narrative of vio-
lence, apart from its reproduction of traditional masculine attributes of military vio-
lence (on the book's importance for Swedish understandings of combat, see 
Smedberg in Dahlström et al. 2002, p.133). In other words, the potential disruptive 
discursive force of the narrative lies in the story’s descriptions of the meaningless-
ness and arbitrariness of military violence. However, “The Unknown Soldier” is so 
skilfully written that it bears with it a possibility of conveying other understandings 
of violent practices than that of the meaninglessness of violence. For instance, Linna 
had the ability to combine credible descriptions of human psychology with contexts 
of military tactics and operations. The narrative can thus be read as a historical novel 
which gives insight into regimental, battalion and company level tactics. 
 
On the right the company which crossed after them had joined the battle and easily penetrated the 
Russian positions, for Kariluoto’s advance along the trench had paralysed the defence. Thus when 
they established contact with this company’s left flank Kariluoto’s men made their way back. 
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Meanwhile part of the Third Company cleaned up in the opposite direction, for the Russians were 
everywhere retreating. (Linna 1957, 102)     
  
The quote above illustrates this duality of Linna’s narrative. It is constructed by 
combining some non-bureaucratising aspects of military violence - fear (paralysa-
tion) - with the discursive elements of production (cleaning up) and order (in the 
way the companies are attributed to act). It also indicates masculinity (penetration) 
which here attach the male dominance into violent military practices. Despite these 
dualistic aspects of the quote, the text can be read as an account of how military 
units act in situations similar to the trench war. It can thus be used to convey mean-
ing for those who invest interest in military theory and tactics, in the way which the 
narrative describes the unfolding events. The point here is not to establish how Lin-
na’s narrative should have been used but to display how this complex story can be 
used to produce multiple meaning which helps construct narratives of bureaucratisa-
tion, despite the book’s descriptions of the horrors and meaninglessness of violence.   
 
Here the Swedish instruction “Command, Discipline and Morale” (1956), briefly 
mentioned above, comes into the picture. This military instruction exemplifies how 
Linna’s narrative was used as leverage when constructing new (at the time) military 
narratives regarding the productive aspect of violence. First, the preface to the Swe-
dish instruction downplays some of the ‘irrationalities’ of Linna’s story as another, 
more ‘sober’ story regarding the realities of the Continuation War (provided by a 
high ranking officer) is presented as an alternative view of the events. This ‘sober’ 
story actively disavows Linna’s narrative, and strips it of the very thing that makes it 
unique, as it promotes a “dispassionate” and a “matter-of-fact” (unemotional and 
practical) analysis of soldiers’ psyches. Such an analysis is seen as productive as it 
can be used to develop new instructions for peace-time education of non-
commissioned officers and officers (Befälsföring, disciplin och förbandsanda 1956, 
6). This military narrative thereby promotes utilisation of those aspects of “The 
Unknown Soldier” that ‘fit’ into the construction of bureaucratisation through dis-
courses of production and education.  
 
Secondly, “Command, Discipline and Moral” uses Linna’s narrative to promote 
usefulness of military violence, as it make use of episodes from “The Unknown 
Soldier” which describe how officers overcome their lack of natural leadership abili-
ties by compensating with courage and an active participation in the killing of the 
Other (Befälsföring, disciplin och förbandsanda 1956, 25). The message is that of-
ficers that show courage and proficiency in close combat will automatically gain 
respect, or at least acceptance, from their soldiers. Hence, the instruction makes use 
of the masculine norms promoted by Linna’s narrative in a way which underlines the 
value of being a good and active killer. As such, military violence (the killing of the 
Other) becomes a product, or a tool, that can be used for strengthening officers’ grip 
on soldiers. Finally, the Swedish instruction, seen as a narrative of military practice, 
directs the use of narratives portraying the ‘realities’ of war to studies of leadership.  
It thereby separates stories of military violence (and their possible critical interpreta-
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tion of military violence) from other parts of the military educational practice, i.e. 
areas such as strategy and tactics, war studies and operational planning. In other 
words, it is possible that the instruction contributes to the creation of the Swedish 
military traditional practice of touching on critique of military violence only when 
specific issues of leadership are dealt with (e.g. how to get soldiers to fight etc.).    
 
In sum, Linna’s narrative supports the analysis of military narratives of violent prac-
tices belonging to the time period 1939 – 1964 by adding the following to the previ-
ously found articulations and signifiers of how military work is narrated: Masculini-
ty, understood as comprising strength, ruthlessness, heroism (including sacrifice), 
boldness and practical knowledge of using violence.11 In the following section, these 
articulations and signifiers will be used as a way of unfolding how understandings of 
violence are connected to certain ways of portraying military masculinity. But the 
section will first outline how the previously analysed themes of production and edu-
cation, order and bureaucracy, technology and science are in use during this era to 
form points of reference for military understandings of death and violence.  
 
4.7  Analysing Narratives: Swedish Military Discourse of Vio-
lence, 1939 - 1964  
           
This section will initially add more discursive elements (ways of articulating and 
signifying bureaucratisation) to the analysis (in the form of ‘short summaries’), 
found in the Swedish military narratives created during the mid 20th century. But the 
main area of analysis in this section comprises, as briefly mentioned, an investiga-
tion of how articulations and signifiers of a certain military masculinity operate so as 
to create bureaucratised meanings of military violence. Insomuch, this section offers 
the second step in answering the question of how (by what themes of military narra-
tives) is violence and death presented, naturalised and/or silenced in the portrayal of 
Swedish military practice?          
   
Short summary: Analysis of articulations of Order and bureaucracy  
To start with, order has become vital for portraying violent practices and has been 
further discursively entrenched since the earlier time period. Exemplified here by 
this quote from “Army Regulations, Part 2” (1952):  
 
Combat is terminated, when planned, or if its prolongation should cause unreasonable loss of force 
in proportion to that which stands to be gained. (Arméreglemente, Del 2 1952, 2:28-42 (my 
translation)). 
 
The quote above could be read critically as portraying a military practice of fleeing 
from/giving up/never engaging in combat activities. But in the archived materials, 
                                                             
11 In comparison, Claire Duncanson in a modern study of British soldiers’ identity construction utilises ”action, aggres-
sion, bravery, heroism, risk-taking and sacrifice” to identify skills and attitudes associated with masculinity and combat 
(Duncanson 2013, 73, 76). 
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violence is narrated as possible to regulate and measure, which creates a meaning to 
violence as something that can end ‘with the flip of a switch’. When reading the 
material, there is not much that makes resemblance to images of soldiers fleeing 
from, or not engaging in, combat due to fear, exhaustion or for that matter, due to 
insight that the current combat is pointless. Order as a central component in under-
standing military violence is forced upon the reader through these types of narra-
tions. Military discourse thus envisions combat as an on/off activity (it can be termi-
nated) and doing this, the archived material furthers the idea that violent practices 
can be controlled and events can be foreseen (as also evident in the analysis of the 
material on WWI).   
 
In addition, categori-
sation is further used 
and enforced as a 
central element of 
narratives of violence 
during this era. Pic-
ture 7 outlines how 
the dead are supposed 
to be handled during 
times of war. Dead 
bodies are still narrat-
ed as logistic items 
which in sum imprint 
the dead as ‘an item 
causing a problem 
which should be 
solved in an orderly fashion’. This creates the need for a separate service of military 
practice: the “war burial service” which in turn produces paragraphs that further the 
objectification of the human body and entrench bureaucratised meaning of violence 
(for a representative sample, see: Arméreglemente, Del 2 1952, 21:61-71).    
 
Short summary: Analysis of articulations of Technology and science 
Narratives found in the archives that build upon technological and scientific dis-
courses are plentiful in the military litterateur of this era. Stories about military vehi-
cles, firepower and weapons illustrate a military understanding of violence where 
the machines take superiority over the human subject. The priority of machines 
(over humans) is promoted in similar ways as during the previous time period, but 
now there are more effective ways of building such narratives (the technology need-
ed to create pictures comprising cross sections of machines has developed). Now 
there are several more military instructions in play, and they cooperate in order to 
instil the importance of technology as a vital part of violent military practices. For 
instance, the preface to “Fire Instructions for the Army, Part 1 A: Basics” (1953) 
Pict. 7. Scan of picture outlining the “principles for war burial 
service”(Arméreglemente, Del 2 1952, 21:76-83). 
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sets the tone for how narratives of military practice are permeated with the themes of 
technology and science. It states that:  
 
[T]he conditions of the target and the time when the fire, for tactical reasons, should hit the target, 
decides the gunner’s activity and the measures taken at firing and observation stations. 
(Skjutinstruktion för Armén. Del 1A, Grunder 1953, 5 (my translation)).  
 
“Tactical reasons” are found in other, supporting narratives, to comprise the over-
arching principle “concentration of fire” (Arméreglemente, Del 2 1952, 2:5-9). Nev-
ertheless, this quote narrates the spatial and bodily prerequisites for the activity of 
the ‘gunner’ to be ruled by how to most efficiently produce a massive amount of 
firepower. In other words, the weapon’s (technical) potential is discursively posi-
tioned as governing the military body. As such, it is technology that ‘decides’ when, 
where and how violence is performed by the military, at least if we accept the power 
that lies in narratives to affect understandings of ‘reality’. Reliance on technology to 
‘govern’ the use of military force has of late been, as discussed in Chapter 2, the 
subject of the academic debate regarding how military violence is managed, neutral-
ised or silenced in the Western military. Particularly when it comes to the use of 
military drones (e.g. Holmqvist 2013a; Schwarz 2016; I. Shaw and Akhter 2014). 
Here the analysis of the military regulations of this time period reveals that this 
‘supremacy’ of technology lies imbedded in the historical construction of military 
discourse.  
 
Short summary: Analysis of articulations of Production and education 
In similar ways as the other themes, production and education are further established 
as crucial for constructing narratives of violent practices during this era. “The com-
petition”, as found in previous narratives, is developed as a theme for depicting 
violent practices, typically composed of sentences like “Remember, he who hits the 
target fastest, wins” (Soldaten i fält 1960, 70 (my translation)).  
 
Furthermore, although some pic-
tures portray soldiers in combat-
ready positions (pencil drawings in 
black/grey), the majority of pic-
tures outlining violent practices 
expand ‘the competition theme’ by 
adding ‘the game’ as a correspond-
ing theme, as observable in picture 
8. Displaying human activity with 
game pieces makes connotations to 
the board game, which orders and 
objectifies human practices (see 
Foucault regarding objectification 
in: Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983, 
Pict. 8. Scan of picture outlining combat as a board 
game (Soldaten i fält 1960, 198). 
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165,182,208). Such connections are continuously made in military discourse as the 
picture, and several similar to it, are displayed in the book “The Field Soldier” 
(1960). This is a book which is meant to impart knowledge about war and combat to 
new soldiers in the army (Soldaten i fält 1960, 7). In that aspect, the educational 
purpose of the handbook that this picture is taken from marks the use of educational 
and productive (the production of conscripts) discourses, supported by narratives of 
‘the game’ as well as the competition (see also: Soldatinstruktion för armén: Allmän 
Del 1951, 156; and: Soldatinstruktion för armén: allmän del (SoldI A) 1955, 113). 
 
In sum, the use of themes in the creations of narratives of military violent practices 
during 1914-1939 have continued to enhance and recreate bureaucratised under-
standings of violence in the aftermath of WWII. Two generations of officers and 
approx. 45 classes of conscripts have been subjected to the discursive enforcement 
of bureaucratisation and modernization illustrated by my analysis. During this time, 
narratives of military violent practices have been in conflict with eyewitness ac-
counts and media coverage from two of the bloodiest wars in history. Despite these 
accounts of ‘real world’ events, the use of these themes has not diminished in the 
construction of military narratives of violent practices. On the contrary, the impact 
and admiration of technology, the striving to inject order into military practices and 
the regularity of the rhythm of conscript education seems to have the upper hand 
against the messages provided by potentially disruptive narratives of war and battle. 
Still, a deeper understanding of how specific use of language enforces this resistance 
towards alternative understandings of military violence is of interest, particularly by 
using the previously outlined norms/narratives of masculinity in the analysis of the 
archived material. The following part of this section on WWII-related narratives 
thus aim at disclosing how the narratives at hand make use of discursive elements of 
masculinity, in order to provide an extended analysis of how bureaucratisation pre-
vails and develops.            
     
Analysis of articulations of Masculinity 
Arguably, the Swedish military practice could be seen as discursively gendered 
partly by Linna’s narrative of violence, as it held a central place in the Swedish 
military discourse of the late 1950s and early 1960s. But the question is how (by 
what means and with what type of language) articulations of masculinity are con-
nected to a process of bureaucratising violence? The following part presents the 
results of reading military instructions of violent practices in search for an answer to 
this question. In other words, the analysis has searched for how elements of mascu-
linity have worked to reinforce or counter bureaucratised understandings of military 
violence.  
 
The 1952 Army Manual, part 2, introduces itself with a nearly blank page. There are 
only four words present on the page: “Stand firm – Strike hard”. The formal intro-
duction follows up on this message by promoting “strength” as the key ingredient 
for securing the preservation of the Swedish nation (Arméreglemente, Del 2 1952, 
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1–4). There is clearly a story here where the ‘hegemonic’ masculine values from 
Linna’s narrative are in use, and the following outlines how the Swedish military 
narratives of its practice gendered in light of this use. 
 
Strength, boldness and ruthlessness are in the material drawn together when differ-
ent forms of attack are depicted. During the mid 20th century, Swedish military prac-
tice has gone from the trench war style of infantry tactics that was present in the 
material analysed earlier in this chapter, and is now deeply affected by German and 
Russian forms of tactics. Speed, surprise and concentration of force are constantly 
encouraged in the instructions and manuals of this time (e.g. Arméreglemente, Del 2 
1952, 2:1-4, 3:1-4, 3:7-8; Taktiska anvisningar. Häfte 2, Stridsavsikt (stridsuppgift) 
och stridssätt 1944, 3). It is only through the practice of attack that the enemy can be 
beaten, and defence is given a weaker meaning. “Attack is the only form of combat 
that can enforce a decisive moment in battle” the 1952 Army Manual concludes 
while drawing up the basics for combat (Ibid, p. 2:29). The discursive promotion of 
bureaucratisation made possible by how such statements depict military violence as 
conducted in an orderly fashion has already been discussed in the previous sections 
of this chapter, but by searching for a gendered meaning-making process something 
new appears. As such, the texts create masculine imprints on the practice of attack, 
since it is narratively constructed to be stronger than defence. Concentration of force 
(or fire) is an example of this construction as it is portrayed to be performed “strong-
ly”, “with strength” or “as strong as possible” (Arméreglemente, Del 2 1952, 2:1-4, 
3:7-8, 3:21-22). This practice of, for a short period of time, culminating the military 
ability for violence is also connected to “ruthlessness” in several passages (e.g. Ibid 
3:1-4, 3:11-22). Today those who have had a modern education in military matters 
(the theory of war, tactics, strategy, operational art etc.) will recognise that the con-
cept of concentration of force is a prevailing convention for military success (e.g. 
Jordan et al. 2016, 96).  
 
In addition to concentration of force, another concept of importance in the military 
practice that has prevailed in the 20th century and is still in use today is “surprise”. 
The weight of surprising your opponent is endorsed both by Western and Russian 
doctrine in the aftermath of WWII (see: Tuck 2014, 87, 92) and Swedish literature 
of this period is no exception to this endorsement (Arméreglemente, Del 2 1952, 
2:1-4; Taktiska anvisningar. Häfte 2, Stridsavsikt (stridsuppgift) och stridssätt 1944, 
2; Taktiska bestämmelser. 1 1940, 6).  In “Tactical Regulations” (1940), the Army 
Command conducts an analysis of recent events (Soviet’s attack on Finland and 
Germany’s invasion of Denmark and Norway) and concludes that surprise is one of 
three principles used in the “new methods of attack” (Taktiska bestämmelser. 1 
1940, 6). “Boldness” is in these regulations presented as a key ingredient in succeed-
ing with surprising the opponent and the practice of narrating boldness in relation to 
surprise is firmly set in publications of the later years (Arméreglemente, Del 2 1952, 
2:1-4, 3:9-10; Soldaten i fält 1960, 132; Taktiska bestämmelser. 1 1940, 7). Bold-
ness is further idealised through statements like “Boldness may lead to great results” 
(Arméreglemente: Del 1 1950, 8 (my translation)), and by describing boldness as a 
  90 
preferred ability among those wanting to serve as rangers (elite soldiers) (Taktiska 
anvisningar. Häfte 4, Fria kriget 1944, 5). The concept of surprise thus furthers an 
already active use of the masculine signifier boldness, and this concept is in the 
narratives connected to greatly enhancing the prospects of “winning”.       
 
Ruthlessness, boldness and strength are masculine norms that I have found in Lin-
na’s narrative, as previously discussed, and they are here moulded into the practice 
of concentrating force. As such, the modern historical foundation for the sometimes 
occurring premeditated and excessive use of force in current operations is to some 
extent based on the masculine ideal that lies in the historical construction of the 
“attack practices”. Rokka and Koskela, the soldiers in Linna’s story that represent 
the heroes of war, display these traits. In Rokka’s case perhaps best visualised in the 
passage where he by using a tommy gun kills 52 (!) Russians trying to pass over a 
snow covered swamp (his strength is bolstered by how the man, Lampinen, that fills 
his cassettes with new ammunition is portrayed: weak, stunned with fear and on the 
edge of running away). Rokka is injured during the combat but after being stunned 
for a moment “The tommy gun resumes its clatter. The survivors were not running 
now, but were trying to tunnel their way to safety. Some succeeded, but they were 
few compared to those who lay silent on the swamp.”(Linna 1957, 183). When the 
rest of the platoon arrives on the scene, the baffled platoon commander inquires 
what has happened: 
 
- Was all the firing yours? 
- Well, most of it. The little Ivan did didn’t amount to much. Cut my head open though, the bas-
tards. I was stunned for a moment.  
- And I tried to run, Lampinen said humbly as though to show that he had no intention of denying 
that he had been scared. 
Rokka only laughed good-humoredly [SIC] and said: 
- So you did. But put a bandage on my head, will you? It’s stopped bleeding, but it’s best to dress 
it just the same. 
Lampinen applied the bandage. He was not at all ashamed of having been afraid as he said with 
humble admiration: 
- You’re sure one hell of a man… (Linna 1957, 184) 
 
Ruthlessness is in this context understood as being able to use violence towards the 
Other, without having any remorse and without giving any pardon. The message 
here is that a “hell of a man” has the strength to resist injuries and is not emotionally 
moved by massive killings.  The weak (feminine) man panics easily and tries to flee 
from combat, and is furthermore in humble admiration of the strong soldier. He 
(Lampinen in this case) is good for tending to wounds but not for much else. As 
mentioned earlier, “Command, Discipline and Moral” (1956) strips Linna’s story of 
the arbitrary and meaninglessness of military violence which could counter a bu-
reaucratised understanding of military violent practices, but in addition to this, sup-
ports the iconic portrayal of Rokka as an ideal for valour and bravery (e.g. 
Befälsföring, disciplin och förbandsanda 1956, 6, 21). By endorsing the ideal that 
Rokka upholds and linking it to the Swedish military practice of education (with 
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suggestions on how to better train soldiers), the instruction helps infuse this type of 
masculine ideal into the military practice.   
 
Summary: masculinity and bureaucratised understandings of violence 
I can thus conclude that strength, ruthlessness and boldness are central to the con-
struction of a linkage between masculinity and the portrayal of military violence 
during this period. Most importantly, this linkage is constructed in such a way that it 
strips Linna’s narrative of its political anti-war message. In other words, the narra-
tives that construct bureaucratised violence manage to rearticulate and reshape a 
critical narrative that speaks against such understandings of violence (e.g. the ‘pro-
ductive’ use of force) and use this very narrative for entrenching a gendered dis-
course of violence. Furthermore, the focus on the principles ‘concentration of force’ 
and ‘surprise’ incorporates promotion of certain masculine ideals. As I have tried to 
illustrate previously in this chapter, the treatment of principles as something that can 
be applied to combat when deemed necessary for winning, is a treatment that is 
closely interconnected to the bureaucratisation of violence. In sum, masculinity 
bureaucratises violence through the theme of production and education as the mili-
tary discourse articulates surprise (the principle endorsed by boldness), which is to 
be used on command. Furthermore, the theme of order and production interconnect 
masculinity with bureaucratisation of violence by how the military narratives illus-
trate ruthlessness – as something that can be controlled and used only when needed. 
Through the theme of technology and science military masculinity is connected to 
bureaucratisation by endorsing the technological development to create more oppor-
tunities to concentrate force. Strength is thus an ideal that is enforced by narratives 
of the perks of military technology.       
  
Presently, feminist thinking aims to disclose a linkage between a dominating form of 
ideal for military men’s identity and the sometimes counterproductive use of force in 
modern missions (a battle which is in line with lessons identified by several military 
missions in Afghanistan and Iraq) (see Duncanson 2013, 2-3,18-23). We can see 
here that in the Swedish historic narratives of military practice, such ideals have a 
substantial part in the construction of violent practices.  
 
4.8  Conclusions 
 
In sum, the question of how (by what rationalities/reforms) the Swedish military was 
bureaucratised and modernised during the early and mid 20th century can be an-
swered by two points. Firstly, the political balancing between the diverging norma-
tive forces inherent to the Swedish context of neutrality created a political story 
underlining the need for a strong, neutral and transparent/predictable, but still pas-
sive, military. Due to this, the military as an institution in Swedish society is discur-
sively constructed as being a non-violent, disciplinary, professional producer of 
military units. In other words, the Swedish military is politically shaped to relate to 
its use of violence in light of having its identity constructed as a ‘productive’ and 
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‘educational’ societal institution. The politics of neutrality thus facilitated the use of 
narratives where military violence could be depicted as a controllable and delimited 
product of military practice. Arguably, as the military practice is already in the af-
termath of two world wars, and during the ongoing Cold War, politically narrated as 
a practice of peace, neutrality must be approached as one condition that has created 
the contemporary political and public silence regarding Swedish military violence. It 
is thus the idea of the Swedish military as an instrumental producer of military peace 
that historically contextualise a bureaucratisation of violence.   
 
Secondly, the political focus on conscription as a way of gathering the People and 
making use of the collective force of society underlined a further need to bureaucra-
tise the military. As this focus was politically aligned with the development of the 
Swedish ‘Total Defence’, conscription came to mean more than just filling the ranks 
of the military – to educate conscripts was to adhere to a national norm of creating a 
‘rational’ and ‘productive’ place for each man. But also to shape and discipline a 
young man into a masculinised protective subject who would understand and take 
responsibility for ‘his’ role as a cog in the national defence machinery. Since re-
cruitment of new officers was made by a careful selection of the ‘best’ conscripted 
soldiers, these norms were reinforced into the military practice as these new officers 
advanced in the ranks of the modern military.        
 
The second question of how (by what themes of military narratives) violence and 
death are  presented, naturalised and/or silenced in the portrayal of Swedish military 
practice is in much answered by how the analysis illustrates examples of such por-
trayal. But so as to offer a more theoretically anchored answer to this question, the 
themes of the bureaucratisation discourse are directly below concluded with the help 
of terms from Chapter 2. 
 
The themes used to elucidate the construction of bureaucratisation of death and 
violence in the military discourse offer insight into how a process of identification is 
made possible through a particular use of language. The relation to the dead and the 
human body is of particular interest here as it illustrates how language and images 
operate to underline a process of reification. It is an objectifying process which trivi-
alises the dead and the fact that military violence actually inflicts harm to the human 
body. The body becomes a logistic item and a ‘problem’ of war which can be solved 
by issuing regulations and creating organisations (units and hierarchies of responsi-
bilities), furthering bureaucratisation as a central aspects of how death and violence 
are neutralised in military practice.  
 
In addition, the analysis reveals how technological language and imagery are set as 
central points of reference for how identification can operate through military dis-
course. Central to this operation are that technological possibilities, such as what 
machines make possible in terms of firepower, is discursively constructed to take 
precedence over human considerations. What this means is that the technological 
aspect of the materiality of war encompass a human-object relation which suggest 
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that the machine (with its possibilities of use) creates a yard-stick for military ‘ra-
tionality’. In other words, the military discourse constructs the possibility for the 
existence of a relation between the military agent and the materiality of the practice, 
in which the possibilities of the machine hold the ‘normative higher ground’.  
 
The relation between technology and the military subject illustrated in this chapter 
feed into the mythology of bureaucratised military violence through the way in 
which military narratives separate killing from a human, irrational and emotion-clad 
activity, to an industrialised, mechanised and automated, performance. In these nar-
ratives the soldier who does the killing is reconstructed from killer to an operator of 
machines. The killed is transformed from victim to casualty and then to a product of 
war (logistic item). These transformations bring with them new (to the 20th century) 
rationales through the automated production of killing humans. The implementation 
of mechanical skills is one such rationale, as it is intrinsic to the promotion of ‘the 
soldier’ as being able to become a craftsman of machines. Those subjected to this 
narration of military violence get gratification from such human norms/ideals as 
perfection, craftsman skill and procedural efficiency. The narratives are powerful in 
affecting our understanding of military violence through the use and portrayal of the 
following elements/components:  the machine gun/gunner’s identity as a producer of 
a product (machine-gun fire); the promotion of the usefulness of training; technolog-
ical progress; the rationality inherent in action; the micromanagement of practice i.e. 
structuralising and ordering social activity. Thus the narratives in this chapter do not 
tell tales of killing humans, they tell tales of modernity, where the promotion of 
these types of norms and practices are in close concert with how modern society is 
conceptualised (Bauman 1989, 35–37, 51, 55, 78; P. M. Hardt and Negri 2000, 74–
75, 83–84, 126). Clearly the relation between machines, and military subjects as 
‘operators’, which contemporary research critically investigate (e.g. the social rela-
tions between drones and the drone-operator) has a historicaly constructed ‘origin’ 
in how military practices has been bureaucratrised and ‘rationalised’. (see Holmqvist 
2013a).  
 
Furthermore, the analysis of the military narratives conducted in this chapter illumi-
nates that production and education of soldiers are closely connected to regulation of 
the military practice. Here the discourse offers avenues of categorisation and ways 
of ordering the military practice by techniques of fragmentising combat practices 
and the spatial aspects of war. By fragmenting close combat, for instance, the mili-
tary practice is bureaucratised and reformed into something similar to health educa-
tion (the training of the soldier’s body) – death and violence are here neutralised and 
silenced by how the language and materiality of the practice rewrite violent practices 
with educational and competitive points of reference.  
 
On a final note, the masculine norms found to be central for how the military nar-
rates its violent practices infuses the military discourse with ways of identifications 
that are anchored in an ‘on/off’ understanding of human emotions. In particular, the 
military discourse portrays masculine norms as something that should be learned 
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and endorsed, but from a ‘clinical’ perspective where the arbitrariness, meaningless-
ness, possible fun or sadistic pleasure of violence are removed and replaced by prin-
ciples of ‘winning’. Masculine norms thus work to enforce the ways of identification 
made possible by military narratives of violence, by endorsing and making use of 
the points of reference where military use of violence is discursively silenced or 
neutralised.     
 
In the following two chapters I will examine how contemporary operational military 
practices connect to some of the ways of identifications that I have tried to visualise 
here. But the following chapters also engage with how the language and materiality 
of operational work comprise subjectivities which work to bureaucratise death and 
violence.  
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5 
Chapter 5: Operational Staff Work 
 
In this chapter, operational staff work is critically investigated in order to analyse 
how military staff practice shapes understandings of violence and death through 
bureaucratic routines and the workings of daily social relations. Furthermore, the 
chapter also investigates how reification and misrecognition of the Other exist and 
operate in the bureaucratised labour of the operational staff practice. Additionally, 
the chapter also analyses what values and norms come into the forefront in the con-
struction of military masculinity in the context of military operational bureaucratised 
labour. In line with the thesis’ theoretical and methodological setting, the aim here is 
in other words to spell out how subjectivities and ways of identifications form (and 
recreate) understandings of violence through the actions taken by the agents of the 
operational staff work. It is thus the ways of articulation, the rituals and the relations 
of a Swedish military staff that outline the main body of ‘data’ analysed here. Initial-
ly the context of the Swedish Joint Forces Command Support Staff is introduced 
whereafter the chapter moves to discuss findings from the ethnographical and au-
toethnographical investigation conducted during the spring of 2016. In conclusion 
the chapter summarises how social rules and norms, and the struggles within the 
practice, provide a reinforcement of bureaucratised understandings of military vio-
lence.    
 
5.1  Context of the operational staff 
 
The environment 
Compared to the intensity of the international staff exercise (outlined in the next 
chapter) the daily life at the Joint Forces Command Support Staff consists of a rou-
tine that resembles ordinary work at any Swedish governmental institution. People 
start between 7.30-8.30 a.m. and leave work at 4.30-5.30 p.m. There is generally a 
coffee break at 9.30 a.m, lunch at 11.30 and another coffee break at 2.30 p.m. Most 
people sit in separate offices and work when they are not attending meetings in con-
ference rooms. Some of them actually do not leave their desk much except for going 
on breaks, but this is dependent on their position and related engagement in the 
different work processes at the departments of the staff. People who are engaged in 
operational planning and support to ongoing operations spend more time in meetings 
compared to those who, for instance, work with administrative issues. All in all, 
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day-to-day work at the staff gives quite a non-military impression of the context of 
work, were it not for the security surrounding the building, and the (occasionally) 
military-related decorations on walls and shelves. And, of course, the fact that many 
people, of which a majority are men, are in uniform. The context of the practice is 
far from the cliché of military men standing around a map, pointing at crucial sec-
tions of the terrain, and discussing different options for how to best achieve opera-
tional goals. Discussions where operational issues are in focus do exist, but these are 
confined to conference rooms, and often conducted by a small number of area ex-
perts (intelligence/logistics/command and control/tactics etc.). I need only a couple 
of days in this environment to be reminded of the power that lies inherent in the 
work carried out by these staff officers and civilian experts. The Swedish system 
puts much of the preparations, planning and to some extent also conduct of opera-
tions on these people’s shoulders, and their daily work can consist of tasks that are 
close to the execution of military force. They work with such diverse and complex 
things as, for instance, creating a draft of the commander’s intent (outline of how 
entire operations are to be conducted) or outlining such central things as a detailed 
logistical plan for deployment of troops. This way of letting the ‘Indians’ serve the 
‘Chiefs’ with suggestions on courses of action, new directions, or development of 
certain issues, fits into the ‘rational’ idea that the experts are the ones best equipped 
to prepare, outline and give suggestions.12 These verbs are helpful when thinking 
about what the practice “operational staff work” is comprised of and what the major-
ity of people engage in it do. In this rationality, the higher officers and senior civil 
servants are used as ‘decision-making machines’. They evaluate the work of the 
experts (staff officers and/or civilian experts) and give a “go” (sometimes with some 
changes) or a “no-go”. In this, the use of PowerPoint presentations is the prevailing 
tool for the ‘Indians’ to use when briefing the ‘Chiefs’. Therefore, apart from attend-
ing meetings, the daily staff work entails preparations for presentations and writing 
orders. Such work is sometimes done in the solitary confinement of the office, or in 
a small group where each picture in the presentation is thoroughly discussed: if its 
message is clear, if it is necessary information for the commander to have, and what 
level of detail it should comprise.        
 
Most of the Joint Staff’s space in the dark brown brick clad building consists of long 
corridors that run parallel to each other, turning in 90 degrees at the corners of the 
building. The building itself is an eight storey high cubic edifice with two inner 
courts. Work-offices are situated on the outer edges of these two corridors, and con-
ference and a few coffee rooms are located in-between the corridors, leaving most of 
these latter spaces without any windows. The walls are painted plain white or light 
beige, the floors are of a light brown plastic material and there is a ceiling of white 
rectangular metal plates. Here and there framed posters hang on the walls. Pictures 
of soldiers talking to women in traditional Muslim clothing or smiling at children 
playing in the streets of foreign cities, or of UN vehicles roaring through desert 
                                                             
12 My colleagues use the terms “Indians” and “Chiefs” quite commonly when they describe their own work and/or their 
position in the chain of command. ”I’m just one of the Indians…” is a type of phrase that often initiates articulations that 
belong to questions of roles and responsibilities among my interlocutors. 
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landscapes are some of the motives that meet me every day. But these types of mo-
tives are concentrated around the area where the Chief of Joint Operations and the 
Deputy Chief have their offices. Otherwise the decorations consist mostly of repro-
ductions of classic art hanging here and there. There are empty, or nearly empty, 
wooden bookshelves in the corridors, which give me a feeling of temporality, as if 
they were placed there to be moved to another location. In the hallway of the main 
entrance to the department there are some glass cupboards that display the Chief of 
Joint Operation’s different gifts from other countries’ armed forces, and framed 
pictures of the general/admiral meeting high-ranking foreign officers. The purpose 
of this display is probably to show visitors that if they bring a gift (commonly a 
small shield on a wooden plate, or a large coin engraved with the giver’s country, 
rank, name and unit) these are shown to other guests/visitors. Other parts of the 
Headquarters (HQ) also have these types of decorations, where plates, pictures, 
medals and sometimes a flag represent the Armed Forces’ long tradition of interna-
tional engagement and cooperation with other countries.  
 
One of my first thoughts on this tradition of decoration was that they help uphold 
certain traits of military identity. That is, putting coins, medals and national flags as 
central objects of a military culture is something that is closely related to our under-
standing of what is important for defining a military Self. Giving the subject some 
more thought, I realise that I had to ‘be’ an ethnographer to see these objects at all. 
Searching for cultural attachment to these objects within myself gives nothing: they 
are indeed peripheral objects to my military Self. Their importance lies thus on ag-
gregating a myth of what the military should encompass when it comes to symbols 
and objects. They are in other words ‘supposed to be there’. One benefit of being a 
‘halfie’ ethnographer is that there are possibilities to go beyond such first impres-
sions and search for the objects and symbols that actually matter for constructing 
identity and Self within oneself. Medals, for instance, help me ‘read’ colleagues 
when meeting them, but I must actively think about doing so. I do not automatically 
look at other officers’ medals for information. To me they are insignias of working 
experience (if you have been to a NATO mission and/or a UN mission and so forth). 
But my peripheral interest in them limits their worth to just that: identifying interna-
tional engagements. I simply do not know/remember what all the colours and mark-
ings mean and I also think that those who know details like that are ‘overly interest-
ed’ in military matters.  
 
In the Swedish military there is an expression for that type of person: Military Over-
ly Interested Person, or MOP. These are the ones that have an ‘unhealthy’ relation-
ship to military practice in that they do not keep their distance to it. This may be a 
unique trait for the Swedish military culture to define a behaviour as ‘overly mili-
tary’. It is beyond this investigation to find that out, but nevertheless, it is important 
to note as part of the context description here that mythological military symbols 
(such as medals and flags) do not necessarily have a central place in the construction 
of operational military culture just because they are placed on display in the corri-
dors of the building. On the other hand, such symbols still offer ways of identifica-
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tion for the personnel working in this building by the mere fact that they actually 
have been placed here.          
    
Organisation and tasks 
The HQ consists of several different staffs. First of all, it is divided (both physically 
and conceptually) between staffs that work with planning/current operations, and 
staffs that work with production/management of units. This separation runs through 
the entire Swedish Armed Forces (AF) and is based on an idea that there are major 
differences between the production of units and the conduct of operations. There is 
thus a ‘war-time’ organisation and a ‘production’ organisation in the Swedish mili-
tary. And the organisation of staffs in the HQ mirrors this division (see pic. 1 (be-
low) where the Joint Forces Command represent the ‘war time’ organisation and the 
Training & Development Staff represent the ‘production’ organisation). What this 
means is that management and production are not supposed to be a major part of the 
operational job. Instead, the staffs working with military operations are to focus on 
planning, conducting and evaluating both national and international missions.  
 
The “joint” in Joint Forces Command means that it handles all the branches of the 
military: army, navy, air force and special operations. There are four tactical staffs 
(Tactical Component Commands or simply ‘CC’s’) and these are placed beneath the 
operational staff, both in hierarchy and actually in levels of floors in the main HQ 
building. These staffs are engaged in current missions and in the training of standing 
units, within respective branches of the military. In addition, there is a higher staff 
(the Defence Staff) that ‘rules them all’ which functions as the strategic level, com-
prising the institution’s connection to the parliament and government (and is placed 
on the top floor of the building).  The Joint Support Staff has a NATO-inspired or-
ganisation where the departments are divided by numbers with standard meanings 
(“J” indicates “Joint”): J1 – Personnel; J2 – Intelligence; J3 – Current opera-
tions/short term planning; J4 – Logistics; J5/7 – a merger of long term planning (no. 
5) and training/exercises (no. 7); J6 – Signal/Command and Control; J8 – Finance; 
J9 – Civil/military cooperation. The staff also has a coordination department (sup-
port to the Chief of Staff and also includes advisers to the Chief of Joint Operations) 
and a department for evaluating operations and exercises. The staff is led by a Chief 
of Staff (COS) and a Deputy Chief of Staff (DCOS).  
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Most of my time at the staff was spent on following the activities of J3 and J5/7, but 
I made sure to engage in conversations with all heads of the departments (booked 
meetings) and as many of the staff workers as I could (regardless of their position in 
the HQ). Interaction with people from different departments came quite naturally 
since Swedes tend to take coffee breaks at given times during the day. In addition, a 
rough estimate is that I knew at least a third of the officers working in this environ-
ment from my previous stationing and positions. This made my job generally easier 
and I could join a department’s coffee break or lunch without much social re-
sistance. After a couple of weeks of ‘defrosting’ it became more common that peo-
ple would pop into my room for a chat, or invite me into their offices when I, during 
slow moments, roamed the corridors of the staff. Needless to say, I owe these people 
a great deal for their welcoming attitude and generosity in sharing their thoughts on 
everyday life at the staff.  
 
With that said, there were a number of times when I had to ‘turn in the door’ as my 
presence was seen as a problem for some of the work done at the staff. Military 
organisations are excluding towards foreign entities in general, but work that in-
cludes classified material becomes even more inaccessible for researchers, even 
military ones. This was more common at the beginning of my stay at the staff as 
people did not know how to ‘handle’ me. After some time, these occasions were 
minimised and my presence at meetings was more and more accepted. This meant 
that I could participate in much of the meetings that handled the Swedish mission to 
Mali and also other types of meetings where operational issues of a wide span (both 
Pict 1. Organisation of the Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters at the time of the ethnograph-
ical investigation. (Swedish Armed Forces, 2016) 
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national and international) were to be coordinated and discussed. The point here is 
that I have focused my ethnographical investigation on a staff that, in theory, should 
be closest to the preparation of, and support to, the use of force. The operative level 
is often described as being the link between strategic/political interests and goals and 
the tactical execution of missions (Angstrom and Widen 2015, 64). To be on the 
operational level means that you have to be able to transform long-time strategic or 
political aims into concrete operational goals, as well as set together these goals with 
appropriative resources and other means by the use of creating plans or giving cur-
rent operational directions to the tactical levels. 
 
One could argue that the tactical staffs (the CC’s) are much closer to the use of force 
than the Joint Support Staff. Several of my interlocutors did point that out during my 
conversations with them (e.g. CR1_02090930-1000). My reason for insisting on 
following the practice of the Joint Support Staff rests on my conviction that opera-
tional work is central when it comes to conditions of possibility to engage in military 
violence. In other words, it is a practice that paves the way for violence. Also im-
portant for choosing it is its transformative character. Operational work can face 
many complexities when trying to turn political and strategic goals into ‘reality’, 
which can either rupture a bureaucratised approach to violence or enforce it, depend-
ing on how the practice is constructed.  And finally, my interest in how military 
practice handles political issues creates a need to follow the work of those who have 
to make operations out of strategy and policies: it is a position where daily routines 
meet with the contingency of the political. Thus, the operational level is in this in-
vestigation seen as the place where the social meets the political when it comes to 
the use of force.  
 
The social is the realm of sedimented practices, that is, practices that conceal the originary acts of 
their contingent political institution and which are taken for granted. As if they were self-
grounded. 
[…] 
The frontier between the social and the political is essentially unstable and requires constant dis-
placements and renegotiations between social agents. (Mouffe 2005, 17–18) 
 
In short, I see operational staff work as a practice where agents need to relate to and 
position themselves with regard to how the political is formed. “Relate” in this con-
text might mean that they ignore the political aspects of their work entirely, or that 
they frequently discuss and involve aspects from the political realm in their work 
(and anything in between these positions). The point is that the political aspect of 
using military force must be dealt with somehow in this practice and as a political 
scientist (in becoming) this intrigued me. But the focus for my investigation is none-
theless to find out how operational work manages, neutralises or silences the ines-
capable presence of death and violence.   
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The meetings of the operational staff 
As touched upon above, I have followed a number of groups, meetings and persons’ 
daily work at the Joint Forces Command. Most time has been spent on the working 
group “AG MINUSMA”. It is a type of meeting housing representatives (I some-
times also call them delegates, and they are staff officers and/or civilian experts a.k.a 
‘Indians’) from a wide range of departments and other staffs, even some from other 
governmental authorities like the Swedish Defence Material Administration (FMV). 
During my time following AG MINUSMA the average attendance at meetings was 
22 people, which indicates that very few of those that were called were missing from 
the meetings. However, this number only accounts for those who are in place for the 
standard 45-60 minutes meeting where the agenda for coordination is quite strictly 
followed. AG MINUSMA was very often followed by what are called “after-
sittings” which are forums for specific issues that need to be discussed in detail. 
Attendance at such ‘sittings’ fell to an average rate of 9 staff members. Delegates 
were most commonly from current operations on the Land Component Command 
(G3 LCC), the Training & Development Staff’s Army Department and Infrastructure 
Department, and representatives from the operational staff’s departments J2, J3 and 
J5/7. So despite the large organisation of the HQ and its staffs, current operational 
issues (for this mission) are coordinated in detail by relatively few people. These 
‘after-sittings’ could last for everything between 20-30 minutes to several hours.        
 
The purpose of the meetings is, as mentioned, to “coordinate” issues regarding the 
Swedish contribution to the UN-mission MINUSMA in Mali. This mission is in 
comparison to the Afghanistan mission seen as a classic peacekeeping UN-mission. 
“It is not Afghanistan” to quote several of my interlocutors at the staff, which means 
that even though Mali is by no means a country in peace, the level of violence is 
expected to be fairly low (R102171115). The official branding of the mission is that 
it is a Chapter VII “stabilisation mission”: “United Nations Multidimensional Inte-
grated Stabilisation Mission in Mali” or MINUSMA (Regeringen 2015, 4). The 
Swedish contribution (2015/2016) consists of an Intelligence, Surveillance and Re-
connaissance Task Force (ISR-unit) and a National Support Element (NSE). Ap-
proximately 250 soldiers and officers are involved. It has been in place since De-
cember 2014 and has had its main area of operation in the western parts of Mali, 
with a base camp on the outskirts of the city of Timbuktu. When I arrived at the 
operational staff at the beginning of February 2016, the work with renewing the 
National Support Plan (NSP) for the Swedish contribution to MINUSMA was in full 
motion. The details of this plan are quite inconsequential for understanding how the 
practice is bureaucratised, and they are also classified. But on a general level it can 
be said that the plan was meant to provide the means for keeping the mission sup-
ported and to provide the staff with tools for measuring how well the mission has 
proceeded. The work with the support plan followed a method called “Swedish 
Planning and Command method” (SPL 3.0) which is a 238 page long document that 
outlines the process of constructing and coordinating operations. This document 
rests heavily on NATO’s equivalent document: NATO Allied Command Operations 
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Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD) which thus provides NATO 
staffs support on how planning and guidance of military operations are to function. 
 
While AG MINUSMA is a J3-led working group, and thus handles issues regarding 
the current mission, the creation of the National Support Plan was a J5/7 task. This 
is due to how the military divide responsibilities for work by what time frame the 
product of the work is related to. A National Support Plan is a product that is created 
to support a coming rotation of new units into the mission area and support for these 
new units during their time in the operational area. This means that such a plan is 
first developed by J5/7 (long term plans) and when the time for rotation of units 
approaches, it is handed over to J3, as they work with current and short term plan-
ning.  
      
Another type of coordination meeting that I have followed is the Joint Coordination 
Board Working Group, most commonly referred to as the JCBWG. This is a type of 
meeting that has the highest level in the ‘coordination hierarchy’ in the operational 
staff work. The purpose is to bring together those Officers with Primary Responsi-
bility (OPRs) who are leading working groups throughout the staff and have them 
inform each other of their work. In addition to the OPRs, the JCBWG is supposed to 
have at least the same type of broad representation that the other working groups 
have, but during my time at the staff it had a much lower attendance rate than AG 
MINUSMA (an average of 17). The outcome of the meeting is to decide what issues 
need to be “nominated” for a place at the Commander’s Decision Meeting (de-
scribed below). So the members of this meeting, led by an OPR from J3, discuss if 
an issue needs to be prepared (and by whom) and eventually presented for the Chief 
of Joint Operations. JCBW has no ‘after-sittings’ and is, in my view, more of an 
event where information is shared, not discussed (as compared to AG MINUSMA’s 
after-sittings).   
 
A third type of meeting that was part of my ethnographical investigation is the 
Commander’s Decision Meeting, a meeting inspired by the Joint Coordination 
Board (JCB) from the NATO staff process. Here different staff officers present their 
respective planning products, often with a final picture where the suggested decision 
is highlighted. Officers presenting are most commonly those who lead the different 
planning groups on the staffs (so called OPRs). This responsibility is often tied to 
those who work on J5 or in some cases J3 (the latter when there is something con-
nected to ongoing operations). The room where these meetings take place consists of 
tables that are placed in the formation of an ‘open rectangle’. Participants are the 
heads of departments, advisers to the Commander, and the chiefs of the tactical 
component commands (or their respective COSs). Most of the advisers and experts 
sit in "back seat" position, i.e. in chairs placed alongside the walls of the room. 
There are 27 participants in average at these meetings so the room is usually quite 
crowded. For those that sit at the table there are plastic signs with the acronyms of 
their respective department marking their designated seat. There is a white canvas 
screen at the far end of the room and several whiteboards and maps on the walls. 
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Furthermore, the room also has a projector which displays PowerPoint presentations 
on the screen. Some units participate on video-link and are seen on a big screen TV 
in the far right corner of the room (seen from the Commander’s place at the short 
end of the formation of tables).  
  
There is always a formal procedure for these meetings, the details of which make 
these meetings different from the other meetings I have participated in. While wait-
ing for the commander, the Chief of the Joint Support Staff (COS) comes in and tells 
us to stand up. One person goes out to let the chiefs know we are ready. Then the 
Commander (and sometimes the Deputy Commander) enters and says "Good after-
noon" and “Please be seated”. During my time at the staff the commanders leading 
this meeting normally wore the "casual" staff uniform (no tie or jacket, but a short 
sleeved collared shirt). Presenters and those involved in managing the meeting wear 
staff uniforms with tie and jacket. So there is a clear difference here: presenters 
make an effort to look tidy for this type of event and it is also an unwritten rule that 
they should wear a tie and jacket. When the Commander (and the rest of us) have 
taken our seats, the COS tells the Commander what today’s briefing is about (which 
the Commander already knows as he/she gets the information beforehand). After the 
COS has finished talking, and the Commander has approved of the agenda, the head 
of the department responsible for the issue to be briefed stands at attention next to 
the canvas screen and says “Admiral (or “General” depending on the commander’s 
rank), JX (x equals the department number) ready for briefing”. The Commander 
says “Go ahead” or “Please start”. The head of the department then stands at ease 
and reports to the Commander what is going to be briefed. This person then takes 
Pict. 2 outlines a generic description of the meeting as found in the Swedish Planning and Command 
Method (SPL 3.0). “C INSATS” is the Swedish wording for “Chief of Joint Operations”.  
(Försvarsmakten 2015b, 220) 
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his/her seat at the table and the actual briefer gets up ‘on stage’. If this person is a 
military officer, he/she also stands at attention and says “Admiral (General)” and 
waits for a nod, or a short “Go ahead”/”Proceed” from the Commander.13 The brief-
er then stands at ease and delivers his/her presentation. Sometimes at the end of the 
presentation the presenting officer yet again stands at attention waiting for the 
Commander’s decision. The decision meetings are quite short (30 min) and contain 
1-3 issues for the commander to take decision on. They are performed approximate-
ly once every two weeks, but it varies depending on the need.    
 
Specific details on material and method for the investigation of the operat-
ional staff  
Before getting to the main results from my investigations, some numbers should be 
presented. Of the approximately 900 people working at the HQ, the Joint Forces 
Command amounts to 264, of which 45 are women (all numbers include military 
and non-military personnel). In my cartography of the practice, I have met very few 
women, 6 civilians and 3 officers have been in close proximity to the work I have 
followed  (In 2015, only 6% of those serving in the Swedish Armed Forces officers 
corps were women, Försvarsmakten 2015a, 40). I was placed as researcher at the 
Joint Support Staff from February 1 2016, to the middle of June 2016. My archive 
consists of 31 notes from interviews and conversations, and 37 written observations 
of meetings and social encounters (such as lunch/coffee breaks). I have tried to write 
my notes in in a way that gives a rich context to events without including details that 
would render them classified. But much of the specific content (details about issues 
worked with) in meetings has not been written down due to the level of classifica-
tion on that information. All in all, my archive for the operational staff work consists 
of approximately 45 500 words. In addition, I also have several hundred pages of 
material (books, manuals, products) that are used in the practice itself. 
 
In the following I have divided the analysis into how ways of identification and 
subjectivities exist as social rules and norms, vital for shaping the operational work 
into a bureaucratised type of labour. These sections are in turn divided into subsec-
tions that aim to clarify what points of reference these social rules and norms com-
prise: which relations are vital for the function of the social rule/norm in focus; how 
meaning-making operates to bureaucratise the practice; and how the transformative 
operative language and its materiality sediment bureaucratised understandings of 
violence. As explained by Glynos and Howarth, making estimates on how articulat-
ed elements of discourse best are sorted into such social rules/norms requires a form 
of expertise (Glynos and Howarth 2007, 183 f). A researcher can acquire the needed 
expertise to make judgments in many ways (e.g. historical studies of a case, or theo-
retical studies of a specific phenomenon). For me it has been on the one hand a part 
of the ethnographical practice to learn as much as possible of the work at the Joint 
                                                             
13 I often got the feeling that the Commanders at this point in the meeting were quite tired of the formalities surrounding 
the briefings. At a minimum, the commander must give some form of “go ahead” for at least three times before the 
actual event ‘goes ahead’. 
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Staff. On the other hand, I have tried to increase my expertise in ‘judging correctly’ 
by studying theories that discuss relations between discourse, language and practice. 
I have had a head start in the former area of expertise compared to others with no 
knowledge of military work, but in the other I have had the same ‘uphill climb’ as 
any novice researcher. But increasing my own expertise has, as noted, only been one 
part of the process. The other strategy of finding social rules/norms of bureaucratisa-
tion has been to discuss what I have seen and learned with the practitioners them-
selves. In several cases such discussions have helped me understand how certain 
aspects of the practice are more central than others when it comes to how social 
relations, language and activities are formed. Furthermore, this has been a way for 
me to adhere to a central theme in contemporary ethnographical investigations: the 
importance of providing relevance for, and inclusion of, the interlocutors (Lassiter 
2005, 16 ff). In the end I have focused on analysing the material in the light of the 
following social rules/norms: consensus; order and bureaucracy; and finally mascu-
linity/production. How these social rules/norms help form the practice is accounted 
for below.  
 
5.2  The Social Rules of Consensus: Maintaining Social 
Bonds and Control    
 
In this section I will account for my analysis of the ways of identification and sub-
jectivities of the social rules/norms of consensus. After a short introduction, I ex-
pand upon how consensus affects the social relations of the practice. Thereafter I 
proceed to discuss how consensus provides meaning to the practitioners and their 
work. Following this, the analysis proceeds by engaging in how consensus operates 
to inform the practitioners with a sense of naturalness when it comes to how the 
practice is conducted. Finally, this section is concluded by a discussion on how 
consensus relates to the formation of bureaucratised understandings of violence.   
 
Introduction 
"We will not bring an issue to the commander if we do not have consensus on it." (OPR JCBWG, 
O26_04131430-1502) 
"My task is to create a solution to this… a solution that we all can agree on, so that we can go to 
the commander with a suggestion that is based on consensus." (OPR Working group, 
O10_03160900) 
 
The first law of Swedish operational practice is to create consensus. It is a rule that 
is both directly articulated during daily work and found in interpretation of actors’ 
behaviour. This rule becomes more dominant with increasing importance of an is-
sue: if an issue is deemed to involve higher commanders (flag officers, i.e. gener-
als/admirals) the articulations of consensus become more common (O13_03220900-
1000; O26_04131430-1502; O30_050310:18-11:09). ‘Issues’ are central objects of 
the practice, and they can consist of many things related to planned and ongoing 
operations. For example, a plan for supporting a mission, or a detailed question 
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where the operational level gives very specific guidance to the tactical staff are typi-
cal issues. Consensus might seem like a straightforward concept in this context (as 
opposed to, for instance, in a context of philosophy) but it is not a simple agreement 
among agents that is at play here. Admittedly, agreement on an issue is the theoreti-
cal idea behind the rule, but it contains much more than that. And its outcome is 
only theoretical in that consensus in this practice is practically impossible to achieve. 
This impossibility is to some extent based on the fact that preparations of issues 
have been constructed in a complex and sometimes mystifying way for the agents 
taking part in it. I account for this complexity in more detail in the next section of 
this chapter as it originates from other rules and norms of the practice. Here I want 
to focus on what consensus encompasses in terms of what social relations it upholds 
and what meaning-making effect it has, and how it sediments certain aspects of the 
practice despite the practitioners’ dismay with it. All of this is done in order to in-
crease our knowledge of the social rule that “makes it [the practice at hand] tick” 
(Glynos and Howarth 2007, 135). 
 
Relations – driving force behind the practice 
First of all, it is with reference to its productive use in work methods that agents 
rationalise the rule of consensus. But from my observations I conclude that its place 
in the practice actually is sprung out of fear for breaking social bonds and threats 
against identity (on the centrality of consensus in Swedish identity construction, see: 
Agius 2006, chap. 3). The senior agents’ own view of it rests on the argument that 
consensus is a goal in staff work and to get there you have to twist and turn every-
thing which thus makes the issue at hand very thoroughly discussed on the way 
towards this goal (C20_04051300-1350; C30_05310800-0855). Another argument 
made trying to rationalise consensus is that it is really about anchoring solutions to 
‘issues’ among different chiefs in the organisation and that it is not about agreement 
at all (C28_05241300-1355). The agreement part just comes along when people 
equate the act of anchoring with the concept of consensus (Ibid).  Contradictory to 
these explanations, observations made of the practice indicate an emotional driving 
force behind its use. Staff officers really do not want to stand in front of an assembly 
of high ranking officers and get questions or statements that they have not previous-
ly dealt with. When, which is very seldom, this happens, I can feel the embarrass-
ment of the onlookers and the agents involved. By using myself as an instrument, 
listening to how I react and feel while observing events and watching others in the 
practice interacting, the function of consensus stands clear (Adams, Jones, and Ellis 
2015, 26): It is in place to avoid shame, resentment and/or discomfort.  
 
Conversations with the ‘Indians’ of the practice strengthen this particular under-
standing of this social rule as they express critique after these rare events. For exam-
ple, one of my interlocutors expressed resentment after getting questions from a 
commander during a briefing where many high ranking officers were attending. 
Questions that (the interlocutor argued) could have been asked before the briefing 
took place (e.g. O31_05031230-1315). Sociological studies show that feelings like 
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shame are powerful drivers of how humans interact, and that shame actually can be 
understood as a threat to social bonds (Scheff 2000). The threat (in this context) lies 
in the exposure of unprofessionalism and reduction of esteem from high-ranking 
officers. The former can hamper the relations between the shamed and his/her col-
leagues in the progress of further staff work, whereas the latter can affect the afflict-
ed person’s possibilities for making a career. At least, the threat is thus perceived. If 
it really has such effects is unclear, but it does not matter for the function of the rule. 
As long as subjects of the practice believe that breaking consensus equals unprofes-
sional behaviour and in addition perceive this as creating embarrassing social situa-
tions, the practice will be informed by it. Professionalism and career are two very 
integrated aspects of military identity as previous studies of military show (in the 
British context: R. Woodward and Neil Jenkings 2011, 258 f; in the Swedish 
context: Ydén 2008, 246 ff). Consensus thus works as a rule that is meant to keep 
military identity intact by making sure that social bonds are not broken.  
 
A situation that is threatening to break the bond that provides a secure place for us is 
indeed a powerful driver in forming military practice. Military identity is strong. It 
has always been rewarding in the sense that it has given me a secure place in relation 
to others. But on the other hand, it also breeds fear of exclusion (see: Grimell 2015 
on how exclusion from military life often results in some form of trauma). Even as I 
write this analysis of what I have seen, heard and learned from my time at the HQ, I 
feel the urge to disregard and hide the aspects of consensus. Writing about it makes 
me feel the risk of exclusion. But as it is clear to me that it is a social rule which lies 
beneath much of what the practitioners actually do at the staff, I really cannot avoid 
it. The task here is to penetrate the surface (of the superficial explanations) of the 
practice and dive in deep.  
 
Meaning-making – how consensus shapes staff practice 
The rules and norms of consensus are not continuously successful in regulating 
social relations within the practice. But the ambition to live by this rule creates and 
gives meaning to several parts of operational work.  Here I want to explore a second 
aspect of consensus: its strong function in completing the ideal set out by the term 
“professional staff work”. This ambition rests on how my observations indicate 
connections between the need to uphold social bonds and how the practice is out-
lined. For instance, to avoid being questioned or getting strong counter-arguments 
during final briefings, the practice has created a system where sending the calling 
message out to a broad list of recipients is seen as a basic rule of good staff work, 
because then you can always argue that parts of the staff have had a chance to partic-
ipate (O20_04051038). While observing meetings I have seen many example of how 
consensus is understood to emerge by sheer participation. Filling a position at the 
meeting does not mean that agents will actively engage in discussions or give com-
ments on issues. Silence is regarded as agreement. Even the given, but not taken, 
possibility to participate may be enough to establish that the rule of consensus has 
been adhered to (O23_ 04061430, O26_04131430). When representatives from 
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departments or other staffs are not present at meetings, there is no direct action tak-
en. In some cases, OPRs for the major forums, like the JCBWG, have had a discus-
sion with departments/staffs that have a low (estimated) frequency of attendance. 
But as one OPR laconically notes at the beginning of one such meeting “apparently I 
lost that discussion”, since the department in this particular case was yet again not 
present (O16_03231430).  But, as mentioned, there is no direct action taken when 
meetings have low attendance or are manned by uninformed personnel. It seems that 
the image of a broad participation of the different parts of the HQ (other staffs) is 
important to preserve. Such sometimes ‘imaginary’ broad representation is a way to 
practically counter the risk for breaking social bonds in the way described above, as 
it gives the impression that consensus ‘is at work’.  
 
If one of the tactical staffs, the Land Component Command (LCC) for example, has 
had participation in the working group that has had the responsibility to solve a 
particular issue, then it is hard for the commander of the LCC to ask critical ques-
tions during the final briefing for the Operational Commander. This comes from the 
simple reason that the LCC commander risks disavowing his/her own personnel 
posing such questions. But even more grave (for the LCC commander in this exam-
ple) is that asking many critical questions during final briefings exposes that chief to 
another critique: that he/she does not have knowledge of the job, and the trust of the 
staff worker, on his/her staff. This becomes evident as the briefer, often the Officer 
with Primary Responsibility (OPR), can counter ‘any’ critique by pointing at the fact 
that all functions of the staff have been ‘involved’ in the preparation of the issue. 
This way of forming the practice also has the effect of creating an understanding 
among chiefs that the products of the work (orders, briefings) have been well-
prepared and suggested solutions are anchored in the different staffs of the HQ. This 
is not really the case in many of the issues that I have followed where the work real-
ly has been done by a small number of people, who also have had very limited time 
to prepare the issues because of the many meetings taking place.  
 
I have seen how consensus can produce a mode of silence during decision briefs, but 
also during some regular work meetings where very few questions or comments are 
made. Conversations with some of the heads of departments confirm this; some (but 
not all) see themselves as mainly filling a seat during some types of meetings 
(C17_03221325, C25_0517009). But as in many cases of social interaction between 
humans, there are exceptions. Some higher commanders simply ignore the risks 
mentioned here and ask questions anyway. But the result is that fractures emerge in 
the relations between the commanders and their staffs. Furthermore, such behaviour 
fuels the practitioners’ use of the consensus rule. The staff learns and adapts to what 
kind of questions their commander has a tendency to ask during briefings. If one 
commander recurrently asks for details on specific issues, then the briefings will 
become more complex and it becomes even more important for briefers to be able to 
refer to participation by different experts in the preparation of the issue (C9_181010, 
C15_03101000, C29_05250920). This type of behaviour infuses the practice with 
activities like involving civilian economy experts or technical experts into the staff 
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work. The result is that working meetings at the operational staff mostly discuss 
details about economy, personnel and equipment. Some commanders are not that 
interested in specific issue related details, but will instead ask about involvement and 
how well the current issues are known by the staffs (O2_02231107, 
O33_05311500). Thus, either approach reproduces the importance of creating con-
sensus.  
 
Furthermore, professional staff work also includes pre-briefings. Created by the 
rules of consensus, this phenomenon is in place to secure lower ranked chiefs’ 
(colonel or one-star general) approval of briefings that are to be given to higher 
commanders. By performing a rehearsal of the briefings that are intended to be giv-
en the higher commanders, the agents involved (both the briefer and his/her closest 
chief) establish an agreement on what is going to be said and shown to the higher 
commander. This part of the practice helps counter a situation where the lower 
ranked chief is put in a position where he/she is faced with questions from the higher 
COM that they cannot answer. It also helps them be informed about what is going 
on in different issues which is how this piece of the practice is often rationalised. 
But this rationalisation goes against the theoretical idea of operational military staff 
work which says that it is those with the detailed knowledge of issues, and with the 
responsibility for sorting them out, that brief commanders. So in theory, low ranking 
chiefs are not supposed to be informed at a detail level as they are not the ones to 
answer questions of that sort. For me it is clear that the force driving this ‘pre-
briefing practice’ is more connected to securing a smooth performance during deci-
sion briefs. There are other ways, less time-consuming than the act of pre-briefing, 
available to a low ranking chief to be up to speed on current work in the staff.  
 
Taken together, the way of letting the practice form under the rules of consensus 
provides it with a certain aspect of theatrical performance. I often get the feeling that 
I am witnessing rehearsals for a play when I attend meetings. And the main play 
itself is certainly the commander’s decision brief. It follows a strict script. Words 
have been chosen carefully and have been rehearsed (pre-briefings). It follows cer-
tain formalities that mark the different actors’ social position (level of power). It 
requires preparation of stage equipment (briefings, computer and screen, tables set in 
position, seatings set with signs, people standing/sitting in the right places) which 
when faulty creates a significant level of stress for the responsible officers 
(O33_05311500). Participants have designated roles to play (briefer, adviser, com-
mander ‘decision-taker’, administrator, prefect (COS), audience ‘seat-filler’). Their 
roles provide them with a certain set of words to use and moments for when to 
speak. But it is a social play that is performed, not an aesthetic one. The former aims 
to establish “[…] structure, clear division, stability between different categories, 
monotony and repeatability, predictability […]” in the practice (Bauman 1995, 222 
my translation). This brings me to the third and final aspect of the consensus rules: 
their function in the process of fixating the practice.      
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Sedimentation – this is simply what we do  
When someone of whom I am afraid orders me to continue a series, I act quickly, with perfect as-
surance, and the lack of reason does not trouble me. (§212 Wittgenstein 2009, 90) 
 
The staff practice “lack of reason” (e.g. the meaning of participation in meetings, the 
importance of mundane details, the silence during decision briefs) is not as in Witt-
genstein’s paragraph untroublesome for the agents of the practice. Many of the peo-
ple I have talked to individually do see problems created by consensus (e.g. 
C19_04051130, C25_0517009). But they act by it, and reinforce the rules when ‘in 
concert’. As the quotations at the beginning of section 5.2 indicate, agents of the 
practice even articulate consensus as a product of staff work. For an outsider this 
might seem strange: how can they be critical to it in one moment, just to enforce it in 
the next? For me the answer is connected partly to the fear of breaking bonds, as 
discussed above, but also partly to the fact that operational staff practice is strictly 
routinised. It is indeed fear (of shame or shaming) that subordinates the agents of the 
practice under the rules of consensus. But this alone is not a viable explanation to 
the behaviour of critique and acceptance of the rules, as there is resistance among 
the practitioners to this particular fear. To stay in place, consensus draws from the 
social play that is performed in day-to-day work. It is the fabric of the monotone 
workday that breaks down the agents’ resistance to the rules of consensus. Wittgen-
stein’s (inner) dialogue on how series of signs are reproduced in a repeated pattern 
provides some food for thought on this latter aspect. Especially since the facility to 
follow given or set procedures seems to be predominant among the members of the 
staff (and myself). There is a certain safety in finding routines and following them, 
but repeatedly informed behaviour will eventually speak for itself. 
 
”How am I able to follow a rule?” – If this is not a question about causes, then it is about the justi-
fication for my acting in this way in complying with the rule.  
Once I have exhausted the justifications, I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I 
am inclined to say: “This is simply what I do.”  (§217 Wittgenstein 2009, 91)   
 
One type of bedrock that I have encountered during my time in the staff is the pro-
cedure of conducting meetings. Every meeting that I have followed during my time 
at the HQ starts with an agenda. The agenda is always the same for the same type of 
meetings. This is in no way particularly surprising, but I often get the feeling that 
my military colleagues follow the agenda because that is what they usually do when 
having meetings, not because every point on it has some value. The roll call which 
begins every meeting is one example. The absence of departments/other staffs does 
not result in any steps taken, it is just noted and the proceedings continue. What is 
the point of saying “they’re not here” and then going about business as usual? Do 
they not fill a part of the meeting? Why should they be there in the first place? These 
are some of the questions that pop up in my mind when I repeatedly watch this type 
of event. And the question of “Why am I here, when they can be absent?” lingers in 
my military mind. The summing up of the meeting is another example of how the 
agenda rules our behaviour: the JCBW has one point in the agenda for when the 
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representatives at the meeting are to share general information that may be of inter-
est (the word travels around the table). The next point on the agenda is the need for 
collaboration between staffs/departments, which means that the word travels around 
the table again. The following type of misunderstanding can occur: 
 
One of the delegates asks: "The point where we report need for collaboration, is it now?" OPR 
JCBWG: "No, it comes on the next page" (refers to the agenda on the screen). Questioner: "Ok, 
then I'll wait" (some lighter laughter is heard) (O16_03231430). 
 
I interpret the merriment as a reaction to the representative’s inflexibility (the way 
the officer strictly adheres to the agenda). It is a sort of appreciative laughter as 
opposed to a laughter that would have elicited disapproval from the members of the 
meeting. It reveals (together with other impressions of the practice) compliance to 
routines and regulations as an operational military norm.     
 
The “Working group” meetings are another example of how routines are created by 
the agenda. These meetings are actually very seldom comprised of work in the 
meaning of preparing current issues. They are more of a forum where the partici-
pants share information on issues and mainly confirm that work on a particular issue 
is actually taking place somewhere in the organisation of the HQ. Much time is 
spent creating a state of information flow so that officers with responsibility can 
learn how to provide answers to issues. So despite the name “working meeting” it is 
more about fulfilling the rules of consensus. Novice participants who try to provide 
actual solutions to issues, or inputs for the preparation of issues, quickly learn to get 
in line and to only share such details with smaller groups (O13_03220900). So the 
working group meetings are established as a ‘speaking point event’ where partici-
pants only report according to what the agenda sets (generic example from Working 
group MINUSMA):  
 
1. Attendance – participants confirm their presence  
2. Intelligence report – Military intelligence officer speaks 
3. Land Component Command reports status of units – LCC delegate speaks  
4. Effectuated, Current, Upcoming (issues) – OPR speaks, comments from 
delegates   
5. Coming decision meeting – OPR speaks 
6. Task manager – OPR speaks, comments from delegates  
7. Comments from delegates – speaking turn goes around the table  
8. Need for collaboration – OPR checks with the participants if there is need 
for it 
9. Need for ‘after sittings’ – OPR decides if there are to be follow-up meet-
ings 
10. Next meeting – OPR speaks 
 
Some delegates attending these types of meetings can sit there for an hour and only 
say “here” (answer to point no 1) and “Nothing to report” (answer to point no 7). 
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They are thus ‘seat-fillers’, a position created by social rules of consensus. On the 
other hand, some delegates get to speak much more - most commonly those who 
work with personnel or economic and logistical issues. This is also a part of the 
consensus fabric as it often is these types of issues that the responsible officers must 
be able to master before briefing the higher commanders. Nevertheless, the point 
here is to highlight the power of the agenda in military practice. It establishes pat-
terns and routines which help secure the way military minds understand operational 
staff work. Consensus as a set of social rules is strengthen by the form of the meet-
ings and eventually hidden for the delegates that participate in them. This is why 
they contribute to its existence and infuse it further in the daily work, despite being 
(individually) critical towards it.  
 
Bureaucratisation of violence and the rules of consensus 
What is it about abiding by the laws of consensus that provides bureaucratised un-
derstandings of violence? It is the focus on resources and the disregard of affective 
aspects of the use of military force that strike me as most central to this question. 
This relates to bureaucratisation in that minds subjected to this particular way of 
relating to the military practice tend to focus on details of production, and think 
about the military practice as a function of resources. I briefly mention above that 
those who speak during the meetings where consensus is to be achieved are in most 
cases actors that have a role to play in issues of finance, logistics and manning. 
OPRs know that when they are to conduct briefings, they must be able to provide 
answers to questions about such things, despite the fact that both I and they think 
that such issues are best to leave to the experts. This knowledge of how the practice 
of briefings functions provides fuel for the constant re-establishment of bureaucra-
tised labour. Officers with long educational backgrounds of conducting military 
operations and experience from participating in international missions find them-
selves in a position where they have to collect and condense information that is 
similar to that of management in private companies or civilian governmental au-
thorities. Even though the staff where my ethnographic endeavour was conducted is 
situated in the ‘wartime organisation’ of the Swedish Armed Forces, not much of the 
actual work differs from that on the Training and Development Staff (which belongs 
to the ‘peacetime organisation’ of the Armed Forces). In short, the desire to comply 
with the demands of consensus in combination with the routinisation of the practice 
is a part of the ontic fabric of bureaucratisation of violence. Seen as a script for es-
tablishing the social play of the practice, consensus thus supports an understanding 
of what counts as ‘issues’ when conducting operations and as such forms under-
standings of the ‘nature’ of the ongoing military missions. This has the effect of 
blurring the line between the ‘wartime organisation’ and the ‘peacetime organisa-
tion’ consequently leaving the former doing much work that then must be conducted 
again at the latter. Consider this example of how one representative (from J5, long 
term planning) talks about the continuation of the mission in Mali: 
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"Problems with a future contribution are well-accounted for in the answer" (they are discussing the 
content of the answer that the operational level has supplied to the higher staff). The delegate from 
J5/7 symbolises this by talking about a stretched rubber band. "You all know how a rubber band, 
when stretched, eventually gets these white edges? Well, that is what we describe in the answer, if 
you get my point" (O4_03080900) 
 
The focus of this meeting when talking about the effects of continuing the mission in 
Mali is put entirely on resources. The soldiers and officers of the mission are being 
reified into objects in that they are a part of the supply and demand chain of the 
production of this mission.  
 
Additionally, in my discussion on previous research I have argued that the misrec-
ognition of the enemy Other is one particularly aspect of how violence becomes 
bureaucratised. In the operational work, the Other, i.e. the opponent or enemy if you 
like, is touched upon very briefly during the meetings. There is a formality to this in 
the routines of the practice: the working meetings on AG MINUSMA had a repre-
sentative from the Military Intelligence and Security Service Staff presenting the 
current situation and assessment on the near future in the mission area. During these 
short briefings (between 5-8 minutes) the Other is described as “Islamist violence-
promoting groups” (e.g. O17_04050900, O28_05030900). These short talks were 
delivered by a young man dressed in formal civilian clothes who after his presenta-
tion left the room. This created a situation where the only reference, or articulated 
trigger, of that violence is (or can be) a part of the mission comes from outside the 
working group. By someone who (visibly) does not belong to the community of 
officers working with operations and who even leaves the room when he has deliv-
ered his product (i.e. finished his presentation). The routinisation of the meetings 
creates a divider between what must be said for the sake of form (the power of the 
agenda) and what really matters (talking about resources). An excerpt directly from 
my notes from one such event might bring some more light on this curious relation 
between violence and the focus of the operational staff work: 
 
Setting: this is an AG MINUSMA meeting. 
 
Representative from MUST talks and shows pictures with the phrase "Islamist violence-promoting 
groups" 
 
The rep. talks about how a unit (not Swedish) from the MINUSMA operation has had to shoot at a 
violent demonstration. And it is reported that there have been "a number of dead and wounded" 
(formulated both on the slide and orally). ---> there are no questions asked about this, and the 
event is treated as a problem which sorts under "information operations" as it can hamper the repu-
tation of the mission. "The attitude towards MINUSMA is expected to deteriorate" the rep. as-
sumes. 
 
The rep. from MUST talks about the situation in the area during 09:01-09:06:30. When the rep. 
has talked for about 5 min the OPR for the working group says: "I'll give you one more minute". 
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In an effort to speed things up, the rep. shows his last two slides for about 4-5 seconds each. These 
are slides that I recognise from previous briefings from this representative, and they usually sum 
up the security situation. They consist of a time sequence "short - mid - long" and corresponding 
squares with arrows in them. And all of this in the colours green, yellow and red (I draw a generic 
example). 
Short Mid Long 
   
 
MUST rep. leaves the room. 
 
Then it’s the rep. from LCC. He talks until 09:08 about our own units. Focus shifts from "security" 
which the MUST rep. has been talking about, to more mundane things: LCC rep. talks about our 
units in terms of how they are trying to save electricity and how they are managing their own secu-
rity. --> we learn nothing about what they actually do in Mali. Or, this is what they actually do? 
 
 After this quick brief, the OPR for the group takes over, and goes through the items on the "com-
pleted - current – future” list. The reps. are asked how things are on the different issues that are on 
the slide. I notice that some of the reps. talk production language: "… we in the working group 
have outlined a BU (basis of requirements)…" "… soon we can place an order…" "How about 
starting up a project group that is tasked with creating a list of needs?"  
 
"We are ready, together with FMV, to create a list of needs and to set a price tag on that" 
(O28_05030900) 
 
There is some formality imbued in the performance of the representative from the 
Military Intelligence and Security Service Staff (MUST). When he is reprimanded 
for running out of time, he shows his last slides just because he is supposed to do so, 
not to underline a deeper understanding of what they comprise. We barely have the 
time to identify what they are to outline and I find myself shrugging at the pictures 
and the presentation. Falling back into my subject position as staff officer I think 
that clearly the pictures have no greater value as they are so quickly rushed through. 
This is underlined by the fact that the briefer leaves the room when he is done. What 
is important for us in the working group begins with his exit: the details surrounding 
the maintenance of the mission. Bureaucratisation of violence is thus discernible in 
this excerpt by how the production language has a position of domination. Not just 
by how much time is spent talking about it but also, most importantly, what system 
of relations controls the conduct of the meeting. This system is, as my observations 
reveal, partly constructed through the rules of consensus (there are other social rules 
and norms at play too) and there is thus a link between such social rules and our 
understanding of military operative staff work.        
 
The description given above of the sustaining function of consensus in the opera-
tional staff work runs the risk of giving a ‘matter of fact’ impression. It would be 
counter-theoretical to claim that my description is that of some ‘essence’ or ‘truth’. 
Even so, it is based on observations and conversations made during my time at the 
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staff and is thus my and several of the practitioners’ impression of the practice. But 
there are cracks and ripples of resistance in the homogeneity of the practice. It is 
therefore important to clarify that the rules of consensus can, on rare occasions, be 
actively broken by actors, and that some of my interlocutors do not share my obser-
vation of its impact (C20_04051300). As for the first case, I have not witnessed any 
active resistance myself, but some of the interlocutors have told me stories about 
when they themselves, or some of our colleagues, have bypassed the rules 
(C28_05241300). In the latter case, some of the chiefs that I have talked to plainly 
do not agree with my interpretation of how the rules play out: they tell me that yes, 
they exist, but that consensus does not hinder people from speaking their mind 
whenever needed (C21_04121500). They do not see, or agree with, my emphasis on 
the impact that social rules have on how the daily work is performed.  
 
Summary 
In summary, consensus functions in complex ways: it gives meaning to why a cer-
tain part of the practice exists, but at the same time provokes the practitioners to 
think that it is an unwanted aspect of their daily work. Its rules stabilise social rela-
tions in that consensus enables briefings and meetings to be held undisturbed by 
critical questions or comments, in line with what the professional staff practice re-
quires, but at the same time goes against the ‘so-often-in-theory-described’ opera-
tional military professional norm that critique is always to be allowed (before deci-
sions taken). Consensus provides ideas/images of decisions actually being well-
prepared and thoroughly grounded in the organisation’s different departments and 
staffs, at the same time as it is clear that practical constraints of time and amount of 
personnel make it impossible for them to adhere to these demands. Additionally, 
consensus creation of routines and enforcement of actors’ performance in social 
plays, provides the practice with a certain plastic, or artificial, aspect. Most im-
portantly for discussions further on, the rules of consensus conform military minds 
in their understanding of what operational staff work is, and in prolongation, what 
military missions are. And the rules of consensus tell us that operational staff work 
is a practice of production, where acts of violence are reduced to ‘events’ or ‘dis-
turbances’ in the instrumental application of military force. The rules of consensus 
thus keep violence, and the effects of using it, as an unspoken and sometimes unseen 
aspect of operational work. A clearly established outcome of this suppression of 
violence through bureaucratisation is that the ‘enemy Other’ is neutralised and even 
disappears from the operational discourse. What the above excerpt, where the 
MUST-representative leaves the room after a short ‘brief’ on the ‘enemy Other’, 
elucidates is an empirical illustration of how the misrecognition of the Other oper-
ates through the bureaucratised labour of operational work. Such misrecognition 
thus functions through often unspoken agreements among the social agents, as they 
through a consensus-based discourse establish a normative framework in which the 
practice is formed to exclude the ‘outcome’ of violence, and instead include material 
details.           
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The rules of consensus are something that I did not encounter in my historical inves-
tigations of how bureaucratised relations to death and violence have emerged. The 
archived material that was the corpus for the analysis of military practice in Chapter 
4 provided no hint of these rules, probably because consensus is something that I 
have discovered while watching practitioners in action. This indicates that theoreti-
cal descriptions of a practice cannot give us a comprehensive insight into how a 
practice is understood and performed. It must be complemented with investigation 
where social relations between the practitioners are elucidated. Oddly enough, I had 
not reflected on this ‘consensus-aspect’ of my own practice as a military officer 
before engaging in my academic studies. Surely I myself must have been in the 
midst of it, reproducing it as a part of my daily work. Nevertheless, the forthcoming 
sections will pick up threads from the historical analysis in Chapter 4 as it connects 
contemporary observations and conversations with historically established points of 
reference for how death and violence have become bureaucratised. 
 
5.3  The Social rules of Order and Bureaucracy  
 
In this section I will account for my analysis of the social rules and norms of order 
and bureaucracy. After a short introduction, I expand upon how these rules affect the 
social relations of the practice. Thereafter I proceed to discuss how bureaucracy and 
order provide meaning to the practitioners and their work. Finally, this section is 
concluded by a discussion on how the social norms and rules of order, bureaucracy 
and categorisation operate to keep bureaucratised understandings of violence in 
place.   
 
Introduction: Rules that make Operational Staff Work both Possible and 
Impossible 
 
Colonel Sandurz (CS): “Try here. Stop”. Dark Helmet (DH): “What the hell am I looking at? 
When does this happen in the movie?” CS: “Now. You're looking at now, sir. Everything that hap-
pens now, is happening now.” DH: “What happened to then?” CS: “We passed then.” DH: 
“When?” CS: “Just now. We're at now now.” DH: “Go back to then.” CS: “When?” DH: “Now.” 
CS: “Now?” DH: “Now.” CS: “I can't.” DH: “Why?” CS: “We missed it.” DH: “When?” CS: 
“Just now.” Dark Helmet: “When will then be now?” Colonel Sandurz: “Soon.” (Spaceballs, 
(1987), Brooksfilms and Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer) 
 
The quote from the movie Spaceballs (1987) is here to transfer a part of my field-
work experience from participating in agents’ renegotiation of operational staff 
work. That is, watching agents of the practice engage in conversations that aim to 
explain how the process of planning is (or should be) conducted, I have found that 
some take the role of Colonel Sandurz (trying to explain the rationality behind the 
impossible task of playing the movie while in the midst of making it) and others fill 
the shoes (or helmet) of Dark Helmet (trying to grasp what is being said, and to 
handle an increasing feeling of confusion and discomfort). In other words, a situa-
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tion where participants of a practice are not quite comfortable with how it is per-
formed in terms of complexity, but still go along with it and even let it guide their 
daily work. Here the practitioners in the former role sometimes identify themselves 
as “method men” or “concept fascists” (C10_02241015, CR_02161230), but mostly 
this ‘educational role’ is occupied by those with long experience of working at the 
HQ. While talking about the observed tendency to put much time and effort into 
discussing work procedures and the meaning of concepts during meetings, my inter-
locutor (one of the OPRs) says “CJTF [Combined Joint Task Force] concepts are 
our times’ military Latin” (C29_05250920). Much of what I want to shed light on 
here can be read in these few words: the position of precedence that military con-
cepts have in the practice and the complexity that follows with ways of ordering the 
practice by such concepts. Observations and noted conversations where questions 
like “who?”, “what?” and “when?” have been a central part of the practice and have 
thus formed the base for this part of the chapter.  
 
Nevertheless, normally I would refrain from discussing results of analyses under a 
header that sets out an aporia for the reader. But from my observations of this par-
ticular aspect of operative staff work, I find no other means by which it can be criti-
cally explained. In Chapter 4 I show that historically, order and bureaucracy (among 
others) have permeated military narratives. They came to dominate how military 
practice is depicted and understood during the first half of the 20th century. In con-
temporary military practice, these themes or points of reference have come to 
evolve, creating new meaning and systems to uphold social relations within the 
military. The will to ‘rationalise’ the practice through the use of the rules and roles 
that bureaucracy and order provide, have, on the other hand, also made military 
practice impossible in the way these rules immerse every aspect of operational staff 
work in complexity. Apart from endorsing the discussions on concepts and methods, 
order and bureaucracy invest the practice with structure that upholds positions of 
power. I have chosen to focus on this latter aspect of the rules in the subsection 
where social relations are discussed. The meaning-making aspect of the rules in 
focus will here be analysed in the subsequent part after the relational aspects have 
been discussed, and there I will put more emphasis on how order and bureaucracy 
provide content to the complexity of the practice. I will thus map out how these 
social rules and norms support the formation and conduct of the main activities of 
operational staff work.  
   
Relations – mandate and responsibility, the fabric of operational military 
hierarchy  
COS starts by explaining that he has "the mandate to, under the Commander, in peacetime lead 5 
staffs and in wartime to lead the conduct of operations". (C21_04121500) 
 
"We just deliver the milk here now" Dep. Chief of Joint Operations regarding the Joint Forces 
Command’s mandate after the latest re-organisation within the HQ (C22_04131030) 
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Head of J3 tells me "I have a far-reaching mandate, and obligations, within the frame of JCBWG, I 
can acquire resources that lie outside of the Joint Support Staff if it’s needed." And regarding 
"contact surfaces" with Government Offices and with the strategic level: "[I have] the commander 
of joint operations’ mandate to talk to them directly." (C24_04141241) 
 
Head of J9: "The mandate in the game between LedS, InSS and PROD has been a bit unclear, but 
we have started up dialogues that aim to clear this up.” (C25_0517009) 
 
Many of my military colleagues speak about mandates during my conversations 
with them. They use this concept to situate themselves and their responsibility in 
relation to other practitioners. Obviously, mandate has the official function of regu-
lating responsibility but it is its relational function that is in focus here. Mandate is 
in this latter aspect connected to how the rules of order aim to establish predictabil-
ity in relations between agents and parts of the organisations. The HQ has several 
documents that regulate who is responsible for what, and what possibilities there are 
for the different staffs and meeting forums to ‘acquire resources’ from each other 
(e.g. Försvarsmakten 2016a, 25). These documents also closely regulate what the 
staffs are supposed to do and when things are to be done. Their importance for the 
practitioners cannot be underestimated: such documents are very often referred to in 
my talks with the heads of departments and they lock the practice in a routinised but 
still complex pattern of meetings (e.g. C9_02181010, C21_04121500, 
C24_04141241).     
 
It is clear from these documents and from my time at the staff that mandate has, in 
some cases, an overriding effect over rank. A large part of the ‘Indians’ are equal in 
the rank of lieutenant colonel (as myself) but those bearing this rank who work as 
OPRs for working groups and other forums (and as Dep. Chief of Joint Support 
Staff) have through the concept of mandate the possibility to engage people in work, 
that they through the chain of command would not have access to. On a first, super-
ficial, level of analysis this might have meant that these ‘Indians’ are believed to be 
in a position of power (within the military organisation). But they are not. They are 
ruled by the concept of mandate in itself by how it puts them in positions where they 
have very little space to manoeuvre the operational work in directions outside of the 
established routines. Routines held securely in place by the rules of order and bu-
reaucracy. That is, mandate is the grease that makes the complex organisation ‘func-
tion’ in accordance to the rules set out by order and bureaucracy. Without the use of 
mandate, all meetings and working groups would have to be organised through the 
chain of command. That would overload the chiefs with the management of request 
of participation in the existing plethora of such events. So in order to sustain meet-
ings and working groups with personnel the OPRs are given the direct authority to 
send calling messages outside of their staff and sections.  
 
But this only creates an illusion of authority, for the person in charge of these meet-
ings cannot break away from provided rhythm that the ordering of the practice has 
provided: meetings are held despite their sometimes meagre significance and low 
output, and some agents participate even if they have nothing to add or contribute. 
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These ‘faults’ of the practice are not unknown to those in charge of these meetings 
but they feel that they have a very limited position from where they can change the 
routines. Indeed, mandate with its inherent provision of responsibility is a concept 
that epitomises the rules of order and bureaucracy in the way it works to secure 
sedimentation of roles and daily work. The following observation of an AG MI-
NUSMA meeting is one of several such observations that lie behind my argumenta-
tion of this embodiment of order and bureaucratisation. The excerpt from my notes 
is quite lengthy but needed to explicate how the practice is under heavy influence of 
regulations, and also to show how this influence affects the relations between the 
actors:   
 
Setting: this is another "after-meeting" following directly upon the previously one. It is about an 
inspection that has been done on the camps in the mission area. A report has been issued that in-
cludes several things that must be dealt with. 
 
OPR: starts the meeting by showing a slide where he has organised the points made by the report 
in a table. He asks "Given that you all have read the report with great care, do you share my view 
that these are the issues brought up by it?" --> There is sarcasm in the way the OPR formulates the 
question to the representatives at the meeting. That is to say, it is clear that he suspects that the 
main part of them have not, in fact, read the report. 
 
There is silence. Some shifts in weight on chairs. People look down at their papers. It is clear to 
me that there is some justification to the sarcasm expressed by the OPR (1).  
 
Without further ado the OPR hands the report to one of the reps. and asks him to help out while he 
goes through each point. The he sits in front of the computer and fills in the empty places in the 
three columned table that is on the screen. The headlines for the columns are: "issue" (already 
filled in with the points made by the report), "action" and "responsible". (2) Each point from the 
report is worked on by applying this question: "Who is responsible for this?" e.g. One rep. asks: 
"Who is in charge of setting the directives for this type of training?" (3) regarding one point that is 
aimed towards adding another aspect to the training of soldiers before going to the mission. 
 
One rep. asks: "A question of principles: the report is not assigned to FMV, but they are clearly re-
sponsible for several of these points?" another answers: "But PROD actually sets the tasks for 
FMV regarding things that need to be done" (3) 
 
OPR asks the rep. from FMV if it is OK that he writes "FMV" in the square for "responsible" for 
the current issue that they are going through. FMV rep. says "I'm counting on that the issue will be 
brought up on the next PROD-coordination meeting" and looks at the rep. from PROD, who nods 
and answers affirmatively. (4) 
 
The people at the meeting continue categorising the issues brought up by the report (deviation or 
observation) and discussing responsibility and who should handle each issue. (3) 
 
One of the reps. from LCC asks a question about the details of one of the points made by in the re-
port. OPR: "Hell, you were given the task to read this through before the meeting!" LCC rep an-
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swers calmly: "I didn't receive any notice about this meeting, and no document to read." Despite 
this, the meeting just continuous as if nothing had been said. (1) 
 
A couple of minutes after this, another rep. asks: "What does that [point] mean? What more does 
the report say [about that point]?" --> the rep. helping OPR reads it. This shows that there are sev-
eral more participants that have not read the report. (1) 
 
The OPR concludes the meeting by stating that the way the meeting has been conducted has creat-
ed a traceability and tells people to work as quickly as possible with assigned tasks so that tasks 
can be "marked green". --> important driver for the practitioners, to get things marked green. 
 
In the small talk after the meeting (I am checking some dates and timings for coming meetings 
with the OPR) one of the reps. says "These old truths: summon everyone to your meetings so that 
they can exclude themselves". 
 
One rep stands silent besides us, apparently waiting to say something to the OPR.  OPR : "Do you 
have a question for me?" rep.: "Yes" OPR: "If I'm thinking of killing myself?" ---> this is a typical 
example of the black humour that often comes up in relation to the practice. For me, it’s something 
that seems to help the participants to cope with the impossibility of practice, which in turn seems 
to be related to the complexity of it. (O20_04051038) 
 
The frustration that lies behind the joke that ends this particular observation is relat-
ed to how the agents are trapped by their mandate and responsibilities. I feel a strong 
need to escape while observing this everyday event, immersed as it is in aspects of 
categorisation, bureaucracy and order. And I know from conversations with my 
colleagues that many of them share this feeling. But responsibility in the meaning of 
acting according to mandate and regulations weigh heavy on us. The excerpt above 
shows that meetings comprise (some of these are marked by corresponding number 
in the excerpt): 1, participation without knowledge of the issues at hand; 2, categori-
sation of tasks that could easily have been done by one or two people; 3, navigating 
the complexity of the organisation, creating an educational focus on finding out who 
is to do what; 4, a duplication of efforts and tasks.  
 
The existence of these oddities are partly related to the rules of consensus that I 
discuss above, but also to how social relations in the practice are constructed by the 
function of regulation. Job descriptions, standing operating procedures and military 
manuals are the artefacts of the social rules and norms under scrutiny here. They 
regulate the practice by dividing responsibility and issuing mandate, as well as set-
tings for which and how activities are to be performed. But there is a tension in the 
operational work between the need to follow regulations and the need to escape the 
formalities created by them. Consider the fact that there is a constant flow of meet-
ings (similar to the one described above) at the HQ. Not many workdays are spared 
in general from these central activities of the practice. And then relate this to the fact 
that not one of the colleagues that I interacted with during my time at the staff ex-
pressed anything positive about going to meetings. On the contrary, they all com-
plained about it (as did I). But they still attend and also in many cases run these 
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meetings. How can it be like this if there is resistance amongst us officers against 
this order? The answer lies in the creation of the subject ‘staff officer’. This is a 
constant ongoing process where meetings are the construction site for the identity of 
the staff officer. Here the content of the role staff officer is renegotiated through the 
identification with familiar routines and articulations.  
 
Meetings are as such a place of securing oneself in the relations with others at the 
work place, as the familiarity of the activity and its reinforcement of bureaucratised 
labour provide content to “me” and “us” as staff members. In addition, this act of 
identification that the meetings comprise also provides the agents in the operative 
staff work with the possibility of feeling enjoyment in the Lacanian meaning (fr. 
jouissance) (D. R. Howarth 2013, 174 ff. Mouffe 2005, 26–27). That is, enjoyment 
in the sense that the pain of following regulations (of the meeting practice) is in 
itself what the subject takes pleasure in. There is thus a psychoanalytical aspect at 
play here in the social relations, which bolsters a repeatability of the meeting prac-
tice. It takes its articulatory form in expressions of theft: ‘If I only could be released 
from these meetings I would be able to do a better job’ is generally a perspective 
shared by the participants in staff work. The meetings steal something that would 
make us ideal as staff officers but this is in itself impossible: there can never be a 
perfect closure of identity in one singular subject position like the staff officer 
(Laclau 1990, 210–11). A subject position must be inherent with flaws and these 
flaws actually become the very structure of our forms of identification. So the meet-
ings continue with something that resembles self-inflicted pain. 
 
Formal mandate thus provides little leverage when it comes to power to influence 
others or the outline of the activities within the operational practice. What I have 
witnessed and lived through at the staff indicates that such power is instead connect-
ed to knowledge of how the complex organisation functions. Those agents, be it 
‘Chiefs’ or ‘Indians’, that have a broad working knowledge of who does what in the 
HQ are the ones who can influence decisions and in some measure also form the 
outline of the practice (e.g. C22_04131030). This brings me to the next aspect of the 
impact of the rules of order and bureaucracy: the way these points of reference pro-
vide the operational staff practice with meaning.    
 
Meaning-making – how order and bureaucracy shape operational work 
The method that the Swedish National Planning Process (SPL 3.0) outlines affects 
the daily work at the staff in several ways. It provides terms and forums for the crea-
tion of plans and for the continuous work with ongoing operations: Core Planning 
Teams (CPT) comprise a small number (5-6) of people and can be viewed as a 
working group. They control the direction of the planning and create drafts of the 
main part of the order; the Joint Operational Planning Group (JOPG) consists of 16-
20 people depending on the task at hand. Here the JOPG-leader checks the status of 
work and assigns new tasks for the different departments and branches of the HQ. 
The work is strictly governed by a timeline, created in consideration of the time 
  122 
when the final product (the plan/order) is to be handed over to lower levels of com-
mand. The work is also shaped by the meetings and briefings provided by the meth-
od of planning. Below, picture 3 provides an example of how such planning pro-
cesses are typically illustrated in documents that outline methods of operational 
planning. 
  
 
 
 
Together with the organisation of the staffs in the HQ, the Swedish version of opera-
tional planning methods provides the backbone for the existence of certain subjectiv-
ities, objects (products) and for relationships between practitioners. The connections 
to the rules of order and bureaucracy lie in how the method regulates the planning 
practice and creates an environment where bureaucratisation can thrive (compare 
with Chapter 4 and the excess in regulation depicted there). The complicated prac-
tice that is the product of order and bureaucracy requires full attention to matters of 
categorising issues and tasks to the right staff or department. Here the possible and 
the impossible meet: my interlocutors spend much time discussing if an issue should 
be handled in their current forum, or if it is for another forum (e.g. O9_03151200). 
The rules thus create a foundation for the practice to function, but it also complicates 
it so that time must be spent on understanding the “what, who and why” of many of 
the issues that go through the system (compare to Weber’s iron cage, discussed in 
Chapter 2). In addition to this, the regulation of the practice through Swedish Na-
tional Planning Process (SPL 3,0) also creates content to some of the meetings. 
Conducting evaluations of how things are progressing in the missions is one such 
content in the staff work that is created by the planning process document. I have 
inserted an example of what such an evaluation comprises in order to elucidate what 
bureaucratisation does to the meaning of the act ‘evaluation’:  
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Figure 4.1 - Strategic and Operational Level Crisis Response Planning 
 
Pict. 3. The ‘flow chart’ depicting the Swedish ational planning process in SPL 3.0 (2015), p. 26, is 
very similar to how NATO illustrates their ‘Crisis Response Planning’ (Försvarsmakten 2015c; NATO 
2013b, 4–4)       
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Setting: this is an ‘after sitting’ from the MINUSMA coordination meeting. We are here to do an 
operational evaluation. It is a product of staff work consisting of a number of assumptions, conclu-
sions and goals that are to be evaluated in a document. 
 
The OPR takes attendance, who is represented and which dept. are missing (some are missing but 
that does not seem to matter much). 
 
He then goes on to explain what the group is supposed to do. "An operational evaluation consists 
of a number of people, sitting in a room trying to be as smart as possible." 
 
Thereafter he reads out loud the first assumption in the document (there are no computers or 
screens in the room, he has a printed version of the document in front of him as support). He asks 
the participants if it is fulfilled or not: "Is it done? Yes or No?" The participants cannot answer by 
yes or no, instead they include a number of complicating details in their answers. As a result, the 
assumption cannot be evaluated now, as some things must be checked with the unit currently in the 
mission area. This clearly cannot go on as the meeting will take forever (there are several pages of 
things to assess). The OPR speeds things up.  
 
The OPR proceeds with assumption after assumption. The printed list has colour markings (green-
yellow-red) which indicate the status of each assumption. He checks if there are any changes by 
referring to the colours: "It is red"  
 
"Is this unaltered or does it go towards minus?" ---> they have, beside from the colours, also mark-
ings on some of the parts of the list that are "minus (-)" "zero (0)" or "plus (+)" 
 
+ 0 - relates to how each point on the list is expected to develop (taking into account how things 
have developed so far).  
 
OPR: "We need to change that so we get the right colour in each square, so it’s clear that we're 
working on that" 
 
One of the items of the list is estimated to be "green" by the representative who is responsible for 
evaluating that particular issue. But he explains that it is because of "the actual tasks that the func-
tion has". This task is not correct. It is more comprehensive in the written text, the order assigned 
to the unit, where the formulation of the goal in question speaks of something more. Which means 
that it should not be green. OPR says "I see it [the written goal] as a fact since the Commander has 
signed the order". But it gets marked as green anyway. 
 
They discuss how to get two different tables in sync as they are both grounded in the same infor-
mation. 
 
"Those two are assessed. They have been given a colour" --> pointing at different squares in the 
document. (O14_03221015) 
 
It is striking to me, watching this from a research position, that ‘evaluation’ does not 
mean making a judgement about the value of the mission in Mali, or how it is actu-
ally proceeding. Instead, evaluation means filling in colours and signs in a document 
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so that the product ‘operational evaluation’ can be completed. Even so, the phrase 
“… so it’s clear that we’re working on that” catches something of how the evalua-
tion process means something more than this ‘colouring book activity’. It is clear 
that the motivation behind the actions taken by the agents are a desire to display 
progress in work. This progress is in turn connected to the work done by the opera-
tional and tactical staffs. The evaluation focuses as such on those issues that the 
practitioners feel that they can have an effect on which means that, yet again, issues 
of finance, logistics and personnel take precedence over other potential issues of 
conducting international missions in conflict environments. The rules of order and 
categorisation, of sorting things and giving them a specific position, number or code, 
thus transforms the act of judgement into a ‘colouring book activity’. Intertwined 
with these rules, the language of production (touched upon in the next section on 
masculinity) provides more meaning to this act. The evaluation becomes a product 
of the staff work and as such it moulds into something that represents internal pro-
gress within the staffs of the HQ.  
 
When I, during informal conversations, ask my colleagues about their views on the 
Mali mission, they quickly conclude that it is being conducted to gain Swedish polit-
ical leverage in the UN and/or that the Swedish Armed Forces need an international 
mission to boost recruitment and development of materiel (O12_03211300). There 
is a stable, solid conviction that no changes of importance will be achieved in the 
country by our mission. This ‘matter of fact’ position creates a further deepening 
impact of the rules of order and bureaucracy on creating meaning for the practice. 
Because these rules provide language and objects (like database and lists) that are 
manageable and in some sense worthwhile to put effort into.          
 
Sedimentation – keeping bureaucratisation in place   
When one of the issues is discussed, one of the participants actually provides a comment that in-
cludes a possible solution to the problem at hand. But this is quickly disposed of as "that belongs 
to a working meeting where we can talk about details" by the main responsible rep for this issue. I 
felt it myself: my initial reaction to the person providing this possible solution was that this meet-
ing was the wrong forum for that type of comment. Which is odd in hindsight since this was sup-
posed to be a ‘working meeting’. (O17_04050900) 
 
My most closely learnt lesson from my study of autoethnography is that it empha-
sises the importance of being mindful of one’s own reactions and feelings in social 
settings. This has proved particularly challenging since I have struggled during my 
time at the staff with my tendency to slip into the position of staff officer. Such slips 
can go unnoticed and important observations can be overlooked. But sometimes I 
have managed to note my reactions to events at the staff in a way that actually re-
veals something of how my state of mind conforms with my interlocutors. The quote 
above from my field notes reflects one such event where my mind obviously is ruled 
by the bureaucratisation of the practice as it is clear that I am ‘on track’ with how 
things are supposed to be run at the staff. As such, sedimentation by the social rules 
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of order and bureaucracy can be found within myself in the way I act and think, 
according to these rules.  
 
Another example of the conforming power of order and bureaucracy can be found in 
the way I sometimes interact during meetings: I have given suggestions about who 
(what organisational part of the HQ/persons in particular positions etc.) can help 
with a task, provided knowledge on how financial issues are to be solved and I have 
discussed issues of organisation, to give but a few examples. These are clearly a type 
of topics that are made central to the practice by the rules that I have described 
above. Once one of the OPRs told me that he got a question from one of the chiefs 
about who had the most knowledge about one major current issue regarding the 
mission to Mali besides himself (he was going on a short vacation). “That would be 
Andreas” was his answer, he said to me with a smile.14 This made me feel very satis-
fied initially, and a bit proud that he saw me as someone who could at least answer 
some questions about this particular issue. Here I felt like dropping the entire re-
search project and going back to the HQ to work at the staff. This is because I felt 
included in the social settings of the practice and that is a very powerful feeling. 
Even so, there was also a feeling of bitterness: was this really it? Can I really be one 
of few with a comprehensive understanding of this issue after so many meetings, 
attended by so many? The point here is to clarify that the content of the operational 
staff practice is not something that has a life of its own. It thrives and is reproduced 
by the practitioners as we are set on what the main activities are and how things 
should be when doing staff work. In other words, operational work upholds the 
bonds that connect us with each other and provides us with recognisable roles.  
 
Anyhow, newcomers through their meeting with day-to-day work quickly learn what 
is expected to be said and done in which type of situation. Soon it becomes routine 
to focus on ‘who? what? and when?’ in the daily work. This accumulation of expo-
sure to the social rules of the practice seems to suffocate the critical question of 
‘why?’. The academic endeavour to critically explain why military minds under-
stand the use of force as bureaucratised labour, and what effects such ontology has 
on the international use of violence, does by no means thrive in such an environ-
ment. This is even more difficult when taking into account the position that the rules 
of production have in providing bureaucratised understandings of military practice. I 
tend to cling on to the question of usefulness of my research, of what the alternatives 
are to doing things in the way we do at the operational staff and to the idea that I 
must formulate key conclusions that will sum up years of research. Alas, all of these 
questions are indeed ‘products’ of the rules of production. Usefulness is a strong 
norm in the military, something that I meet within myself and in interaction with my 
colleagues. To produce is good, but to produce something that is easily understanda-
ble and directly applicable to the practice is even better in the eyes of the military 
officer. The question of ‘why? does not help much in the endeavour to ‘keep it short, 
keep it simple’. Especially if it calls into question established norms and rules such 
                                                             
14 When he told me about this episode and I pointed out that my first name is Anders, he was very apologetic. But this is 
quite a common mistake in my experience and tells me more about the stressful environment than anything else. 
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as the central points of reference exposed in this chapter. Thus, the question of 
‘Why?’ disrupts sedimentation of a practice and can only be asked if it is moulded 
into a question that incorporates the rules and norms of the practice. This will be 
discussed in more detail in the next section of this chapter where the infusion of 
gender norms represents issues that potentially bring with them questions of “why”.  
 
Summary 
In summary, the rules created by order and bureaucracy provide stabilisation to an 
otherwise fragile understanding of what military operational work is, and offers 
avenues of identification which help reconstruct the subject ‘the staff officer’. In the 
practice, agents reinforce their sense of Self and their understanding of what military 
practice comprises, in relation to acts of answering questions of who, what and 
when. It is thus bureaucratised labour - the interconnected relationship between 
operational planning routines, manuals and computer-related work with templates 
and lists – that makes up the main points of reference for what military operational 
work is. And in this bureaucratised labour, violence cannot be seen as anything other 
than productive and useful, although its usefulness is not connected to specific prob-
lems in the geographical area of its use. Instead, violence is productive and useful in 
relation to needs internal to the military organisation (the organisation needs to exist 
and have a meaningful activity), and this cements a neutralisation and silencing of 
the death and violence that is made possible by the operational work. In sum, bu-
reaucratised labour ensures that the practices dependence and close relation with the 
materiality of military work is sedimented as a ‘natural’ avenue for identification 
and belonging – working with meetings, lists, procedures and templates is simply 
what the operational agent is ‘supposed to do’.    
 
5.4  Masculinity and Production: Links between Production 
and the Construction of Masculinities 
  
The following section introduces the linkage between bureaucratisation, production 
as a central point of reference in the operational work, and the infusion of gender 
policies at the operational staff. After the introduction, the analysis is divided into 
two parts where the first investigates how resistance and alteration of gender policies 
relates to the internal norms and rules provided by a focus on production. The sec-
ond part comprises an analysis of how the use of military force in international mis-
sions provides further (externally directed) resistance to a certain set of gender 
norms, while others are accepted. In combination with my autoethnographical meth-
od, where my own emotions and subjectivities are to be used as ways of understand-
ing how bureaucratisation and masculinities interact to shape the ways of identifica-
tions and subjectivities constructing the ‘staff officer’, the text below will, on occa-
sion, become ‘defensive’. Particularly when the text elucidates the ‘gender aware 
man’s’ (my own) struggle with issues of gender. That said, the concluding part of 
this section includes a summary of what values and norms come into the forefront in 
the construction of military masculinity in the context of bureaucratised labour.    
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Introduction – the relation between bureaucratisation, production and is-
sues of gender 
[…] there is a brief about a new handbook, which aims at getting the Commander’s approval for 
publication. After the presenter is finished, the Commander asks "Has this book been reviewed 
from a gender perspective? What do you say?" and he looks at the gender adviser. She tells him 
that it has been reviewed 1,5 years ago, early in the process of making it. The Commander points 
to the importance of this being a part of the process before he can approve it. And adds "Let it just 
pass the gender adviser so we can get a tick in the box on that. When that's done, you can come to 
me and I'll approve it." (extract from notes from a Commanders Decision Brief, (O33_05311500)) 
 
How can we understand and see the discursively and socially constructed points of 
reference that underpin the way the Commander in the quote above relates to issues 
of gender? In the fourth chapter of this thesis concepts and norms such as strength, 
ruthlessness, heroism (including sacrifice), boldness and practical knowledge of 
using violence were identified as particularly evident in the historical portrayal of 
the Swedish military use of violence. These are masculine norms scarcely used, or 
found, in the operational staff work that I have investigated, and cannot be ‘applied’ 
to the analysis in a natural way. Naturally, because the operational practice is a type 
of ‘war-practice’ which is largely bereft of ‘war-as-fighting’ and thus contains an-
other type of relationship to the use of military force. Here, as illustrated by the 
quote from the commander, it is the bureaucratised procedures, hierarchical relations 
and focus on production that stand in the forefront as normative frames. 
 
This fact, in combination with my particularly difficult position (the fact that I have 
worked in a military organisation for the major part of my adult life) to pinpoint 
what it is in my military self that defines me as masculine15, makes masculine rules 
and norms hard to analyse. But instead of starting at the point of what the theoretical 
right to use violence provides the military practice in terms of masculine ideals, I 
still aim to start with the practice and myself. This means that the practice, its agents 
and my own interrelation with issues of gender form the muddy riverbed where 
masculine aspects of the practice are to be found.   
 
During my time at the Joint Operational Staff I engaged the Gender Adviser (GE-
NAD) in the problématique of pinpointing the social effects of the male numerical 
domination of the practice, and asked her for her view on what specifically is a mas-
culine aspect of the practice at the staff (C3106021400). A particular pathetic at-
tempt to find a shortcut out of my dilemma. Or a natural part of engaging my inter-
locutors in my research. Unfortunately, GENAD could not provide me with a clear 
                                                             
15 I imagine that most people would have some problems fixating aspects of their work that contribute to their masculine 
or feminine ‘Self’. It easily becomes a situation where answers are moulded into premade forms. If we ask a stone to 
describe itself and it says “Well, for starters… I’m pretty solid and hard. It comes with the job of keeping this world 
together.” we would say “Aha, you define yourself as a masculine stone then?!”. But if the stone says “I have quite a 
smooth, curved surface, very gentle to touch, from my time lying on the beach” we would say “So… what are you doing 
tonight? How about a drink?”.      
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perspective on this even though we had a rewarding discussion. Apparently, she and 
some of her closest colleagues had recently had a discussion about “is masculinity a 
necessary part of killing?” without coming to a final answer. My own reflection on 
this question was “no”, which I motivated in our discussion by pointing out that 
there are numerous events in the world that show us that women are just as good at 
killing as men (e.g. Whitworth 2004, 154). Nevertheless, in our discussion it was 
clear that we could not clarify what operational military masculinity comprises.  
 
But the discussion kept returning to the difficulties for GENAD to reach out with 
ideals related to the gender perspective. This, and some following discussions with 
academic colleagues working with gender research, made me realise that that the 
masculine trait of the operational work which I study is best highlighted by describ-
ing its relation to issues of gender. In particular, my colleagues and my own reac-
tions to the concept and introduction of gender issues in the organisation are of in-
terest as they give clues to what it is that is at stake by taking in this concept in the 
practice. It is an approach based on my identification of “gender issues” as some-
thing which contradicts masculinity or puts ‘the meaning’ of masculinity in motion 
(see also; Eichler 2011). Following Hutchings’ (2008) observation that even if mas-
culinity as a concept is empty of signification, the concept’s context dependent cre-
ated meaning can be found by investigating how masculinity takes form when meet-
ing with such contradictions (Hutchings 2008, 401). This will illuminate what it is 
that is threatened by gender issues and in turn, this might prove to be what ‘mascu-
linity of the staff officer’ contains in the operational context. But first something 
more should be said in general about the work with gender issues at the operational 
staff. 
 
GENAD was during my time at the staff a female captain that had served in this 
position for several years. A successor (a male major) had been appointed at the time 
of my departure from the staff. The name of the position is quite telling: the gender 
adviser gives advice on issues of gender (and equality) to the Joint Forces Com-
mander and the staffs connected to the Joint Operational Staff. But the job is much 
more complex than the name reveals. Since issues of gender are about power and 
structures in society, giving advice on gender is really about working for integration 
of equality and awareness of such structures. From my academic perspective it is a 
political struggle in the first place. GENAD tells me during one conversation that "It 
[gender issues] is political insofar that it gives space and power for calling things 
into question." (C3106021400). But the strategy used by GENAD is connected to 
“maximising use” as she puts it. That is, during her time in this position she has 
learned that the best response to her advice is connected to how well the use of the 
perspective is clarified for members of the different staffs (ibid). The Special Opera-
tions Command is quite easy to work with, she tells me, as “they see the direct oper-
ational use of gender". This makes me realise that the instrumentality that rules 
military minds does not ‘just’ depoliticise the use of violence, but it actually seems 
to have the same effect on any political issue. It is ‘the use’ of something that speaks 
to our military minds and creates a ‘fit’ in our practice. Production, seen as a discur-
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sive theme of bureaucratisation, has been discussed previously (Chapter 4) as central 
to how military violence is historically portrayed and presently understood as to 
provide solutions to practical problems. But in my conversation with the gender 
adviser I came to the understanding that bureaucratisation of violence is so powerful 
in the military that it reshapes the power struggle of gender issues into another 
(among many) component in the production line.  
 
- What’s this? 
- It’s about women’s liberation and equal rights in society. 
[blank eyes] 
- You know, seeing and working for the women in society as an equally important part 
of it? 
- Eh… good, seems good. [mind wanders off] 
[a moment of contemplation in silence] [everyone is starting to feel a bit awkward] 
- But, you know, if you guys were able to get someone that could speak to women, wives 
of the locals so to speak, more freely? Like a female soldier or officer… 
- Speak about what? Anything? 
- Well, yes… I suppose that’s OK as long as they’ll agree to it. 
- So you’re saying that this gender stuff can help us get intel from women? 
- Yeah, but that’s not really… 
- Sounds great! Let’s get one!  
 
This fictional conversation between a spokesperson for gender issues and some 
military officers tries to highlight just this particular aspect of how usefulness is 
important for acceptance by the military mind. Is this typical for operational work? 
Or can other institutions in Western societies harbour the same type of mentality? 
Probably, but this is outside the scope of this investigation. More central here is that 
I have seen and experienced operational work as a practice that tries to fix things. It 
is a type of work that establishes that a state of being is unwanted (by the help of 
political guidance) and also how this particular state of being should be in the future. 
In military operational terms, we talk about “unacceptable conditions” within a 
frame of problems. And the conduct of military operations will lead to an “end 
state”, which contains a number of “acceptable conditions”. The end state is to be 
reached by employing a number of operations that will affect those aspects of the 
unwanted situation (decisive conditions) that will help transform an unwanted state 
of being into the goal of “acceptable condition”. In short, military operations are 
ontologically seen as events that fix bad things and create something good. Which is 
quite a historical transformation in the understanding of the use of violence gazing 
back, perhaps, to the millennia of military violence used before the Westphalian 
Peace.  
 
Contemporary western military practice has in this transformation into ‘do-gooders’ 
been formed by the idea that liberal rights can be established in ‘suffering’ countries 
by the use of force. Hence the enforcement of the ‘fixing mentality’ in the opera-
tional work. But one could easily argue that the ‘nature’ of military violence is 
something unproductive and destructive even if it is meant to produce ‘acceptable 
  130 
conditions’ (examples of academic debate on war in the name of liberal rights: 
Burke 2004; Geis, Müller, and Schörnig 2013; Heathershaw 2008; Jarvis and 
Holland 2014).  
 
Insomuch, contemporary military discourse ‘violently’ enforces the productive as-
pect of violence by how it depicts the practice. As seen in pictures 4 and 5, the mili-
tary operation is clearly portrayed as giving effect in a specific direction.  Every 
element of a military operation has a productive purpose in that it in a linear way 
leads towards eradicating a problem. In its most simple but also most closely violent 
interpretation this means that in a situation where the military have someone posing 
a problem (interfering with the way towards the operational goal), they kill them. 
Sliding on the scale of violence might mean that the military try to physically move 
‘the problem’ from a geographical area (which might mean that they end up killing 
people anyway, depending on ‘the problem’s’ willingness to cooperate). Or going 
further from the concept of physical violence, it might mean that the military (with 
weapons in their hands) try to talk people into accepting their way of seeing things. 
But all these activities are, as shown in the pictures below, meant to achieve certain 
effects that ‘naturally’ will lead to succeeding with the military operational goals.   
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‐ civilläget nedbrutet i män, kvinnor, pojkar och flickor och andra relevanta faktorer enligt 
PMESII. 
2.5.5 Design	
Den  perativa designen omfattar utv ckling av en hierarkisk ordning av pla eringselement som 
syftar till att omsätta strategiska mål till militära insatser. Den inbegriper målsättningar (som alla 
bidrar till slutläget), avgörande förhållanden, effekter och uppgifter. 
Planeringselementens hierarki kan beskrivas genom nedanstående bild. 
 
Figur 30; Planeringselementens hierarki 
Genomförande av en eller flera uppgifter blir sammantaget en insats som leder till leder till 
effekter/förändringar av system i operationsmiljön vilka bedöms erfordras för att de avgörande 
förhållandena ska kunna uppnås och därigenom uppfylla operationens målsättningar. Har 
målsättningarna med operationen uppnåtts så bidrar förhoppningsvis operationen till det önskade 
slutläget. Vid ett uppnått önskat slutläge ska konfliktens drivkrafter ha nått acceptabla tillstånd. 
Operationer kan ske inom ramen för allomfattande ansats där andra säkerhetspolitiska medel 
används för att nå det önskade slutläget. 
Avgörande förhållanden är omständigheter ger när de uppnåtts en tydlig fördel gentemot en 
motståndare eller bidrar avsevärt till att uppnå uppsatta målsättningar. De kan t.ex. återspegla 
brytpunkter i en komplex operationsmiljö som inte kan ges konkreta parametrar (t.ex. fixerad i tid 
och/eller rum) före genomförandet.  
Angivna effekter spelar en avgörande roll eftersom de ger inriktning för insatser och bidrar till 
förverkligandet av avgörande förhållanden, målsättningar och slutläge.  
Insats är att göra något för att åstadkomma den effekt som beskriver förändringar i förmåga, 
beteende eller attityder hos aktörer inom operationsmiljön. 
En uppgift är en chefs precisa anvisning för vad som ska göras i ett visst avseende. Uppgifter kan vara 
delmängder av ett förbands uppdrag och delmängd av en insats för att åstadkomma effekt. 
Slutläge
Målsättning
Avgörande 
Förhållanden
Effekt
Insats
Avgörande 
Förhållanden
Effekt Effekt
Målsättning
Avgörande 
Förhållanden
Effekt
Avgörande 
Förhållanden
Effekt
Uppgift
Insats
Uppgift Uppgift
Insats
Uppgift Uppgift
Insats
Uppgift
Insats
Uppgift
Effekt
Insats Insats Insats
Uppgift Uppgift Uppgift Uppgift
”End State” 
”Goal” 
”Decisive 
Condition” ”Effect” 
”Operation” 
”Mission” 
Pict. 4. “The Hierarchy of planning elements”. Swedish Planning and Command Method 
(2015), p. 51 (my alteration).  
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Then why is it that political and normative struggles connected to gender issues are 
downplayed when they meet with the operational practice? Well, this question is 
answered on a general level when viewed in light of how military focus on produc-
tivity and the usefulness of things are central for providing a place for them in the 
organisation. But to dig deeper into what lies behind the firm hold that bureaucrati-
sation of violence has on the military, and specifically why the political and norma-
tive aspects of gender are downplayed, I must investigate the introduction of gender 
issues in the operational work from a perspective of a clash of social norms. This is 
an analytic exercise which aims at illuminating the strains created by the introduc-
tion of a ready-made concept of social norms (gender issues) into the military prac-
tice. Seen as such, gender issues provide a formal addition of a set of new social 
rules, placed ‘upon’ a system of historically established (bureaucratic/military) so-
cial rules. In the following this clash is analysed from two perspectives: the reactions 
and resistance to applying gender issues internally (in the operational staff); and the 
reactions and resistance to applying gender issues externally (to the conduct of mili-
tary operations).  
 
Resistance to gender issues related to social rules and norms in the practice 
My first meeting with formal attempts to introduce gender issues in my military 
practice was during an obligatory gathering of personnel, taking place at my ar-
moured regiment some 15 years ago. In the assembly hall we watched as a pair of 
male officers and female employees (we did not have any female military officers at 
this point, save one), that recently had been on a course in the capital, talked in an 
‘amusing’ way about “the creative differences between men and women”. We were 
exposed to how the distinct traits that belonged to the two different groups “men” 
and “women” provided practical benefits for the military practice. For instance, 
women’s ‘natural’ way of keeping track of the many issues of a household and their 
disposition to keep it tidy, was said to balance men’s ‘inherent’ flaws in those areas. 
Which meant that women’s place in the military as soldiers and officers was con-
nected to their ability to ‘multitask’ and to sweep up the mess we men left behind us. 
I remember that I thought that this was nonsense from the very beginning, based on 
the measurement that most of us employ when evaluating something: myself. I had 
SPL  2015‐08‐17  Sida 29 av 238 
   
   
 
 
 
Figur 13 Insats påverkar mål för att uppnå effekt 
 
Design av en operation är en idé över hur det önskade slutläget ska kunna uppnås och oönskade 
förhållande ska kunna omvandlas till önskade förhållanden. 
 
Figur 14 Operativ design som grund för samordning av taktiska chefer 
En operationsorder inriktar och samordnar stridskrafter i tid och rum för att koordinerat uppnå satta 
målsättningar. Den ligger vidare till grund för ledning av pågående verksamhet samt och inriktning på 
längre sikt. Storleken på tids‐ och rumsperspektivet i en operation varierar med förband och medel. 
2.3.4 Verkansprocessen	
SPL beskriver verkansprocessen för nationella operationer. Då Sverige ger truppbidrag till 
internationella insatser tillämpas verkansprocessen enligt den specifika insatsens chef, till exempel 
Natos verkansprocess (Joint Targeting Process). 
Verkansprocessen samordnar verkan mot utvalda mål på marken, på och under vattenytan, i luften 
samt i  nformationsmiljön. Detta för at  uppnå kinetiska och/ell  icke‐kinetiska effekter hos 
otstån a n, andra aktörer eller infrastruktur i syf e att nå operativa målsättningar. Effekten av 
verkan kan vara både fysisk och kognitiv vilket innebär att de resurser som skall generera effekten 
kan variera. 
Samordning av kinetiska och icke kinetiska insatser är viktiga då de tillsammans kan uppnå reell 
förändring och slutligen påverka målets vilja.  
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no such tendencies related to the sloppiness and singlemindedness that were de-
scribed as ‘typical male’ traits. I did not recognise the situations they talked about as 
‘typically’ male or female from my own life and I saw this as another example of 
how the AF had too many ‘old-timers’ in its organisation. Who else saw men and 
women bearing these traits, but those belonging to an older generation? It was, in 
short, a bit embarrassing and insulting to watch. This does not mean that I was very 
clear-sighted and everybody else was not. On the contrary, it took approximately a 
year and then I heard that the whole project had been cancelled as it was discovered 
to actually promote differences between men and women, rather than working 
against such prejudices. I must confess that the whole event gave me some good 
laughs. I submerged myself in the sweet irony of it, shrugged my shoulders and went 
on with my work. 
 
This initial fumbling with issues of equality for women and men seems to have left a 
mark on some of my colleagues. They still speak of women as bringing something 
different to the organisation. They cling on to there being a natural order that makes 
men and women inherently different, besides their physical differences. And that 
this is what makes it desirable to integrate more women in the organisation. Con-
versely, for me it is about numbers. Add 50% more recruits and minds to the equa-
tion, and you will be given a larger chance for more ingenuity. Not because we add 
women per se, but that we add more minds. My position on the matter is obviously 
something deriving from the bureaucratisation of military practice, and particularly 
from production as a central point of reference in this bureaucratisation. However, 
this has actually very little to do with the resistance to gender issues and how they 
fall into a (bureaucratised) order of things in the operational work. It is mostly rele-
vant as a historical backdrop to the analysis made here and specifically as the history 
of the analytical mind conducting this analysis. And my personal stand in the ques-
tion of women in the military is probably worth spelling out before going any fur-
ther: I have always believed that women have an equal place in the military. Work-
places dominated by a single sex (military, fire department, hospitals, eldercare etc.) 
seem to me to suffer from tendencies of juvenile behaviour that sometimes affect 
professional conduct in a negative way. For me, then, gender equality is about 
achieving a higher degree of professionalism in the military. There is no doubt in my 
mind that seeing women as equal to men in all aspects will help us produce better 
killers in the AF (for an overview of research on women as aggressors, see Wibben 
2011, 22). And this state of mind brings me to the masculinity that resists the infu-
sion of gender issues into the practice of operational staff work. 
 
In the introductory part of this section I describe gender issues as inherently being a 
political and normative aspect of society, but that it is transformed to fit into the 
bureaucratised labour of the military so that it is instead something of practical use 
and not a question of norms. The struggle is within myself: 
 
Is the idea of those politicians working with gender that the infusion of women in the military will bring 
about a more peaceful world? It certainly seems like that from my perspective, based on what I have read 
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and heard so far. But that is just not really logical, is it? If men and women are equally equipped to work 
in the military, as I believe we are, it must mean that we will be better at doing our job in the AF if we get 
more women. And our job, as pointed out by the discourse of military legitimacy to use force, is to de-
stroy, kill, fight and in any way possible try to enforce our national will on an opponent. How then, do 
women’s rights to bear arms create a more peaceful world? Their natural place in this organisation 
speaks against some form of inherent (to them) will to not do the tasks provided by our political leader-
ship. So is it that gender issues provide some form of diminishing effect on aggression in the minds of 
those wanting us to embrace the gender norms they promote? But that makes no sense either to my mind. 
Women can be just as aggressive as men as I see it. And the existence of structural differences in the 
upbringing of girls and boys, where girls are moulded into passivity and boys into aggression, cannot be 
an argument for bringing gender issues into the military for the sake of diminishing a possible aggressive 
stance of the practice. It speaks against the end of those differences in upbringing and schooling of boys 
and girls as this structural establishment would have to be continuously ongoing to feed the military with 
persons of a less aggressive ‘nature’. I do not by that assert that you on the one hand can say that women 
are morally better equipped than men to withstand aggressive behaviour, and at the same time say that 
there are really no static normative differences between men and women. And finally, my resistance to 
gender issues as a peace creating normative framework within the military also rests on the fact that 
women were also active in of one of mankind’s greatest crimes: the Holocaust. The professional duty that 
the guard, administrator or bureaucrat in the organisation of this event leaned on in the destruction of all 
those people was just as effective at eradicating higher moral standards from men as from women. Moral 
standards of an organisation are thus not about men and women per se, they are about the possibility to 
think critically and have the guts to voice that critique in the practice. (LtCol Malm)     
        
The above excerpt from LtCol Malm’s reflection regarding my resistance to accept 
gender as a normative framework speaks (defensively) about a division between 
formal (pacifying) gender norms and the acceptance of women in the organisation. 
Women are not a threat to me as a military officer, but the peace-content of the nor-
mative message wrapped in the gender context is. It is its proclamation of peace that 
make me resist it.  
 
Thus, unravelling the band of brothers myth is essential to demystifying and ending wars. My ob-
jective is not simply to see more women join the US military, or make a case as to whether women 
are “good” or ”bad” soldiers. My objective for this book has been to deconstruct the band of 
brothers myth in order to change the conversation about war, and to make it more difficult to ro-
manticise and legitimise war. (MacKenzie 2015, 198) 
 
MacKenzie’s aim of her book is an example of how this split aspect of gender issues 
takes form in academic discourse. She works with the normative aim of trying to 
change discourses about war in order to make them less likely to happen. But her 
main argument is that women can fight and should therefore, in the name of equali-
ty, be allowed to do so. I agree with her on both accounts: Yes, myths built upon 
ideas of warrior code, male bonding and the like should be actively resisted by the 
military practice. And yes, women should be able to serve in the military with equal 
rights. Indeed, these are two inherently different things because in the discourse of 
gender, they speak about two very different sets of norms: the norm of restraining 
the use of violence (pacifying normative framework) and the not related norm of 
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equal rights between men and women (framework of equality) (see Wibben 2011, 24 
for a summary of previous research that identifies this tension in feminist studies of 
military matters).  
 
But in a discourse of bureaucratisation, both the reduction of male myths and equal 
rights are compatible in a certain form because they both speak about creating a 
more professional, efficient military (which in turn means a military that will use 
violence in a way that will grant the practice more success in achieving cohesive 
political goals). In this latter discourse the abolishing of ‘traditional masculine ide-
als’ is as functional as in the pacifying gender discourse, but they have very different 
driving factors. That is, in the perspective of bureaucratisation, old masculine ideals 
are seen as contra-productive as they split the working force and create unnecessary 
friction between men and women in the production of violence. Therefore, tradition-
al ideals of male bonding and domination should be abolished as such ideals work 
against effectiveness in an inclusive military organisation.  
   
It does not fit in my military mind that anyone would like to internally pacify the military practice by 
adding women to it. Aspirations of reducing the use of military force should emphasise the study of 
political science, international relations and the practice of diplomacy. But also studies of military vio-
lence and how the military practice relates to and understands its own practice. Even if we are discussing 
tasks that belong to ‘peacekeeping’ the military role is closely connected to the use of force. This is 
precisely what my own research wants to elucidate, that rearticulating the military practice as a creator 
of peace hides its violent side, and promotes an unpolitical use of force. The diffuse inclusion of gender 
norms in the name of peace makes me feel uneasy about how gender issues are then turned to be of 
productive use in the military. More precisely, about how their normative message (naturally) disappears 
and gender is used instead to enhance military efficiency to conduct operations. What if these operations 
have flaws in their legitimacy? Have we then with such operations committed crimes against the demo-
cratic values that gender issues speak of by using them to enhance military efficiency? Gender as a 
conjurer of peace is, to return to the terms of social rules and norms, a framework of rules that does not 
fit into the existing normative rules of operational staff practice. That is why I feel resistance towards 
gender as a formal framework driven by ideas that pacification should be included into the military 
practice. But I feel no resistance to gender as a set of ideas providing equal rights and opportunities to 
women soldiers or officers, whom I easily accept as any other colleague in the organisation. One of my 
interlocutors on the staff (one of the Chiefs) tells me when we are speaking about this: “We attend the 
formal sessions on gender that we’re obliged to do, but my guys at the department always ask afterwards 
“How are we to fit this into our work? Military plans for defending our nation, how does a gender per-
spective add anything to how we are to stop an aggressor against our nation?” and I have no good 
answer for them. Because I cannot see it either.” I think this sheds some light on this internal clash of 
norms, as the use of force is something of a last resort to us, and seen as such, violence is not something 
normatively ‘good’. Gender issues, on the other hand, are something normatively good in their formal 
presentation and this creates resistance. (LtCol Malm and the researcher struggles)   
 
Another aspect of internal resistance which I have not felt myself, but witnessed 
among some of my colleagues, is the resentment to be told what kind of private 
norms you should harbour. In some cases, this can be seen in how some officers 
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become angry when the infusion of gender issues into the practice is the topic of 
discussion. They feel that norms are a separate and a very private thing of their lives 
and that an employer has nothing to do with telling employees what they should 
think or feel. This is from a philosophical and historical point of view nothing sur-
prising as there always has been resistance to formal attempts to alter people’s 
norms.   
 
[…] Here also is a hint for the explanation of the paradox, why it was precisely in the most Chris-
tian period of European history, and in general only under the pressure of Christian sentiments, 
that the sexual impulse sublimated into love (amour-passion). (Nietzsche n.d., 152) 
 
Nietzsche refers to the dogmatic rule of the Christian church and the counter move-
ment in the form of an emerging romanticism and how such resistance is typical for 
human reaction towards the (forceful) introduction of norms. The authoritarian form 
that the introduction of gender issues sometimes takes in the Swedish military is, 
ironically, simply not well-received. Colleagues mumble about “communist regime” 
and “Stalinism” when they react to such attempts, but these reactions are very sel-
dom spoken of in any official discourse.  But many of us that have experience of the 
practice know about this kind of reaction and some key players have also identified 
the need to adjust gender issues to the ruling norms of the practice. The strategy to 
conform gender issues to military social rules and norms is evident even in academic 
work that has evaluated implementation of such issues:   
 
The Swedish Armed Forces have been among the forerunners in implementing a gender perspec-
tive in military organisations and operations.”  
[…] 
“Second, the analysis in this book ascertains that the change agents within the Swedish Armed 
Forces made a strategic decision to approach the implementation of a gender perspective in the or-
ganisation as an issue of operational effectiveness – as opposed to one ‘merely’ of gender equality, 
women’s rights, or human resources.” 
[…] 
“The strategic placement of the Gender Adviser and the focus on operational effectiveness not on-
ly amplified the implementation of a gender perspective in the Swedish Armed Forces as a core is-
sue of output in terms of operations, but also sent a strong signal to the organisation regarding the 
importance of a gender perspective as an issue of operational effectiveness. (Egnell, Hojem, and 
Berts 2014, 2, 6, 7) 
 
Egnell (et al.) present their findings from evaluating the ‘success’ of implementation 
of gender in the Swedish Armed Forces and thus highlight the transformation of the 
issues into the framework of production (output and effectiveness in operations). 
From my academic understanding of gender (as political and normative issues that 
have to do with equality and/or pacifying the military) this is not so much an exam-
ple of successful implementation of such issues. On the contrary, it is an example of 
how powerful bureaucratisation is in the practice. The very fabric of gender issues is 
twisted to make them fit into the military framework in that its multidimensional 
aspects are downplayed and what is left is its ‘good use’ in the military organisation.  
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As you take a pause from the assembly line and join the gathering of other members of the production 
team, nothing in the social relations between the workers should negatively affect your capacity for 
assembling our product in the most efficient way. You are treated with an equal amount of respect re-
gardless of your physical traits. Our factory sets the boundaries for your identity: you are all, regardless 
of your sex, ethnicity, religion, age or the like, defined by the professionalism that producing our high 
quality product demands. You are not woman/man/father/mother/old/young. You are all professional 
producers of military violence. (LtCol Malm)      
 
If the norms that oppose the acceptance of pacifying gender issues are equivalent to 
masculine norms, then ‘production’ is indeed a contemporary operational military 
masculine norm.16 This is an aspect which I touch upon in the historical chapter of 
this thesis and which seems to be strengthened in the contemporary military dis-
course. Thus the internal resistance to gender issues is not connected to risks of 
diminishing some form of traditional warrior ideal, as evident in some other military 
forces (studies of the US Armed Forces provide insight in such resistance. E.g. 
Mann 2014, 179). Instead, resistance is actually connected to the staff practices 
reliance in the social rules of bureaucratisation. Or as the new gender adviser at the 
operational staff puts it in one of our discussions: "It seems like the gender perspec-
tive doesn't fit the templates" (C31_06021400).  
 
Resistance to gender issues related to the conduct of operations 
Here I leave the internal clash of social norms for a moment and present some find-
ings from the operational staff regarding how gender policy is understood in relation 
to international missions. This is, of course, related to the internal struggle discussed 
above but my material points to these two different aspects of military struggle with 
gender, and I therefore let the ‘data’ guide the outline of the analysis. This has the 
benefit of providing some insight into how bureaucratisation goes hand-in-hand with 
what some academics would call an ontology adhering to neorealism (e.g. A. Wendt 
1992, 392). I identify neorealism as coexisting with bureaucratisation by how my 
colleagues at the staff speak about our international missions. Here it is clear to me 
that a perspective of ‘self-interest’ in international relations prevails as a dominant 
among them. In this particular perspective, Sweden is conducting missions for polit-
ical leverage and for gaining military benefits like increased interoperability and 
creating a certain show of our capabilities. As such, international security is based, 
in the minds of the staff personnel, on a constant ongoing struggle between all na-
tions. And UN missions, or other forms of military coalitions, are used as a means 
for levelling out differences in levels of power:  
 
                                                             
16 This is a conclusion drawn from situating the investigation of the military practice internally. Analysing on a higher 
level of abstraction, the level of society, one could say that the very institutionalising of an organisation for using mili-
tary force in society is driven by masculinity. In such an analysis, historical ‘traditional’ masculine traits would be more 
in focus since this establishment is performed in another context. 
  137 
"But why are we in Mali for instance? It would have been helpful for us to know that for sure, be-
cause we will not be able to change anything major down there. As it is now, we see it like a polit-
ical marker, that Sweden supports the UN. […]” (C30_05310800) 
 
[excerpt from notes] He then describes how another of the nations is also competing for a place in 
the UN-Security Council. ---> this is how the practitioners understand the political use of force: 
that it is for gaining prestige and power. O32_05310900 
 
[excerpt from notes] During this discussion which is otherwise completely free of political or mor-
al/ethical considerations, one of the officers remarks: "the election to the security council is soon 
upon us, so…" Meaning that there is little political interest in reinforcing the mission to Mali since 
it will not be in time for increasing political influence to get a place on the council. Another officer 
responds, ironically: "Now you're just being cynical" and smiles (O12_03211300) 
 
The most apparent link between bureaucratisation and neorealism is that both put 
emphasis on a certain type of productive, linear causality in a system of hierarchy: 
you can (must) apply certain strategically chosen parts of your national resources 
(where military force is one such resource) in a consequently ordered way to achieve 
your goals. Such goals are always linked with providing a better position in the 
hierarchical order of nations (to get some leverage on the Other). Gender issues that 
naturally consist of norms of equality have some trouble finding their place in such 
hierarchies, due to their normative aim of removing positions of dominance and 
altering identity. Stability in these latter positions are the very conditions that make 
neorealism function as an ontology, which consequently makes gender a threat to the 
bearer of this particular world view (e.g. Hopf 1998, 176). Or it at least provides a 
tension in that agents of neorealism have problems with fitting such a normative 
framework within their understanding of actions taken by nations.   
 
This tension is something that sometimes emerges when talking with the practition-
ers at the staff about Swedish policies related to international relations. An excerpt 
from one such conversation is given below where I discuss the Armed Forces’ ten-
dency to answer on the political level by saying what we can do, but at the same 
time not giving much advice on consequences beside those related to resources. 
Note that I have so far in the conversation not mentioned gender or in other ways 
talked about issues of equality before this occurs: 
  
My old colleague confirms this as we speak [the Armed Forces’ tendency to officially reply what 
can be done in terms of resources]. His experience from working at the Government Office also 
tells him that people there do not have the time to analyse such things either. Again due to shortage 
of time.  
  
"Besides, Sweden hasn't any strategy [security policy] anyhow" he says, and continues: "Gender 
can't be a strategy. To make sure that girls can go to school in Afghanistan cannot be a specific 
Swedish interest. A global one, maybe, but not specifically Swedish. It's of course good if we can 
do some good as well." 
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Then he talks about how hard it is for the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to create a coordinated for-
eign policy. This is because the Swedish governmental institutions are traditionally so strong, that 
they can act internationally and thus conduct foreign policy themselves. This without being gov-
erned by a clear strategy for foreign, and security politics.    
  
He suddenly comes back to gender: "I like gender, it’s an important tool, but it is a part of the way 
ahead, not an end state in itself. What Sweden needs is a clear goal with its strategy" 
(C7_02161540) 
 
That gender is understood as a “tool” is natural to emerge in an environment of 
bureaucratisation, but here I start to learn something about how gender relates to the 
‘outcome’ of military practice. This was just one conversation but it occurred timely 
at an early stage of my fieldwork.  It made me note if there were other articulations 
that indicated something awry with the relationship between gender issues, official 
policies and the conduct of operations. Such things emerge during ‘small talk’ and 
informal meetings with other workers at the staff. In more formal conversations, and 
especially with those in ‘Chief’ positions, not much of the tension between gender 
and security policies is elucidated. There is certainly a gap between what a staff 
worker and a chief can say to a researcher, where the former tends to be more out-
spoken about their position on such sensitive things as gender.  
 
My impression of the practice at a general level is that there is a fear of speaking 
frankly about such issues among the agents, which I do not relate to some form of 
‘political correctness’, but more to the social rules of consensus. The rules of con-
sensus produce silence of disparate views as previously shown, and gender issues 
are no exception. In any case, the conversation above contains several troublesome 
‘facts’ about the interrelation between the Armed Forces and the political level, but 
the interesting fact here is that my colleague actually provides me with hints about 
how gender policies are resisted: they are seen as something that cannot govern 
military strategy because gender policies cannot frame a (neorealist) end state for 
military operational work. It is again the incompatibility of norms that haunts the 
practice as the neorealist does not see the function of eradicating structures of hier-
archy with the use of military force.  
 
Even though I do not count myself as a person bearing a realist ontology, I do un-
derstand that point of view as my military profession has always been focused in a 
setting of winning. That is, military force is (in theoretical and historical societal 
discourse) applied to defeating an opponent (e.g. Clausewitz 1991). This is done in 
order to gain a position of dominance where military force is used to make the Other 
comply with political demands. It is important to understand that this is not some-
thing that is confined to regular warfare or belongs to remnants of old views on 
national warfare. On the contrary, this understanding also applies to modern theories 
of counter insurgency (COIN) and peace enforcement, which in turn have been 
much of what the practice has been doing for the last two decades (e.g. Tuck 2014, 
196). Understanding military practice within a framework of ‘winning’ creates little 
space for gender as a possible goal, but indeed as a tool towards victory.  This com-
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petitive framing of the practice has a modern history previously discussed in Chapter 
4, as a part of the narratives that makes use of production and education as themes 
for sustaining a bureaucratisation of the military. Clearly the contest has survived 
after the 20th century and continues to influence military minds in the form of real-
ism, and now creates tensions between gender and the conduct of military opera-
tions. 
 
Lastly there is one other aspects of resistance to the external application of gender 
issues that I want to touch upon before concluding this chapter. And that is how the 
pacifying normative ‘taint’ of gender policies clashes with conducting military oper-
ations. In this, external (policy) related resistance to gender issues is connected to 
how the military is being turned into ‘do-gooders’ by contemporary political rhetoric 
on liberal peace, and specifically in the liberation of oppressed women in other 
countries.  
 
For the postnational defence, a pertinent query is whether the changing tasks of ‘doing peace in-
stead of war’ also is a way to demilitarise the military defence organisation. (Kronsell 2012, 145) 
 
That is, it is clear to me that there is a place for a certain version of gender issues in 
operational staff work, but the acceptance of these issues suffers from ‘slips’ in the 
reasons for why they should be invoked by the practice. I am certainly not alone in 
detecting that some form of obscure pacifying agenda lies behind the infusion of the 
concept in the practice. But gender issues still live on by their adjustment to the 
social rules of the practice. Even if aspects of gender fit in the organisation insecure-
ly something important is lost in the process of bureaucratised transformation: the 
perspective of domination. Gender equality is, as previously mentioned, about bal-
ancing levels of power by reducing a dominant part’s position to dominate others. 
Conversely, gender understood as increasing military operational effectiveness, 
provides further ways for western military forces to dominate people in other coun-
tries. The only one that I meet in the staff who clearly formulated such a critical 
connection was the Gender Adviser (C31_06021400), but others made similar 
statements. Here one of my colleagues points to the possibility of backlash when 
using military force in the name of gender equality: 
 
Our time is up, but as I am leaving for my next talk he tells me that "Wallström's feministic for-
eign policy will be held accountable when an IS-suicide bomber explodes in central Stockholm". 
(C27_05241230)  
 
Sweden, which mixes foreign policy and security policy, has a clearly stated femi-
nistic action plan for these policies (which incidentally state that Sweden is to be the 
first country in the world with such a foreign policy, ironically spilling into the 
framework of competition). “Peace operations” are briefly mentioned in this action 
plan but otherwise there are no clear articulations of the use of military force in it 
(see: Regeringen 2016, 20). But the emphasis on UN resolution 1325 in the govern-
mental white paper on the mission to Mali visualises the connection of policies: 
“Resolution [1325] commitments should permeate operations undertaken by the 
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Swedish unit” (Regeringen 2015, 13 my translation). So the mission to Mali is un-
dertaken under the auspices of official policy to protect women and girls and to 
work for the possibilities for these groups in Malian society to have equal human 
rights. But as my colleague knows, the actual conduct of such missions is far from 
peaceful as the missions comprise armed military personnel deployed in areas with a 
high amount of hostility. The exposure of Swedish military forces to violent groups 
in Mali increases the risk for attacks against Sweden carried out on Swedish territo-
ry. Attacks which, in line with terrorists’ modus operandi, would target civilians.  
 
So the resistance to using military force in the name of gender equality is twofold: 
partly by the way it actually increases our opportunity to dominate others, and also 
by how international missions are seen to increase risks for violence in the national 
setting. These are not as separate as one might think, as the ‘oppression’ of another 
always comes with risks of retaliation. The problem for my colleague is that the 
feministic foreign policy does not take this aspect (of violence) into account when 
proclaiming Sweden’s ambitions of liberating the women of the world. Oddly 
enough, this is one of the few times during my time at the staff that someone actual-
ly identified destructive and escalating aspects of violence in relation to Swedish 
military missions. For me this ‘strong’ reaction is a sign of how gender issues build 
up a certain level of tension within the practice. I would in theoretical terms explain 
this type of resistance as springing from the ability of gender issues to rupture a 
bureaucratised hegemony when gender issues’ origin as a political struggle is mani-
fested in the practice. In other words, gender issues’ political origin brings about a 
hegemonic struggle which comprises threats to identity by the risk this struggle 
poses to sedimented practices. This is due to how hegemony provides us with unity 
between theory and practice and as such helps us make sense of what we do 
(Gramsci 2003, 333–34). Much of what is secured and stabilised by bureaucratisa-
tion is in motion when gender issues are normative instead of productive, and this 
insecurity creates resistance.  
 
Summary 
In conclusion, production as a discursive point of reference promotes a certain type 
of masculine norms and social rules that create resistance to gender issues. This is 
clearly much more difficult to pinpoint compared to how traditional masculine war-
rior ideals resist the infusion of equality in the military practice. These latter ideals 
provoke clashes in the practice and create a more noticeable oppression of women in 
combat roles, whereas the masculinity imbued in the norms of production lies hid-
den in the processes of bureaucratisation. Another type of resistance is thus created 
by the ‘grey’ daily work of an operational staff, as such work forces gender issues 
take a form that fits into the rules that promote operational efficiency. It is a re-
sistance based on categorising gender from the perspective of usefulness, leaving out 
those aspects of such issues that speak about a more peaceful world.  From this fol-
lows that the discursive focus on production provides rules to the practice that will 
sustain a resistance regarding the pacifying trope that lingers in gender equality even 
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in times of ‘peace’ or of minimum violent activity. Most importantly, the confusion 
that arises when the bureaucratised adaptation of gender issues is ruptured (for in-
stance, by new types of political or institutional articulations on what gender actually 
is and what it aims at) provides further categorisation of the many different aspects 
of gender issues. In this confusion (struggle of hegemony) that spawns a division of 
questions about gender equality, practical solutions for including more women in the 
Armed Forces seems to be lost to us that serve (in this, both men and women seem 
alike). Finally, one very central observation from this part of my fieldwork is how 
bureaucratisation of military operational work has the power to depoliticise gender 
issues through the same techniques as it neutralise violence.  Here the normative 
goal of gender issues to reduce levels of domination is sundered and in its bureau-
cratised form gender issues actually increase our possibility to dominate other peo-
ple by the use of force.     
 
5.5  The Social Rules of Operational Work: A Summary 
 
If I were to brief the Commander, I would talk about what we can do: We have the capability to deploy 
units in an area of operations. We have the financial and logistical resources needed, and also a stock of 
personnel enough to do as our politicians ask. I would say that risks connected to a mission are calculat-
ed with regard to how it will strain our resources, in case we need to do something else during the opera-
tion. I can add my thoughts on how an international mission is good for us in the Armed Forces, as it 
helps us to keep up to speed with materiel development and boosts recruitment efforts. It will, despite 
straining our resources, promote an increase in production of units. And I would also point out that our 
units are to be trained according to our new handbook on gender, as this will further increase our opera-
tional efficiency in a mission area. I can foresee the Commander asking about details such as if our 
soldiers can be provided with nutritious food. Since such issues have put a negative light on previous 
missions (by the media) I will strive to see to it that I can answer with assurances that our soldiers can 
eat as well as, or nearly as well as, Swedish standards. I would conclude my briefing by saying that it is 
the staff’s suggestion that the Commander take a decision to send these considerations as a formal an-
swer to the higher staff for further relay to the political level. (LtCol Malm)    
 
The question of how military staff practice shapes understandings of violence and 
death through bureaucratic routines and the workings of daily social relations is to 
some extent mirrored in the autoethnographical reflection above. But this section 
aims to further summarise and clarify this question. 
 
Consensus rules the practice by its laws of language-use and social interaction. What 
can be said without breaking social bonds is narrowed down to materiel aspects of 
military missions. Finance, logistics and personnel are ‘issues’ in operational work 
that the practitioners agree on before presenting them to higher commands. Consid-
eration is taken regarding media reactions and political questions from previous 
missions. But experience of such media reactions/political questions has taught the 
practitioners that these concerns are related to materiel aspects of the missions as 
well, so there is really no greater external strain to the bureaucratised discourse of 
the practice. Furthermore, the bureaucratisation enclosing the operational staff prac-
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tice is further enforced by how hierarchy freezes the practice in a status of duty-
related responsibility – a responsibility that for the agents of the practice is the em-
bodiment of Weber’s Iron Cage. In addition, the social rules of and language of 
consensus provide the higher chiefs with an image of active participation in what the 
staff deems important issues. Complementarily, the social rules of order and bureau-
cracy support the hold that consensus has on the practice through their ability to 
sediment day-to-day activities. These latter rules provide the practitioners with rou-
tines, levels of hierarchy and defined responsibilities. In this they also inform the 
practice with norms related to compliance to given routines and regulations. When 
materiel issues are not in focus for the agents, discussions about the meaning of 
concepts and procedures of the staff working process set the boundaries of dis-
course. There is not much room for anything else besides what these social rules and 
the language of bureaucratisation infuse into the practice. Meetings, briefings, dis-
cussions on who, what and when fill the practitioners’ days. The few existing mo-
ments of contemplation must be used to talk about something else. Home, family, a 
trip or perhaps some gossip about who will be the next Chief are topics that provide 
some momentary escape from the bureaucratisation of the practice.  
 
As elucidated in the analysis above, the social rules of consensus and those of order 
and bureaucracy, give practitioners a sense of meaning and place in the operational 
work. Violence is not seen as a practical outcome of this particular meaning and 
place, and is treated as a state of exception, originating from groups of religious 
fanatics or criminality. The ‘fact’ that violence is relational, that it is a human activi-
ty and that Swedish military missions play a part in the existence of this activity is 
hard to fathom in this context. Above all else, the social rules and norms of opera-
tional staff work ensure that bureucratised labour prevails and sediments into a natu-
ral way of understanding the point of military practice: to enable a secure place of 
belonging for its practitioners and a productive operational use of military force. The 
ironic consequence of this is that practitioners in the operational staff do not think 
that they have much to do with military use of violence. Instead they are ‘planning’, 
‘producing’, ‘meeting’, ‘supporting’ or ‘briefing’. These are the activities that take 
space for moral considerations and about which discussions concerning responsibil-
ity take place. In other words, neutralisation and silencing of death and violence is 
something which is a central aspect of operational work. And this is achieved 
through how social relations are, one the one hand, constructed by formalised proce-
dures and levels of hierarchy, as a reflection of idolising the perks of ‘rational’ bu-
reaucracy.  
 
But importantly, the social rules and norms of ‘rational’ bureaucratisation are com-
plemented by the actors themselves, through formal and informal agreements on 
how the operational work is to function. The discursive focus provided by ‘rational’ 
bureaucratisation - a focus on procedures and formal rules, “without regard for per-
sons” – is thus strengthen by the subjectivities of the operational work (M. Weber 
2009, 215). Which leads me to the question of how reification and misrecognition of 
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the Other exist and operate in the bureaucratised labour of the operational staff prac-
tice.  
 
Firstly, reification – to deem “the Other as a mere object or an inanimate thing” – is 
in the above analysis shown to operate through the actors’ strong identification with 
the materiality of the operational work (Lindemann 2014, 490). Admittedly, the 
Other is seldom a part of the operational discourse investigated in this chapter, but 
when the Other appears, it is as part of lists, templates and/or statistics. And this 
materiality is closely integrated with how the actors of the practice are linked to each 
other, through a common bureaucratic language, which forms the boundaries for 
what is supposed to be dealt with in operational work. It becomes natural to objecti-
fy the Other, as both the materiality and the language of the practice offer such clear 
avenues of identification with bureaucratised discourse. Secondly, the operational 
work described and analysed in this chapter further underlines the disappearance of 
the Other from contemporary military discourse, as discussed in Chapter 2. The 
misrecognition of the enemy Other, as Delori puts it “the blanks in the contemporary 
discourse.”, clearly extends to also contextualise the buraucratised labour of opera-
tional work (Delori 2014, 525). In operational work, this misrecognition operates 
both through formalised procedures (such as allocating intelligence reports little 
time and discursive space in the practice) but also through how the social rules and 
norms of the practice establish points of reference for the actors which do not relate 
to war and violence. I will go deeper into this question on reification and misrecog-
nition of the Other in the next chapter, as it deals with the operational work which is 
directly pointed at using military force.  
 
On a final note, the chapter also analyses what values and norms come into the fore-
front in the construction of military masculinity in the context of military operational 
bureaucratised labour. And it is evident that the biggest challenge to the prevailing 
hegemony of bureaucratisation in operational work, is posed by the infusion of gen-
der issues into the practice. But bureaucratisation prevails and overcomes this chal-
lenge as its close relations to the language of production provides a neat fit for a 
certain version of these gender issues. After a period of adjustment and assimilation, 
questions of gender are understood as increasing operational capability and effi-
ciency. Consequently, ‘neorealism’ and bureaucratisation go hand-in-hand subjugat-
ing gender issues to tools of the military trade with the subsequent effect of depoliti-
cising gender struggles. Insomuch, the subject position ‘staff officer’, or for that 
matter ‘civilian staff worker’, are encapsulated in articulations and actions that en-
sure that masculinity is provided meaning derived from discourses of productivity. 
Here, the infusion of gender as a normative ‘framework’ guiding the development of 
military practice is actually proven to become a move enforcing the productive as-
pect of military masculinity. In other words, gender creates a possibility to deem 
‘traditional’ warrior ideals as unproductive, thus pushing them to the margins of 
military identity construction. But in this process, ideals of masculinity, connected to 
those norms and rules found in the practice to rely on the language and materiality of 
production, are enhanced. Bureaucratisation has thus been shown here to not only 
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prevail over political aspirations of altering a military normative framework, but also 
to be strengthened by such attempts.    
 
In Chapter 7, the social rules and norms investigated here will be discussed in the 
light of what they say about how military violence becomes bureaucratised and what 
that does to the management, neutralisation or silencing of death and violence in the 
military. And there the artificial aspect of military operational practice, evident in its 
rituals and routines, moves into the foreground of the discussion. But for now I leave 
the operational staff work and its indirect relation to military violence, and step into 
the central practice of preparing for, and engaging in, operational use of force. 
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6 
Chapter 6: the Targeteer 
 
6.1  Introduction 
 
This second of two chapters on contemporary military practice and the management, 
neutralisation or silencing of death and violence in operational work turns here to the 
practice of targeting. Investigating operational military work with targeting, and 
specifically how the subject position ‘targeteer’ forms through daily work with 
targeting processes, provides a complementary understanding of the bureaucratisa-
tion violence. Specifically, the previous chapter gave insight into the rules and 
norms of daily operational work in support of a military mission, but the direct use 
of violence is, for the agents of that practice, quite distant to that reality. This dis-
tance means that the social rules analysed in Chapter 5 set the position of the opera-
tional staff officer in a status of indirect use of military violence and as such, neu-
tralise some possible dilemmas and disruptive events found in the more direct use of 
force. The intention here is therefore to add to the insights provided by the previous 
chapter by examining what social rules hold joint operational targeting -the govern-
ing of operational military violence- in a status of bureaucratised naturalness. The 
chapter is thus meant to expand our knowledge of how military violence is used and 
understood to function within the framework of operational military work, by inves-
tigating how the ‘targeteer’ is shaped by his/her daily work with the targeting pro-
cess. 
 
The data for this chapter has been collected during three international staff exercises 
conducted in Sweden 2015, 2016 and 2017. Targeting during these exercises has 
been conducted within the framework scenario of a Peace Support Operation, and 
has as such much in common with how the practice of targeting was formed during 
NATO missions such as Operation Unified Protector (Libya, 2011) and the Interna-
tional Security Assistance Force (ISAF, Afghanistan, 2001-2014).17 I have learned 
from conversations with experienced ‘targeteers’ that the exercise provides the par-
ticipants with opportunities to work with processes and objects that are close to how 
‘real’ targeting is conducted (C01 251420, C02 261310, CJSE 17). But before going 
any further one central objection must be met: what relevance is there in investigat-
ing how military work in exercises contributes to bureaucratised understandings of 
                                                             
17 Specifically, this means that the type of targets, such as extremists, terrorists, informants and irregular forces are 
similar in category to those that were common in those military missions. 
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violence? Are exercises not just something temporal and simulated and thus have 
little weight in providing avenues of identification and subjectivities? Exercises are 
relevant for this investigation as they are generally seen as central for increasing the 
ability to solve central tasks of a military organisation, and they therefore hold a 
place of importance in most military organisations (e.g. Hedlund and Österberg 
2013, 90). It is during exercises that military minds are shaped in ways which pre-
pare agents of the practice to face ‘reality’ and consequently they also affect how 
that ‘reality’ is perceived. Perhaps the relevance is best described by how the typi-
cally short military expression “train as you fight – fight as you train” establishes a 
link between what is done during exercises and the ‘real’ practice (e.g. S. Rietjens, 
Van Fenema, and Essens 2013, 27–28). Naturally, the practice of participating in 
exercises, field training or staff courses contributes to shaping military subjectivities 
and offers a certain way of identification, and such events are therefore central to 
any investigation where the aim is to elucidate how understanding of violence is 
constructed in military work (see also: R. Woodward and Neil Jenkings 2011).   
   
I have participated in numerous meetings and conversations during these three years 
of ethnographical investigations, but for this chapter I have chosen to focus on those 
that relate to the function of targeting. Starting my observations in the 2015 exercise, 
I had a broad span of interest concerning operational work, but from 2016 and 2017, 
my main observations and interaction with participants have been pointed at the 
targeting practice.  This choice is based on the fact that targeting is central to how 
the operational level uses violence, and thus to how military violence is provided 
with specific content through the practice of targeting. As participants learn and 
adjust to the vocabulary and activities involved in this practice, they ‘evolve’ and 
become ‘targeteers’. My interest here is thus to investigate the content of this partic-
ular subject position (‘the targeteer’) in order to shed some light on how bureaucrati-
sation of violence is formed through the ways of identification and subjectivities that 
construct this particular subject position. That is, the targeting practice comprises 
activities and discursive elements that help reinstate and place bureaucratised under-
standings of violence as natural for military personnel.  
 
With reference to how they speak and act when ‘doing targeting’, the ‘targeteer’ is 
an operative function which is distinctly different from the broader position ‘staff 
officer’, whereof the latter I describe and analyse in Chapter 5. The ‘targeteers’ 
differs from the ‘staff officers’ in that they require specific knowledge of the target-
ing practice, including an understanding of the targeting-related language and proce-
dures inherent to targeting. For me, as a staff officer, targeting has, before my re-
search engagement with it, been shrouded in mystery due to the distinctly different 
way the practice is talked about, compared to the more ‘all-round’ military opera-
tional way of speaking in staffs. This ‘distinctiveness’ in language is laid out in the 
following context description and subsequent results of analysis of the targeting 
practice, elucidating some of the mystery of the targeting practice. It is important not 
to lose sight of the observation that targeting is a practice that internally to military 
organisations can be seen as distinctively different from ‘ordinary’ operational work 
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and also somewhat mystical to onlookers. I will return to this observation in the 
analysis below and also in Chapter 7, where the thesis results are further discussed.  
 
Targeting is a concept that has emerged from the linguistic move from the noun 
“target” to the verb “targeting” as it signifies a practice performed by military forc-
es. But the practice goes under several different names, such as “Joint Fires”, “Joint 
Targeting”, “Joint Effects” even though most of the military personnel that I meet 
during my investigations just use the word “targeting” while talking about this par-
ticular function in military organisations. This simplification may be necessary as 
the practice with its meetings, routines, lists and language is quite overwhelming 
even for us who are used to military acronyms and practice-related language. But in 
this chapter I will still make an effort to lay out the basis of the practice as it has 
been outlined during the exercises. It must be done in order to make the chapter’s 
subsequent analysis (reasonably) intelligible.  
 
As in most ethnographical investigations, context description is not ‘just’ a tale of 
the research environment. It is also needed in order to provide insight into how the 
context relates and contributes to agents’ formation of Self/Other and to how bu-
reaucratised labour forms in relation to what these agents do in their daily work. As 
a reminder from Chapter 1, bureaucratised labour is in this investigation seen as 
shaped in the relation between the formation of social relations and the lan-
guage/materiality of the practice at hand. This means that the meaning which bu-
reaucratised labour provides is dependent on how agents of the practice identify with 
their job and the content of targeting. Therefore, the next section introduces the 
targeting practice in the context of the international staff exercises that I have partic-
ipated in. After this overview of the practice at hand, the chapter commences with 
describing the result from analysing the practice in the light of social rules and 
norms. Here the ethnographical data (field notes and audio recordings) are used 
together with regulating documents of the practice, and with my own reactions from 
interacting with the agents of the practice. This corpus of material provides insights 
into how the subject ‘targeteer’ emerges and establishes itself as a central position 
for military use of force, as well as insights into how articulations and actions in the 
practice form a specific type of bureaucratised understanding of violence. The chap-
ter is then concluded with a summary of the main findings from the analysis. But 
first a short note on some methodological differences compared to the previous 
chapter.  
 
The difficulty of becoming a ‘targeteer’ 
In my investigation and analysis of the operational staff work in Chapter 5, I was 
often faced with the tendency to slip into my role and subject position as ‘staff of-
ficer’. As outlined in my methodological chapter, this is something I have made use 
of in order to deepen my analysis of the operational work at hand. In particular, the 
self-reflexive method of autoethnography has helped me to identify what it is that 
pulls me into a ‘secure’ and familiar position of identity in the practice. Or in theo-
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retical terms, to identify ways/moments of identification and subjectivities. In exten-
sion, this tells us more about how the social relations and meaning-making of the 
practice at hand establish a ‘normality’ of the workplace, and also how this modus 
operandi interacts with discourses of bureaucratisation. But the life-world of the 
‘targeteer’ has not been as easy to access for me, as was the case with the operation-
al staff practice. I have felt estranged/alienated by how the targeting practice is con-
ducted, and subsequently, the subject position of the ‘targeteer’ is a type of identity 
that I have not established as a part of my Self. In other words, I do not identify 
myself as an ‘targeteer’. I will come back to this fact in Chapter 7, where I make 
some notes on my learnings from combining autoethnography and discourse analy-
sis, but for now some central points must be made regarding what this means for the 
following analysis. Most importantly, since my ‘lack of desire’ to become a ‘tar-
geteer’ was quite clear to me early on, I used this as a supporting research question: 
why (what in the practice) is it that makes me uphold a distance from it? This ques-
tion has helped me identify connections between what it is in the daily targeting 
work that is important for how the subject position of the ‘targeteer’ forms. For me, 
it seemed plausible to assume (with help from my knowledge of the theoretical base 
for my research) that my resistance to the ‘targeteer’ must be connected to what the 
practitioners do, how they interact and how they speak. The following context de-
scription and its subsequent analysis are thus structured in relation to what I have 
found to be the most central parts of the targeting practice, insomuch that they are 
central to mystifying the practice. But these aspects of the practice are not just mys-
tifying (for me) but also something that fill much of the time available to a ‘tar-
geteer’ to perform the targeting activity. In conclusion, this means that I will emerge 
less as ‘LtCol Malm’ in this chapter, and more as ‘the ethnographer’ trying to clarify 
what it is that upholds the social fabric of the targeting practice.                 
 
6.2  The Combined Joint Staff Exercise (CJSE) – a Wider 
Context 
 
Staff exercises are perhaps not the most thrilling experience an officer can encounter 
in his/her military life. Joining one is often connected to the burdensome task of 
reading through thick scenario descriptions, Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) 
and process descriptions of how certain functions within the staff (such as the target-
ing function) are meant to be performed, just to mention but a few not so exciting 
chores. And if it is an international staff exercise, as in this case, then joining is also 
connected to challenges of speaking English18 and collaborating with military per-
sonnel from foreign countries. Such joint efforts are always complicated by formal 
and informal rules of interaction between participants, where the risk of slips in 
revealing national classified information perhaps stands in the forefront of what is 
seen as problematic. But there are benefits with participating as well. For officers 
working with operational planning and with support to ongoing missions, staff exer-
                                                             
18 For those who do not have English as their first language this might pose an obvious challenge, but there are also 
challenges for those that are from English speaking nations, as these persons will have to adjust to the language levels of 
the participants. 
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cises provide opportunities to work as close to the theoretically outlined procedures 
as possible. To find and establish a common use of routines, templates for staff work 
and a common understanding of the meaning of concepts is in the military world 
seen as necessary for achieving professional standards. Participation in staff exercis-
es are therefore an important experience for any aspiring officer who is destined for 
staff work (the latter in many cases inescapable in most military organisations for 
those officers that aim for higher positions in the chain of command). The overall 
norms that frame a Western military staff exercise, like the Combined Joint Staff 
Exercise (CJSE), are thus those that place military professionalism in context. To be 
a professional participant in an international staff means, from my own experience, 
that you abide by the rules created by descriptions of routines and processes, as well 
as definitions of concepts. Moreover, that you socially can set aside possible nation-
al differences between yourself and your fellow staff workers. 
 
CJSE19 is an event organised by the Swedish Armed Forces in cooperation with the 
Swedish Defence University, and its aim “is to train and educate participants to be 
part of a multi-national staff. For the participants from the Swedish Armed Forces, a 
further goal is to be part of the development and the use of Command and Control 
procedures at the operational and tactical level. The focus of the exercise is to train 
staff procedures and processes for the Commanders and the Staff members.”  
(Försvarshögskolan/Försvarsmakten 2015b, 5). It has approximately 1200 partici-
pants, originating from 24-27 different countries and it is a 9-10-day long exercise. 
The scenario for the exercise is quite complex as it is created to simulate aspects of 
peace operations in regions of crisis and instability. There is thus a multitude of 
fictional organisations, key agents and armed/unarmed groups in the scenario that 
have different agendas and can create problems for the participants (at least those 
who are a part of the staff, often referred to as the Training Audience (TA)). The 
CJSE is manned with a “game” function that comprises officers and civilians who 
are responsible for creating inputs, providing the Training Audience with seemingly 
‘real’ problems that originate from these fictional agents and groups. It is interesting 
to note that despite this ‘play and pretend’ situation being known to everyone partic-
ipating in the exercise (that it is ‘not for real’), sometimes discussions become heat-
ed among members of staff when missions go wrong or when solutions to problems 
are discussed. For some participants, the exercise becomes so real that they show 
emotions of distress, anger or frustration when ‘chaos’ emerges through inputs from 
the gaming side. On the other hand, occasionally simulated reports of atrocities, 
casualties and abuse have slipped through the TA without much concern. The closest 
I can get to some form of stable observation of this phenomenon is that it is depend-
ent on the level of engagement of the key agents of the participants, and to some 
extent also on how much pressure these players have on them in their roles of being 
responsible for the staff work.  
 
Nevertheless, the scenario is constructed to train officers to deal with crisis situa-
tions, not conventional interstate war. The different staffs (there are several staffs on 
                                                             
19 CJSE ’becomes’ an even larger staff exercise every 3rd or 4th year, and is then named VIKING. 
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the tactical level, and one operational staff) have ‘resources’ in form of military 
units that the gaming cells simulate and therefore the staffs are trained in both deal-
ing with current events and with planning for further actions. There is a challenge 
imbedded here, in the outline of the exercise, of making use of military units in a 
way that does not escalate or trigger further violence among the (fictional) local 
population. As briefly mentioned in the introduction, the scenario and the outline of 
CJSE mirrors real life challenges from past NATO missions in Afghanistan and 
Libya, and current challenges in ongoing UN-led operations in several African na-
tions like Mali or Somalia. In order to conceptually support the staff members in 
their effort to separate warring factions, hinder atrocities and pave the way for dis-
armament, the doctrinal idea of a “comprehensive approach” is included in the 
guidelines for operational work (e.g. Försvarshögskolan/Försvarsmakten 2015a). 
This is a concept that is meant to combine military operations with civilian (e.g. 
diplomatic, economic, logistic, medical) relief efforts. In general, the idea is to coor-
dinate actions taken by military and civilian organisations in an area of conflict in 
order to create ‘desired effects’ (such as compliance to peace agreements and creat-
ing a “safe and secure environment”). The military part of this approach includes 
such concepts as “Precision Fires”, “Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance 
(ISR)”, “Lethal and/or Non-Lethal Effects” to mention but a few.  
 
The operational staff: Bogaland Forces Headquarter (BFOR HQ)           
My ethnographical investigation has on a general level been concerned with the staff 
life at the operational headquarters of the fictitious NATO organisation “BFOR”. 
This is an organisation manned by approximately 165 officers, civilian experts and 
administrators. It is led by a Chief of Staff, normally a colonel working at the Swe-
dish Joint Forces Command or some other part of the Swedish Headquarters, from 
which the commander (general/admiral) is also usually brought in to the exercise.20 
As indicated in the overall aim of the exercise, Swedish personnel are (apart from 
military students) usually taken from the Swedish Joint Forces Command as they 
then will be given the opportunity to train staff procedures according to NATO 
standards. For example, during the CJSE 2016 110 of 160 persons in the BFOR HQ 
were from Sweden and of these 39 were from the Swedish Headquarters. But a ma-
jor part of the participants are military officers who are studying different types of 
staff officer courses. 
  
The operational headquarters was situated in the small city of Enköping where the 
Command and Control Regiment stands as host for a major part of the CJSE. This is 
a town where the inhabitants ‘roll in the sidewalks’ at 6 p.m. so there is nothing that 
could potentially lure participants of the exercise to leave the regiment at the end of 
the day. This, in conjunction with the quite intense tempo of the exercise, creates an 
environment where participants are quickly forced to adjust to the routines and the 
‘internal world’ of the CJSE.  The typical day at the staff exercise begins with break-
fast in the main dining hall at 06.30-07.00 a.m. Participants then gather in their re-
                                                             
20 During CJSE 17, the position of chief of staff was manned by a colonel from the Swedish Defence University.   
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spective sections/working groups/cells and conduct a quick run-through of the day’s 
schedule, before converging at the main initiating activity for each day: the Com-
mander’s Update Brief (CUB), which starts at 08.30 a.m. This event is in place to 
brief the commander on how the operation is proceeding and to provide the staff 
with guidance from the Commander and the Chief of Staff. It takes place in a large 
assembly hall and is indeed a formal and ‘theatrical’ part of the exercise day. Even 
though this is an exercise, much of the theatrical aspects of this event have strong 
resemblance to how formal briefings are conducted in the Swedish Armed Forces 
Headquarters (se Chapter 5). In other words, here officers learn the importance of 
rehearsed, scripted and simplified ways of informing higher Commanders of ongo-
ing military missions. 
 
After the CUB participants return to their different staffs and working spaces. The 
generic exercise day is filled with a variety of meetings where the operational staff 
‘coordinate’ and gives orders and guidance to lower staffs. As might be expected, in 
the first days of every exercise the meetings consist mostly of talking about ‘who 
does what’ when it comes to procedures and routines. Even if this becomes less 
relevant for discussion after a couple of days, such content to meetings is a common 
part of ‘real’ staff life as well, as I show in the previous chapter. During the day 
participants go for lunch and dinner and many functions of the staff take turns so 
there is always someone manning every particular branch of expertise (e.g. different 
sections of the staff, such as for example logistics, intelligence and long term plan-
ning). A typical day ends with an internal meeting called ‘hot wash up’ at approxi-
mately 7.30 – 8.00 p.m. where every team (section or cell) gathers and talks about 
what they have done and what is to be done the following day. Evenings are spent 
on working out or relaxing in the barracks or the mess hall.  
 
Accommodated in either a large staff training hall, or in a building usually hosting 
military education, the participants often share cramped working spaces, putting 
focus on the importance of functioning social interaction between them. English is 
obviously used to communicate between participants from different nations, but it is 
also used to socially include those who do not speak Swedish. I have sometimes 
come across Swedish personnel communicating in English without any non-Swedish 
personnel in the vicinity. This behaviour is related to how the participants adjust to 
speaking English as an act of social inclusion, setting them as “stuck” in the exercise 
language. In addition to this socialisation, a major part of the participants also share 
living quarters during the exercise. These are situated in barracks where the sleeping 
quarters holds 6-10 persons per room. Every floor in the barracks has 4-5 such 
rooms and the residents on each floor share showers and toilets. Participants in the 
exercise are triggered by these circumstances to quickly adjust to being a part of a 
new group as there is little or no room for privacy. My observations indicate that 
there are more things uniting military personnel from different countries than divid-
ing them, as many of the agents make a quite smooth transition from national enti-
ties into, if not unified then at least functioning, working groups. But there is still a 
tendency among participants to gather in their primary, national, groups during 
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breaks from work. This is in no way surprising behaviour as these groups offer a 
secure position of identity and provide a breathing space for those who struggle 
when speaking English. 
 
In summary, the staff exercise includes powerful instigating techniques for disciplin-
ing the participants’ freedom of movement, limiting their possible identification and 
subjectivities to relate to the content of their role in the exercise. The targeting prac-
tice and the creation of the ‘targeteer’ is thus framed within an environment that 
provides very little room for the subjects to release themselves from the grip of prac-
tice-related discourse.         
 
6.3 The Context of Targeting21  
 
 “We do targeting to minimise the use of force” (R1605271115)  
 
The quote above is taken from a lecture on the subject of targeting that I attended in 
spring 2016. The air force lieutenant colonel educating us on the subject of targeting 
used this phrase as a way of introducing those with little knowledge about targeting 
into the rationale behind the practice. Despite having studied the staff work con-
cerned with this function during two exercises (at the point where the lecture took 
place) I reacted to this articulation. It was a reaction based on the fact that I have not 
once heard this as a motivation for targeting among my interlocutors at the exercise. 
And from my point of view the statement ‘minimising violence’ seems to be a legit-
imising idea constructed after the practice has formed. Conversely, targeting stems 
from the technological advances that allow for precision air strikes (see Osinga & 
Roorda in Ducheine, Schmitt, and Osinga 2016). And precision has arguably been 
an important part of military practice ever since the introduction of gunpowder (per-
haps a medieval manufacturer of crossbows and longbows would argue that preci-
sion as a concept in the military has an even longer history). Furthermore, such ideas 
about precision have to do with another central concept in the military: effect. Preci-
sion is a norm in the military since it is connected to the importance of afflicting the 
opponent in such ways that he/she ceases to be a threat to, or hinder, military goals 
(but it also indicates an ‘ethical’ use of violence, see: Zehfuss 2011). In other words, 
effect and precision go hand in hand in military minds and in contemporary military 
practice. This is as clear as it gets when it comes to targeting. From my perspective, 
the nexus between effect in military operations and affecting a target can be seen in 
this NATO definition of Joint Targeting: 
 
                                                             
21 Please note that the way the targeting practice is outlined varies from different types of exercises and also between 
’real’ operational headquarters. So, the context description below accounts for what it means to be working with target-
ing during the CJSE (2015, 2016 and 2017). Despite this, many of the concepts and activities described here as a part of 
the targeting practice are very similar between, for instance, NATO and US doctrine. In addition, many of the concepts, 
such as ‘Time Sensitive Targeting’ or ‘Collateral Damage Estimation’ has been in use by the Western military in opera-
tions such as Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom (US forces in Afghanistan and Iraq) (see 
Ducheine, Schmitt, and Osinga 2016, 58–65).    
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Joint targeting is the process of determining the effects necessary to achieve the commander’s ob-
jectives, identifying the actions necessary to create the desired effects based on means available, 
selecting and prioritising targets, and the synchronisation of fires with other military capabilities 
and then assessing their cumulative effectiveness and taking remedial action if necessary. At the 
operational level, targeting focuses on determining specific actions to take, physical and psycho-
logical, to create the desired effects and realise the JFC’s operational objectives. While carrying 
out an action, either physical or psychological, on a target remains a tactical event, the effect must 
be relevant to the JFC’s operational objectives. The targeting process is crucial to the application 
of joint fires. (NATO 2011, 1–13 my alteration (underlining)).  	
 
“Taking remedial actions” is the language used here that connects desires of achiev-
ing effect with actions of affecting a target. Here the central role that the operational 
level has in the military for the execution of military violence is also observable. The 
quote above is a type of statement where the centrality of production in military 
language is visualised, as violence is articulated as a means that will create (pro-
duce) solutions to military goals (objectives). These goals are in the quoted text 
implied to be measurable in terms of how well the selected type of violence will 
work to achieve them. This ambition to measure ‘effect’ is very much a result of 
how Western militaries have tried to incorporate a ‘spawn’ of New Public Manage-
ment – Result-Based Management – into the practice of conducting military opera-
tions (see S. J. H. Rietjens, Soeters, and Klumper 2011). Minimising the use of force 
might be a voiced legitimation for targeting now, but the raison d'être behind target-
ing thus rests firmly upon an ontology where military violence is possible to control 
and utilise in an orderly fashion.  
 
To some extent contemporary discourses on targeting have established connections 
to legitimacy, although still in the name of effect. To minimise ‘unwanted’ casual-
ties and what is called ‘collateral damage’ is arguably a part of ‘the liberal way of 
war’, but it is also, in military (and academic) discourse, connected to the problem of 
losing public support for military operations (e.g. K. Grayson 2012; Owens 2003). 
In other words, the technological possibility to “cut the serpent’s head”, and thus 
minimise the use of force, is driven by the idea that such actions will mitigate public 
antagonism towards military campaigns (see Coker in Ducheine, Schmitt, and 
Osinga 2016). Hence, here we have a practice that thoroughly connects to legitima-
cy, but not to ideas of some form of humane warfare as some proponents of target-
ing suggest. As outlined in the analysis below, legitimacy in the targeting practice is 
connected to what is practically possible to do without breaking formal rules or 
endangering established social relations within the framework of a targeting com-
munity. In simple terms, morality as in ‘I reduce my contribution to taking lives 
because it is a fundamentally bad thing’ does not exist as a normative framework in 
a ‘targeteer’s’ daily work (naturally, such moral considerations can exist on an indi-
vidual basis). Instead, legitimacy for a ‘targeteer’ is strongly connected to maximis-
ing the use of available instruments in order to gain approval for nominated targets 
(in turn to gain certain effects). The organisation of the targeting function during the 
staff exercises (outlined below) mirrors how precision, effect and control/order are 
intertwined in practice.  
  154 
 
The targeting community 
Experienced ‘targeteers’ sometimes talk about “the targeting community” when 
educating new ‘targeteers’ (e.g. CJSE 17, 251315 JTCB, OTTM comment (34:40)). 
It is a phrase that captures how the practice, regardless of organisational level or 
belonging, includes practitioners within the targeting process into a distinct group of 
staff officers. To belong to this group means that you can master the language of the 
practice and that you perform according to the professional standards set by the 
requirements of the targeting process. From a social relations-perspective, this 
means that the primary pre-conditions for belonging to this group rests on 
knowledge (of the targeting process) and process induced behaviour (that the social 
agent acts accordingly to process). I will elaborate further on this during the analysis 
below. Here, as a part of understanding the particularities of the targeting context I 
want to call attention to the fact that the targeting practice in this way offers an addi-
tional group of belonging for members of different military staffs.  
      
The CJSE has divided the BFOR HQ into branches in accordance with NATO 
standards, which means that the function for running targeting, the Joint Effects Cell 
(JEC) is located within the branch/department J3 (which handles current events 
within an area of operation). Manning of the Joint Effects Cell includes a chief and 
heads of the sections Information Activities (who is responsible for the non-
lethal/non-kinetic types of activities within the targeting process) and Joint Fires 
(which is responsible for running the meetings and coordinating the work with the 
Joint Prioritised Targeting List). The Joint Effects Cell, and in particular the 5-6 
officers in the section Joint Fires, need to work in close cooperation with the Target 
Support Cell (TSC) which is located within the branch/department called J2 (handles 
intelligence). This latter cell has a chief and 2-3 staff officers who are responsible 
for receiving and evaluating the ‘target nominations’ from the Component Com-
mands (the lower level of the organisation). The J3 and J2 targeting functions were 
located in different rooms or cubicles during the exercises, but they often moved 
personnel between them to facilitate cooperation. When not in formal meetings, 
many of the staff officers from these two functions were engaged in smaller meet-
ings where they exchanged information and cooperated on evaluating the intended 
effects on the nominated targets. So, what is it that these people do when they have 
become/are becoming ‘targeteers’? The short contextual description for this can be 
found in two words: “lists” and “meetings”. Within these words lie several avenues 
of subjectivity which enable formation of this specific version of military identity. 
The description below provides some insight into how the subject can establish itself 
as a ‘targeteer’ by acting within the framework of ‘lists’ and ‘meetings’.    
 
In order to understand the importance of these activities, I will provide a short de-
scription of how the targeting process is meant to be performed. In the following I 
will use the actual ‘nomination’ and ‘processing’ of ‘target-id 6002’ conducted dur-
ing CJSE 17 as an example.  
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The construction of a target22 
The following text uses the bureaucratised language of the targeting practice in order 
to describe how ‘targeteers’ can, with the help of such language, re-create a human 
subject to fit the mould of a ‘target’. To indicate this language, and to make an effort 
of not re-establishing bureaucratised discourse, I have increased my use of quotation 
marks (‘ and “) in this particular part of the chapter. Furthermore, it is important to 
stress that the process outlined below does not just transform a (fictive) human sub-
ject (Kristina in the following example) into an entity that fits computer generated 
folders and forms. The process itself also shapes the practitioners understanding of 
what being a ‘targeteer’ means. That is, in the process of becoming a ‘targeteer’ the 
agents of the practice identify with bureaucratised discourse on a regular basis.      
 
In the scenario, the Gute Rams, an extremist organisation with kidnappings, atroci-
ties and violence against a minority part of the population stand as a ‘central prob-
lem’ for BFOR. Member networks of such armed groups are ‘targeted’ in order to 
achieve the ‘operational goals’ of ‘reducing the threat level’ in the area of opera-
tions. By detailed analytic work and using informants in the field, the ‘intelligence 
branch’ of the military forces (and special forces) produce ‘diagrams’ of which peo-
ple and/or objects are of central importance for the ‘function’ of such organisations 
as the Gute Rams. The (fictive) person Kristina Blofält is initiated as a presumptive 
‘target’ by the Special Forces branch during CJSE 17, as she is understood to act as 
a link between the Gute Rams and its main supporter, one of the neighbouring coun-
tries (see 170423-CJSE17-BFOR-Target folder 6002, p. 5 ff.). The logic behind this 
analysis rests on a belief that the possibilities for the extremists to cause trouble will 
be reduced as their influx of money and weapons will be hampered by removing 
their contact with their main benefactor.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
22 When presenting earlier drafts of this chapter, military colleagues with field experience in targeting have voiced some 
critique about my focus on the nomination process and the following decision meetings (the boards). In short, this 
critique has been related to the fact that before a person is being ‘nominated’, staff officers might have spent weeks, even 
months on mapping this person and coming to ‘know them as a human’. The point of the critique is that this part of the 
process can provide ‘targeteers’ with subjectivities and possible identifications that might contribute to their resistance to 
the powerful bureaucratised discourses inherent to the practice. My response to this is twofold: firstly, the purpose of 
‘mapping’ a person is in itself a part of the bureaucratised labor ruling the practice (that a person can have a productive 
function in gaining certain military effects). Secondly, even if a ‘targeteer’ in the chain of command ‘feels for the 
person’ being investigated as a presumptive ‘target’, such emotional ‘content’ is effectively removed by how the ‘nomi-
nation process’ and the work within the ‘boards’ are conducted. That is, in the ‘process’ of fitting correct data into lists 
and through the social games inherent to the meetings of the targeting practice, possible humanising traits of the ‘target’ 
are removed  (e.g. I. Shaw and Akhter 2014, 226 ff.).      
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When the ‘nomination’ of this ‘target’ is received by the Target Support Cell in the 
operational headquarters, it is in the form of a digital file called “target folder”. It 
consists of filled out templates in Word, Excel -and/or Power Point format where the 
‘nominated target’ is rationalised as ‘valid’ (of interest) through the use of estab-
lished military analytical concepts. One such central concept is “desired effects” 
which is used to underscore how the ‘target’ is to be affected by military ‘means’ 
and to what ‘end’ it is affected. For Kristina, now provided with a “target identifica-
tion number” (6002), the ‘effect’ that the ‘targeteers’ aim for is to “detain” and 
thereafter to “disrupt” and “exploit” (see 170425-CJSE17-BFOR-FRAGO 061 AN-
NEX 1-JPTL (D+46)-J3-JEC).  
 
What this means is that the ‘target’ is to be ‘captured’ by the use of force (if neces-
sary) and held in detention for a time period (indicted by the use of ‘desired effect’ 
“detain”). During this time, the intention is to ‘hamper the function’ of the Gute 
Rams (indicated by the use of ‘desired effect’ “disrupt”) and to use the temporary 
loss of their ‘link’ (Kristina) to gather further ‘intelligence’ on their possible alterna-
tive ways of communicating with their benefactor (indicated by “exploit”). Target 
ID 6002 is also to be interrogated during ‘its’ incarceration which will further mili-
tary ‘operational chances of exploiting’ ‘its’ knowledge of the Gute Ram ‘network’. 
It is also possible that detaining this ‘target’ will damage ‘its’ relations of trust with 
the ‘extremist network’ and/or ‘its’ supporter, further ‘disrupting’ their ways of 
communicating.  
 
Anyhow, the ‘target’ is moulded into a standardised format by the use of the main 
working tool of the ‘targeteers’, the Joint Prioritised Target List (JPTL).  
Pict. 1. The Joint Targeting Cycle, (NATO 2016, 2–2) 
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The lists of the practice are central, both for how targets as objects of the practice are 
conceptualised and for the construction of the ‘targeteer’ as an identity.23 I have 
observed during the exercises how ‘targeteers’ gather around print-outs of lists such 
as the Joint Prioritised Target List, or sit in meetings with the Joint Prioritised Tar-
get List displayed on the big screen, discussing the content of each column and the 
meaning of, and attachment of, concepts appropriate for each target. But let us get 
back to ‘target ID 6002’ (I will expand upon the importance of the Joint Prioritised 
Target List (and other lists) in the next section).  
 
The ‘target’ in the example above is understood to have possible limitations in the 
form of restrictions (in the upper left column). These are limitations connected to 
legal aspects of engaging the intended ‘target’, but in this case, the abbreviation 
“NIL” (Nothing In Line) indicate that the ‘targeteers’ deem the ‘target’ to be possi-
ble to engage within the legal framework of the mission. The agents of the targeting 
practice learn quickly that the legal aspects concerning intended targets take prece-
                                                             
23 Lists are a major part of the materiality of the practice and as such help establish the targeting process, mainly by 
filling the practice with content and acting as main points of reference, as the ‘targeteers’ utilise these lists in the day-to-
day staff work. On a general NATO-level, there are 6 major lists which are central to the targeting practice: The Integrat-
ed Data Base (IDB) which is a NATO system where nations add targets. Secondly, there is the Joint Target List (JTL) 
which is a list that concerns particular NATO missions (or campaigns as the NATO AJP-01 doctrine calls them), and 
some of the information in that list comes from the IDB. Thirdly there is the No-Strike List (NSL) which contains such 
targets that are prohibited and in need of ‘de-confliction’. Fourthly, there is the Joint Prioritised Target List (JPTL) which 
contains the targets of the current mission and a prioritising of these targets made by the operational level. Fifthly, there 
is the Restricted Target List (RTL) which contains targets that are considered legal but still have some restrictions 
connected to them, and are therefore ‘on hold’ by the Joint Forces Commander. Sixth and last, there is the Prioritised 
Target List (PTL) which belongs to each Component Command (i.e. those in charge of tactical operations within each 
branch of the military, generically: Air Force, Navy, Army and Special Operations)  
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Pict. 2. Example of draft of Joint Prioritised Target List (JPTL) taken from CJSE 17. Altered to fit by author.  
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dence, as they cannot proceed with their work on that particular target if it is not 
considered juridically correct to engage some form of action against it. After eventu-
al limitations are sorted out, the agents of the target practice engage in what lan-
guage and social rules of order provide for the practice: placing the intended ‘target’ 
into different types of categorisations, providing it with codes that relate to location, 
type of target (“Tgt Cat 22” means Paramilitary Forces/Terrorists) and simply giving 
it a unique number to keep track of it (it is here Kristina becomes a number). Fur-
thermore, in the staff work with the Joint Prioritised Target List some type of nego-
tiation must be performed in order to decide what target ‘deserves’ the highest prior-
itisation. This is a type of staff effort that is closely connected to setting the ‘tar-
get’s’ relation to “BFOR DC”, which is a designation for one of the missions “Deci-
sive Conditions”, and also to “Desired Effect”. If affecting a target is deemed to 
have a high impact on moving towards fulfilling a certain “Decisive Condition”, 
then the target will be taken into consideration for a high prioritisation. This is due 
to how “Decisive Conditions” are understood to be central in moving the operations 
of the mission in a direction that will eventually lead to the fulfilment of the “opera-
tional objectives”. Or, as stated in the NATO document Allied Joint Doctrine (AJP-
01(D), 2010), “decisive conditions” are:   
 
A combination of circumstances, effects, or a specific key event, critical factor, or function that 
when achieved allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an opponent or contribute 
materially to achieving an operational objective. (NATO 2010, Lexicon-7). 
 
In the pictured Draft Joint Prioritised Target List above there is a numerical refer-
ence (no. 3) to “BFOR DC” which means that the ‘targeteers’ anticipate that engag-
ing the ‘target’ will contribute to the achievement of Decisive Condition 3: “Influ-
ence of irregulars diminished.” (Försvarshögskolan/Försvarsmakten n.d., 26). Here 
the focal point of efficiency and precision, as mentioned above as central to the ideas 
behind targeting, is yet again elucidated by how the use of violence and the produc-
tion of solutions to military problems are interconnected in the concept of “decisive 
conditions”.  
 
Violence as a means for achieving certain “desired effects” is perceivable in this 
extract of a Joint Prioritised Target List, and the term used for this is “kinetic”. The 
alternative term is “non-kinetic” which usually is in use when there are targets that 
need to be influenced by ‘Information Activities’ or set under ‘surveillance’ (which, 
on the other hand, may, despite the term ‘non-kinetic, result in physical violence 
and/or other forms of violations, such as related to a person’s integrity, i.e. both 
kinetic and non-kinetic may include violence). In addition, the ‘target’ is, by the use 
of this list, connected to the abbreviation “ROE”. This is a term used for Rules of 
Engagement and its place again creates the need for the practitioners to sort the 
intended actions into specific categories. These are categories related to the Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law, sometimes also called Laws of Armed Conflict.  
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In summary, Kristina is now conceptualised as ‘target ID 6002’, an object which has 
gained meaning from two main avenues of understanding: Firstly, it (she) is a ‘tar-
get’ as it (she) will contribute to producing ‘objectives’ and ‘effects’ in a certain 
foreseeable order. This is what I previously have shown to be an intrinsic part of 
military bureaucratised labour (Chapter 4 and 5) as it is an understanding fueled by 
the discursive points of reference of production, order and bureaucracy. Secondly, in 
close connection to being deemed useful for the operation, it (she) is a ‘target’ be-
cause it (she) is ‘legitimate to engage’. This aspect of military violence has not been 
discussed in the previous chapters and is really only in play when there is an actual 
use of violence at stake in the practice (as in the targeting process). Therefore, legit-
imation of targets, and “legitimacy” as a concept, will be central to the following 
analysis of the practice.  
 
But before Kristina can be an approved ‘target’, the ‘targeteers’ must, through a 
series of meetings, argue and discuss her appropriate position (that she really is 
‘valid’) as such an object. These meetings are outlined further below as, together 
with the ‘targeteers’ interaction with the materiality of lists, they enhance a particu-
lar understanding of “legitimacy” and “responsibility”, and provide content to the 
subject position the ‘targeteer’ (what it means to be a ‘targeteer’). For now, I would 
like to go deeper into the question of why the use of different lists is so central to the 
specifics of the targeting practice.           
             
The lists of the targeting practice and the subjectivities provided by ‘listolo-
gy’ 
The Joint Prioritised Target List (JPTL), often orally referred to as the “JayPiTtLe” 
in the language used by the agents of the practice, is a product that requires a great 
deal of negotiation and information exchange between different sections/cells of the 
HQ. In its finalised form the Joint Prioritised Target List affects the use of key ‘re-
sources’ in the area of operations, such as Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnais-
sance (ISR) assets or measures for Electronic Warfare (EW). Due to its status as 
directly affecting how such limited resources are to be used (in what order, amount, 
type and/or during which time) there is much need to ‘de-conflict’ the content of the 
list. In addition, the legal aspects of the intended targetings must be considered, 
which is futile without the involvement of an LEGAD – an adviser in matters of law 
– sometimes a position filled by a military officer with a degree in law, or a civilian 
expert. 
 
The Joint Prioritised Target List is one example of how the targeting practice re-
volves around a complex web of materiality, which I call listology. This is a concept 
that I use to emphasise the discursive force intrinsic to a network of lists and the 
practitioner’s attempt to master these lists. In other words, listology provides practi-
tioners with possible avenues of identification with list-related objects that pervade 
and limit a ‘targeteer’s’ ontology. Listology stands thus for a specific formation of 
bureaucratised labour and is as such both part of the context and the analysis of the 
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targeting practice. As shown in the example above of how a target is created, the 
lists provide meaning which allows the targeteers to fit humans and objects into the 
framework of bureaucratised labour, giving them a ‘natural’ place as ‘productive 
targets’ in the striving to achieve “operational effects”. 
 
But the creation of targets in one list such as the Joint Prioritised Target List is not 
the only action connected to the use of lists. The division of targeting into “Deliber-
ate Targeting” (which is the process of planning for targeting, as in the case of Kris-
tina) and “Dynamic Targeting” (which is the process of handling targets that might 
appear during the course of operations)24 creates a further need to cross-reference 
the existing lists that were previously mentioned, and to create new ones. For exam-
ple, the idea of “Time Sensitive Targeting (TST)”, which is based on the understand-
ing that some targets are “fleeting” (in simple terms that some things in this world 
are not static and actually may be mobile or appear randomly, e.g. Joint Publication 
3-60 Joint Targeting 2007, A-1) provides the need for the construction of a matrix. 
This matrix is yet another list that helps the ‘targeteers’ keep track of when certain 
targets are ‘valid’ for targeting and by whose authority actions can be taken. Picture 
2 below outlines an example of a TST-matrix where an artillery system belonging to 
the armed group “Protectors of Truth” appears.  
 
As seen in the picture, words and concepts like “priority”, “desired effect” and 
“ROEs” reappear in this matrix, which indicates some of the discursive centrality of 
these concepts. But added, compared to the Joint Prioritised Target List, are the 
concepts of “Risk”, “Decision” and “CDE estimate” where the latter means “Collat-
eral Damage Estimation (and there is a duplication of words here in the column 
“CDE Estimate”). In this example this means that due to the target’s ‘unwillingness’ 
to stand still or disinclination to announce time and place for its intention to break 
the rules and enter the demilitarised zone (which categorises it as a “Time Sensitive 
Target”) the analysis expands. Now the ‘targeteers’ must include such things as 
trying to foresee how affecting this target would generate (own) casualties (“Risk to 
BFOR” column) and also the likelihood of “Inadvertent casualties and destruction in 
civilian areas caused by military operations.” (this latter is a quote from the NATO 
definition of “collateral damage”, see NATO, 2013, pp. 2-NaN-6).  
 
In this example the Collateral Damage Estimation is set to “yellow” which means 
that the targeteers estimate that there will be “no CD Object(s) inside 250m from 
                                                             
24 In simple terms, dynamic targeting is a concept indicating that certain parts of warfare cannot be anticipated and 
planned for. Sometimes an event happens (e.g. ambush) that makes it necessary to engage a target without going through 
the time-consuming process of deliberate (planned) targeting.   
Pict. 3. Example of Joint Time Sensitive Target Matrix taken from CJSE 16. Altered to fit by author.  
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intended impact point” (qoutation taken from the exercise “manual” on targeting, 
see Försvarshögskolan/Försvarsmakten 2016, 10). “CD Object(s)” is short for col-
lateral damage object(s) and the practitioners are provided with (more) lists that will 
help them check if the deemed geographical appearance of the ‘target’ will include 
such objects that are not to be ‘affected’ by military operations.  
 
In the complex matrix of lists there is need for simplification, which is usually 
achieved by coding information in three types of colours: green (i.e. approved), 
yellow (i.e. restricted) and red (i.e. prohibited). Mimicking the use of traffic signals 
the red colour indicates different types of ‘stops’ in the targeting process. This does 
not mean that ‘target sets’ that are indicated in the colour red will be ‘spared’ from 
military violence. Indeed, the targeteer can ‘nominate’25 a target (via a Target Nomi-
nation List, TNL) with a “Collateral Damage Estimation Red” and motivate that the 
target should be actively engaged despite this estimation. In practical terms, such 
action will place the decision of acting on the ‘target’ to the Commander of the Joint 
Operation (or even on higher command, depending on the type of collateral damage 
foreseen by the ‘targeteers’). This means that the ‘listology’ of the targeting practice 
includes, among other types of analyses, a summarising act of different values (and 
colour codes) which will determine by whose authority will the target be affected. 
The level of authorisation is in targeting terms expressed as “Target Engagement 
Authority” (TEA), and “Target Approval Authority” (TAA).  
 
If we return to ‘target ID 6002’, the incorporation of correct ‘data’ in the appropriate 
columns of the Joint Prioritised Target List will ensure that the ‘target’ gets ap-
proved by the board that evaluates and discusses the list (more on the meetings be-
low). But this only means that the ‘target’ will stay on the version of the list that will 
be forwarded to the Commander for his/her decision. As soon as the list is ‘ap-
proved’ by the Commander, the ‘data’ in the specific columns will tell the executing 
part of the military organisation what ‘level of authorisation’ the specific ‘target’ is 
connected to. For Kristina, the applicable Rules of Engagement to capture her are 
delegated to the lower command, and as soon as the list is approved by the opera-
tional Commander (and distributed), the assigned (lower level) Component Com-
mand will ‘plan and execute’ the mission.             
 
‘Target approval’ is thus most commonly gained through a series of meetings, about 
which I will come back to below, and/or through possibilities to ‘delegate authority’. 
For now, it is enough to add this contextual detail that the language used by the 
‘targeteers’ often returns to the expressions “TeEeAiy” (TEA) and “TeAiyAiy” 
(TAA) when discussing the progress of ‘nominating’ new targets. The concept of 
‘nomination’ is also important to pay attention to as it sets some of the working 
environment into light. ‘Targeteers’ are in a position of trying to get acceptance of 
                                                             
25 It is important for the following analysis to note that the use of the word ‘nomination’ is not a product of my context 
description. The word is frequently used by the members of the CJSE operational staff and it is also used in NATO and 
US doctrines that describe the development of targets (e.g. Joint Publication 3-60 Joint Targeting 2007, sec. ll-5; NATO 
2011, para. 192(h)) 
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targets, which is an activity that takes them through a series of meetings and infor-
mation gathering from different actors (for instance specialists such as the LEGAD 
or the POLAD (the political adviser)) and with the interaction of different lists. In 
other words, the professionalism of the targeteer is closely connected to getting solid 
control of the information needed to get targets ‘approved’ (master the lists). This 
professionalism thus evolves under the procedures connected to working with the 
nomination process and is thus central to how the subject position the ‘targeteer’ is 
constructed. 
 
In summary, the language and materiality connected to the use of lists creates under-
standings of how violence (and/or non-kinetic actions) will achieve certain foreseea-
ble effects, and these are in turn understood to provide solutions to ‘problems’ that 
the military face in the mission. Moreover, the lists emphasise a specific social rule 
of legitimation (discussed below) where Laws of Armed Conflict and social relations 
connected to the position held by the legal adviser come in the foreground of the 
targeting practice. In addition to this, the lists provide the agents with a system of 
meaning and interconnection between hierarchy and responsibility (for the use of 
force). As such, the central position held by lists in the targeting practice, ‘listology’, 
provides the agents physical and mental focus which goes beyond the mere exist-
ence of a digital ‘object’ viewed on the screen of a computer. ‘Listology’ is thus a 
discursive force (the phenomenon relates to both language and materiality, as listol-
ogy both affect how agents of the practice speak and how they use their bodies, 
objects and technology) and in that respect affect how ‘targeting-reality’ is perceived 
by the practitioners. In other words, the subject position ‘targeteer’, a specific mili-
tary version of identity, is constructed through the identifications and subjectivities 
provided by ‘listology’. I will therefore come back to the concept of ‘listology’ dur-
ing the discussion below on my results from analysing the social rules and norms of 
the targeting practice. As previously mentioned, the ‘targeteers’ need to discuss the 
construction (‘nomination’) of every single ‘target’. These performative actions lead 
me to the second activity mentioned above that will give more information on how 
the targeting practice on the operational level bureaucratise violence: the meetings. 
 
The meetings of the targeting practice 
Time is of essence in the targeting practice. During my years in military service I 
have never encountered another part of our work that has such close linkage to time 
and the practice of scheduling. Targeting processes rotate around the numbers 72, 48 
and 24 as it is 72 hours that the people working with air operations (e.g. air strikes) 
need for preparation (48 hours) and execution (24 hours). Naturally, not all targets in 
the targeting process are to be ‘affected’ by air force abilities, but since these timings 
are understood as preferable for facilitating the use of the limited but powerful re-
sources of the Air Component Command (commonly referred to as the air force), 
they come to rule the sequences of the targeting practice (e.g. NATO 2011, 4–14). 
Incorporated into a schedule that is called “the Battle Rhythm”, the meetings re-
quired to manage the ‘production’, ‘refinement’, ‘nomination’ and ‘approval’ of 
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targets are set to match the 72-hour cycle. In other words, this is a cycle that controls 
the actions taken by the ‘targeteers’, in so much that it regulates the what, when and 
who of the process. Military personnel who belong to experienced staffs and who 
‘live’ with the targeting practice during real missions may object and point to the 
fact that targeting is not as rigid as I claim here. Be that as it may, this 72-hour cycle 
is the basis of how meetings and timings are connected, but admittedly there is also 
room for practitioners to ‘act in between meetings’. Still, there is a rigidity to the 
daily work that I want to make clear here in the context description. This is due to 
how the process of becoming a ‘targeteer’ is linked to the centrality of time, the 
scheduling of meetings and to the content of these timings and events.         
 
Time and Subjectivity - The Battle Rhythm 
The method used to fuse staff effort is the battle rhythm. This is a disciplined routine of meetings, 
briefings and miscellaneous gatherings contained within 24-hour cycles and used to maintain an 
optimum tempo for all levels of command, location and time zone. It is the essential mechanism 
for maximising concurrent activity and aiding synchronisation. (NATO 2011, para. 0424)  
 
The word “battle” in this context does not really refer to activities between units in 
the field, even if that might have been the original intention with the creation of the 
concept of Battle Rhythm. From my observations, and in accordance to the quote 
above from the NATO doctrine for “conduct of operations”, I conclude that the 
“battle” in Battle Rhythm is provided with meaning that stems from order as a point 
of reference.26 The often intensive working day of an operational staff is filled with 
meetings, briefings, reports and responses to what NATO doctrine calls “incidents”, 
the latter meaning events that have not been foreseen in the operational planning 
activities (NATO 2011, para. 436). The Battle Rhythm provides structure to this 
otherwise unmanageable amount of information exchange. Its physical (or electron-
ic) form is in the shape of a schedule (see pic. 4 below) and it is as such central to 
regulating spatial and temporal aspects of the staff members working environment. 
But the Battle Rhythm does not just monitor the ‘where and when’ of the staff mem-
bers’ working day, it also attempts to alter and adjust time itself. “Zulu Time” is 
used to create an internal operational time which then may be used to synchronise 
activities that span over several time zones.  
 
At times, this provocation of ‘normal’ time leads to misunderstandings when the 
untrained staff mixed up which time they were using when calling to meetings, but 
such misunderstandings were often quickly resolved and most members of the staff 
adjusted to the steady, predictable, rule of the ‘rhythm’ of the schedule. As contrast 
to the official NATO articulation of the function of the Battle Rhythm described by 
the quote above, I would like to relay this sociological idea of what this rhythm is: 
 
[on the central features of total institutions] Third, all phases of the day’s activities are tightly 
scheduled, with one activity leading at a prearranged time into the next, the whole sequence of ac-
                                                             
26 Another, similar interpretation, is that “battle” means “efficiency” in this context (see Öberg 2016, 10)  
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tivities being imposed from above by a system of explicit formal rulings and a body of officials. 
(Goffman 1991, 17)  
 
As provoking this might seem, Goffman’s (1991) sociological ethnography of what 
he called “total institutions” visualise some of the power that lie in the way the ‘tar-
geteer’ is disciplined and formed by the Battle Rhythm. The schedule that the ‘tar-
geteer’ is subjected to is created within a military bureaucracy where it is ‘natural’ 
that hierarchical structures impose limitations on the subject. These limitations are, 
as pointed out by Goodman already in the 1950/60s, more than just ‘timings’ inso-
much that they create a certain life world for the exposed subject (e.g. Goffman 
1991, 24). In short, the Battle Rhythm contributes to the construction of a bureaucra-
tised labour of violence in the way the ‘targeteer’ identifies with the ‘objects’ of the 
schedule.     
  
The Battle Rhythm is connected to how the subject position of the ‘targeteer’ in-
cludes a specific understanding of, and relation between, time and violence. As 
discussed in the context of ‘listology’, a ‘targeteer’ understands violence as gov-
erned by time in a way where precise timing of the use of force will produce ‘de-
sired’ operational ‘effects’. According to the mind of the ‘targeteer’ it is, as such, 
possible to foresee the (productive) result of using violence. Here there are two main 
aspects that the incorporation of the Battle Rhythm into the practice adds to the iden-
tity formation of agents of the targeting practice. First, the ‘targeteer’ can stabilise 
the otherwise fragile ontology of ‘productive’ results of violence by how time itself 
is, by the act of scheduling, shaped around the notion of foreseeable ‘effect’.  
 
Secondly, the Battle Rhythm does not just order the meetings in the operational staff, 
it adds to the discursive power of ‘listology’ and creates a focus on linearity and 
future events. This brings with it a reduction of interest in history and a discursive 
focus on one possible future. And this is a future that contains threats that must be 
taken care of before they can reduce ‘operational effectiveness’. As such, the order-
ing of time in the practice of targeting ensures that there will be a continuous stream 
of targets to nominate, and pervades the construction of the ‘targeteer’ with an un-
yielding 72-hours focus on the ‘kill-chain’ (see also: Adey, Whitehead, and 
Williams 2011; B. Anderson 2011b, 2011a; Dillon and Reid 2009). The repetitive 
function of the Battle Rhythm enhances the routinisation of the daily work, which in 
turn strengthens the impact that these two aspects have on the formation of the ‘tar-
geteer’.        
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Moreover, the targeting practice is interconnected with the Battle Rhythm as the 
practitioners need the Commander’s attention and decision in order to proceed with 
engaging several types of targets. It also, as previously indicated, ensures the right 
regulations of the time spans needed to use military assets as ‘efficiently’ as possi-
ble. By borrowing from the corporate world, NATO-inspired military operational 
work is here governed by “boards” in which an appointed “chairman” makes deci-
sions based on recommendations by the board members. One such central organ is 
the Joint Coordination Board (JCB) in which the Joint Force Commander, among 
other things, gives “… approval of all products from the joint targeting coordination 
board (JTCB), information operation coordination board (IOCB) and other estab-
lished working groups.”(NATO 2011, para. 427(c)). It is thus in the Joint Coordina-
tion Board that targets which require special prioritising (usually due to conflicts in 
Pict. 4. Battle Rhythm, BFOR HQ 26APR16 (taken from CJSE 16, altered to fit by author).         
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the allocation of resources), or that have restrictions/prohibitions affixed to them, 
and/or need to be coordinated with other efforts within the staff, are presented to the 
commander before being executed. In other words, it is here that the final decision is 
taken for initiating actions that will achieve the military desire to “detain, disrupt 
and exploit” ‘target ID 6002’. Due to the fact that the Commander is in meetings 
most of his/her day, the briefings and information given must be short, concrete and 
already ‘staffed’, meaning that all issues (such as target approval) must have been 
prepared beforehand. A professional ‘targeteer’ must be able to answer possible 
questions from the Commander and balance the provision of complex details that are 
included in the ‘target folder’ by delivering a timely and comprehensive briefing to 
the Commander. Therefore, the development of target folders and preparation of 
briefings are central to the ‘targeteer’s’ daily work, and the information within these 
folders/briefings are thoroughly discussed during meetings conducted before the 
Joint Coordination Board.  
 
One such pre-meeting is the Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB) where 
‘targeteers’ from the operational staff meet with ‘targeteers’ from the tactical com-
mands, special advisers on legal and political matters, such as the LEGAD, POLAD 
and sometimes also a gender adviser (GENAD). These advisers and experts are 
joined in the struggle to evaluate the staff work done on suggested targets, which 
means going through parts of the information that is included in each target folder. 
Typical questions for the Joint Targeting Coordination Board are if a ‘target’ is 
sufficiently ‘developed’ to be put on the Joint Prioritised Target List, if there is need 
for de-conflicting, and if the target needs to be presented to the Commander for 
further consideration/decision.27 Furthermore, the board is chaired by a Targeting 
Director (who also is DACOS J3, i.e. second in charge of the department J3: current 
operations) who based on the recommendations given by the members of the board 
either rejects (for further development) or approves the nominated target.28  
 
Due to the complexity of the targeting process and its possibility to affect the use of 
limited resources (thus putting internal conflict over such resources in play), the 
issues brought up on the Joint Targeting Coordination Board must in turn be pre-
pared before each meeting.29 Such preparations were formalised during CJSE 
15/16/17 by another meeting: The Joint Targeting Working Group (JTWG).30 Here 
                                                             
27 “developed” is here related to how well and how much of the templates in the targeting folders are filled with infor-
mation deemed relevant.   
28 That the Joint Targeting Coordination Board is chaired by a Targeting Director is quite generic, but there may be 
variations in which staff member of the operational staff will hold this position. During the exercises that this analysis 
concerns, the board has been chaired by the DACOS J3. But from conversations with ‘targeteers’ who have real life 
experience of the targeting process, I have learned that the JTCB has been chaired by the deputy Joint Force Command-
er, or the head of J3 (operations). (CJSE 2017, C02 261310)   
29 There are in addition to this other reasons for preparing meetings. These are related to social rules and relations such as 
discussed in Chapter 5.  
30 There are several other meetings that interconnect with this production of targets, such as meetings that coordinate the 
gathering of intelligence and the use of such resources, or meetings that coordinate how Information Activities are to be 
conducted. These latter meetings are important parts of the targeting process as both the domain of Intelligence Service 
and that of conducting Information Activities have the possibility to provide more data on prospective targets, as well as 
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the ‘targeteers’ meet with several of the same specialists and experts that are a part 
of the Joint Targeting Coordination Board, but there is more room for discussion in 
this working group compared to the two previously described forms of meetings. 
The ‘target folders’ and the process of ‘nomination’ are the main focus of the work-
ing meetings, even if these ‘products’ are prepared (staffed) beforehand by the ‘tar-
geteers’. ‘Target ID 6002’ is one example of a ‘product’ from these activities, as the 
nomination of Kristina must be checked with the expert advisers before the Joint 
Targeting Coordination Board is conducted. Making such preparations is not always 
possible which opens up for the possibility that the ‘targeteers’ must argue for the 
‘validity’ and ‘productive use’ of placing Kristina on the list during the conduct of 
the targeting meetings. What this provides us with when it comes to insight into the 
practice, is that the ‘targeteer’ is a type of subject who identifies with actions such as 
negotiation and persuading. Furthermore, the ‘targeteer’ is, through the way this 
process is outlined, placed in a social setting where there is a risk of losing face 
when failing to argue for ‘nominated’ targets. The format of ‘the board’ thus singles 
out individuals and puts their expertise on display for other members of the board to 
evaluate. 
 
In summary, the complexity of the process and the demand for various types of 
information create a context where the subject position ‘targeteer’ develops with 
focus on the internal lifeworld of the operational staff. It is a world characterised by 
following procedures, collecting information for the performance of ‘listology’, and 
preparing and participating in meetings. The Battle Rhythm stabilises the ‘tar-
geteer’s’ understanding of how violence and time are interconnected and centres this 
understanding on linearity and productivity (there are always future targets waiting 
to be included in the nomination process). Furthermore, the social structure and 
discursive context of the meetings inform the targeting practice with corporate-
related social rules and norms (discussed in detail below) which in turn provide 
aspects of negotiation and norms of professional performance that the ‘targeteer’ 
identifies with. Moreover, both the lists and the meetings of the practice provide a 
certain relation to, and understand of, legitimacy and responsibility. This latter as-
pect lies deeply imbedded in how subjectivities and identifications of the ‘tar-
geteer’s’ everyday work revolves around hierarchical responsibilities and expert 
(legal/political) knowledge.  
 
From here I now turn to the analysis of the social rules and norms that underpin the 
targeting practice. As briefly mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, these are 
made up by language/materiality and social relations that provide stability and 
meaning to the operational use of military violence and as such add to the previous 
social rules/norms described in Chapter 5. This means that consensus, for instance, 
is not discussed here, but it is still present as a social rule in the work done by the 
                                                                                                                                               
providing possible non-kinetic actions for the targeteer to consider while developing his/hers target nominations. Given 
these connections with other parts of the operational staff, the targeteer must be prepared to sit through, or interact with 
participants of such meetings like the Daily Assets Reconnaissance Board (DARB) and the Information Activities 
Coordination Board (IACB). 
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operational staff at the exercise. In this sense, the practices of ‘real staff work’ and 
‘exercise staff work’ are constructed by similar social rules and norms, which per-
haps might seem natural as the latter is in place to prepare officers for working in the 
former environment. Instead of repeating such governing social relations and mean-
ing-making that were discussed in Chapter 5, here I focus on such aspects that work 
to set the targeting practice apart from other operational staff work. This is a choice 
made in order to allow for an in-depth investigation in how bureaucratised labour 
includes social rules and norms that govern operational use of force, and to further 
create insight into how agents identify with the role of the ‘targeteer’.  
 
6.4  The Social Rules and Norms of Targeting 
 
The following section of this chapter outlines the social rules and norms of the tar-
geting practice. These have been identified by observing and talking to ‘targeteers’, 
but they have also emerged in close relation to how the context of the practice 
forms, which is to say with regard to how ‘listology’ and meetings can function as 
meaningful activities. As briefly mentioned above, there are other social rules at 
play which ensure that the operational staff functions, such as those discussed as 
rules of order and bureaucracy, or masculinity for that matter, but since these are 
more fully investigated in the previous chapter they are not discussed here in any 
greater depth. Still they are in the background of my analysis of how the ‘targeteer’ 
is constructed as a possible position of identity and therefore references to the dis-
cursive points of reference and social rules found in Chapters 4 and 5 will occasion-
ally be made. There are, as indicted by the description above of the targeting prac-
tice, two main areas of social rules and norms at play here: the rules of legitimation 
and those related to corporate discourse. The former springs from the central role of 
the function/person LEGAD and the Rules of Engagement have in the ‘targeteer’s’ 
daily activities. Furthermore, the language of legitimation provides meaning to the 
content of the lists used by ‘targeteers’, and is as such central to how ‘targeteers’ 
conceptualise targets. The latter, the corporate related discourse, relates to how hier-
archies and forms for interaction provide the ‘targeteers’ with roles and relations that 
ensure the function of targeting. Here the naming of these two points of reference 
stems from the strong discursive influence that resides in how the positions and 
meetings of the practice are outlined.  
 
The Social Rules of Legitimation    
‘Targeteers’ are shaped by how they constantly struggle with Rules of Engagement 
and cope with demands of finding a path through the complicated sets of social, and 
formal, rules that govern acceptance or rejection of targets. Here I will outline how 
the practice can be understood to create certain meaning and relations between legit-
imation and violence. Moreover, this part of the section will also include an analysis 
of how the key agents of legitimation infuse the ‘targeteer’s’ working environment 
with specific sets of social rules and hierarchies. This subsection is concluded with a 
short summary of how the language and social relations of legitimation coincide 
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with bureaucratisation and what that means for the ‘targeteer’s’ understanding of 
violence. 
    
Meaning-making and the Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC) 
Legitimacy is pivotal for the targeting process as it is perceived as something that 
needs to be in place in order to proceed with the use of force. Several of my observa-
tions elucidate how Rules of Engagement (ROE) are seen as formalities that provide 
opportunities to use violence. They are thus not used as a normative framework of 
rules that are in place to ensure the safeguarding of humanitarian values. Even if this 
is how a targeteer would answer a direct question about what these rules are, the 
actual practical forms of utilising them reveal a different story. Consider the follow-
ing transcription from a Joint Targeting Coordination Board that I participated in 
during CJSE 16:         
 
(7:19) "The TAA and the TEA, which we discussed yesterday as well, is at the COM BFOR. So 
do not engage targets without approval from the correct authority level. And do not use ROEs… as 
an… you can say, pre, pre, pre-emptive mission. So, for example if there is a SA22 [mobile short 
range air defence system] in the area you can't use ROEs at your own discretion. It needs to shoot 
something before you can use self-defence. And if you want to attack it! You need to contact ah, 
J3 JOC, and then we go through the TST. Now there have been quite a few questions like “can we 
put in ROEs and attack the SA22?” for example. No, you can't. The TAA and the TEA are at 
COM BFOR level." (8:14) (CJSE 16 O18_04241500) 
 
Here we are instructed by a Finnish air force captain31, who is placed at department 
J3’s Joint Operations Centre (J3 JOC), on the relations between Rules of Engage-
ment (ROE) and levels of authority. What is referred to here are the lower levels of 
command’s desire to have the freedom to act on ‘targets’ within their own level of 
authority. In simple terms, the lower levels want the operational level to “release” 
the applicable Rules of Engagement so that they may act with less restraints. In this 
case, this is not possible as the level of authority, referred to as Target Engagement 
Authority (TEA), and Target Approval Authority (TAA), is held by the operational 
Commander. Which in short means that the intended ‘target’ cannot be engaged 
even if the lower level of command would have access to the applicable Rules of 
Engagement. They also need formal approval from the higher command to use force 
against it.  
 
In this discourse of ‘request – release – approval/refusal – authority’ strong connota-
tions between ownership of rules and approval from authority shape the basis of the 
practical outcome of the concept legitimation. All of this is of course not necessary 
if the ‘target’ should become hostile which would simplify matters in that then the 
                                                             
31 This agent of the practice uses the title ”targeteer” when introducing himself in the meeting ((5:25) CJSE 16 
O18_04241500) 
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forces can use self-defence to engage it.32 The ‘targeteer’ in the quote above is point-
ing at this possibility by saying “… it needs to shoot something before you can use 
self-defence.” which reveals, in this context, legitimacy as a threshold that must be 
exceeded in some way. This is to say, the discourse of legitimacy indeed consists of 
complex rules of authority and acceptance into the lists of the practice, but it also 
includes backdoors which simplify the legitimate use of force (this desire to be able 
to use self-defence was also observed in meetings during CJSE 15, e.g. 181400 
(21:35)). In this, the need to either proceed in accordance to the framework of ‘lis-
tology’, or in the framework of possible self-defence, indicate the ‘tick-in-the-box’ 
mentality that the language and rules of legitimacy sediments within the targeting 
practice. As such, legitimacy is thus pivotal for the ‘targeteers’ as it is central for the 
possibility to proceed with the practice, and as such also pivotal for the re-
construction of the subject ‘targeteer’.  
 
But pivotal does not mean that the rules connected to this centrality are of an ethical 
character, it only means that legitimacy needs to become ‘green’ - within the frame-
work of authority, or within the framework of self-defence. In the language of the 
targeting practice, there is no sign of liberal values, no expression of humanitarian 
concerns, no consideration of what might be plausible in normative terms. Instead 
the discourse of legitimacy is constructed with articulations that position procedures 
at the ‘core’ of what it means to ‘legitimately’ use military force. In the following 
excerpt two ‘targeteers’ are trying to find common ground on when a specific ‘tar-
get’ (in this case belonging to the fictive irregular armed group Protectors of Truth 
(POT)) can be legitimately targeted: 
 
(8:38) LCC rep. "Shall I comment?" 
 
BFOR rep. "Yes please" 
 
LCC rep. "Okay, comment from LCC. Eh, it’s [the use of force against the target] only if entering 
Bogaland. So, we will of course prosecute these targets, and we have planned for prosecuting the 
targets in case then it enters Bogaland, and that applies to all of the POT targets on the JPTL." 
 
BFOR rep. "Roger that. So they're still not eh… because of reasons for de-confliction, you still 
have this pending, so we will need, sort off, some update on when these might be actually en-
gaged. … But that is for after this meeting." 
 
LCC rep. cuts in "so, yes but I'll like to comment on that the, I mean as was mentioned at the meet-
ing, that the TEA is retained at… COM BFOR level. So, we have to prosecute them dynamically 
when we find, when we engage them. But we are planning to engage [use force on] them though.  
                                                             
32 This is somewhat of a practical simplification of the theoretical rules stemming from the Laws of Armed Conflict. In 
theory, there are restrictions on the level of violence that can be used, that is, it needs to be proportionate in its execution. 
Unfortunately, it is mostly a question for the remaining forces and its country of origin to decide if such actions were, 
indeed, proportionate (there is much written in the trope of international law about this. But proportionality (and 
necessity for that matter) stands out as a vague concept in light of how military operations and targeted killings in Iraq 
and Afghanistan have developed. See C. Gray 2008, 148–56, 160–66, 203–16).     
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BFOR rep. "very good, thank you very much" (9:41) 
(CJSE 16 O27_04261500) 
 
Clearly some of the confusion in this exchange stems from the agents being part of 
an exercise and not used to working together. But what is more important is that 
their articulations reveal the connection between authority and legitimation. In order 
to ‘prosecute targets’ (meaning, in this case, that someone will be subject to the use 
of military violence) the Land Component Command (LCC, which in common terms 
would be called “the army”) needs the approval of the higher operational command 
(which is COM BFOR in this case). Clearly the army staff personnel are preparing 
for the use of force and need the higher command to grant permission for using it. 
The matter of using violence becomes dependent on the geographical location (of 
the intended ‘target’) and the possibility for getting the ‘target’ accepted into the 
matrix of lists (the Joint Prioritised Target List, JPTL). Here the discourse of legiti-
mation, apart from the procedures which lie at its core, includes a physical aspect of 
intrusion: the ‘target’ in this example is seen as legitimate to engage if ‘it’ enters 
‘Bogaland’ (which, as a reminder, is the fictive name of the country where in the 
exercise scenario the mission for the military forces is to create a “safe and secure 
environment”). But the physical location of a ‘target’ is not enough, as it is clear, 
again, that the level of authority plays an important role in providing legitimacy.                    
 
When it comes to the act of filling in lists and gathering information for the comple-
tion of ‘target folders’, legitimation provides the practitioners with a specific view of 
what law is. Or expressed differently, the format for a legal act of killing is provided 
with content as the formal corpus of legal discourse for the targeting practice is 
retrieved from the Laws of Armed Conflict. But it is not the ‘targeteer’ who reads or 
otherwise interacts directly with these laws. There are legal experts who provide the 
‘targeteers’ with the link between legitimate actions and the Laws of Armed Conflict. 
Besides providing the targeting practice with specific types of social relations, which 
I discuss below, this ordering of the practice also provides the ‘targeteer’ with mean-
ing that sets legal issues in the hand of experts. This means that the practice of tar-
geting does not ‘just’ set hierarchal authority in the foreground of legitimacy, but it 
also places expert authority as a central meaning of how the concept of legitimacy is 
understood in the targeting practice.  
 
In this meaning-making process, it is the judgments made by the legal adviser that 
‘guarantee’ legitimacy and as such create linkage between lawful acts of violence 
and expert authority. In sum, both the authority of the Commander (or higher com-
manding staff/officers) and also the authority of the legal expert inform the concept 
of legitimacy with meaning. Such infusion of authority is what helps create the piv-
otal aspect of legitimation, as authority is naturally imbued with the power of giving 
a ‘go’ or a ‘no-go’ as judgment of the efforts of the ‘targeteer’. And these efforts are 
visualised in the creation of the lists and the ‘target folders’, as these are the main 
product of the practice. This brings me to a final meaning-making aspect found in 
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the discourse of legitimation, before going further to the social relations related to 
legitimation, and that is the aspect of approval.  
 
The discourse of legitimation gives meaning to the targeting practice and the role of 
the ‘targeteer’ by placing the production of ‘approved nominations’ as a norm of the 
practice. What this means is that for a ‘targeteer’, the approval of ‘target nomina-
tions’ is understood as success, whilst a rejection of a nomination is considered a 
failure. To achieve success and gain approval of nominations, ‘targeteers’ need to 
know how to navigate within the rules provided by the discourse of legitimation. 
There is no, or a very slim, possibility for a ‘target’ to get approval without having 
the right linkage to Rules of Engagement and levels of authority. Which, by the way, 
must seem like a naturally good thing for those who might think that  military use of 
violence needs restraining. But the point here is that the language and materiality of 
legitimation does not provide meaning of restraining violence. Conversly, the practi-
tioners interaction with acts of legitimation provides meaning of utilising violence as 
applicable as possible to given rules. Or as expressed by a legal adviser during a 
Joint Targeting Working Group conducted at CJSE 15: 
 
“The rules of engagement are not about preventing the use of force, it’s about regulating it. And 
COM BFOR uses that in order to develop or to decide what amount of force he wants to be pro-
jected over the theatre."33 (CJSE 15 181400 (19:26)) 
 
As such, legitimation is not about following norms of what is morally right, but what 
is technically possible and most efficient in relation to the Laws of Armed Conflict. 
This is what is invested in getting approval of nominations: it confirms that the ‘tar-
geteer’ is professional enough to know how to navigate through the rules of legiti-
mation. It would be hard to imagine, in contrast, an agent of the practice continuous-
ly reporting at meetings that he/she has no targets to nominate (see also: D. Gregory 
2011a). 
 
On a final note on meaning-making and legitimation, as a shift into the social rela-
tions connected to this particular discourse, the discursive force of ‘listology’ (the 
central place of lists as objects of identification and meaning-making in the targeting 
practice) forms a ‘targeteer’s’ understanding of what constitutes a ‘legitimate target’ 
by underpinning the importance of validity. For a targeteer on lower levels of com-
mand, such as the tactical level, a ‘valid target list’ is central for being able to exe-
cute missions (e.g. CJSE 17, 211315). Without a valid Joint Prioritised Target List, 
the tactical level of the Air Force (the Air Component Command), for instance, can-
not issue any Air Tasking Order (ATO) with details on missions connected to target-
ing. In simple terms, if there is no valid list with targets, there will be no flying. 
What this means is that lower levels of command put pressure on the ‘targeteers’ of 
the operational level to ‘produce’ targets that fit the lists so that targets may be ap-
                                                             
33 This is also a typical example on how bureaucratisation takes practical form in the different discourses of the practice. 
Violence is here seen as possible to control (“projected over the theatre”) with the help of Rules of Engagement, thus 
supporting the creation of bureaucratised understandings of violence by using a discourse of law. 
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proved and branded ‘valid’. Furthermore, this material focus on valid/not valid (list) 
increases the influx of discursive effect to the ‘targeteer’s’ understanding of legiti-
macy, even further fixating legitimacy as a concept belonging to a chain of produc-
tion.   
 
Social relations and legitimacy – authoritative morality 
In an observation (in 2015) I note in my field journal that the LEGAD and the ‘tar-
geteers’ of this particular exercise seem to relate to each other as in a parent-child 
relationship:  
 
[I note that] The body language and tone of voice from this particular LEGAD resembles that of a 
parent that constantly is asked tiresome questions from a child that wants to fix things the easiest 
way. The tone of voice is somewhat distant and guarded. The LEGAD is resting the weight of the 
upper body, via his arms, on the table, leaning over a thick set of documents (presumably compris-
ing laws and rules of engagement). The position and the documents enhance the impression of pa-
rental authority. (CJSE 15 171530)  
 
This particular authority, where the LEGAD fills the role of a parent holding in their 
power allowing or denying actions suggested by the ‘targeteer’, has been observed 
in the two following exercises as well.34 The authority is moral in the sense that it 
relates to what is permissible according to rules. But these rules are, as in most par-
ent-child relations, not absolute or completely set with clear boundaries. In fact, 
there exists a possibility for the ‘targeteer’ to persuade the LEGAD of the need to 
take specific actions, and thus be granted the legitimacy needed to take actions 
against an intended ‘target’. The following extract illustrates how the possibility for 
persuasion emerges in the targeting discourse (Joint Targeting Working Group 
meeting, CJSE 16):    
 
(30:53) LEGAD: "As for the question of operating to uphold our mandate outside of the exclusion 
zone, this is very similar to the discussion we had yesterday concerning the eh smugglers and this 
ship coming from from eh HANGÖ. We have taken the position that outside of the exclusion zone 
such operations cannot be done unless one can say that it’s very clear that they are on their way 
over. So it is, you know, one can play a little bit with that as well, but but eh to plan operations 
outside in the eh in the space between the mainland and GOTLAND, on the international waters 
[inaudible], eh, would be more difficult to eh get a green light from. We're always open to be per-
suaded of course but the exclusion zone is eh green but [inaudible] would not be." (31:48) (CJSE 
16 O22_04251400) 
 
The ‘parental’ relational aspect of legitimacy is not constructed by the targeting 
practice just because the LEGAD actually articulates the possibility of persuasion. It 
is also in place by the way the LEGAD refers to himself as ‘we’, indicating that he 
belongs to another group (different from this group of ‘targeteers’) where decisions 
                                                             
34 CJSE 17 had a LEGAD who was new to the ‘trade’ and who had a less outspoken way of exercising his power. Still, 
the ‘go or no-go’ function inherent to the position was noticeable during the meetings. 
  174 
are made and the power to legitimate resides. Here legitimacy provides social rela-
tions which underpin regulation of morality as something that is govern by authori-
ty, and something that is only absolute in that approval of action comes from a posi-
tion outside of the subject position ‘targeteer’. Or as Derek Gregory (2011) aptly 
puts it: 
 
The invocation of legality [in targeting] works to marginalise ethics and politics by making availa-
ble a seemingly neutral, objective language: disagreement and debate then become purely tech-
nical issues that involve matters of opinion, certainly, but not values. The appeal to legality – and 
to the quasi-judicial process it invokes – thus helps to authorise a widespread and widening milita-
risation of our world. (D. Gregory 2011b, 247 my italics) 
 
In other words, the ‘targeteer’ is confined to something that is similar to the moral 
space navigated by a child not yet socialised into being a moral subject on its own. 
This does not mean, however, that agents acting as ‘targeteers’ have the moral capa-
bilities of such a child. Naturally other influences, such as the sway that other possi-
ble subject positions invoke on the agent’s understanding of morality, can provide 
some resistance to this authoritarian aspect of morality. Unfortunately, observations 
made of this practice do not indicate any ‘relief’ from which ‘targeteers’ can gain 
momentum for activating other possible ways of relating to norms that lie outside of 
the practice. That is to say, the continuously shielded and repetitive way of acting 
whilst fulfilling the tasks provided by ‘listology’ and meetings give little or no open-
ing for activation of resistance to the rules provided by legitimation. For instance, in 
the confinement of the operational staff, the ‘targeteers’ are not provided visual 
feedback of the impact of their daily work, other than the occasional reviewing of air 
footage from long distance strikes. This distance to the effects of violence is not 
exclusively dependent on these being scenario-based exercises with no ‘real’ impact 
of the decisions taken.  
 
Let me return to the now constructed and approved ‘target ID 6002’ for an example 
of how ‘targeteers’ review the use of force. The following excerpt is taken from a 
Joint Targeting Working Group meeting (CJSE 17) which takes place after the ‘de-
tainment’ of Kristina. According to procedure, the ‘targeteers’ evaluate the impact 
of executed missions linked to previously nominated and approved targets.  
 
(2:36) J2 Target Support Cell: "Target ID six zero zero two [6002] Kristina Blofält was detained as 
desired"  
 
Chairman: "Next Slide" 
 
Targeteer SO J3: "Eh, Fires. According previous information you already know that this target was 
executed and detained. That means that this target effectually goes directly to operational effective 
three point one [Operational Effect 3.1]. Slide please. It means that from valid JPTL-List D+44 
this could be removed. And also highlight that the SOCC is not valid anymore. And additional 
questions about Rules of Engagement were raised up eh with LCC, and this question about targets 
will be discussed later on."  
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Chairman: "Okay, thank you xxxx [first name of reporting SO] […]. And with regard to, to target 
ID 6002, we will discuss how we proceed and if it stays on the, on the JPTL or not in accordance 
with what exactly will happen to the, to the individual after, after the detainment. […] (5:04) 
(CJSE 17, 241315 JTWG) 
 
The language used by the ‘targeteers’ provide insight into how distance to the actual 
use of violence is constructed and how reification works within this practice. The 
‘desired effect’ “detain” has been achieved and this is connected to the operational 
effect (3.1) that the ‘targeteers’ had foreseen to be affected by this action. What this 
implies is that the action was a success. The question that remains for the ‘tar-
geteers’ is if the ‘target’ should stay on the list, and if it should in that case be with 
some form of adjustments. In other words, the main question is if there exist any 
further ways of using ‘target ID 6002’ in the military operations, which reveals how 
the practice identifies ‘targets’ as objects that creates military productivity. What is 
also evident by this excerpt is that when the detention of ‘target ID 6002’ is con-
cluded to be in line with what was expected in terms of ‘effects’, there is no discus-
sion about it being correct from a moral point of view. In fact, there is no discussion 
at all. So, what the process and its activities provide when it comes to filling the 
concept of legitimation with meaningful content, in addition to what was discussed 
above, is an emptiness of articulations that refer to morality in terms of humanitarian 
values. This is not in any way related to if Kristina is ‘really’ an extremist and as 
such deserves a slight dose of military violence. It is instead related to the fact that 
she is a ‘legitimate target’ according to the targeting process and that she ‘fits’ into 
how the targeting community understands (authoritative) legitimacy.             
 
Social relations and legitimacy – the regulating function of operational 
command 
 
(56:24) "That will be decided upon tomorrow and it will depend eh heavily upon your request for 
Rules of Engagement. If you get, if we, if the application is approved we can put it on the JPTL 
and you can act upon it. And If not, its its gonna go to the TST-matrix and at the time if its be-
comes a threat, then we have to make an TST-decision and go in to the Commander again [and 
say] now its active you have to act upon it. And so." (56:57) (Chief of Joint Fires, CJSE 15 
181400) 
 
The above transcript is taken from a Joint Targeting Working Group meeting and 
outlines the Chief of Joint Fires (at the operational headquarters) answer to a re-
quest, made by the lower tactical level (the Air Component Command), to engage a 
target ‘kinetically’. Besides being one of the first recordings where I realise that 
‘targeteers’ have a language of their own, the quote itself is also important for how it 
links Rules of Engagement with the operational command level. This is a link that 
the discourse of legitimacy creates out of necessity, by how the social rules have, as 
discussed above, created a pivotal meaning to legitimacy and an authoritative under-
standing of morality. In such meaning-making and relational dependence there must 
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be a figure of power with the task of ‘approving’ or ‘rejecting’, or else agents would 
be lost on how to abide by the social rules. The operational level of war (that is to 
say, the operational staff and its commander) is in contemporary Western doctrine a 
centre of references to typical bureaucratised labour, such as balancing the flow of 
resources and keeping the efficiency of military units at a high level (NATO 2010, 
para. 0115). But here, in the light of social rules, operational command is shown to 
have other functions. Mandate appears again (as it did in the former chapter) as 
central to how legitimacy creates social relations. Specifically, one operational 
Commander and his/her deputy, cannot in practice oversee the entire need of re-
quests made by lower levels of command (or indeed by their own operational staff). 
Therefore, the power to give legitimacy to military actions, as in making decisions 
on activating certain Rules of Engagements, must be delegated throughout the chain 
of command.  
 
The reply outlined above, given by the ‘targeteer’ Chief of Fires, concerns a set of 
Rules of Engagement that have not been ‘released’ to the lower level of command, 
but these rules can tentatively be delegated to the tactical level. In doing so, the 
operational Commander will not just transfer the authority to ‘engage the target’ 
according to those specific rules, the operational Commander will also transfer the 
power to legitimise actions to the lower level of command. What this indicates is 
that legitimation contains an aspect of self-imposed normative hierarchy which is 
dependent on how Rules of Engagement are categorised. Here the impact of the 
social rules of bureaucracy and order shine through and their sedimentation of how 
military practice is ordered underpin military understandings of legitimation. What 
can be said about practicing delegable legitimacy? Given that ‘legitimacy’ is a con-
cept empty of content until it is placed in the context of a specific human practice, 
the anchoring of the concept’s meaning lies here in the act of imposing a ‘delegate-
and-categorise’ aspect to Rules of Engagement. Other possible social norms and 
rules than those relating to hierarchy, delegation and procedures of request have no 
place in such discourse. The targeting practice cannot hold other meaning and rela-
tional rules related to legitimate use of force other than what this bureaucratisation 
and ‘rationalisation’ promote. There is little, or no, space for humanitarian values, 
for instance, as legitimacy is something that is owned by authority and can be, by the 
use of procedure, moved between different subjects of power. In contrast, this hier-
archical aspect of the Rules of Engagement is nowhere to be seen in the theoretical 
principles of the Laws of Armed Conflict: 
 
Despite the detailed codification of much customary international law […], four fundamental prin-
ciples underlie the whole law of armed conflict. In 1966, in continuation of his ground- breaking 
article of 1937 [note to Verdross (1937)], Verdross came to the conclusion that the “humanitarian 
principles underlying these conventions are basic principles of general international law with the 
character of jus cogens.” [note to Verdross (1966)] These principles are military necessity, human-
ity, distinction, and proportionality. [note to UK Ministry of Defence] The law is intended to min-
imise the suffering caused by an armed conflict rather than to impede military efficiency. [note Id.] 
It thus is a compromise between the diametrically opposed impulses of military necessity and hu-
manitarian requirements. [note to Greenwood in Fleck (ed.) (1999)] (Otto 2012, 215–16) 
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If ‘targeteers’ were to articulate and include the principle of “humanity” that is indi-
cated in the quote above, we would see something more than the authoritative and 
pivotal meaning of legitimacy, mentioned at the beginning of this subsection, when 
questions of legitimate use of force are in play. Thus, despite the apparently heavy 
focus on taking legitimate actions in this targeting context, what the discourse of 
legitimation contains is an internal framework for regulating authority of actions. 
Ironically, this means that of all the people working with targeting, the few agents 
concerned by possible moral (humanitarian) considerations are the ones with the 
authority to make decisions about releasing or activating Rules of Engagement.  
 
This activity of ‘releasing’, ‘activating’ and/or ‘delegating’ the possibility to use 
certain Rules of Engagements can be followed by the excerpt below from my notes, 
and a transcription of a recording from a Joint Coordination Board meeting (CJSE 
17), where the Commander is briefed on several Rules of Engagement that the lower 
command requests to be released to their level:   
 
[I note that the] LEGAD shows slides on lower command’s (LCCs) requests of Rules of Engage-
ment which could allow for them to act more forcefully. After talking about some rules that al-
ready have been delegated, the LEGAD comes to rule number 425, a rule that allows BFOR mili-
tary forces to attack hostiles that have previously attacked BFOR’s own forces.  
 
 (12:30) LEGAD: "The red doesn't show very well I realise now, but basically for the next one 
which is one of the most permissive rules we have, that's the one that allows to attack a force that 
has previously at one point in time attacked [BFOR], whenever they are found at a certain point in 
time without any further attack [on BFOR]. This is a very aggressive rule. From our perspective, 
[inaudible] I do not know if the POLAD wants to add something on this particular one? But, from 
my perspective, from a legal perspective, you know, it’s fine either way [the LEGAD, standing up 
during the briefing, shifts his shoulders and holds out his arms when saying that it is “fine” from a 
legal perspective, indicating with his body language that strictly legally it is no issue, but that per-
haps there might be other concerns?]. It's really what you, how are you comfortable using this very 
aggressive rule, with the components." (13:10)  
 
[…] 
 
(13:23) ACOS J3 advises the Commander: "I think it’s better to delegate this as much as possible 
in this, in this condition I would say. So, if not having it on COM BFOR level is fine with you, Sir, 
I think we should delegate it." 
 
Chief of Staff adds: “I agree with ACOS J3, I think we should give it for this time. So, until the 
situation on Gotland settles and then we can, we can take a step back and make sure we don't esca-
late further in the situation" (13:57)    
 
They proceed to other rules and to other matters. 
 
The Commander comments in the end: (23:50) "Okay, thank you very much. I signed a couple of 
FragOs, [orders for the lower command] and, also the JPTL. And related to the ROEs I would like 
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to say that I would like to delegate as much as possible. To give freedom of movement because 
that's also related to my command and control philosophy, mission oriented command. There’s on-
ly one thing which, Chief of Staff said, that's about Gotska Sandön. I mean we don't need it, or 
they [the LCC] don't need it right now, so we can keep that one. Otherwise I will have a go for the 
rest of them." LEGAD: "Thanks" COM: "Okay? [looks at LEGAD]" LEGAD: "Yeah, understood" 
COM: "thank you". (24:30)  
 
And now the possibility to engage and pursuit previously hostile entities in the area of operations 
are delegated to the lower commands.  
 
A number of important points stand out in this exchange between expert advisers, 
senior staff members and the Commander. First, in what way is the violence made 
possible by this exchange visualised and grasped by the actors? Or, from another 
perspective, how would a political legitimation of this mission be formulated, if the 
type of violence made possible here were taken into account? This latter question is 
particularly interesting as the level of violence here delegated to the Component 
Commands is certainly very close to allowing for traditional ways of warfighting 
(which might have not been the initial idea when labelling BFOR “stabilisation 
force”).  
 
Second, of further interest for our understanding of the rules of legitimation is how 
the relations between the legal expert authority (the LEGAD/POLAD), the military 
expertise (the ACOS/COS) and the hierarchal authority (the Commander) seem to 
make the question of responsibility look like a shuckle (the metal/plastic puck) on a 
shuffleboard table. Responsibility glides between these agents as they rely on each 
other to take the responsibility their particular expertise/authority requires. It is not 
that they do not take responsibility, they certainly do, but it is different types of 
responsibilities that bounce from one actor to another. The legal adviser takes the 
responsibility for evaluating the legal concerns and the military experts take respon-
sibility for evaluating the possible productive gains of delegating the rules.  
 
Thirdly, this leaves the Commander to take the moral responsibility and to consider 
possible humanitarian effects of increasing the level of violence in the operational 
area. Which is a question not raised, as somehow it is implied that at least the politi-
cal and legal advisers should have thought of such implications. The body language 
and articulations of the LEGAD indicate that something is a bit awry: “from a legal 
perspective, you know, it’s fine either way” but… what? This leaves the Command-
er to utilise what he knows best, which naturally is military matters conceived within 
an ontology of bureaucratised labour. Hence the ‘logical’ articulation that delegation 
(no matter the issue) is good since it strikes a chord with military nomenclature on 
best practice of command and control (to delegate is central to mission oriented 
command). All within the timeframe of a 30-minutes meeting, conducted under the 
regulations and norms provided by the social rules of consensus, as discussed in the 
previous chapter.  
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One could argue that the Commander’s and his advisers ease in increasing the poten-
tial level of violence in the area of operations is connected to the situation being 
within the framework of a military exercise. Nothing ‘real’ is going to happen, so 
what does it matter if the actors treat this question in this way? Well, it matters be-
cause the practice of ‘delegating rules’, utilising process-infused understandings of 
responsibility and conceptually frame levels of violence as possible to control, pro-
vides further establishment of bureaucratised labour. The rules of legitimation are 
thus here demonstrated through the way the exercise unfolds and as such leaves a 
discursive effect on both the partakers and the onlookers. It is an effect which help 
sediment the way legitimacy and violence are connected and how these concepts are 
understood to function in military operational work.  
   
Summary – bureaucratisation and the rules of legitimation 
The intention of the Laws of Armed Conflict, as evident in the quote in the subsec-
tion above, is to mitigate human suffering whilst, at the same time, not hindering the 
‘efficiency’ of military actions. There is thus something of an internal contradiction 
built in the framework of the Laws of Armed Conflict as these two aspects of the law 
are pulling the practice in different directions. Can military violence, the ‘tool’ 
which is used for ensuring ‘efficiency’, at the same time mitigate human suffering 
caused by its use? This complexity within these laws is ‘dissolved’ by bureaucratisa-
tion. Within the ontology of bureaucratised labour, the rules of legitimation extracts 
military ‘efficiency’ out of these laws and creates a framework of meaning and 
norms that stabilises the laws as ‘tools’ of the military trade.  
 
In addition, by placing ‘the expert’ as a figure of authority in the targeting context 
an over-emphasis on efficiency and a downplay of mitigating suffering is further 
established as natural (there are no indications that this order of things is in question 
by the agents of the practice). The conclusive result is that humanitarian considera-
tions are lost. Simply put, bureaucratised labour prevails in the way the discourse of 
legitimation recreates the concept of legitimacy into a check-in-the-box-function of 
military operations. In the end, ‘efficiency’ as a concept works well with the condi-
tions of possibility on which the targeting practice rests which, in turn, helps down-
play the idea that there is suffering going on in the field of battle. This latter aspect 
is something that I will go further into in the next section, where the distance be-
tween the ‘board member’ and actions taken in the field is (among other things) 
discussed.      
 
Social Rules and Norms of the Targeting Practice: The Corpo-
rate Discourse 
In the following I will proceed with analysing the targeting practice-based on how 
its meetings are constructed and how the meetings comprise and recreate certain 
roles, rules and relations. By naming this analysis “the corporate discourse” I aim to 
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explicate the discursive and social interconnections between partaking in military 
activities in the role of a ‘board member’ and that of utilising military force. In short, 
the corporate discourse stems partly from how the agents of the practice act and 
speak when in meetings. But in addition, the discourse at hand is also based on how 
the operational staff organises meetings and names the participants of these meet-
ings. Finally, the corporate discourse captures a certain set of norms and social rules 
that are in play when ‘targeteers’ meet and discuss the process of ‘nominating’ and 
‘accepting’ sets of targets into their framework of lists.    
     
Meaning-making – how bureaucratisation of violence interconnects with 
running a company.  
 
The challenge of all military technology in the past hundred years is that it creates death while de-
stroying the experience of it. It is much easier to become desensitised, distanced from the conse-
quences of our actions. It is quite another thing to become altogether disconnected from what our 
actions mean for others. By acting without meaning we are in danger of being stripped of our mor-
al core. (Coker in Ducheine, Schmitt, and Osinga 2016, 20–21) 
 
Coker (2016) points here to how technology destroys the experience of death for 
those wielding it (the ‘targeteers’ in this case). This reification and misrecognition of 
the Other is evidently clear in the targeting practice, but what is not is that ‘tar-
geteers’ act without meaning. There are social rules and meaning-making in play 
whilst acting as a ‘targeteer’ and this creates an instable set of norms for the subject 
position ‘targeteer’ which, if left unchallenged in turn will sediment into a specific 
version of targeting-morality. Naturally, the following analysis is a small step in a 
direction that tries to unsettle such sedimentation, simply by making these norms 
and social rules discernible. 
 
In Chapters 4 the machine gun was used to elaborate on how production and other 
discourses of modernity infused narratives of early 20th century military practice. 
There I argue that this device becomes iconic for all its benefits of ‘productiveness’ 
and that the modern Swedish military practice becomes focused on its maintenance 
and usefulness, setting its deadly purpose aside. A century later, military operational 
work, and here the targeting practice specifically, is deeply invested with aspects of 
modernity that draw heavily on the discourses of production, order and bureaucracy. 
But these discourses are not specific enough to capture how ‘targeteers’ are subject-
ed to meaning-making practices by attending an endless stream of meetings. Just as 
industrial production has acquired multiple levels of governance and hierarchy, 
military violent practices are now infused with more organisational layers than was 
the case at the beginning of the 20th century. The machine gun is no longer a central 
object for those practitioners who reside in the operational level as it belongs in the 
field. In fact, operational work with military violence is now mostly confined to the 
materiality of meeting rooms, video conferences and desks filled with computer 
screens (as observed in Chapter 5). There is, at the operational level of command, a 
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lack of identification with such otherwise theoretically central military objects like 
guns, tanks, airplanes and for that matter, masses of soldiers. In close concert with 
the NATO organisation of operational level of command, spatial aspects of the daily 
work for a ‘targeteer’ are therefore open to be formed by other types of identifica-
tions. And the meaning of violence becomes, as a result of this, also open to be 
shaped into another type of bureaucratised labour than what was presented in Chap-
ters 4 and 5. Here military operational violence is transformed into a product of the 
corporate ‘board’. It is the manufactory of ‘lists’, ‘targets folders’ and of new (tar-
get) ‘nominations’ that drive this meaning-making.  
 
The picture below (pict. 5) is taken from a presentation that was held during a Joint 
Targeting Working Group meeting, CJSE 15. The ‘targeteer’ speaking (to this pic-
ture) aims to clarify how the targeting practice is connected to the Battle Rhythm and 
whilst doing so he draws heavily on corporate discourse. Partly because the present-
er articulates several central concepts belonging to the corporate world, such as 
“product” “meeting” and “nomination”, but also in the way the gathered collective 
of ‘targeteers’ is instructed to follow a certain set of procedures. Speaking the type 
of ‘Bad English’ that we who are used to working in international staffs and partici-
pating in exercises recognise well, the presenter walks us through the process of 
‘target nominations’.  
 
 
Pict. 5. Battle Rhythm review, BFOR HQ 20APR15 (taken from CJSE 15, altered 
to fit by author).         
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These ‘nominations’, the ‘targeteers’ learn, are a part of the Battle Rhythm as this 
object is presented as a process chart with an influx and outcome of products (nomi-
nations/lists). This strengthens the ‘targeteers’ affiliation of working at a corporation 
that produce goods according to a certain set of processes. Furthermore, the present-
er speaks about this “working group” as a producer of “[a] list” that will be sent to a 
board (the Joint Targeting Coordination Board) for further consideration, which 
establishes this group as one, of several, producing function(s) in the productions 
process.     
 
(08:33) "So, to be sure we're on the same page of music, we explain order battle rhythm and more 
particular if you see Monday is Dee D+33, every, every day you should have target nominations 
and you should sent those to J2 and upload to particular homepage. Not later than 9 a.m. Then af-
ter, BFOR HQ will have a pre-meeting and all your nominations are going to be discussed on the 
BFOR HQ level and made critical analysis. This is an input for Joint Targeting Working Group 
which we are making at the moment. And result of this meeting would be that we have [a] list, 
which will be input to the Joint Targeting Coordination Board. If you have any refinements, any 
comments [inaudible] after Joint Targeting Working Group, SOP [Standing Operational Proce-
dures] says that you should send them to J2 not later than nineteen hundred. […] after JTCB, 
which will be held tomorrow, we should have a product ready for BFOR Commander to be 
signed." (10:15)  (J3 SO1, RS15201400, CJSE 15) 
 
Moreover, the agents of the targeting practice are guided here towards a producing 
function by how the presenter, and the Battle Rhythm, encourage target nominations 
on a daily basis. Finally, the presenter ends his description of the work pro-
cess/Battle Rhythm by accentuating the outcome of all the collective efforts of the 
‘targeteers’: a product, ready for the commander to sign (which, in targeting terms is 
the final draft of the Joint Prioritised Target List).  Despite this being a single, short, 
excerpt from a targeting meeting (although representative for how these types of 
meetings are played out), ‘targeteers’’ understanding of the practice is formed in 
relation to process, production, PowerPoint charts, regulation, refinement, nomina-
tion and the organisation of ‘the Board’.  
 
Often depicted as the apex of the corporation, boards are a distinctive feature of the corporate 
form. Boards are often populated by directors of other corporations. While they may develop 
through mimesis inspired by interlocking directors, [note to Caswell (1984)] they can be constitut-
ed, in size, shape and composition, in a wide variety of ways. In the absence of legal prescriptions, 
codes seek to describe which categories of board designs are legitimate. (Nordberg and McNulty 
2013, 359) 
 
Although written in a completely different academic strand, Norberg & McNulty 
point to the centrality and symbolism of “the board” in the corporate discourse. The 
codes they speak of are those of providing guidelines for how boards are to be con-
stituted and how they should (principally) operate. Such similar guidelines are no-
ticeable in NATO doctrine where the different types of boards of an operational 
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headquarters are described. Below is one such description presented as it outlines a 
‘code’ for the board of the targeting practice.  
 
Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB). The JFC [Joint Forces Commander] may establish 
and task an organisation to accomplish targeting oversight functions or may delegate the responsi-
bility to a subordinate commander. The JFC may create a JTCB with representatives from the JFC 
HQ and all components of the JF [Joint Forces] and, if required, national liaison representatives. If 
the JFC so designates, a JTCB would be an integrating centre providing a high-level targeting re-
view mechanism. This should be a joint activity with representatives from the JFC and all compo-
nents of the JF and, if required, their subordinate units. Typically, the JTCB would review target 
information, develop targeting guidance, priorities, and may prepare and refine joint target lists for 
recommendation to the JFC. […] (NATO 2011, para. 0430 my alteration) 	
 
“Representatives”, “review mechanism”, “guidance”, “recommendations” and the 
task of preparing lists (and nominations) are concepts and tasks that can be found in 
corporate governance codes (e.g. Financial Reporting Council 2016). Besides 
providing ‘targeteers’ with subjectivities and objects of identification that stem from 
the corporate world, the discourse at play here also helps create norms for the func-
tion of the meetings. Such ‘best practice’ is established in the way doctrinal texts, in 
their corporate language, provide practitioners with guidelines of how the practice 
should be conducted. The meaning-making process which is fueled by the corporate 
discourse is thus one that positions ‘the board’ as the (only) way of preparing for, 
and ordering violence at the operational level. Here, corporatisation of the targeting 
practice furthers the production-inspired bureaucratisation of violence into a men-
tality of instruments that perceive violence not as a central tool in the production 
process, but as a bi-product of the targeting process. The corporate discourse thus 
encompasses meaning-making that reshapes military understanding of violence by 
the use of the process of ‘nomination’ and the processes of ‘the board’. Or in other 
words, the dynamics of nominating (targets) encompass the main point of reference 
for a ‘targeteer’s’ relation to military violence.  
 
Another meaning-making aspect of the corporate discourse is how it provides fuel to 
the notion of creating certain ‘effects’ by the use of ‘kinetic’ or ‘non-kinetic’ 
‘means’. Which is something previously discussed, and also chimes well with 
Ducheine’s (2016) definition of targeting “[…] as the application of capabilities 
(against targets) to generate effects to achieve objectives.” (Ducheine in Ducheine, 
Schmitt, and Osinga 2016, 203). In particular, this understanding of creating ‘ef-
fects’ is connected to the corporate discourse in how ‘targeteers’ learn to evaluate 
their processes in order to ‘maximise the utility’ of military means. Just as it is a 
central task for a corporate board member to critically evaluate how the company 
processes are functioning, the ‘targeteer’ is tasked with the same type of work. Here 
it is exemplified by a doctrinal instruction from US Joint Publications (2007): 
 
Targeteers work closely with operations planners to balance the available employment options 
with their expected effects. The targeteers’ recommendations should reflect an objective assess-
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ment of the most appropriate capability to create the effect required to meet the commander’s ob-
jective, no matter the source. (Joint Publication 3-60 Joint Targeting 2007, para. F-2 my alteration)  
 
Such “assessment” is not just about checking if the right ‘product’ is used for 
achieving the expected goal, but also to examine the processes of the targeting cycle 
and evaluating if business is running smoothly. Concurrently, board meetings during 
CJSE include discussions on both means and effects, as well as how the operational 
work is proceeding. In the following field note excerpt from a Joint Targeting Coor-
dination Board, ‘targeteers’ articulate and create connections between board rec-
ommendations (nominations), lists, targets, effects and assessment/evaluation (un-
derlined by me).   
 
[I note that] Target support cell rep. speaks about a target that is already valid and set for execution 
since a couple of days. It is a mobile broadcasting station that is set for "the desired effect dimin-
ish":  
 
(27:01) "And our comment is that there has been no BDA report received or evaluated. And our 
assessment is that the effect of the diminish action towards the mobile broadcasting station, is yet 
known… not known. And the BDA diminish, the BDA of the diminish action should first be col-
lected and evaluated before starting another desired effect involving any sort of kinetic action. So 
our proposition… recommendation would be, to remove it from the list… pending your decision 
Sir. (27:50) 
 
(28:01) LCC rep. makes a comment on the new nomination of this target, and that they need time 
to evaluate the effect of jamming it (which is the practical aspect of the desired effect "diminish”). 
But the rep. also explains why the target has been put on the nomination list for this meeting, thus 
answering the comment from Target Support Cell that it should be removed since it is already ap-
proved and under execution.  
 
(28:41) "Furthermore, I would like to add that, the LCC's opinion right now is that we would in the 
next cycle nominate it for, for capture or to, to, neutralise it by asking SOCC  to actually seize 
this… equipment, but that is for the next cycle. So LCC does not concur to the fact that it should 
be removed from the list. It should stay on the list with jamming and we will contin, continouly, 
continuously, evaluate the effect of the jamming. Thank you." (29:15) (CJSE 16 O27_04261500) 
 
BDA stands for Battle Damage Assessment which is a formalised form of evaluating 
the ‘effects’ of targeting. In this type of discussions, members of the board make use 
of how the targeting process is meant to be performed whilst trying to convince their 
discussant of the best way of doing things. It is clear to me that the engagement 
required to proceed with these types of discussions must be based on comprehensive 
identification with meaning that links ‘process’ with ‘evaluation’. But it is a type of 
evaluation which, adhering to the corporate discourse, strives to optimise the best 
(sales) ‘effect’ for achieving given (company) goals.  
 
Furthermore, this meaning-making creates a setting where the individual board 
member’s ability to use the ‘nomination’ process and concepts linked to ‘listology’ 
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as ‘weapons’ of persuasion is put to the test, which is something that I will return to 
in the next subsection where social relations are discussed. For now, it is enough to 
point to the ‘fact’ that the targeting practice, as evident in the above excerpt, in-
cludes agents positioning around the question of nominating, or not nominating 
targets. And in addition, the agents abide by norms where providing the most effec-
tive solution to achieve the ‘desired effects’ of the military operation are central.     
 
Provided with codes of how boards are to operate and given the guidelines of how to 
work with ‘nominating’ and ‘approving’ targets, the ‘targeteer’ subjected to the 
corporate discourse is in such provision bound by certain norms (social rules) and 
relations. The following passage will investigate these relations and rules in order to 
illuminate how bureaucratisation relates to the targeting practice. 
 
Social relations and the corporate discourse – games of persuasion and 
power 
After twenty years, I still remember my basic training and the following training as a 
squad leader in the mechanised infantry. I can, despite being away from these prac-
tices for a very long time, recreate the movements of my body using an automatic 
rifle. I can move (perhaps with slightly less stamina) like a soldier in combat, and I 
can order other soldiers to move in specific tactical patterns. These engraved func-
tions of my being are typical aspects of having your body disciplined by military 
practice, as shown in several other studies (e.g. Samimian-Darash 2013). Moreover, 
I bear with me feelings of comradeship, teamwork and the externally focused feeling 
of competition (against other squads, platoons or companies) as central to my life as 
a soldier. I still feel much of the joy of being part of a team, and I have therefore 
tried to guide my service as a staff officer (in retrospective, quite unreflexively) to 
the work of planning groups. But such socially connected provisions of military 
training and life as a soldier change when some social settings are abandoned and 
replaced by others. The social world of the ‘targeteer’ is different from such plan-
ning groups, as you in the latter, but not in the former, can find some remnants of the 
social relations of the mechanised infantry squad. It occurs to me when trying to 
analyse my observation of the targeting practice that my distance from it, and my 
initial feeling of being mystified by it, lies not only in the fact that ‘targeteers’ share 
a different language. They also have a different set of social relations, rules and 
norms guiding their work compared to what I am familiar with as a ‘staff officer’ 
working with operational planning. What this indicates is that not even such a small 
unit as an operational staff can be said to be homogeneous in its internal social 
world.  
 
As shown in the discussion above on the social rules of legitimation, ‘targeteers’ are 
prone to guiding their work into the format of expert recommendations, either from 
the ‘targeteer’ him/herself, or in relation to agents of authorised knowledge (such as 
the legal adviser). In contrast, a ‘staff officer’ working with operational planning 
often creates and presents team-based solutions to military problems. Thus, we have 
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here a social setting where the military officer distances him/herself from ‘the team’ 
as a unit of social reference, to a setting where relations are based on individuals and 
personal expertise.        
 
In what way is this aspect of the internal life world of the operational staff related to 
the corporate discourse? Well, firstly, the individualisation which is a part of the 
‘targeteers’ daily life at the staff bears with it a particular relation with working in 
the format of ‘the board’. Although ‘targeteers’ who are organised in the section 
Joint Fires (in J3) have this as their primary group of belonging, ‘the board’ (and the 
target nominations) is what drives their work. In contrast to a planning team, which 
is to a large extent driven by the internal dynamics of the group, the ‘targeteer’ 
works in a corporate inspired setting that puts emphasis on the singular performance 
of the ‘board member’. Secondly, as a consequence of this singular performance, the 
‘targeteer’s’ social context is one where the individual agent is much more exposed 
to relations of persuasion and power, than what is the case with a member of a team 
(where in the latter case, team members are to some extent protected by the unity 
and group performance of the team). Simply put, the targeting boards that I have 
observed have been imbued with a clear social distance between the partakers.35 
Perceptions of individual accuracy and professionalism are what is at stake for the 
active members of the board, and articulations are often made in wordings and tones 
that insinuate the other board members’ inferior knowledge of the targeting process-
es. On occasion, even officers who are positioned in the exercises as mentors for 
aspiring ‘targeteers’ come off as patronising when providing feedback regarding the 
performance of the ‘members of the board’ (e.g. CJSE 15_181400, CJSE 16 
O09_042113:55).  
 
My first thought, which I quickly scrapped, was that this ‘coldness’ of the working 
climate for the ‘targeteers’ was connected to the grim realities of their practice, i.e. 
the amount of violence it projects. As it turns out, the “grim realities” of the target-
ing practice have very little to do with the physical and psychological violence that 
airstrikes, drone attacks or other types of targeting related ‘activities’ produce. The 
reality of the ‘targeteer’, as elucidated in the context description above, is instead 
one created when the ‘targeteer’ identifies, and forms his/her subjectivity, in rela-
tions to the activities of ‘listology’ and the meetings of the Battle Rhythm. When it 
comes to the agent’s identification with lists and the process of shaping the subject 
‘Targeteer’, listology delimits the subject’s conception of what the ‘reality’ of mili-
tary use of force is. In fact, listology includes subjectivities that construct a version 
of use of military force where ‘the world’ is written up by the content of the lists of 
the targeting practice. From my observations, I can conclude that the cold climate of 
the targeting boards stems partly from how the practice is formed by its process-
                                                             
35 This differs from other functions within the exercises’ operational staffs and has very little to do with the exercise 
putting together strangers in working groups. Both my own experience as a partaker of new teams in the exercise, and 
my observations of other parts of the operational staff point in the direction of this peculiarity of the ‘targeteers’ social 
context. Which leads to the conclusion that it is the context of the targeting practice itself that shapes these differences in 
social relations.    
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induced complexity and particular ‘list-related’ language, and partly by how the 
meetings are organised to mimic corporate boards. One of these aspects would not 
be enough for shaping the relations in this individual, competitive, direction. For 
instance, other parts of the operational practice utilise the system of a board and I 
have not experienced the same type of games of relations while observing those 
types of meetings. It is thus when ‘listology’ meets ‘the board’ that the atmosphere 
alters and fear of being exposed as a ‘uninformed targeteer’ is activated as a factor in 
how the agents relate to each other.     
 
Due to the risk of being exposed to critique for failing with ‘nominations’ of targets, 
and by being in a subordinate position towards the experts and positions of power in 
the board (chairman, Co-chair), agents in contact with the targeting practice must 
establish identifications with new objects of knowledge. During board meetings, 
expert knowledge related to legal framework/Rules of Engagement together with 
expert knowledge of the targeting process clash, oddly enough, with traditional 
fields of military knowledge, such as technology and tactics. The following ex-
change took place during a Joint Targeting Coordination Board (2016) and it eluci-
date how ‘targeteers’ need to relate to knowledge. The corporate discourse brings 
with it a normative framework that enhances ‘processes of nomination’ and ‘legality 
of actions’ as central objects of knowledge, and reduces (counter intuitively) tactical 
prowess. Allow me to quote at length, in order to illustrate how a ‘targeteer’ in be-
coming is disciplined by the use of targeting-process related knowledge: 
 
[I note that] The target support cell speaks about how targets nominated by the MCC are incorrect 
as they (the MCC) already have the mandate to handle the targets on their own. And the legal ad-
viser points to flaws in how the nominations are prepared concerning appropriate choice of rules of 
engagement:  
 
(17:20) Target Support Cell: "Yes Sir, I would like to… eh take in target two two three nine 
[2239] as well as two seven seven four [2774], their both Neustrashimy-class war ships. And our 
comment is Annex E to OPLAN CJSE 16 dated the 17th of January treats the rules of engagement 
including hostile intent, hostile act and when to fire. And our assessment is that the ROE necessary 
for escorting transport vessels to Gotland are already covered in the MCC mandate, mission and 
ROE. And therefore, we recommend the board to reject! This nomination."   
 
(18:20) Joint Fires Chief [Co-chair]: "Yes, recommendation of rejecting both target ID twenty-two 
thirty-nine [2239] and target ID twenty-seven seventy-four [2774], eh legal?"  
 
(18:32) LEGAD: "I had a question. It says in the pack [target folder], sorry, about the first, the 
frigate, it says the desired effect is "monitor" and "prevent" these ships to interfere with the MCC 
operation in the vicinity of Gotland. And then it says rule four twenty-seven [427] and that is pret-
ty much the sharpest tool we have in the shed. It seem that may need a little bit more develop-
ment… I thought that that was discussed?"  
 
(19:05) Joint Fires Chief: "MCC, would you like to comment on these two targets?" 
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(19:11) MCC: "Yeah, the comment is that… why I bring them up is that if there are no threat or 
they are not acting any hostile intent, let us to have freedom of movement with all the operations 
that we are doing, we are not reacting in any way. But if they start acting hostile or we have to give 
a boarding to them… so that's why we have taken them there. And if you look at the weapon sys-
tems on those ships so every CC would be a little bit worried. If they are there in… our way when 
we are moving our troops."   
 
(19:55) LEGAD: "Yeah I know, I accept that, but the reason for my question was that when we 
had the work group it said use of minimum force if needed to protect our own operation. Sorry this 
is my note, but… then I see four twenty-seven [427] which is a very different type of situation. So, 
that's the point of my question, but I understand what you mean […]"   
 
POLAD also questions the need for the nomination of the suggested targets and thereby supports 
the critique from Target Support Cell and the LEGAD. 
 
Here I note that the Co-chair lets the legal adviser comment on the relation between 
rules of engagement and the function of the Joint Prioritised Target List. The legal 
adviser 'educates' us on how he sees the relation between these two objects of the 
practice. While doing this, he takes support from a thick pack of documents lying on 
the table in front of him, from which he reads out loud parts of how the targeting 
process is to be conducted. His point is that MCC's request has no function that 
makes it necessary for being on the list. They can just use self-defence if the war-
ships interfere with the sea-based troop reinforcement to the island of Gotland. This 
is ‘correct’ in legal terms and in line with what the targeting processes tells us about 
how the targeting function is to work. The discussion proceeds: 
 
[I note that] The MCC answers that they need help from the ACC to protect them from these ships, 
due to the capabilities of the warships weapon systems (the potential enemy ships can fire at the 
convoy from a very long range). And that such support from the air force must be planned ahead in 
order to be functional. The MCC sees that the ACC has "assets in the list" which can help them 
with this. à this is a request that is based on a tactical evaluation of the situation. 
 
(24:53) DCOS J3 [Chairman of the board]: "So, so if I understand you [MCC] correctly, you want 
that on the JPTL just because if they are entering the military exclusive zone you want help from 
the ACC? If that's correct? Ehm, I think that should not be on the JPTL, cause then we'd had to put 
every aircraft that the [inaudible] has on the JPTL. So, therefore it has to be a coordination if 
things like that happens. That's what, its what we're having this organisation for, to cord, the joint 
cord… the joint level to coordinate if things like that happens.  Ehm, so … yes. So, I, I can't see 
really purpose of having it on the JPTL. You understand? my thoughts?"  
 
(25:50) MCC: "It’s your call, Sir"  
 
Some sighs, and one small laugh is heard among the board members.  
 
[a short silent pause occurs] Then Joint Fires Chief sums the discussion up by saying (26:17) "… 
target ID twenty-two thirty-nine [2239]and target ID twenty-seven seventy-four [2774], will be 
removed from this list, Sir?   
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(26:27) DCOS J3: "Yes, they will be removed!" 
(CJSE 16 O27_04261500) 
 
The MCC representative, faced with critique from the key players on the board (the 
legal and political advisers, the expert ‘targeteers’ and the chairman), submits to the 
knowledge claim these agents make regarding the nominated targets. The sighs, and 
one small laugh, that I notice (also audible in the recording) when this happens are 
clearly directed towards the MCC representative’s inability to comprehend the func-
tion of the Joint Prioritised Targeting List. In this excerpt, a ‘targeteer’ in becoming 
(the MCC rep.) is socialised into the position of ‘targeteer’ by being taught which 
objects of knowledge matter when working in the targeting practice. As such, ‘tar-
geteers’ learn to understand the Rules of Engagement as ‘tools’ that are to be in tune 
with ‘effects’ and, in addition, that the targeting practice is centralised on the manu-
facturing of correct lists according to processes found in manuals.  
 
Moreover, this socialisation subjects the ‘targeteer’ to new sets of norms that reside 
in the corporate discourse (and of legitimation) by how subjectivity is realigned 
towards process knowledge and ‘listology’. In other words, such central objects of 
knowledge like tactics and weapon capabilities are to some extent downplayed and 
removed to the periphery of how the ‘targeteer’ identifies with his/her practice. It is 
not that these things no longer matter (they are still needed to be able to prepare 
‘target folders’ for instance) but the socialisation that takes place within the frame-
work of the corporate discourse destabilises the secure ground held by these tradi-
tional military objects of knowledge. Argumentation from a tactical/technical tradi-
tional military discourse simply does not work as well as arguments sprung from the 
process-related discourse of the targeting practice. To become a ‘targeteer’ is thus to 
learn how to talk in terms of ‘operational effect’ and process-effectiveness, as well 
as learn how to use Rules of Engagement as a base for arguments.   
 
Summary – the corporate discourse and bureaucratisation 
Having the corporate discourse providing its specific version of production-based 
norms and social rules into violent military practice, bureaucratised understandings 
of violence move into new territory. The bureaucratised labour of the 20th century, 
where violent practices were moulded into the shape of a factory production line, is 
by the corporate discourse transformed to reside in process charts and ‘effect-based’ 
thinking. Furthermore, by introducing military personnel to the boardroom and its 
inherent corporate social rules, the classical team-based approach to the production 
of violence is replaced by a focus on acts of persuasion between individual experts. 
Doctrine, manuals and rules are placed even more in the centre of using violence 
which furthers the agents’ distance to an already peripheral understanding of vio-
lence as something that actually inflicts pain and suffering on human subjects. Focus 
lies instead on establishing oneself as an unthreatened expert within the board whose 
‘nominations’ of targets are accepted into the order of lists on a daily basis.          
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6.5  Conclusions – The Construction of a ‘Target’ (and bu-
reaucratised violence)  
 
“We don’t talk about non-kinetic or kinetic, we talk about Joint effect” (CJSE 16, 04261030)           
 
‘Efficiency’ and ‘precision’, these are concepts that form the base for how opera-
tional military violence has evolved into a contemporary targeting practice. During 
my investigations, I cannot find any agent, event or articulation that questions this 
‘fact’. But there are moments when some of the targeting practice’s (foreseeable) 
effect-infused take on military violence is disrupted, as when a legal adviser asks the 
‘targeteers’ at a targeting working group “How do we downgrade a person’s func-
tion? Kneecaps? (participants giggle) Or detain? It's ok to use these kinds of words 
as long we all know what it means” (CJSE 16 O10_04211500).36 That there is a 
‘giggle-reaction’ to this question/comment relates to how the legal adviser connects 
the effect ‘neutralise’ with shooting a person (the target) in his/her knees, thereby 
physically ‘neutralising’ the person’s ability to move. It might seem utterly harsh to 
joke about such things, but for me this actually is a relief in this otherwise uncondi-
tionally formal practice. Humour has an ability to release some of the grip that bu-
reaucratisation has on military understandings of violence, as elucidated in Chapter 
4 and 5, even if it is achieved in a macabre way.  
 
Nevertheless, rare as these moments are, ethnographical investigations of operation-
al targeting are something that put the researcher in an individualised and process-
saturated environment. To learn the transformative language of the ‘targeteers’ I 
have been forced to examine and re-examine recordings of meetings, read weari-
some doctrines and manuals like Standing Operational Procedures (SOPs), and, 
naturally, attend a plethora of formal and informal meetings between ‘targeteers’. 
But it is perhaps in the conversations with those ‘targeteers’ who have real-life expe-
rience of the targeting practice that I have learned the most important lesson: this is 
how it is done, aside from the participating officers’ lack of formal training in the 
targeting practice. One such interlocutor tells me that he thinks that two of the big-
gest differences from his own work with targeting in Afghanistan, is that the stu-
dents of the exercise are not formal enough during their meetings, and that normally 
there is more arguing and persuading (regarding nominations) going on in the ‘real’ 
meetings (CJSE 17, C01 251420). 
 
It seems reasonable to summarise this chapter by letting ‘target ID 6002’ re-emerge. 
What have I witnessed and learned as this ‘target’, this ‘object’ and artefact of mili-
tary bureaucratised labour, is created and processed in the lists and meeting of the 
targeting practice? First of all, the targeting practice is despite its complex web of 
prohibitions, rules and red colours very efficient in depriving the subject of any 
other content than its possible use for military gain. The discourse of legitimation 
                                                             
36 This relates to a target nomination where a target has been nominated with the effect ”neutralised”.  
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deprives the humanitarian aspects of the Laws of Armed Conflict in the way the 
practitioners make use of the Rules of Engagement, which makes room to use the 
rules as permissively as possible. Kristina’s first step in becoming an ‘object’ of 
military efficiency lies in her ability to fit the mould for ‘target category 22’ (irregu-
lar forces), which automatically validates her as applicable for the rules that allow 
for ‘kinetic means’. Kristina cannot escape from the power inherent to the initial 
placement of her in the list of targets as the targeting practice’s step upon step of 
categorisation and filling out of columns, applications of ‘effect’ and ‘means’, and 
through the targeteers discussions, only further her position as as a viable ‘target’. 
As legitimation is understood as pivotal (gives a go, or no-go) and also as imbued 
with regulating (expert and hierarchical) authority, there is no further need to discuss 
her ‘validity’ as a target. Only the most efficient and productive way of utilising this 
formal ‘go’ is left for debate.  
 
Secondly, the responsibility for approving Kristina’s status as a ‘target’ lies with the 
Commander. But the presentation and ‘packing’ of ‘target ID 6002’ presumes that 
all legal, political, cultural and gender-related issues have been considered before the 
‘target’ comes to his/her attention. When the list of targets is presented for approval, 
it is in the final stage of being finalised under the norms and rules provided by the 
social relations of consensus, and this means that voicing critique during the deci-
sion meeting is left to the Commander. Adding the social rules of legitimation, with 
its inherent slippery way of creating different types of responsibilities (e.g. strictly 
legal), to the act of approval, removes the possible support this single authority 
could have in terms of thinking outside of frames provided by bureaucratised labour. 
The result is that ‘target ID 6002’, by the means of how ‘it’ has been constructed 
within the targeting practice, no longer is an entity suitable for humanitarian con-
cerns. The bureaucratised labour has thoroughly removed the tension in the Laws of 
Armed Conflict between mitigating human suffering and achieving military ‘effi-
ciency’, and removed the possibility for the actors to perceive this tension as put in 
effect by approving the nomination of Kristina.   
 
Thirdly, the fact that the ‘targeteer’ is an actor working within the format of the 
‘board’ brings with it norms and relations that equal military professionalism with 
individual proficiency in using ‘target nomination’ processes, and the Rules of En-
gagement, as topics for arguments. The corporate discourse provides ‘targeteers’ 
with opportunities to exchange punches made out of process-knowledge, and with 
the satisfaction of getting nominations accepted into the networks of lists. Further-
more, it sediments the actors’ understanding of responsibility as belonging to expert 
knowledge and higher authority. In this quite homogenised discourse, there is no 
space for voicing concerns regarding non-productive issues such as if the violence 
used really is proportionate. Perhaps even more interesting, there is little that indi-
cates that actors who are formed by this corporate discourse, actually think of the 
outcome of their work in terms of violence. In the language used by the ‘targeteers’, 
words exists in order to escape the outcome of the practice, and instead of talking 
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about violence, they talk about “desired effects” (Kristina was connected to “detain, 
exploit and disrupt”), “means” and “decisive conditions”.                  
 
In the end, Kristina has become an ‘object’ of military bureaucratised labour. Not a 
human, in other words, but reified as a ‘target’. This is what Judith Butler would 
have called being placed on the outside of the frames of war, where the existence of 
human life no longer is possible to recognise or even apprehend (Butler 2010). But 
what is a fascinating and certainly also a fragile aspect of the targeting practice and 
its ultimate use of bureaucratised violence, is that it kills, through the subjectivities 
of listology, the possibility for questioning the identification of Kristina as really 
having the ‘function’ she is supposed to have. As soon as she is in the first draft of 
the lists, the process, with its norms and social rules, ensures that she stays there. In 
fact, the desire to get ‘nominations’ accepted, and to achieve certain ‘productive 
effects’ (which the practice even has named “desired effects”) seem to hinder any 
second thought on if the initial intelligence gathering may have any flaws. This is a 
sociological expansion of what previously has been critically voiced regarding the 
function of technology in targeted killings: 
 
The fact that your weapon enables you to destroy precisely whomever you wish does not mean 
that you are more capable of making out who is and who is not a legitimate target. The precision 
of the strike has no bearing on the pertinence of the targeting in the first place. That would be tan-
tamount to saying that the guillotine, because of the precision of its blade –which, it is true, sepa-
rates the head from the trunk with remarkable precision- makes it thereby better able to distinguish 
between the guilty and the innocent. (Chamayou 2015, 143) 
 
Adding to Chamayou’s deflation of what proponents of targeting call ‘ethical war-
fare’, my investigation of the targeting practice indicates that the process-induced 
way of ‘doing’ targeting is self-propelling in a way that resists self-critical evalua-
tion of what is posed as a ‘legitimate target’. Furthermore, as several academics have 
shown in other studies, and as discussed in relation to the effects of the Battle 
Rhythm, the way the practice is instilled with a particular narrow understanding of 
the future enforces this dynamic momentum (e.g. Öberg 2016). Perhaps we here 
have the answer to the ever-emerging question (posed from outside of the military 
practice): how come they bombed a family, wedding, funeral, hospital etc. when it 
should have been clear that such action (aside from being morally questionable) 
must be counterproductive to achieving ‘a safe and secure environment’ in the mis-
sion area? Whether or not this is the case, what can be said with certainty is that 
despite the practice’s close connection to formal laws and regulations, ‘doing’ tar-
geting mitigates the existence of critical thinking in its ‘true’ meaning.  
 
Nevertheless, the repetitive aspects of the targeting practice – the meetings of the 
Battle Rhythm, the material acts of ‘listology’ – create a social setting where the 
subject ‘targeteer’ is formed by how the agents perform these repetitive acts. What 
we have witnessed in this chapter is thus an account of how a subject position is 
constructed by that which Butler calls performativity: “[…] that reiterative power of 
discourse to produce the phenomena that it regulates and constrains.” (Butler 1993, 
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2). The ironic part of the targeting practice is thus that not ‘only’ are humanitarian 
subjectivities removed from the ‘target’ created by the practice, they are also re-
moved from the acting ‘targeteer’. In the next chapter I will proceed to discuss what 
these ‘findings’ mean in terms of the overall question of how violence and death are 
managed, neutralised or silenced in operational work. 
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7 
Chapter 7: Conclusions and Con-
tributions 
 
How is the inescapable presence of death and violence managed, neutralised or 
silenced in military practice? This question has, as discussed in Chapter 2, in more 
recent scholarship been answered by directing our attention towards a bureaucratis-
ing impact of language and materiality. It is indicated by this research that military 
violence has come to take the shape of a form of bureaucratised labour, in which 
bureaucratic systems and processes reshape and objectify military relations to, and 
understandings of, violence. But this previous research has been focused on specific 
technological systems (e.g. drones) or the reification and misrecognition of the Other 
that operate at lower levels of Western military organisations. Little attention has 
been guided towards the operational work that enables and sustains the use of West-
ern military force, and this is particularly troublesome as this work is arguably the 
focal point of bureaucratisation of violence. This thesis has aimed at filling some of 
this gap in our understanding of what bureaucratised labour is, and how it operates, 
by investigating and analysing such operational work. In particular, by making a 
point that bureaucratisation is a process that is only partly constructed through the 
use of language, but also through how agents of a practice create and abide by social 
rules and norms, the thesis expands previous knowledge of how bureaucratised la-
bour operates within military discourse, so as to include sociologically related un-
derstandings of how violence is managed, neutralised or silenced in military prac-
tice.    
 
In this concluding chapter, I will summarise my findings from the ‘empirical’ chap-
ters and single out what it is in bureaucratised labour of operational work that differ-
entiates it from other empirical context that has been the focus of previous research, 
so as to clearly illustrate my contribution to our understanding of what military vio-
lence ‘is’. After this, the chapter proceeds to comprise a reflection on some possible 
ethical implication of bureaucratised labour. The chapter is then concluded with 
suggestions for further research and a brief autoethnographical reflection on military 
violence.        
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7.1  Central Conclusions from the Empirical Investigations  
 
In the following section I first summaries my historically related findings by dis-
cussing how the research context of operational work has gradually been politically 
influenced, and militarily narrated, to include a specific type of bureaucratised rela-
tion to violence and death. Then I provide a summary and concluding answer to each 
of the supporting research questions that have guided the investigations of the thesis. 
In these answers I intend to highlight the theoretical gains – what we have learned – 
regarding how bureaucratised labour operates in ways that neutralise and silence 
death and violence in military practice.  
 
Summary – the formation of bureaucratised relations to violence and death 
in Sweden, 1914-1960 
Chapter 4 outlines how political reformation of the military practice ‘paves the way’ 
for a bureaucratisation of military relations to, and understandings of violence. Part-
ly through the political balancing between the diverging normative forces inherent in 
the Swedish context of neutrality, but also through the political focus on conscrip-
tion as a way of gathering the People and making use of the collective force of so-
ciety. Due to this, the military as an institution in Swedish society was discursively 
constructed as being a non-violent, disciplinary, professional producer of military 
units. This means, on the one hand, that the politics of neutrality facilitated the use 
of narratives where military violence could be depicted as a controllable and delim-
ited product of military practice. Complementarily, conscription came to mean more 
than just filling the ranks of the military – to educate conscripts was to adhere to a 
national norm of creating a ‘rational’ and ‘productive’ place for each man. But also 
to shape and discipline young men into a masculinised protective subject who would 
understand and take responsibility for ‘his’ role as a cog in the national defence 
machinery. Since recruitment of new officers was made by a careful selection of the 
‘best’ conscripted soldiers, these norms were reinforced into the military practice as 
these new officers advanced in the ranks of the modern military.  
 
But the main take-aways from Chapter 4 comes from the analysis of military narra-
tives. Here the discourse analysis reveals that military violence is narrated through 
the use of certain themes, or discursive points of reference.  The themes used to 
elucidate the construction of bureaucratisation of death and violence in the military 
discourse offer insight into how a process of identification is made possible through 
a particular use of language. The objectifying relations to the dead and the human 
body is one such insight as it illustrates how language and images operate to under-
line a process of reification. It is an objectifying process which trivialises the dead 
and the fact that military violence actually inflicts harm to the human body. In these 
historical narratives, the body becomes a logistic item and a ‘problem’ of war which 
can be solved by issuing regulations and creating organisations (units and hierar-
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chies of responsibilities), furthering bureaucratisation as a central aspects of how 
death and violence are neutralised in military practice.  
 
In addition, the historical analysis reveals how technological language and imagery 
are set as central points of reference for how identification is made possible to oper-
ate through military discourse. Central to this operation is that technological possi-
bilities, such as what machines make possible in terms of firepower, are discursively 
constructed to take precedence over human considerations. What this means is that 
the technological aspect of the materiality of war encompasses a human-object rela-
tion which suggests that the machine (with its possibilities of use) creates a yardstick 
for military ‘rationality’. In other words, the military discourse constructs the possi-
bility for the existence of a social relation between the military agent and the materi-
ality of the practice, in which the possibilities of the machine hold the ‘normative 
higher ground’. Those subjected to this narration of military violence get gratifica-
tion from such human norms/ideals as perfection, craftsman skill and procedural 
efficiency. This underlines similar observations made by researchers investigating 
contemporary use of military drone technology (e.g. Holmqvist 2013a).  
 
Furthermore, the analysis of the military narratives conducted in Chapter 4 illumi-
nates the fact that production and education of soldiers are closely connected to 
regulation of the military practice. The discourse analysis reveals how ways of ‘ra-
tionalising’ the military practice operate by techniques of fragmentising combat 
practices and the spatial aspects of war. By fragmenting close combat, for instance, 
the military practice is bureaucratised and reformed into something similar to health 
education – death and violence are thus neutralised and silenced by how the lan-
guage and materiality of the practice rewrite violent practices with educational and 
competitive points of reference.  
 
In addition, the masculine norms found to be central for how the military narrates its 
violent practices infuse the military discourse with ways of identifications that are 
anchored in an ‘on/off’ understanding of human emotions. In particular, the military 
discourse portrays masculine norms as something that should be learned and en-
dorsed, but from a ‘clinical’ perspective where the arbitrariness, meaninglessness, 
possible fun or sadistic pleasure of violence are removed and replaced by principles 
of ‘winning’. Masculine norms thus work to enforce the ways of identification made 
possible by military narratives of violence, by endorsing and making use of the 
points of reference where military use of violence is discursively silenced or neutral-
ised.  
 
In sum, the historical chapter provides insights into how political reforms and mili-
tary discourse are interlinked in the bureaucratisation of violence, and offers a back-
ground to how the operational work that I investigate in Chapter 5 and 6 can exist as 
bureaucratised labour. The analysis reveals how processes of modernisation and 
‘rationalisation’ of a military organisation create discursive ways in which death and 
violence are neutralised and silenced in military practice. In other words, the chapter 
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offers insight into how contemporary military discourse has historically formed (in 
the context of Sweden) so as to make possible a further pervasion of the bureaucrati-
sation of violence.         
                           
Summary – what are the main subjects or points of reference in operational 
military discourse? In particular, how does military staff practice shape un-
derstandings of violence and death? 
 
In stark contrast to Carol Cohn’s (1987) investigation of the nuclear discourse, 
where technology was show to hold a central place in the management of military 
death and violence, my investigation illustrate that in operational work, main points 
of reference for the agents are drawn from discourses of bureaucratisation. The bu-
reaucratisation enclosing the operational staff practice is enforced by how hierarchy 
freezes the practice in a status of duty-related responsibility – a responsibility that 
for the agents of the practice is the embodiment of Weber’s Iron Cage. It is a type of 
duty which relates to the norm of following rules, and abiding by routines and pro-
cesses. The “value-based system of control” which I highlight in Chapter 2 as part of 
how bureaucratisation forms in contemporary organisations, is in operational staff 
work shown to exist ‘on top’ of the classical ‘rational’ and hierarchical bureaucrati-
sation that creates this duty to follow rules (Barker 1993, 434). The thesis illustrates 
how value-based discourse operates in the operational work, in the shape of the 
social rules and language of consensus, which comprise unwritten and socially 
agreed upon ways of performing in the practice. Insomuch, the formal rules of ‘ra-
tional’ bureaucracy support the hold that consensus has on the practice through their 
ability to sediment day-to-day activities. In other words, the format of ‘rational’ 
bureaucracy provides the practitioners with routines, levels of hierarchy and defined 
responsibilities, but the agents’ own socially agreed upon norms of how operational 
work should be done further entrenches a bureaucratisation of the practice.  
 
This brings about a discursive hold on the practice which puts focus on materiel 
issues and on discussions about the meaning of concepts and procedures. Meetings, 
briefings, discussions on who, what and when fill the practitioners’ days. There is 
simply no room for death and violence in this situation of a ‘double bureaucratisa-
tion’ – the hierarchical ‘rational’ bureaucracy and the self-imposed rules and norms 
of operational work mitigate the agents’ apprehension of the ‘real’ consequences of 
their work. Which is why I often had to discuss the ‘impossible’ question of why I 
chose to investigate understandings of violence at the operational level with my 
interlocutors. A majority of the practitioners felt that their work had nothing to do 
with violence. Instead, the social rules of consensus and those of order and bureau-
cracy, give practitioners a sense of meaning and place in the operational work.  
 
Violence is not seen as a practical outcome of this particular meaning and place, and 
is treated as a state of exception, originating from groups of religious fanatics or 
criminality. The ‘fact’ that violence is relational, that it is a human activity and that 
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military missions play a part in the existence of this activity is hard to fathom in this 
context. Above all else, the social rules and norms of operational staff work ensure 
that bureucratised labour prevails and sediments into a natural way of understanding 
the point of military practice: to enable a secure place of belonging for its practition-
ers and a ‘productive’ operational use of military force. My investigation and analy-
sis of operational work thus builds upon the growing attention that Critical Military 
Studies put on the sociological aspects of military practice and military relations to 
violence. What I have outlined in the thesis is a cartography of how military minds 
and bodies are shaped by the language and materiality of bureaucratisation, and it 
offers in some ways an unique insight into the inner workings of ‘real’ operational 
work. The thesis can show that the bureaucratisation of the military practice removes 
violence and death from military minds, and as such constructs a military life world 
which is similar to any other type of civilian governmental or corporate job. If it 
were not for the fact that the operational practice still ‘produces’ military violence, 
this effect of bureaucratisation would have been little to pay attention to, but as we 
know, this is not the case. I will therefore, further below, take the opportunity to 
reflect on some possible ethical problems of this bureaucratic state of affairs in the 
military relation to violence.  
 
Summary - how does reification and misrecognition of the Other exist and 
operate in the bureaucratised labour of operational staff practice and in the 
practice of targeting? 
The discursive focus provided by ‘rational’ bureaucratisation - a focus on procedures 
and formal rules, “without regard for persons” – is in the thesis revealed to be com-
plemented by the subjectivities of the operational work, both in ‘ordinary’ staff work 
and in the practice of targeting (M. Weber 2009, 215). The question of how reifica-
tion and misrecognition of the Other exist and operate in this context of bureaucra-
tised labour can be answered by two points that are closely interlinked with each 
other.  
 
Firstly, reification – to deem “the Other as a mere object or an inanimate thing” – is 
in the thesis shown to operate through the actors’ strong identification with the mate-
riality of the operational work (Lindemann 2014, 490). If the Other appears in the 
practice, it is as part of lists, templates and/or statistics. And this materiality is close-
ly integrated with how the actors of the practice are linked to each other, through a 
common bureaucratic language, which forms the boundaries for what is supposed to 
be dealt with in operational work. Hence, it becomes natural to objectify the Other, 
as both the materiality and the language of the practice offer such clear avenues of 
identification with bureaucratised discourse. But in stark contrast to the military 
discourses of the early and mid 20th century, my contemporary analyses reveal an 
almost complete disregard for the existence of the Other, except in the form of a 
productive ‘thing’. Reification is as such a part of how operational work is designed 
by NATO doctrine, and by ‘best practice’ of staff work, to be aimed at achieving 
measurable goals and to search for achieving ‘effects’. Here the operational dis-
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courses are aligned to create a simplification of conflict as a human endeavor, as 
(complex as they are) operational procedures take for granted that the dynamics of 
human conflict can be measured, weighted and ‘rationalised’ into effects. Reifica-
tion thus lies embedded in the ontological framework of operational discourse, and 
what is remarkable with this military type of work is its grip on the practitioners’ 
minds and bodies – they think and act in liaison with this ontological framework and 
reification of the Other becomes a ‘natural part’ of operational work.  
 
Secondly, the operational work described and analysed in this thesis further under-
lines the disappearance of the Other from contemporary military discourse, as dis-
cussed in Chapter 2. The misrecognition of the enemy Other, as Delori puts it “the 
blanks in the contemporary discourse”, clearly extends to also contextualising the 
buraucratised labour of operational work (Delori 2014, 525). In operational work, 
this misrecognition operates both through formalised procedures (such as allocating 
intelligence reports little time and discursive space in the practice) but also through 
how the social rules and norms of the practice establish points of reference for the 
actors which do not relate to war and violence. Previous research has illustrated that 
technology is central for how military agents reshape military violence so as to leave 
the Other aside (e.g. Cohn 1987; Delori 2014; Holmqvist 2013a). But what we learn 
from my investigations is that the material content of bureaucratised labour, such as 
targeting lists, databases and templates, have a more central place (compared to 
technology) in creating a misrecognition of the Other in the operational work. What 
this tells us is that it is not technology or administrative types of material per se that 
drive a misrecognition of the other. Instead, my complementary research indicates 
that contemporary military practice is discursively and socially inclined to construct 
its practice as being similar to civilian (bureaucratic and corporate) work, and the 
enemy Other is therefore excluded from operational work. Even a ‘violent’ practice 
such as targeting is in much empty of a relation to the enemy Other, as the materiali-
ty of listology and the discourses of legitimation and the corporation align targeting 
as a part of achieving goals and effects, not about killing and death.       
 
Summary - how does the bureaucratisation of violence relate to military 
masculinities? In particular, what values and norms come into the forefront 
in the construction of military masculinity in the context of bureaucratised 
labour in an operational staff? 
The thesis also analyses which values and norms come into the  forefront in the 
construction of military masculinity in the context of military operational bureaucra-
tised labour. And it is evident that the biggest challenge to the prevailing hegemony 
of bureaucratisation in operational work  is posed by the infusion of gender issues 
into the practice. But bureaucratisation remains on top as its close relations to the 
language of production provides a neat fit for a certain version of these gender is-
sues. After a period of adjustment and assimilation, questions of gender are under-
stood as increasing operational capability and efficiency. Insomuch, the subject 
position ‘staff officer’, or for that matter ‘civilian staff worker’, is encapsulated in 
  201 
articulations and actions that ensure that masculinity is provided meaning derived 
from discourses of productivity. Here, the infusion of gender as a normative 
‘framework’ guiding the development of military practice is actually proven to be-
come a move enforcing the productive aspect of military masculinity. In other 
words, gender creates a possibility to deem ‘traditional’ warrior ideals as unproduc-
tive, thus pushing them to the margins of military identity construction. In contrast 
to the mid 20th century discourse on military violence that I analyse in Chapter 4, 
operational discourse has left ‘traditional’ warrior norms aside. This chimes well 
with more recent research on how military masculinities develop in military practic-
es that have distance to the direct use of force (such as drone operators, see Chapter 
2). But in operational work, ideals of masculinity, connected to those norms and 
rules found in the practice to rely on the language and materiality of production, are 
enhanced. Bureaucratisation has thus been shown here to not resist political aspira-
tions of altering a military normative framework (through gender-related refor-
mations), but to be strengthened by such attempts.  
 
In simple terms, the military officer and the civilian servant working with operation-
al matters are formed into bureaucrats, more than warriors. Not a revolutionary ob-
servation in itself, but when taken into account what this does to understandings of 
violence (neutralising and silencing death and violence) this buraucratisation of the 
practitioners emerged as a problem. That is to say that analysing hegemonic mascu-
linity as closely connected to an understanding and practice of a type of military 
violence, the explicit killing of enemies, might lead the research to a dead end. What 
discourses of productivity add here is that they exemplify how the content of both 
military violence and military masculinity develop to sustain a ‘functioning’ military 
institution. So in a reciprocal move of exchanging articulations and social norms, the 
development of bureaucratised understandings of military violence feeds the devel-
opment of what type of masculinity dominates the military identity construction.  
 
What this reciprocal exchange does in terms of neutralising or silencing violence is 
that it entrenches a situation in the military where the use of force is treated as a 
dispassionate part of operational practice, and, as shown in Chapter 5, even creates a 
situation where violence is not perceptible as an ‘output’ of the practice at all. With 
no little amount of irony I conclude that the type of masculinities where feelings 
such as hate (for the Other), aggression and traditional ideas about sustaining honour 
are central, can actually facilitate a political and ethical identification of an excessive 
use of military force. What ‘hidden’ bureaucratised violence does is to mitigate such 
ethical and political critique, as the military use of force is realigned as ‘effects’ to 
achieve operational ‘goals’. The discourses of production thus create both military 
violence as ‘rational’ and ‘necessary’, but they also have the effect of depoliticising 
the use of force (and gender reforms).                             
 
My analysis of the targeting practice also addresses this reciprocal relationship be-
tween the social rules and norms of bureaucratisation, the formation of military 
violence, and the construction of types of masculinities. The NATO-inspired opera-
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tional work which legitimates the use of force in terms of Rules of Engagement and 
the social norms of ‘the corporation’ naturally construct a type of hegemonic mascu-
linity as well. But it was clear to me that the key to analysing the subject position of 
the ‘targeteer’ was to analyse how the articulations and practices of the agents pro-
vide subjectivities and acts of objectifications. The ‘targeteer’ is naturally a gen-
dered subject position but there was nothing in the practice that I found to disrupt a 
military masculinity built upon discourses of production. What this tells me is that I 
failed in my attempt to find some cognitive dissonance to the bureaucratised under-
standing of violence in the targeting practice. Instead, Chapter 6 outlines a practice 
and a subject position which stands for ‘the height of bureaucratisation’ and as such 
comprises no social rules or norms which could work against how the discourses of 
production inform military masculinities at the operational staff.  
 
Previous research on military masculinities, as discussed early on in this thesis, are 
fairly consistent in that masculinities in the military organisation work to legitima-
tise military violence. So the question here is more of engaging in how this legitima-
tion works, and in particular, how bureaucratised understandings of violence relate 
to such a process of legitimation. It is clear to me that the literature on military mas-
culinity and violence has heavily invested its analyses of the formation of masculini-
ty in such areas as preparation for boys becoming soldiers, and/or in how men are 
shaped into soldiers by the military institution. Here masculinities are seen to pre-
pare boys/men for, and eventually to sustain, the military use of violence (Higate 
and Hopton 2004; e.g. Whitworth 2004). But this literature takes a ‘leap’ in the way 
its analyses move from the subject of the soldier to a conceptual level of society, 
where in the latter masculinity is approached as in need of realigned social construc-
tions in order to end/minimise the use of military violence (Cockburn 2013; e.g. 
Enloe 2015).  
 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, there is not much research done on the higher military 
organisational levels that include analyses of where masculinities are recognised as a 
part in how these practices function. Furthermore, there has been a tendency in IR 
studies that the majority of male researchers in the field avoid the concept of mascu-
linity in their analyses of military power, which leaves the gender aspect of military 
violence aside (Carver 2014). This brings about a situation where men’s experiences 
and their subjectivities do not explicitly enter the academic field from the research 
‘position’, with some notable exceptions of course.37 Which in turn delimits both the 
recognition of gender as a driver for social conflict, but also leaves out possible 
insights and critical explanations derived from being a male researcher in a male 
dominated research environment. My analysis of the operational staff practice is in 
light of this foremost a contribution of ‘empirical’ character as it fills some small 
space in the lack of research in these two aspects: the higher organisational level of 
                                                             
37 Since much of modern research has historically been drawn up by men, the construction of how research is condition-
ed and conducted and what it comprises is ‘naturally’ formed by types of masculinities. But what I point to here is a 
situation where male researchers deliberately use the lenses provided by masculinities as an analytical approach in their 
research. 
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military practice, and the analysis of masculinities made explicit by the male (mili-
tary) researcher. In other words, my investigation allows others to peek into the 
social play of a military staff and the practice’s relations to violence, and in particu-
lar, how military minds ‘deal’ with gender issues.             
     
Summary - how are military subjects relation to violence shaped through 
the transformative language and materiality of NATO targeting lists and 
practical procedures? 
As mentioned above and as discussed in Chapter 2, technology has had a central 
place in research that invests time and effort to unravel the meaning of materiality 
and war. What my analysis of the operational work ‘targeting’ reveals is that bu-
reaucratisation of violence moves another type of materiality into the foreground. 
But more importantly, the analysis elucidates that the databases, templets and lists of 
the targeting practice are a central part of what drives the ‘production’ of violence to 
resemble something of a self-propelling practice. In the thesis, I call this complex 
web of materiality listology. This is a concept that I use to emphasise the discursive 
force intrinsic to a network of lists and the practitioners’ attempts to master these 
lists. In other words, listology provides practitioners with possible avenues of identi-
fication with list-related objects that pervade and limit a ‘targeteers’’ ontology. Lis-
tology thus stands for a specific formation of bureaucratised labour and is as such 
both part of the context and the analysis of the targeting practice. As shown in Chap-
ter 6, the lists provide meaning which allows the targeteers to fit humans and objects 
into the framework of bureaucratised labour, giving them a ‘natural’ place as ‘pro-
ductive targets’ in the striving to achieve “operational effects”. 
 
Furthermore, the attempt in Chapter 6 to disturb the neutralisation and silencing of 
violence inherent in the bureaucratised labour I met in the operational staff practice, 
by uncovering the ‘mysteries’ of the targeting practice, provides some further in-
sights into how bureaucratised labour operates. First of all, the analysis of the lan-
guage of the targeting practice shows how the discourse of targeting helps neutralise 
the possible ‘negative’ consequences of using military force to solve conflicts. The 
process of selecting, evaluating, merging-with-lists and nominating a ‘target’ pro-
vides an appearance of a bureaucratic but still judicial practice. In other words, the 
use of military violence is established by the practice as being similar to other socie-
tal juridical processes in which the professionalism of the ‘targeteer’, and the legal 
adviser, stands as a ‘guarantee’ for a correct execution (of violence). In addition, the 
neutralisation and silencing of violence, analytically identified in the investigation as 
a outcome of bureaucratised labour, has the power to portray the use of military 
violence as efficient, precise and lawful. A process similar to the creation of what 
James Der Derian (2009) calls “[…] “virtuous war.” At the heart of virtuous war is 
the technical capability and ethical imperative to threaten and, if necessary, actualise 
violence from a distance - with no or minimal casualties.” (Der Derian 2009, xxxi 
italics in original).  
 
  204 
The investigation thus provides empirical ‘evidence’ of how use of military violence 
is discursively ‘repacked’ as a ‘clean’ practice, so as to be accepted as a ‘normal’ 
part of contemporary Western liberalism. Other studies have pointed in a similar 
direction, but then with focus on tactical and/or specific use of certain technologies, 
often within the US context of warfare (e.g. Roderick 2010). What my analysis of 
targeting indicates and adds is the existence and formation of an operational bureau-
cratised labour which is dependent on the discourses and practices of other parts of 
society for its sustainment and development. The ‘cleansing’ of violence through the 
discourses of bureaucratisation, with their close connection to civilian juridical dis-
course and corporate life, work in favour to keep military operational violence in the 
background of military practice.  
 
In close connection to the theoretical implication of my analysis discussed above lies 
the ‘fact’ that the investigation reveals that the social play of the operational staff is 
realigned in the targeting practice to include close connections to the workings of 
corporate boards. The learned and embodied aspect of bureaucratised labour, enters 
here as a pertinent element of the conclusions from investigating the construction of 
the ‘targeteer’. For instance, the advisers (on legal and political implications) have 
been represented by both military and civilian personnel during my ethnographical 
investigations. But as outlined by my analysis, this has not resulted in any clear 
difference in how these advisers play their parts in the board meetings. On the con-
trary, what has been noticeable was if they were new to the role of adviser, in that 
they showed some signs of uncertainty in how to navigate the social rules of the 
meetings. What is indicated by my investigation is thus that the naturalisation of 
military violence as legally correct and politically plausible is something that these 
agents of the practice learn as they socially adjust to the targeting practice. As they 
are forced to deliver answers to questions of instrumental character, such as which 
Rules of Engagement are applicable to facilitating a correct ‘nomination’ of a ‘tar-
get’, they adjust to this bureaucratised discourse. This observation strengthens the 
theoretical conclusion from Chapter 5, which implies that the ‘correctness’ and ‘nat-
ural’ way of using military force to achieve certain productive results are something 
that cannot just be approach as a deliberate, thought through process. The discursive 
force of the social rules of bureaucratisation are thus a ‘mechanism’ in the construc-
tion of a particular type of bureaucratised labour where the use of military violence 
is shaped as ‘legitimate’. But as seen in the analysis of the practice, it is a type of 
legitimacy which is of a procedural and hierarchical character.  
 
In relation to how bureaucratised labour can be understood and analysed as some-
thing that exists undisturbed in a society where war and the use of military violence 
is something generally confined to television screens and computer games, the prac-
tice of targeting stands for a ‘truth’ about what war and military violence is. So what 
is the ‘truth’ that the ‘targeteer’ and the practice of ‘selecting, nominating and exe-
cuting targets’ produce regarding violence? What is clear from the investigation is 
the close connection between legitimacy, bureaucracy and authority when ‘tar-
geteers’ learn to ‘process’ operational violence. What this means in terms of neutral-
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ising and silencing violence is that the discursive effect, i.e. the meaning-making 
provided by these identifications, is a construction of use of military violence as 
necessary (and legitimate, as already pointed out).  
 
Furthermore, in the targeting practice there exists an ongoing objectification of hu-
mans into ‘targets’, as visualised in the chapter, which redraws the traditional 
Clausewitzian ‘war-like’ image of military practice into a spectacle of production. 
Targeting thus includes a discursive reduction of the existence of a ‘traditional’ 
clear-cut enemy in this objectification of ‘targets’. And the process of revising the 
military use of force, inherent to the targeting practice, facilitates for less disputes on 
what the practice actually does (see also; Nordin and Öberg 2015). In other words, 
there are few indications in the practice that there actually is any reciprocal ex-
change of violence ongoing in the ‘field’, which arguably contributes to sedimenting 
military practice as ‘non-violent’ and as a practice of precise deliverance of ‘pay-
loads’ (e.g. Chamayou 2015). Here, the construction of military violence as legiti-
mate and necessary indicates that bureaucratised labour works to portray military 
violence as a ‘natural’ part of the social world.  
 
 
7.2  Ethical Implications of Bureaucratisation – Hegemony of 
Bureaucratised labour and Problems of Silence and Re-
sponsibility 
 
The ethical implications of using military force in the context of bureaucratised 
labour are multifaceted, but what I aim at here in this part of the chapter is to discuss 
those ethical problems that are closely related to the way military practice is socially 
and discursively constructed. In the bureaucratised way of portraying and using 
violence there lies a compelling story about rationality and a ‘natural’ and ‘given’ 
way of understanding military force. “In what way should we do it, if not as we do it 
now?” several of my military colleagues ask during my fieldwork, when discussing 
the problems with bureaucratised labour. And I asked myself this question as well 
many times during the course of research until I finally understood that the problem-
atic aspects of bureaucratisation were not intrinsic to ‘the way’ military force is 
prepared and used. The pressing ethical problems are instead connected to the ‘fact’ 
that bureaucratised ways of understanding and practicing military force holds a place 
of hegemony in the military. As touched upon elsewhere, in this thesis hegemony is 
a concept which points to a domination of a certain type of articulations and mean-
ing-making within a discursive structure. But it is not a mere numeric domination of 
particular words or acts that hegemony points to. Here, as elsewhere in poststructur-
al discourse theory, hegemony is illustarted by how social relations operates within 
the military practice (Laclau and Mouffe are following the developments made by 
Gramsci in this respect, see Laclau & Mouffe 1985, pp.56–61, 79). In other words, 
hegemony indicates those aspects of discourse (language/practice) that unite ideas 
and practice into a seemingly ‘natural’ whole (see also; Gramsci 2003, 333–34). 
And it is precisely the status of ‘naturalness’, existent in both language and the so-
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cial relations of a practice, that hegemony can be identified and used to initiate a 
critique. As such, in line with Laclau’s and Mouffe’s view on hegemony, bureaucra-
tised labour comprises a hegemonic ontology for how military violence can be por-
trayed and understood. 
 
The frustration felt, for me and my military colleagues, while posing the question of 
‘how should we work with, and think about, violence if not as bureaucratised la-
bour?’ indicates that there thus exists a hegemonic relationship between bureaucra-
tising discourse and military practice, as we who pose the question/feel the frustra-
tion, do so from ‘inside’ of the practice. Hegemony is as such not just a question of 
discourse shaping the ways of a practice as ‘natural’, but it is also, in its relational 
character, a concept which points to the construction of subject positions within the 
practice (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 101–8). Even if the frustration regarding the 
question of ‘how’ might seem out of place here, what my ‘empirical’ chapters eluci-
dates is how the military operational practice, with its agents, is constructed as bu-
reaucratised labour. And this bureaucratisation is shown to stand undisputed and as 
central in how the relations of the practice are outlined, thus ‘revealing’ the hege-
monic status of bureaucratisation in operational work. The following two subsec-
tions discuss the ethical problems of identifications and subjectivities closely related 
to this domination of bureaucratised labour. These sections are not in place to imply 
a practical change to the military practice (and as such answering the question of 
‘how’), but to facilitate a theoretical position from where the hegemony of bureau-
cratisation can be challenged. As such, the subsections below reflect upon the wider 
question: what does the (in the thesis) identified close dependence on bureaucratic 
language and materiality tell us about what ethical problems the use of military 
violence posits in operational work?       
 
Silence – who speaks about using violence and illustrates its ‘effects’ in the 
hegemony of bureaucratised labour? 
[…] nothing can function as a mechanism of power if it is not deployed according to procedures, 
instruments, means and objectives which can be validated in more or less coherent systems of 
knowledge. (Foucault 2007, 61) 
 
When contemplating the question of ‘who speaks’ about violence in a discourse of 
bureaucratised labour, my initial thought was ‘no one’. But that answer would, be-
sides being typically militarily short and assured, pose a problematic position of 
disavowing my research endeavour as it implies a complete silence regarding mili-
tary violence. As pointed out in the quote above by Foucault, military violence can-
not exist without the ‘procedures, instruments, means and objectives’ of the military 
practice. Meaning that the hegemony of bureaucratisation ‘must’ be in place in the 
practice, for it provides a ‘truth’ about what military violence is, and what it means 
to use military force. But from an ethical perspective, the keyword here is ‘power’. 
And by power I here mean both the possibility to prescribe the ontological and the 
ontic status of military violence. 
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What bureaucratised labour does is to establish a normality in operational work 
where, as previously discussed, violence is reduced to a product or is left aside alto-
gether. Here the canon of Western violence exists in a status of ‘normality’ through 
the mundane routines of political and military practices. This positions the use of 
force in a fragile but still relatively undisputed position as normatively ‘good’. I 
have not encountered anything that suggests that this position should be in motion 
due to Swedish operational work turning to a national focus (as compared to interna-
tional missions). And as seen in Chapter 6, by the power of bureaucratised hegemo-
ny even the enemy ‘Other’ disappears as a ‘natural’ connotation to the use of mili-
tary violence. This means that the incarnation of military force as politics by other 
means dissolves, and the Clausewitzian ontology collapses in relation to the exist-
ence of bureaucratised labour. For the Clausewitzian dictum rests on an identifica-
tion of both violence and the enemy ‘Other’ in how it facilitates a philosophical 
connection between war and politics (see Clausewitz 1874, chap. 1).  
 
The hate, enmity and passion that Clausewitz’s instrumentalisation of violence 
(where he portrays violence as a political means) depends on, is not recognisable in 
the contemporary bureaucratised depiction and practice of military violence. Instead 
the ‘faceless’ bureaucrat is passionlessly applying military force in the precisely 
right amount of doses needed to achieve the operational ‘effects’. What this tells me 
is that the critique of Clausewitz’s concept of ‘absolute war’ as instigating war is 
much less relevant for discussing military violence corresponding to the operational 
context. In a similar vein, others have searched for more relevant positions for an 
ethical critique of the de-politicising of war and Western military violence by the 
power of articulating it as something else than use of violence, and found it through 
the critique of the ‘Liberal Way of War’ (e.g. Dillon and Reid 2009).  
 
The removal of the enemy ‘Other’ becomes particularly relevant as a part of this 
critique, or as in the words of Brad Evans “Unlike Clausewitzean confrontations, 
which at least provided the strategic comforts of clear demarcations (them/us, 
war/peace, citizen/soldier, and so on), these [Liberal] wars no longer benefit from 
the possibility of scoring outright victory, retreating, or achieving a lasting negotiat-
ed peace by means of political compromise. Indeed, deprived of the prospect of 
defining enmity in advance, war itself becomes just as complex, dynamic, adaptive 
and radically interconnected as the world of which it is part.” (Evans 2010, 422). 
This is something that I could show in the way the targeting practice is outlined. For 
instance, how it is driven by a continuously production of ‘nominations’ and ‘tar-
gets’ which are ‘objects’ of a process without an end that has meaning outside of the 
corporate discourse. The ‘end’ is in itself the production of targets, and the sustain-
ment of the operational practice.   
 
This is to say that by elucidating the workings of bureaucratised labour, and its rela-
tion to a neutralising and silencing of violence, I can offer some new insights into 
how the ‘Liberal Way of War’ is constructed in Western societies where, unlike the 
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US and British context, war is far from the public domain. This is important from an 
ethical perspective as previous critique of the way Western nations use force in the 
name of Liberalism has had a point of origin foremost in US and British militarism 
(Amoore 2009; Evans 2011; e.g. D. Gregory 2011a; O’Malley 2010). From my 
point of view, the early literature on the ethical implications of the ‘Western Way of 
War’ also bears with it a problem of anchoring the ethical critique in an ‘empirical’ 
context of violence. Especially in the way this academic discourse focuses on the 
term ‘security’ in their critique (see Browning and McDonald 2013 for a discussion 
on the “weakness” of the security concept; also: Eastwood 2018). In other words, as 
rewarding as it may be for other research purposes, utilising ‘security’ when discuss-
ing the ethical implications of bureaucratisation of violence provides little which is 
new to the debate on the ‘Liberal Way of War’.  
 
As a complement to the broader concept of ‘security’, and as the recent rise of inter-
est in Critical Military Studies implies, ethical deliberation of military violence 
might gain momentum from studying how war and violence are understood within 
the military institution. For instance, identification of legality functioning as a ‘driv-
er’ for use of military force by analysing the actual military practice and the agents 
that works with ‘effectuating’ violence, provides a research context that those sub-
jected to this practice can relate to. In other words, it seems plausible to me that to 
gain a momentum in creating a position of critical reflection regarding the use of 
force, and to instigate a possibility for subjects of the practice to speak about their 
own work in critical terms, the research needs to be recognisable for them. Similarly 
to the ethical debate regarding the use of drones, where the concept of technology is 
used foremost to ‘ground’ ethical arguments in a practical environment, ethical de-
bate on the use of force can gain by drawing together concepts such as violence and 
production (see Schwarz 2016 for more on technology, ethics and drones). The elu-
cidation of the social rules and norms of bureaucratised labour is in relation to the 
context of daily military work a way of visualising the ‘oddities’ imbued in the prac-
tice, and they provide leverage for practice-near discussions on how military force is 
initiated and sustained. As such, the social rules analysed and illustrated in this the-
sis can be used to discuss what ethical problems a language and practice which 
omits the use of force create for the military practitioners. This is to say that the 
social rules and norms of bureaucratised labour, read as a way of conceptualising a 
cartography of the operational military practice, provide practice-related concepts 
that can be used to counter the hegemony of bureaucratisation.  
 
In other words, to approach the military organisation and think that the subjects that 
inhabit the military life world are ‘lost causes’ in terms of critical normative reflec-
tions is to create ‘straw men’. If Critical Military Studies are to adhere to a norma-
tive idea where the ‘ease’ by which military violence is in use can be mitigated and 
resisted, then the research must take into consideration the possibility of ‘activating’ 
the agents of the practice’s own ethical awareness.    
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This leads me to the concluding part of this section where the question of responsi-
bility will be discussed in relation to this position of creating an ethical awareness, 
within a bureaucratised military practice.  
                   
Responsibility – where lies the responsibility for using force in the hegemo-
ny of bureaucratised labour? 
As seen in the previous chapters the military institution exists, at least in the opera-
tional context, in a discontinuity between theory (self-image) and practice (daily 
work). In particular, the military (and political) ideas of existing in separation from 
the ‘rest’ of society, and the theoretical self-image as a wielder of violence in inter-
state conflict provided by the Clausewitzian ontology, clash with the practice out-
lined in the pages of this thesis. This points to a situation where conceptually, the 
practitioners at the operational level adopt an ethical position imbued with assump-
tions about who assumes responsibility for ‘activating’ the use of force. Namely, the 
politicians or the practitioners closest to the use of force (in the ‘field’).  
 
In the first case, the idea is that the democratic process of accepting a government 
proposal for sending troops on international missions equates a responsibility for 
accepting the consequences of such decisions. The problem here is that as long as 
the practice exists in the status of bureaucratised labour, the multiple meanings of 
the violence inherent in, or potentially released by, such missions are discursively 
downplayed. Meaning that the responsibility taken by the political decision-makers 
is reduced in its span by the ‘promises’ made by the military discourse where vio-
lence is ‘effects’ or ‘products’, and the enemy ‘Other’ is removed from the broader 
picture of what the military practice is. The operational language, and/or the lan-
guage of the ‘targeteer’ work as such as a mitigation of political responsibility for 
military use of violence. Furthermore, by the meaning-making power of discourse, 
the operational bureaucratised language and its social relations, also teach the politi-
cians about the ‘how’ and ‘what’ of military practice. In contrast to the theoretical 
ideas ‘framing’ the existence of the military institution, this is a meaning-making 
process that takes leverage from common societal discourses found in corporations 
and other government institutions. The operational practice, in its bureaucratised 
representation, thus underlines on a daily basis a reduction of the responsibility 
taken by the political level by the military affiliation with other ‘non-violent’ socie-
tal practices. This is a provocative thought for many of my military colleagues, I am 
sure, but what this means is in plain words that it is the military practice itself that 
reduces the level of political responsibility taken for the use of force.  
 
When it comes to the second case of responsibility mentioned above, where the 
operational level points to the responsibility of the use of force as resting with those 
in the ‘field’, some reflections from the investigation can be of use to dislodge this 
idea. First of all, the centralisation of the use of force that is produced by the ‘target-
ing process’ includes a meaning-making process where responsibility is conceptual-
ised and embodied by ‘the Commander’. Here the ‘go or no-go’ by the Commander 
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offers an (albeit illusory) escape from the ethical burden by the soldier in the field: if 
the Commander takes the decision to accept nominations of targets, then he/she is 
implicated when things go ‘wrong’ (this is from a juridical perspective somewhat 
unclear, see: C. Gray 2008; Gunneflo 2016, 195–215). But it is foremost the sym-
bolism that this meaning-making process supports that removes the ethical burden 
from the ‘field’. Particularly in how the operational governing of force creates a 
mythological idea, or imagination, of operational violence ‘being’ a legal and bu-
reaucratic process which comprises several opportunities for setting a ‘red light’ on 
the use of force. Ethical deliberations are implied to exist in the operational targeting 
process by following procedures and listening to advisers. But as shown in the the-
sis, the regulations, lists and meetings lack such ethical reflections. This can only 
lead to the logical conclusion that the ethical burden lies not (only) with the com-
mander, or in the ‘field’, but with those who prepare, nominate and recommend 
‘targets’ (see also: Hood 2011, 31–32).       
 
In summary, this boils down to a situation where military decision-makers and their 
staffs must articulate in open deliberation the problematic situation that, on the one 
hand, the existence of military ambitions of getting acceptance for deployment, with, 
on the other hand, the ethical burden of being responsible for the violence such de-
ployment can instigate. As I cannot control my impulse to get practical, although I 
say in the beginning of this section that I would refrain from it, a policy suggestion 
is in light of this that such deliberations are noted and accounted for in discussion 
with the political level. This might lead to a greater restraint in the use of military 
force, and perhaps also mitigate the domination of the bureaucratised  language that 
otherwise is used in the military narrative of what a military mission would entail. 
But foremost, such deliberation would at least disrupt the normative ‘content’ of 
operational practice as comprising the responsibility belonging to bureaucratic pro-
duction intrinsic to the tasks of the operational staff. Meaning that articulating and 
visualising the possibilities for an escalating, messy, fun and destructive use of vio-
lence on the operational agenda might bring about a cognitive dissonance to what 
type of responsibility a practitioner at the operational military level has.   
 
7.3  Reflections and Suggestions for Further Research 
 
In Chapter 2, I briefly discuss the recent focus on a wider (sociological) concept of 
militarism in critical studies of International Relations and military masculinities. In 
this section I take the liberty to suggest some possible avenues of researching milita-
rism, that might gain from critically seeing military violence as a form of bureaucra-
tised labour. Considering the keywords here (militarism and critical) there are possi-
bilities for researchers to embrace the social workings of military-related practices 
without having to abide by an agenda of uncritical support. Or, for that matter, an 
ethical pathos of pacifism. I have, despite my deep connection to the Swedish mili-
tary, engaged in an investigation where few stones have not been turned, and I am 
convinced that such research endeavours are needed if we are to learn more about 
how we situate military use of force as ‘normal’. But critical analysis of different 
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forms of militarism are not necessarily unsupportive or supportive of military use of 
force. Critical research is from my point of view a result of questioning the argument 
that something is ‘normal’ with military practice in the first place. And it is thrilling 
and rewarding, at least for a researcher, to search for what it is that makes practices 
and their articulations and relations set in a framework of ‘just how things are’. That 
said, there is in Critical Military Studies a clear pathos of anti-militarism driving 
many of its researchers, but as pointed out by Cynthia Enloe (2015), such normative 
agenda work best in the form of a ‘sceptical curiosity’: 
 
Sceptically critical military analysts’ questioning is wider and deeper. At its most reliable, it is in-
fused with a feminist curiosity. Such analysts are interested in militaries that become dysfunction-
al, not just because those dysfunctions connote political failure, but because those dysfunctions are 
analytically interesting; they expose all the dynamics that have to be in working order for any mili-
tary to appear deceptively coherent. (Enloe 2015, 8) 
 
I adhere to Enloe’s words as they indicate that there is much to gain from being 
curious about the military, and that to use such curiosity is to dismantle an illusion 
of coherence regarding how military violence is ‘naturally’ understood and used.        
    
In my mind, I see bureaucratised labour as problematic from several perspectives, of 
which some are discussed above. Problems include identifying the use of violence, 
and engaging in ethical discussions regarding taking responsibility for its use. But 
there are aspects not touched upon as they are peripheral to my research aim, such as 
the larger impact of having a foreign policy practice which, on the one hand, sup-
ports the use of military force (even though through the discourse of the Liberal 
Way of War). And, on the other hand, speaks about peace, consensus, diplomacy 
and actively projects a general depiction of Sweden as a ‘non-violent’ nation. In 
other words, one can ask what consequences such ‘vagueness’ has for a political 
practice internally to the nation’s ability to create national incentives for working in 
either of these diverging strands. Or, what consequences such obscure behaviour has 
for Sweden’s ability to create stable relations with its neighbours. Even though such 
questions have been asked previously by other researchers, there is a difference in 
point of departure here that I would like to clarify.  
 
Strictly speaking, if research on International Relations starts in the end where con-
ditions of possibility for a socially embedded bureaucratised understanding of vio-
lence is identified and analysed, then policies of security and international politics 
may be ‘read’ in a new light. What ‘rationalities’ are given for Sweden’s diverging 
foreign policies and international activities as a way of maintaining a ‘status quo’ in 
such bureaucratised relations to violence, for example? Likewise, several internal 
practices of a state can be analysed as ways of trying to stabilise the continuous 
existence of the military institution in society, but, again, rationalised through ‘non-
military’ discourse. Practices such as the maintenance of a thriving arms industry 
with references to job security and technological development in the light of the shift 
from historical arguments of the importance of manufacturing one’s own weapons 
due to, in the Swedish context, a political policy of neutrality.  
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In addition, IR’s return to militarism, understood as a sociological phenomenon, is 
as I see it interesting as a study of how ‘the military normal’, is established on a 
level of subjects and ‘micro-practices’ in a society. In contrast to the level of politi-
cal policy, or principles of economic development, such research engages in the 
underlying conditions under which militarism lives and thrives in a society through 
constructions of particular subjectivities. But what are these subjectivities? How is 
the spatial and temporal ordering of a subject a part in creating and maintaining such 
subjectivities? In other words, is the ‘rational’ and hierarchical bureaucratisation that 
I have illustrated here operating on a wider societal level? Or, what is the role of 
legacy and the passing on of narratives and practices with military connotations in 
the maintaining of a particular type of militarism? Furthermore, in what way do 
societal developments, such as the infusion of gender equality, or an increase in 
immigration work as ‘fuel’ for sustaining or reshaping a phenomenon of militarism? 
Such questions are, for me at least, most pertinent in relation to how IR and Critical 
Military Studies are developing to embrace a more context- and practice-dependent 
strand of research regarding the workings of militarism and bureaucratised under-
standings of violence.  
 
Autoethnography is one way to ‘access’ such subjectivities but this research method 
is not available for all as it is regarded with some degree of scepticism in larger 
academic circuits, or because its requirement of an open reflective ‘posture’ of the 
researcher’s ‘Self’ in the research is too overwhelming. There are several ethical 
concerns, as discussed in Chapter 3, to consider as well. But on the other hand, very 
few research endeavours are spared ethical deliberations even if some researchers 
leave them out of their written work. In my case I have faced problems with balanc-
ing the clarity and openness of my description of the research context and the analy-
sis with possible damage such transparency could inflict to the Swedish Armed 
Forces as an institute in society, and/or to my military colleagues or myself. Au-
toethnography is in this regard a way of directing the possible ‘damage’ away from 
all these instances, as even my own openness is set in relation to a theoretical 
framework which ‘dampens’ the blow.  
 
Consider the story about “the Officer, the Child and the Tank” that initiated this 
thesis. The narrative reflects two different avenues of disruptions from the homoge-
nising effect of bureaucratised discourse. Firstly it describes a disruption where my 
daughter’s reaction makes me aware of that there is something in my own relation to 
the use of force that has normalised and delimited my understanding of military 
violence. But in a second move, the story reinterprets this disruptive event in relation 
to my encounter with a child (a baby boy in a tram) during my ethnographical inves-
tigation of the operational staff. Even though these two events are separated in time 
(8 years between the different events), and by completely different contexts of work 
(the military and the academic), they can be used to theoretically illustrate how 
something in the military discourse delimits ‘the meaning’ of violence. In other 
words, the use of autoethnographical accounts are limited in the thesis to such con-
  213 
tent where my own experiences and narratives mean something for the development 
of the analysis. Furthermore, Poststructural Discourse Theory enables the analysis to 
move between the positions of subjectivity that these reflections create, and to let 
LtCol Malm speak about ‘his’ bureaucratisation and masculinity without collapsing 
the analysis of the practice. In sum, personal narratives can offer avenues for new 
research endeavours and open up for further investigations into how military vio-
lence is managed, neutralised or silenced in our society. And this is precisely what 
will conclude this thesis. 
 
‘I’ reflect on ‘moments’ of naturalisation of violence:       
 
Bunker archaeology light  
Me and my friend are exploring the long beach line not far from my parents’ farm. Although we’re only 
ten or eleven years of age, we roam freely and are only governed by the clock that our stomachs direct, 
planning to turn back ‘in time’ for evening supper. The beach is riddled with garbage, everything from 
empty shampoo bottles to tyres and the occasionally refrigerator. We look for stuff to play with, or to 
break, and our walk slowly take us to a place where the concrete bunker lies. It is supposed to be locked 
(we think) but the lock is gone and the rusty door is stuck in a partially open position. No match for two 
small boys to pass through. Inside we look for traces of weapons and we find some empty shells from 
small arms fire. Joy! Such things are the hard currency of exciting projects, such as building small 
‘bombs’ out of crackers. We know from other explorations that the coastline of our island is riddled with 
these bunkers, and they disrupt the shoreline with their ugly faces of crumbling concrete and narrow slits 
for eyes. But for us, they are cool containers (both conceptually and literally) where you can fantasise 
and play defender and attacker. 
 
/./ 
“Keep it tight to your shoulder” 
It is the early traditional spring break where Swedish kids are encouraged to try different sports. We have 
been given a paper from our school outlining the different activities that are open for us to try. Bowling, 
horseback riding, and yes, shooting is among the things offered during the one week long break. Nor-
mally it is the type of shooting with rifle airguns but I tried that before and I think that’s boring. The 
airguns are large, clunky and really not that cool. But this year something else has been pointed out by 
my friends at school. The Swedish Federation for Voluntary Defence, Education and Training is arran-
ging an opportunity for us to try and shoot with their 6,5 mm Mauser (.26 caliber). And so it is. When in 
place at the crude shooting range the old man acting as instructor tells me about the weapon and how to 
use it. “Keep it tight to your shoulder or else it will bruise you with the impact of the recoil.” And he 
chuckles. The next day I check my shoulder and it’s fine, it only feels a little tender. Apparently I had 
some skills at this but I actually found the shooting range quite boring. So I choose to not take it up on a 
permanent basis. I am twelve at the time. 
 
/./  
“No Rambodian tendencies!” 
I am sitting at the first gathering of my newly formed officer class. The major speaking is addressing us 
with the usual welcomes and telling us that we are selected from a large body of applicants and that the 
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screening process has been thorough, and what not. But what makes me react is when he says “But I will 
not tolerate any Rambodian tendencies!”. Referring to the fictional character Rambo the major is telling 
us that the officer course is not a place for those who are ‘overly interested’ in weapons and the like. My 
reaction is one of surprise, because, if we have been so thoroughly vetted, who of us is the type that 
idolises such behaviour? Nah, such weapon nerds can’t be in this lot, I think and look around me. If there 
is, they will have a hard time finding a girl when we go out for the weekend. Such things shine through.   
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Appendix 1. Narratives of bureaucracy, 1900-1965, ‘Data’ 
 
2. utkast till skjutinstruktion för trupper utrustade med kulspruta M/14. - 1914 
Andra manuskript till arméreglemente. D. 3, Begrepp. - 1962 
Anvisningar för fria kriget. - 1944 
Anvisningar för trupputbildning. - 1969 - 1969 års upplaga 
Arméhandbok. D. 4, Stabstjänst, personaltjänst. - 1954 - 1954 års uppl. 
Armésoldat: soldatinstruktion för armén. allmän del. - 1957 - 1957 års uppl. 
Arméreglemente, Del 2. 1952.  
Arméreglemente: Del 1. 1950.  
Att bli befäl: armén. - 1968 - 1968 års uppl. 
Beskrivning av kulsprutegevär m/37. - 1958 
Beskrivning över kulsprutegevär m/21. - 1926 - 1926 års uppl. 
Bestämmelser för grundutbildning av värnpliktiga vid armén: allmän del. - 1970 
Befälsföring, Disciplin Och Förbandsanda. 1956. 
Donner, Edvard af. - Hjälpreda för värnpliktiga / utgifven av major Edv. af Don-
ner. - 1915 
Ett yrke för dig: upplysningar om underbefälsyrket vid armén. - 1958 
Fälttjänstreglemente: (F.R.). 1917. 
Föreskrifter för utbildning i bajonettstrid: fastställda 1921. - 1921 
Förslag till bihang 2 till tredje delen av SIe och ksp : indirekt eldgivning med ksp 
m/14 och m/14-29 (6,5 mm am m/94) m m. - 1933 - 1933 års uppl. 
Förslag till skjutinstruktion för trupper beväpnade med kulspruta m/14 : Förslag S. 
I. Kulspr : anbefallt till användning genom gen.-order d. 12 april 1920. - 1920 -
 1920 års uppl. 
Första manuskript till arméreglemente. D. 3, Begrepp. - 1961 
Handgemäng: anvisningar för utbildningen. - 1956 - 1956 års upplaga 
Hjälpreda för värnpliktiga: innehållande utdrag ur värnplikslagen med dithörande 
författningar, bl. a. beträffande värnpliktig tillförsäkrade rättigheter och förmåner 
m.m. samt förmulär till olika slag av ansökningar / utgiven av överstelöjtnant Gösta 
Drake. - 1932 - 23. uppl. 
Hjälpreda för värnpliktiga: innehållande utdrag ur värnplikslagen med dithörande 
författningar, bl. a. beträffande värnpliktig tillförsäkrade rättigheter och förmåner 
m.m. samt förmulär till olika slag av ansökningar / utgiven av överstelöjtnant Gösta 
Drake. - 1934 - 25. uppl. 
Hjälpreda för värnpliktiga: innehållande utdrag ur värnplikslagen med dithörande 
författningar, bl. a. beträffande värnpliktig tillförsäkrade rättigheter och förmåner 
m.m. samt förmulär till olika slag av ansökningar / utgiven av överstelöjtnant Gösta 
Drake. - 1940 - 31. uppl. 
Hjälpreda för värnpliktiga: innehållande utdrag ur värnplikslagen med dithörande 
författningar, bl. a. beträffande värnpliktig tillförsäkrade rättigheter och förmåner 
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m.m. samt förmulär till olika slag av ansökningar / utgiven av överstelöjtnant Gösta 
Drake. - 1941 - 32. uppl. 
Hjälpreda för värnpliktiga: innehållande utdrag ur värnplikslagen med dithörande 
författningar, bl. a. beträffande värnpliktig tillförsäkrade rättigheter och förmåner 
m.m. samt förmulär till olika slag av ansökningar / utgiven av överstelöjtnant Gösta 
Drake. - 1938 - 29. uppl. 
Holmgren, Justus. - Exempel å gruppering och ordergivning vid anfall under ställ-
ningsstrider / av Justus Holmgren. - 1918 - 1-2 uppl. 
Instruktion för ställföreträdande arméfördelningschef. - 1917 
Kulsprutesoldatinstruktion. 1923. 
Provisoriskt arméreglemente. D. 1. - 1958 - 1958 års upplaga 
Samlingspärm för taktiska anvisningar. - 1944 
Skjutinstruktion för armén: eldhandvapen och markkulsprutor. - 1971 
Skjutinstruktion för armén. 1 B, Skjutregler: Eldhandvapen,kulsprutegevär och 
markkulsprutor. - 1959 
Skjutinstruktion för armén. 1 C, Skjutregler: 9 cm pansarvärnspjäs, granatgevär, 
raketgevär och pansarskott. - 1962 
Skjutinstruktion för armén. 1 C, Skjutregler: Granatgevär, raketgevär och pansar-
skott. - 1959 
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Appendix 2. Observation scheme for the auto/ethnographical investigations 
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